September 5, 2026. (Photo by ATTA KENARE / AFP)

If Iran’s Center Fragments, What Future for Gulf Security?

Coming in the wake of December’s anti-government protests, Iran’s confrontation with Israel and the U.S. has posed pressing questions. Will the Islamic Republic endure or collapse? What will emerge if a collapse is accompanied by state fragmentation?

November 16, 2026
Turki Algoblan

It is possible to envision a regime change in Tehran, yet with the military and state apparatus remaining intact. Another scenario might see the central regime weakened, while a nucleus continues to coordinate security affairs. A split in the leadership and the fragmentation of control over weaponry is a third, entirely different possibility—one that could transform an internal crisis into a theater for proxy war, with repercussions for Iran’s neighbors.

Iran’s disintegration is not inevitable. More likely is a governance crisis coinciding with a fracture in the security apparatus, leaving the center unable to manage the periphery or Iran’s military installations. New actors could emerge from peripheral ethnic or regional groups; from factions within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) with control over missiles and the parallel economy; from among security commanders who transform their networks into localized power bases; or from regional proxy groups that, having lost their core support, seek alternative sources of power and funding.

Conversely, segments of the military and the civil administration might succeed in forging a national coalition able to preserve the integrity of Iran’s state institutions. Thus, protests aside, the fate of the Iranian state hinges on the domestic balance of power.

These risks are compounded by a geography that could act both as a conduit for the spread of instability and as a barrier against it. The institutions of power are concentrated in the heart of the country, but Iran’s border regions are home to various ethnic groups—many with ties to states beyond its borders.

 

Who will Decide Iran’s Future?

These cross-border communities do not necessarily have separatist agendas or unified leaderships. Iran’s fate will be determined less by the intensity of ethnic grievances than by the cohesion of its security apparatus. An intact chain of command could contain unrest and confine its impact to the periphery.

Conversely, should the apparatus fracture, certain military units might form independent power centers. A rapid collapse could catch neighboring states off guard and create a gaping power vacuum; a slower erosion may instead give smuggling networks and armed factions time to entrench their economies and establish parallel institutions. The key question would be which state institutions remain functional throughout this decline.

Were the regime to fall, it would not be the result of disintegration alone, but of what one might call the “law of constant geopolitical function.” Geography has inherent value, but leveraging it requires an authority connecting center to periphery.

The spillover across Iran’s borders could be grave: not only waves of refugees, but the fragmentation of its military capabilities. Stockpiles of missiles, drones, and naval vessels that fall into the hands of local commanders could be used in sporadic attacks on facilities and maritime corridors. Possessing such hardware does not equate to the ability to operate it over the long term, given the infrastructure required, yet while large-scale, coordinated operations may decline, limited, low-cost attacks would likely persist—sufficient to disrupt navigation and raise insurance premiums.

Yet more sensitive is the issue of Iran’s nuclear program. Who would secure Iran’s nuclear facilities, and who would have the authority to engage with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)? This makes maintaining basic state functionality a regional and international interest, despite the conflict with the current regime.

A fractured environment would also significantly complicate deterrence. A posture aimed at a single power center becomes less effective when multiple decision-making authorities emerge. The objective shifts from deterring a single adversary to a multifaceted approach: deterring vulnerable actors, protecting critical infrastructure and maritime traffic, disrupting the resources funding aggression, and reducing the overall volatility of the environment.

External powers may compete to sponsor or contain these new actors, driven by divergent interests. Ankara would focus on the Kurds and the Caucasus; Islamabad on the Baluchistan border; Moscow on the Caspian Sea and Iran’s northern transit corridors; Beijing on energy and commercial stability; and Washington on military and nuclear capabilities. It is by no means certain that all would act in unison; some may vie for influence while others may find their interests aligned in preventing collapse and safeguarding facilities and transit routes. Either way, any local actor risks becoming a tool in external rivalries. The Gulf sits on the front line of any potential friction, given its proximity to coastlines, islands, and maritime corridors—and the fact that its economy depends on their stability.

In Iraq and Yemen, this equation would play out differently. Should armed groups in Iraq lose their Iranian backer, they would not necessarily vanish. Some might integrate into the state or retreat for lack of funding, but some may sustain themselves through force of arms and parallel economies. This underscores the critical importance of the Iraqi state imposing a monopoly on weaponry: this will determine whether Baghdad remains a bulwark against such spillover or becomes its first victim.

For Yemen’s Houthis, declining Iranian support could diminish advanced capabilities, yet it might also grant greater autonomy to the forces controlling Yemen’s western coast and the eastern shore of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. The possible outcomes range from escalation to retrenchment—or an active search for alternative support or political arrangements to preserve their influence.

If the Iranian center proves resilient, the risk would lie in the potential for coordinated pressure on the straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb—or the alignment of the agendas of actors in both locations—regardless of whether they are controlled by a single operational command. State fragmentation could diminish the likelihood of an organized, simultaneous closure, yet raise the risk of chronic friction: a ship seized here, a drone launched there, and extortion elsewhere. Such low-intensity actions could nonetheless drive up shipping and insurance costs and disrupt energy markets.

 

Enhancing Gulf Resilience

The Gulf states face a dual challenge: their geographic proximity to Iran and their economic dependence on vulnerable energy corridors. Consequently, they would be the first to feel the absence of a central authority, and could not afford to ignore the consequences. This necessitates an increase in the Gulf’s resilience—the capacity of its infrastructure, transit routes, and markets to absorb shocks from decentralized sources. This includes bolstering strategic reserves, expanding export routes that bypass the Strait of Hormuz, enhancing the efficiency of ports located outside the Strait, fortifying energy, water and telecommunications facilities, and pre-emptively establishing a joint mechanism for maritime security. It also requires coordination with Oman over security in the Strait of Hormuz and the Sea of ​​Oman, as well as with Iraq over its eastern borders, alongside international cooperation to secure maritime corridors and safeguard nuclear facilities and materials.

A second pitfall to avoid is that of fostering fragmentation. Supporting certain marginalized groups may seem a low-cost form of pressure against a weakened central authority. However, such intervention also provides what remains of the regime with an opportunity to frame the internal crisis as a foreign conspiracy and an Arab-Persian or sectarian confrontation, leveraging this narrative to revive the public’s waning loyalty. The Gulf’s interest lies not in a shattered Iran, but in a cohesive Iranian state that keeps its weaponry under control, respects its borders and the sovereignty of its neighbors, and maintains a central decision-making authority that can be held accountable. This necessitates supporting a transition that preserves state institutions and prevents the proliferation of arms, while protecting the rights of peripheral groups—without militarizing these issues or turning them into bargaining chips.

Third, southern Iraq must be viewed as the Gulf’s forward defensive perimeter. Strengthening its resilience through development will offer practical benefits—provided that investments are not captured by armed networks. Initiatives such as electrical grid interconnections, energy and port projects, and the development of Basra and its surrounding areas can only serve a security function if they are integrated with state institutions, subject to revenue audits and linked to improved public services, thereby creating a local interest in border stability. As legitimate economic alternatives expand, the capacity of the “smuggling economy” to purchase loyalties and fund armed groups will diminish.

Fourth, the Mecca Agreement on Joint Defense—between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan—offers added value, providing a framework for proactive consultation over potential repercussions for the security of all three. Türkiye and Pakistan share direct borders with Kurdish and Balochi territories, while Saudi Arabia is situated within the Gulf sphere, the region most vulnerable to spillover. Consequently, Iran’s stability and territorial integrity are shared interests, as is preventing chaos and weaponry spilling across borders. This necessitates joint assessments on securing borders and transit corridors, addressing security and humanitarian issues, and discussing the security of each party from the perspectives of others.

While the Gulf states cannot dictate the future of governance in Iran, they can bolster their preparedness for various outcomes, and influence the impact these could have on their own security. A centralized Iran is an adversary with a clear decision-making core, and can be deterred. A weakened Iran presents a risk that can be contained. Yet an Iran lacking a central authority would see many actors take up arms, while none would dominate. Preparation for such a scenario begins with establishing resilient transit routes, stockpiles and infrastructure; developing early-warning systems capable of detecting institutional fractures before they reach news reports; and forging partnerships with pre-agreed protocols for crisis management. Those who fail to chart their own course before a storm arrives will inevitably find themselves on maps drawn by others.

 

 

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Middle East Council on Global Affairs.

Issue: Iran War
Country: Iran

Writer

Head of the Daymuma Center for Studies and Researches
Head of the Daymuma Center for Studies and Researches