The historic U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation accord signed on July 22 was reached amid efforts to bolster bilateral energy cooperation and diversify the Kingdom’s energy sources, and it includes a commitment to the highest standards of nuclear safety. But it also clearly shifts the delicate balance between the demands of nuclear non-proliferation and calculations of political alliances. It was signed, moreover, in the context of escalating competition between the United States and China for political and economic influence in the Gulf.
Although the full legal text of the agreement has not yet been released, and the U.S. Congress is still reviewing its terms, information made public so far points to a notable shift in American policy. Washington appears willing to adopt a more flexible approach than the “Gold Standard” for civilian nuclear cooperation, which prohibits uranium enrichment and the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel—two technologies that could enable a state to pursue nuclear weapons development. That standard was established under a U.S. deal with the United Arab Emirates in 2009, known as the “123 Agreement.” This flexibility suggests the deal with Saudi Arabia could allow it to develop an advanced nuclear program without being required to renounce the option of uranium enrichment up front.
This shift pushes beyond mere bilateral cooperation and the exchange of technical expertise. It sets in motion a shift in the balance between nuclear powers across the entire Middle East, directly impacting the security considerations underlying Iran and Israel’s pursuit of influence, and could prompt other regional powers to demand similar arrangements.
Implications of the Agreement for Gulf States
Beyond developing the U.S.-Saudi strategic partnership, or even the regional balance of power, the deal could also trigger new dynamics within the Gulf Cooperation Council. Other Gulf states are likely to view the agreement less as an exception applicable only to Riyadh, and more as a political and legal precedent that can be leveraged in their own dealings with major powers, particularly the U.S. If Saudi Arabia does indeed secure a more flexible nuclear cooperation agreement, it could spark a regional race to demand similar nuclear arrangements, driven by political and security imperatives.
This could present the UAE with a strategic paradox, as it is the only Gulf state to have accepted the U.S. “Gold Standard” and thereby relinquished its right to enrich uranium and reprocess spent fuel. If Saudi Arabia obtains more flexible terms, this could reopen the debate over the viability of the Emirati model—and specifically, whether that template represents a permanent arrangement or merely a step in the current U.S. strategy to revitalize its own domestic nuclear energy industry. Kuwait, which froze its nuclear program following the 2011 Fukushima disaster in Japan, may also find itself compelled to reconsider its stance, especially given rising demand for electricity and water desalination, the growing need to diversify energy sources, and the repercussions from attacks on its power plants during the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran. Such factors make the nuclear option perhaps more attractive today than ever before.
For its part, Qatar has long advocated for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, including the creation of a regional framework for nuclear safety and guarantees of adherence to comprehensive safeguards when developing peaceful nuclear energy programs. Qatari diplomats play an active role in international discussions over the use of nuclear energy to address the climate change crisis. The country also has the economic fundamentals to embark on large-scale civil nuclear programs as part of the global transition to sustainable energy and the drive toward net zero, and it is well-positioned to expand its capacity for peaceful applications of nuclear technology—from food security to water resource management and so on. Doha, moreover, maintains deep strategic ties with Washington, hosting the largest U.S. military base in the region, giving it significant negotiating leverage should it decide to pursue this path to achieve its post-hydrocarbon energy diversification goals.
Oman, which pursues a more cautious and balanced foreign policy, has its own particular motivations that could lead it to explore similar nuclear agreements, particularly regarding small modular reactors (SMRs), water desalination, and green hydrogen production. Oman’s location on the Arabian Sea and its strategy of expanding renewable energy facilities provide solid ground to become a regional hub for clean energy. This makes civil nuclear technology a long-term option worthy of serious consideration, despite Muscat’s consistently-stated position ruling out nuclear energy—a stance owed not least due to the abundance of alternatives, the high costs, and the challenge of managing the risks.
Toward a Gulf Nuclear Market
The U.S.-Saudi nuclear agreement is unlikely to trigger a competitive Gulf nuclear arms race. States in the region remain committed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and their developmental and economic priorities are fundamentally at odds with any such contest. However, one might expect a different kind of race: a scramble to acquire civil nuclear technology, build a workforce of specialists in the field, develop related industries, and deepen expertise on the nuclear fuel cycle.
As such, Gulf rivalries are morphing from a traditional contest to outproduce each other in oil and gas into a more complex struggle for the advanced technologies that will determine each nation’s position in a post-oil economy.
Should these agreements expand in scope in the coming years, the Gulf could emerge as one of the world’s largest markets for civil nuclear energy over the next two decades. This competition will not be limited to U.S. companies; it will extend to France, South Korea, and possibly Japan. China and Russia, too, will seek to maintain a foothold in the less sensitive segments of the nuclear industry.
At that point, the question will no longer be whether a Gulf state possesses a nuclear program or not, but rather: Which nuclear model will it adopt, and who will be its strategic partner in building it? This implies that the U.S.-Saudi agreement may not mark the end of nuclear negotiations in the Gulf, but rather the beginning of a new phase in which nuclear cooperation becomes a cornerstone of strategic partnerships between regional states and major powers.
This could mean such deals evolve from bilateral undertakings between Washington and individual Gulf states into springboards for redrawing the entire nuclear landscape of the Gulf. The region could gradually transition from near-total reliance on oil and gas toward a more diversified energy system, and from competing over natural resources to competing over technology and knowledge. Ultimately, the agreement’s greatest impact will lie not in the number of reactors built, but in how it shapes the future of energy, security, and strategic balances in the Gulf for decades to come.
