A development that was a mere strategic hypothetical a few weeks ago has now become a dangerous reality on the ground. The Houthis’ rapid advance along Yemen’s western coast, in a push to seize control of Mocha, Dhubab and the island of Mayyun (or Perim) at the mouth of Bab al-Mandab, signals a qualitative shift in the nature of Yemen’s conflict—one that cannot be framed as just another battle in a protracted war.
Control of such shipping lanes confers the power to influence one of the world’s most critical arteries for trade and energy. Still more alarming are reports that this advance has taken place under the direct guidance of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This points to a new dynamic that could open an additional front in the broader U.S.-Israeli-Iranian conflict. Iran views the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab not as separate fronts, but as two poles of a single maritime battleground, through which it can exert pressure on the global economy from east and west simultaneously.
As I noted in a recent article in The National Interest, this underscores the urgent need for the U.S. to rectify a strategic error in its ongoing approach to the Red Sea and the Gulf: that of treating them as distinct theaters, each with its own military calculations, naval resources, and security priorities.
Two Theaters of War, One Strategic Equation
U.S. and the Western framing of the Red Sea crisis—primarily as an issue concerning the Houthis, Yemen and freedom of navigation—has proven increasingly costly over the years, even if it was convenient when Washington was preoccupied with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and its direct confrontation with Iran.
By contrast, Tehran and the armed factions in its orbit work according to a different vision: that of “zero strategic distance” between the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab Strait—one being a vital maritime corridor for Gulf energy exports and the other the southern gateway to the Red Sea, the Suez Canal and European markets.
The global economic significance of these two straits has become increasingly clear. Prior to the outbreak of the U.S.-Iran confrontation in February, they served as conduits for some 30% of the world’s seaborne oil. Estimates from Washington’s Energy Information Administration (EIA) indicate that, during the first half of 2025, about 20.9 million barrels per day (bpd) passed through Hormuz and 4.2 million bpd through Bab al-Mandab, out of a total global seaborne oil trade volume of roughly 79.8 million bpd over the first half of 2025.
Today, these figures have shifted dramatically. Crude flows through Hormuz dropped to approximately 4.9 million bpd in the second quarter of 2026, while the figure for Bab al-Mandab rose to about 8.1 million bpd, as the Red Sea began to serve as a partial alternative.
From Tehran’s perspective, the more difficult it becomes to navigate the Strait of Hormuz, the greater the strategic value of Bab al-Mandab. As this value rises, so does the Houthis’ importance within Iran’s regional strategy. Consequently, it is a strategic error to view the group solely within the Yemeni domestic landscape.
While their grip on Sanaa grants the Houthis domestic authority—and their control over the vital Hodeidah port provides a maritime outlet—seizing Mocha, Dhubab and Mayyun has elevated their influence to an entirely different level. It positions them as a pivotal strategic actor capable of upending the status quo by acquiring advanced weaponry and consolidating their ability to threaten one of the world’s most vital waterways—the link between the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean.
The situation on the ground does not suggest that the group could completely close Bab al-Mandab or control every vessel passing through it. That said, there are signs that the Houthis have growing capabilities to monitor maritime traffic, target ships, lay mines and launch missiles and drones, imposing significant security, insurance and economic costs on shipping—manifested in higher insurance premiums, reduced traffic, altered maritime routes and increased transportation and energy costs.
From Military Control to a Bargaining Chip
At this stage, the Houthis are not seeking geographic expansion for its own sake. Rather, they are seeking to consolidate a new reality on the ground and entrench their control in a way that allows them to enter any future negotiations regarding Yemen, the Red Sea, or Saudi Arabia from a vastly different position, and shift their scope from issues like Sanaa Airport, the vital port of Hodeidah, salaries, or economic restrictions, to encompass the security of one of the world’s most vital maritime corridors. This makes the Houthis’ calculus clear: military control generates geopolitical bargaining power that can be leveraged for political and economic gains.
This is a formula Iran itself has already tested in the Strait of Hormuz, and which has secured it the privilege of negotiating over the Gulf’s eastern gateway. Accordingly, having a powerful, armed ally overlooking the Bab al-Mandab Strait grants Tehran indirect leverage over the Gulf states’ western conduit for energy and trade. This allows for a different understanding of Iran’s role in the Houthi advance: the objective is not to officially seize control of Bab al-Mandab, raise the Iranian flag over Mayyun Island or deploy the Iranian navy off the coast of Djibouti. Instead, it suffices to have an allied force equipped with missiles, drones and naval capabilities capable of threatening maritime traffic whenever necessary.
Tehran has pursued this strategic approach for decades, consistently aiming to maximize its influence while minimizing direct costs. This has led to the emergence of a cordon of maritime pressure extending from Hormuz to Bab al-Mandab, placing much of the Gulf’s energy exports under strategic pressure at two of the world’s most vital maritime chokepoints simultaneously.
Rebuilding the Yemeni Front: The Key to a Secure Bab al-Mandab
This rapid shift in the Iranian and Houthi roles cannot alone explain the landscape in Yemen. A clearer picture requires examining the political and security realities of other influential actors: the internationally recognized Yemeni government, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), the forces led by Tariq Saleh, the Islah Party and various tribal and local factions. These groups are often motivated by conflicting priorities, agendas and interests, rather than acting within a unified political and military framework.
This deep, persistent institutional fragmentation and the multiplicity of armed power centers in Yemen grant the Houthis an added advantage and reshape questions over how to resolve the crisis. Has the group advanced because it has grown stronger, or because its opponents have become weaker and more fractured? The answer is likely a combination of both.
The days ahead will demand more than simply protecting ships on the high seas. Safeguarding navigation while leaving the coast and islands under Houthi control would likely lead to an ongoing, potentially worsening crisis. Therefore, diplomatic efforts must shift toward adopting an integrated strategy. This should prioritize rebuilding a more cohesive front against the Houthis, supporting state institutions and the internationally recognized Yemeni army, restoring a unified military command and preventing Yemen’s coast and islands from becoming permanent bases for Houthi missiles, drones and naval capabilities.
This must be accompanied by economic and security measures aimed at severing the networks used to transport Iranian weapons, technology and military components, enhancing maritime surveillance and intelligence, and protecting trade routes. Furthermore, any military progress must be linked to a political track that prevents any gains from being eroded once armed operations cease.
While the government’s military operations, airstrikes and artillery attacks against the Houthis may yield temporary results, they will not achieve their ultimate objective without a comprehensive political framework that prevents weapons from remaining in the hands of non-state actors loyal to Tehran—arms that grant them the capacity to alter regional and international dynamics.
Decision-makers and influential powers shaping the current conflict must intensify their support for the Yemeni army and help strengthen the authority of the internationally recognized government. They should do so not in order to interfere in Yemen’s internal affairs, but rather to uphold freedom of navigation in international waterways—a fundamental principle of international law and an integral component of global security—and to prevent the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait from becoming a permanent arena for the extortion of international trade and global energy corridors.
