The significance of the third Hili Forum—convening in Abu Dhabi on September 7-8 under the theme “Gulf at Crossroads: Conflict, Consequences and Course Correction”—stems from the exceptional timing of the event. The region remains mired in one of its most strategically ambiguous moments in decades, amid rapid transformations.
The U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran remains unresolved—politically and militarily—and prospects for Arab-Israeli peace have yet to materialize amidst Israel’s regional escalation. Furthermore, the Strait of Hormuz has shifted from a mere maritime corridor into a focal point of the struggle over the future of the Gulf’s security architecture, evolving into a theater of intense geopolitical rivalry.
Dozens of officials and thinkers from around the world have gathered at the forum, organized by the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research (ECSSR) in partnership with the Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy, to discuss the options available to Gulf states in navigating a complex strategic environment. More than 55 speakers from over 35 countries and approximately 1,000 participants are seeking to envision the region’s future. Across more than 20 discussion sessions, they are joined by the Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and a host of experts from Gulf and international think tanks.
These strategic dialogues come as Gulf states face a security test that could redefine everything they have built over decades of a thriving economic model rooted in stability, openness and East-West connectivity. The challenge now extends beyond merely protecting borders and military installations, to encompass safeguarding the development model itself—in a regional environment where war, drones, missiles, maritime corridors, sanctions and supply chains have become interconnected elements of a single equation.
At this pivotal moment, the Gulf confronts not only the repercussions of a protracted war of attrition, but also a fundamental question regarding the shape of the Gulf system that will emerge from this conflict, and the nature of the regional order that will take shape once military operations between Tehran and Washington cease.
Major wars do more than just shift the balance of power. They expose the fragility of long-held assumptions and compel nations to re-evaluate their concepts of security, economics and alliances. They necessitate a redefinition of each state’s position and role within the ensuing regional and international order—all topics central to discussions at the Hili Forum.
The Attrition Equation
For decades, the Gulf faced a central question: How do we maintain the stability that allows for the flow of oil, gas, investments and trade? Today, that question has changed. Maintaining stability is no longer the sole requirement; the goal is now to build resilience, preserve what has been achieved, and advance the development agenda. Far from a fleeting phase, this represents a fundamental shift in strategic thinking.
Recent developments have demonstrated that periods of de-escalation do not signify the end of a conflict. Temporary understandings between Tehran and Washington can quickly collapse in the face of deeper disputes regarding Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions, the status of the Strait of Hormuz and the future of regional deterrence. In this context, the latest escalation between the U.S. and Iran—including an exchange of strikes and disagreements over the terms for returning to previous understandings—has again highlighted that the crisis remains open to multiple potential scenarios.
This state of attrition poses a greater risk to Gulf states than either a short war or a clearly defined settlement. Open warfare has its rules and peace has its institutions, yet the gray zone between the two creates a persistent drain on economic, security and political resources. Markets become anxious, investors more cautious, insurance companies more conservative and supply chains more costly, all while regional governments are compelled to simultaneously fund defense, economic diversification and alternative infrastructure.
Hormuz: More Than Just a Strait
The crisis has also revealed that the Strait of Hormuz is not merely a geographic corridor for the transit of oil and gas, but also a critical factor of both strength and vulnerability within the Gulf system. Before the crisis, about one-fifth of the world’s oil passed through it; recent fighting has demonstrated that mines, drones, missiles and small boats can turn this stretch of water, just a few kilometers wide, into a problem for the entire global economy. This was a central theme at the 2026 Hili Forum, where experts concluded that the lesson lies not merely in how to reopen the strait, but in how to diminish any party’s ability to hold shipping lanes hostage for strategic leverage.
This entails accelerating the development of alternative pipelines, expanding ports on the Red and Arabian Seas, increasing storage capacities, building more resilient energy grids and investing in maritime protection systems. Economic diversification will not suffice as long as export arteries remain concentrated around a single chokepoint.
Notwithstanding the importance of securing vital shipping lanes—and ensuring the safety of supplies, trade and energy, while advancing economic diversification—the most pressing issue for Gulf states remains defense. Over the past few decades, the region has spent hundreds of billions of dollars on state-of-the-art aircraft, air and missile defense systems, and military technology.
Yet the nature of modern warfare underscores that owning weaponry does not necessarily equate to possessing an integrated security system. Low-cost drones can deplete stockpiles of expensive interceptor missiles, a cyberattack can cripple infrastructure without a single shot being fired, and a low-tech naval mine can disrupt a corridor through which massive trade passes.
Consequently, the strategic transformation continues to face significant and genuine challenges, from the procurement of defense systems right up to the construction of an interconnected Gulf defense system encompassing early warning capabilities, joint air and missile defense, cybersecurity, maritime security, intelligence and critical infrastructure protection, along with capacity on the part of regional states to assess shared threat levels, exchange information and make decisions in real time.
Naturally, the relationship with the U.S. is central to discussions at the forum, as the war has placed this issue at the heart of the debate in the Gulf. The U.S. maintains the largest military presence in the region and remains the most important defense partner for several of its countries, with capabilities that cannot be quickly replaced. It is neither pragmatic nor realistic to envision Gulf security in isolation from Washington. Consequently, the structure of the Gulf-U.S. security relationship is likely to evolve in the coming years. Signs may emerge of reduced over-reliance on the U.S. security umbrella, and the relationship may achieve greater balance by maintaining a robust strategic partnership with Washington while simultaneously bolstering the Gulf’s capacity for self-defense and autonomous security decision-making.
Partnerships vs. Costs
Although Europe is one of the Gulf’s main economic partners, its presence in the regional security equation remains disproportionately small given its economic and political weight. Thus, the participation of the EU Special Representative for the Gulf region in the Hili Forum was significant, within an agenda addressing the roles of various powers and partners in the emerging order.
Europe itself now recognizes that Gulf security is not a distant issue; any prolonged disruption to energy supplies or trade in the region rapidly impacts the European economy, drives up inflation and casts a shadow over industry and supply chains. Consequently, the coming phase requires the Gulf-European relationship to shift from general political dialogue to more serious cooperation in maritime security, defense, cybersecurity, energy and technology.
As for China, the crisis highlights the inherent contradiction in its position. While Beijing is a key economic partner for the Gulf states—and a major importer of energy from the region, with a direct interest in the stability of the Strait of Hormuz—its foreign policy avoids assuming the security commitments historically shouldered by the U.S.
This confronts Gulf states with a crucial reality: China can serve as a strategic economic partner, but it does not yet represent a security alternative to the U.S. Yet this does not diminish the importance of China’s role. On the contrary, the coming phase could offer an opportunity to encourage Beijing to contribute more significantly to regional stability—not necessarily through a large-scale military presence, but rather through diplomacy, investments in alternative corridors, energy security and the safeguarding of free trade and navigation.
Any party seeking to benefit economically from Gulf stability will increasingly face a difficult question: what will it contribute to maintain that stability? From this perspective, the new strategic identity of the Gulf states should assert their independence from any specific axis. This does not imply neutrality in the traditional sense, but rather entails positioning themselves as “middle powers” with the resources, relationships and mediation capabilities that allow for greater latitude in shaping their choices. At the same time, a multiplicity of partnerships must not devolve into strategic ambiguity. A clear distinction must be maintained between the diversification of relationships and a lack of vision.
Preparing for Consequences
This year’s Hili Forum comes at a moment when scenarios once considered futuristic have been transformed into the daily reality we now inhabit: What if the Strait of Hormuz were closed for longer than anticipated? What if Gulf infrastructure faced simultaneous attacks? What if the U.S. security umbrella were to recede? What if Artificial Intelligence and drones became the core of warfare? How should the region engage with Washington, Beijing and Europe simultaneously?
The imperative today is not merely to manage the Iranian crisis, but to consider its consequences. Whether the confrontation concludes with an agreement or a truce, or persists in a gray zone of “neither war nor peace,” the Gulf that emerges from this phase must not be the same Gulf that entered it.
Building an economy in isolation from security, purchasing security without building indigenous power and relying on allies while lacking self-reliance: that era has come to an end. The premise the Hili Forum places before the Gulf is not how to return to the pre-war status quo, but how to construct a new order that renders future conflict less likely—and ensures that the cost of such conflict is less capable of crippling the region’s future.
