For months prior to the outbreak of war between the United States, Israel, and Iran, major Sunni-majority countries began laying the groundwork for a security partnership that could reshape Middle East geopolitics. The foreign ministers of Türkiye, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt have convened on multiple occasions to coordinate responses to an increasingly dangerous and chaotic security environment, including recently at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum.
At the meeting, Pakistan announced the deployment of its troops to Doha, pulling Qatar into a framework that now spans five states. Although the initiative does not constitute a formal military alliance, in the traditional sense, military cooperation features prominently, as security concerns represent the primary impetus for collective action. The question is no longer whether these states are aligning—it is how far that alignment can go, and what is holding it back.
Facing Shared Threats
The Middle East is experiencing one of its most chaotic periods, driven by the destabilizing policies of Iran and Israel—which are both militarily powerful and pursuing unilateral regional strategies. Since October 7, 2023, Israel has attacked at least six countries and occupied territories in Lebanon and Syria, while destroying Gaza and continuing its illegal occupation and colonization of Palestinian lands. It has also signaled interest in securing a position in Somalia by becoming the first state to recognize the breakaway region of Somaliland. Enabled by Washington, Israeli aggression against Iran has brought unprecedented war to the Gulf states and severely undermined the regional and global economies. Israeli officials have hinted at further strikes against additional states, including Türkiye. Such actions threaten to deepen instability and violence across the region.
Since its 1979 revolution, Iran has intervened in the domestic affairs of regional states for both ideological and pragmatic reasons, using alliances with local Shiite groups to project power, influence, and strategic depth. Most Middle Eastern countries have, at various points, perceived Iran as a direct threat or a destabilizing force in their domestic politics. Although some formerly antagonistic states—Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates among them—had reached an accommodation with Iran in recent years, the ongoing war has undermined those arrangements as Iran has attacked its neighbors as part of its retaliatory strategy. Iran’s potential pursuit of nuclear weapons adds a further layer of regional anxiety and constitutes a point of convergence with Israel as a strategic threat.
In the face of direct and indirect aggression from Israel and Iran, other regional actors have sought to secure themselves. Historically, many relied on U.S. security guarantees. However, recent conflicts—including the Iranian strikes on Gulf states—have suggested that Washington is either unwilling, unable, or constrained by its prioritization of Israeli security to effectively deter either threat. This has disappointed several states that host U.S. forces and has accelerated the search for intra-regional alternatives.
Strategic Assets
The most notable alignment taking shape is that of relatively larger Sunni-majority states, namely Türkiye, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, with Qatar also now in the fold. Each participant brings distinct strategic assets, but also vulnerabilities. Pakistan possesses advanced weaponry, including nuclear capabilities, and a well-trained military, yet it lacks sufficient fiscal resources to sustain its state budget. It also faces security challenges with neighboring Iran and India—the latter enjoying Israeli support.
Saudi Arabia holds considerable financial power but remains vulnerable to overt Iranian—and covert Israeli—operations. Egypt has the largest military in the Arab world with a sizable combat fleet but recognizes that Washington consistently favors Israel in bilateral and regional disputes. Despite having a longstanding peace treaty, Egyptian policymakers view Israel as an unreliable neighbor whose future actions are unlikely to align with Cairo’s interests. An alignment with Türkiye and Pakistan gives Egypt greater strategic autonomy—diversifying its arms supply and reducing its dependence on any single patron.
Türkiye is a member of NATO and has the most advanced military in the group, with a booming domestic arms industry. While not facing an immediate threat from Iran—the two have not directly fought since 1639—Türkiye takes seriously Israeli official statements suggesting that it could be a future target. Although Turkish public sentiment often dismisses Israeli military capabilities and expresses a desire to punish Israel for perceived war crimes, Turkish officials adopt a more realistic stance, acknowledging that armed conflict demands advanced weapons, intelligence, and fiscal resources. Therefore, forming an alliance with like-minded states, or at least those sharing common adversaries, has become a strategic necessity.
Alliance or Partnership?
Experts suggest that initial areas of coordination will include counterterrorism, maritime security, defense industry cooperation, and synchronized responses to crisis zones such as Gaza, Sudan, and Libya. While these activities may not constitute a full-fledged military alliance, they remain strategically valuable and may encourage deeper cooperation across other domains. Enhanced relations will naturally facilitate military collaboration, training exchanges, defense technology transfers, and logistical support in the event of armed conflict. Even mutual support short of direct frontline participation would represent a significant strategic gain.
Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons is, perhaps, a leading advantage for the collective, offering balance against Israel and potentially Iran. The co-production of, or sanctions-free access to, advanced weaponry is another benefit, especially during wartime. If successful, more states in the region will likely be enticed to join.
Still, labeling this formation a formal alliance may be premature, as the depth of cooperation remains uncertain. While Türkiye, Pakistan, and Qatar already maintain advanced military, economic, and diplomatic ties—and Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a mutual defense pact in September—not all the countries are on the same page. Notably, Turkish Qatari support for Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated movements during the Arab Spring generated tensions with both Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Although relations have since improved, deeper trust and integration will require more time.
Another potential dividing line is a country’s dependence on the U.S. and its willingness to defy Washington. While all five states are allies of the U.S. and maintain military cooperation, Riyadh and Cairo are less likely than the others to ever challenge Washington and its special relationship with Israel in a potential confrontation with the latter. As long as their dependency on the U.S. persists, avoiding American displeasure remains a strategic imperative.
In contrast, Türkiye and Pakistan—two U.S. allies that also have parts of their defense industries under U.S. sanctions—enjoy greater strategic autonomy and stand to lose less in any confrontation with the U.S., Israel, or Iran. These advantages render the Turkish Pakistani-Qatari sub-group—given Qatar’s willingness to act assertively despite its small size—closer to a de facto military alliance. Turkish and Pakistani defense industries and armed forces are already deeply integrated, and Pakistan’s planned troop deployment to Qatar further solidifies Doha’s role within this informal alignment. While Qatar may continue to host US Centcom forces, Doha must account for the fact that the U.S. has not ensured its security of late, as evidenced by Israel’s attack on Hamas officials on Qatari territory in 2025 and Iran’s strikes during the current war.
For the time being, shared threats are compelling these five states to set aside their differences and pragmatically deepen cooperation across multiple domains, with security the primary focus. This alignment reflects a search for maximized security-oriented interests and constitutes a viable strategy for collective resilience in an increasingly fragmented Middle East. The central question is how closely Saudi Arabia and Egypt will align with the other three. Their level of engagement will likely be determined by the tangible benefits they derive from this partnership.
