The Iran war has catapulted the Gulf region into a new era of conflict and fragmentation, with Gulf capitals reassessing how best to defend their countries and stabilize the region amid unprecedented threats to their national security. Despite precarious ceasefires in Iran and Lebanon, the region remains on edge as tensions between the United States and Iran continue to manifest at sea in the Strait of Hormuz, and Israel persists in its attacks on southern Lebanon. These dynamics continue to threaten both regional stability and the global economy.
Gulf Arab states will almost certainly increase defense spending and deepen security partnerships moving forward, but they will also seek to understand and engage the new leadership in Iran to find a modus operandi that will help stabilize their shared region. This means that diplomacy and conflict mediation will remain critical tools for Gulf foreign policy, particularly in managing relations with the new leadership in Tehran.
All six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have confronted extraordinary attacks over the past two months. Iran launched thousands of missiles and drones at military installations, critical energy infrastructure, and civilian areas in the Gulf Arab states in retaliation for the U.S. and Israel launching a military offensive on February 28. The response of Gulf Arab states was limited to defending their territories while avoiding engaging in offensive operations alongside the initiators of the war. This nightmare scenario confirmed the worst fears about Iran in several capitals and derailed the Gulf Arab-Iran rapprochement that had been taking shape over the past five years.
Trust between the GCC states and Iran is at an all-time low, and the regional security picture is bleak. Despite the current ceasefire, the Strait of Hormuz remains effectively under a dual blockade from both Iran and the U.S., disrupting critical trade routes. GCC states now confront a more radical, emboldened, and military-dominated leadership in Tehran that has withstood a U.S. -Israeli military onslaught, while key energy and trade infrastructure across the region are in need of repair. In response to being attacked, most Gulf capitals, except for Muscat, have expelled Iranian diplomats and downgraded ties.
Yet diplomacy with Iran is more important than ever. For many Gulf policymakers, both strong security ties with Washington and a functional relationship with Tehran are strategic imperatives. As many Gulf experts and officials have underlined over the past two months, GCC states cannot change their geography and finding a modus operandi with Iran is not optional. Indeed, most GCC states—including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Oman—have already had some senior-level contact with Iranian officials.
While Gulf Arab societies and policymakers will not easily forget the trauma sustained from Iran’s attacks, this early Gulf engagement underscores the general agreement among the GCC states—albeit with deep mistrust—that dialogue remains necessary to de-escalate tensions. Although the Gulf states did not directly mediate while they were under attack from Iran, they were present and plugged into all the various efforts bilaterally and multilaterally. For example, Saudi Arabia regularly participated in talks with Pakistan, Türkiye, and Egypt, the primary mediators between the U.S. and Iran, throughout the war. Qatar and Oman maintained direct contact with Tehran, with Muscat playing the most active role—hosting senior Iranian officials for visits and participating in technical discussions regarding the Strait of Hormuz. According to The New York Times, Iranian officials see working with Oman, “as critical to hammering out a settlement” for the strait. Despite some concern and criticism about Muscat’s close working relationship with Tehran in some corners of the Gulf, Oman’s role will remain essential to managing and de-escalating GCC-Iran tensions moving forward.
Historically, GCC states have pursued varied policies toward Iran, driven by distinct historic and economic ties, as well as demographic, territorial or ideological concerns. There has also been shared unease over Iran’s influence across the Arab world—particularly its support for armed groups in Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq—as well as its ballistic missile and nuclear programs. Yet even during times of acute tension, diplomacy and mediation with Iran have remained an indispensable part of their toolkit.
During the period of rapprochement that preceded the current crisis, Gulf countries adopted different approaches toward Iran. While they differed in their views of the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign, they gradually converged toward a dual policy of engagement and containment ahead of the Biden administration taking office. In 2022, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait resumed full relations with, followed by Saudi Arabia in March 2023. Bahrain remained the exception, though it had signaled openness to restoring ties before tensions intensified in the lead-up to the twelve-day war in June 2025.
The war will further shape these approaches. The UAE, which was the top target of Iran’s attacks throughout the war, is understandably the most publicly hostile and opposed to engagement with Iran. Emirati political scientist Abdulkhalaq Abdulla said Iran had become “public enemy number one.” Presidential advisor Anwar Gargash recently said that the UAE’s containment strategy toward Iran had “failed miserably,” while Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed said, “we will never be blackmailed by terrorists.” Nonetheless, when a ceasefire was established on April 8, UAE Vice President Mansour bin Zayed held a phone call with Iran’s parliamentary leader, Mohammed Ghalibaf, underscoring once again the necessity of re-engaging with Tehran.
The bottom line is that the Gulf Arab states have few good options in the current regional security environment. They must somehow defend themselves and stabilize the region in the face of an unpredictable U.S. administration, an increasingly aggressive Israeli government, and a more radical and militarized leadership in Tehran. They have no choice but to use all the soft and hard power tools at their disposal to reassert deterrence, de-escalate the crisis, and mitigate threats to their national security. Strengthening defensive capabilities will be essential, but so too will diplomacy, mediation, and diversified regional and global partnerships.
