A visitor walks past a display featuring military aviation and defense systems during the Doha International Maritime Defence Exhibition and Conference (DIMDEX 2026) at the Qatar National Convention Centre in Doha, Qatar, on January 19, 2026. (Photo by Noushad Thekkayil / NurPhoto / NurPhoto via AFP)

Reframing the Gulf Regional Security Architecture 

As regional tensions intensify, Gulf states are reconsidering their long-standing security arrangements with Washington and pushing for a relationship that better reflects their interests and strategic autonomy.

March 30, 2026
Khalid Al-Jaber

The U.S.-Israel-Iran war has reopened the question of the security relationship between the Gulf and the United States with an intensity and controversy not seen before. The debate is no longer confined to the traditional notion of a protective umbrella that guarantees the security of oil supplies in exchange for a substantial American military presence. Instead, it has evolved into a deeper and more fundamental inquiry: who ultimately holds the authority to decide matters of war and peace, and who bears the security, economic, and social costs of those decisions? At the heart of these questions lies what might be described as a new equilibrium: a security partner rather than a guardian, and an alliance based on conditions rather than the open-ended delegation that characterized the region’s security architecture for decades. 

 

From Absolute Protection to the Recognition of Structural Risks 

Since the 1970s, Gulf security has largely been built on the formula of oil in exchange for protection. This arrangement was embodied in the establishment of major U.S. military bases and an implicit commitment that any serious threat to regimes or energy routes would be met with overwhelming American force. In return, Gulf states effectively accepted a form of strategic tutelage: a broad operational space for Washington to conduct military and intelligence activities from their territory in exchange for a sense of existential security. 

Yet accumulated experience—from the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and now the current war involving Iran—has revealed another side of this arrangement. Military bases have become primary targets in the strategic calculations of the United States’ adversaries. Ports, oil terminals, desalination facilities, and even major cities have increasingly fallen within the range of potential retaliation during periods of escalation. This growing awareness does not negate the role the American security umbrella has played in preventing worse scenarios. However, it places its real costs under scrutiny: security risks from missile strikes, political repercussions from association with controversial wars, and social consequences as citizens begin to question whether their countries remain insulated from great-power conflicts. 

 

Conditional Partnership: Constraining the Ally Rather Than Breaking Away 

Against this backdrop, a growing trend is emerging in Gulf political discourse—both official and intellectual—toward what can be described as a model of conditional partnership. This approach does not seek a rupture with the United States. Rather, it attempts to redefine the rules of engagement by transforming the alliance from one that effectively grants Washington wide freedom to use regional bases and airspace into a relationship grounded in three central principles. 

The first principle is mandatory consultation rather than symbolic notification. Gulf capitals, as sovereign partners and decisive regional actors, should not be presented with a fait accompli in the final hours or days before a military strike. Instead, they should be involved early in discussions regarding objectives, escalation scenarios, retaliation risks, and exit strategies. If implemented, such consultation would transform Gulf states from mere operational platforms into political stakeholders with the capacity to object to, modify, or veto proposed actions. 

The second principle involves establishing clear red lines governing the use of bases and facilities. Among these lines is the refusal to allow Gulf territory to serve as the launching point for operations that significantly increase the likelihood that cities and vital infrastructure will become direct targets. Any offensive use of regional bases would need to be linked to tangible defensive guarantees, including strengthened air defense systems, civilian protection plans, and arrangements for reconstruction should significant damage occur. 

The third principle concerns transparency in strategic planning. During the recent conflict with Iran, even senior diplomats and security officials in allied countries reportedly found themselves outside key decision-making circles, learning about major operations through media reports rather than formal channels. Such experiences have reinforced the Gulf perception that opaque American decision-making processes can threaten their direct interests. As a result, there is a growing demand that regional security decisions not be formulated entirely outside the region and only later imposed on those who must bear their consequences. 

 

Diversifying Partners and Arms: Between Reducing Dependence and Multiplying Constraints 

A significant component of the Gulf effort to rebalance its security relationships lies in diversifying arms suppliers and strategic partnerships. Increased engagement with Europe—through defense procurement and naval and air cooperation—reflects a belief that European partners may be less inclined toward direct military adventurism and more focused on ensuring the stability of global energy flows. 

At the same time, expanding ties with China—now one of the primary consumers of Gulf energy and a rising global power—has at times been used as a bargaining tool in negotiations with Washington. The implicit message is clear: if American conditions become too restrictive, alternatives exist. 

Yet this diversification strategy raises its own dilemmas. Does expanding the circle of partners actually reduce dependency, or does it simply relocate it within a more complex framework? Introducing China, Russia, and other actors into the Gulf security equation effectively brings great-power competition directly into the region. The Gulf could shift from being a peripheral arena of global rivalries to becoming a central theater of strategic competition between Washington and Beijing, and possibly Moscow as well. In this context, the notion of balance becomes increasingly difficult to sustain: the more ropes a Gulf actor attempts to hold simultaneously, the more challenging it becomes to maintain equilibrium among them. 

 

A Difficult Balance in a Turbulent International System 

Gulf states face a difficult strategic dilemma: they cannot afford to sever ties with the United States, yet they also cannot comfortably maintain an alliance structure that exposes their security to decisions made beyond their borders. This tension is pushing them to seek a new security framework—one that strengthens their own defense capabilities, renegotiates the terms of the U.S. security umbrella, and cautiously diversifies partnerships with European, Asian, and regional actors. Ultimately, the real challenge is not simply advocating greater independence, but institutionalizing it through formal agreements and consultation mechanisms that ensure major security decisions—especially those as consequential as war with Iran—cannot occur without the substantive political involvement of the Gulf states, as the sovereign regional actors whose national interests and security architecture are most directly affected.  

 

 

 

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Middle East Council on Global Affairs.

Issue: Iran War, U.S. Foreign Policy
Country: United Arab Emirates

Writer

Executive Director
Khalid Al-Jaber is the Executive Director of the Middle East Council on Global Affairs. He is a distinguished scholar and practitioner specializing in political communication and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) affairs. Al Jaber has held prominent leadership positions, including Director of Al-Sharq Studies & Research Center and Editor-in-Chief of The Peninsula, Qatar’s leading… Continue reading Reframing the Gulf Regional Security Architecture