On November 6, within hours of closing the polls, Donald Trump was declared the winner of the 2024 presidential election in the United States, defeating Vice President Kamala Harris by a wide margin. Trump’s remarkable triumph, which will return him to the White House after his defeat to Joe Biden in 2020, comes at a time of extreme turmoil and violence in the Middle East. Despite four years of precedent, which offer insights into Trump’s potential policies toward issues such as Israel-Palestine, U.S.-Gulf relations, and Iran, there are compelling reasons to believe that his approach to the region might differ from the past.
In 2016, Trump entered Washington as a political outsider and neophyte, reliant on a wary Republican establishment to guide his transition and make political appointments, from the highest levels of the administration on down. The result was a tumultuous government with unprecedented turnover in personnel. Eight years later, Trump has come to dominate his party like few before him, creating a movement of dedicated followers ready to impliment policy as he sees fit.
Moreover, the Middle East has changed dramatically since Trump’s previous time in office. Over the past year, Biden’s handling of the Israeli response to the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on southern Israel has helped produce a plausible genocide in Gaza and war in Lebanon and elsewhere in the region, making it difficult for Trump to simply resume the regional policies he pursued in his first term.
In this Council Views, experts from the Middle East Council on Global Affairs assess the possible implications of Trump’s victory for the Middle East and North Africa, from issues of war and peace to climate policy.
—Omar H. Rahman, Editor
The Return of the “Disruptor-in-Chief”?
The election of Donald Trump as the 47th president of the United States should not come as a surprise amid all the polarization and mishaps of the Democratic Party and its leadership. However, his return to office will likely heighten existing uncertainties on both the domestic and foreign policy fronts. The “America First” and “Make America Great Again” slogans will return to the front and center, even if they do not translate into meaningful, immediate and nationwide gains.
American policies abroad under Trump have unfinished business from his first term in 2016-2020, particularly relations with China, Russia and the EU/NATO allies. Nonetheless, this new term starts with ongoing wars in Ukraine and Palestine, to which the Biden administration contributed with weapons and money. Trump and his team are likely to push for ceasefires or temporary peace deals to showcase their peacemaking prowess and the ability to “stop war,” as he mentioned in his victory speech in Florida. However, by the time Trump’s inauguration takes place in January, many things could change, including last-ditch attempts for a ceasefire and/or symbolic executive orders by the Biden administration.
The assumption that a Trump presidency will bring peace to the Middle East is a high-stakes gamble, especially with the close relationship between Trump and many of his associates with Israel. This is unlikely to improve conditions for the Palestinians or create a meaningful path toward a Palestinian state. Other ties to strongmen and Gulf monarchs will likely bring back the transactional approach, an off-loading of certain security responsibilities to some regional actors, and a further disregard for any semblance of democratic and human rights norms. If there are two critical issues the new Trump administration will focus on in the Middle East, they are finding a path for a Saudi-Israeli normalization, and a return to maximum sanctions on Iran.
Continuity in American Policy is More Relevant than the Differences
No two U.S. presidential administrations are identical, but their differences tend to obscure continuities, particularly in matters of foreign policy. If we look at the Biden administration’s policies towards the Middle East, whether with respect to Israel, Iran, Arab-Israeli normalization, Western Sahara, energy policy or virtually any other issue, there is precious little to distinguish it from what might have been expected of a second Trump administration.
Similarly, we can expect Trump to pick up where Biden left off. His administration will of course add its own twist, but don’t expect any radical breaks. Indeed, the first Trump administration’s various initiatives on Jerusalem, the Syrian Golan Heights, and UNRWA are better seen as the logical culmination of decades of U.S. policy rather than a sudden reversal.
The problem with divining the approach of a second Trump administration is that the incoming president has, if anything, become more erratic and unpredictable. Endorsing an Israel annexation of the occupied territories and direct conflict with Iran are as plausible as taking measures to ensure Israel does not suck Washington into a new war that will make Iraq look like child’s play. But once again we would do well to focus on continuities even where it comes in the guise of change. Putting America’s interests first, more often than not at the expense of the region and its peoples, is hardly a policy innovation introduced by Donald Trump.
Trump Election Heralds the End of Economic Liberalism?
If he carries through with campaign promises to impose tariffs on all imported goods from abroad and expand the “America First” policies in support of domestic economic sectors, Donald Trump’s presidency will accelerate the retreat of globalization that has already been underway since his first term and was further reinforced by the Biden administration’s industrial policies. Moreover, if affected countries like China, which Trump has threatened with a 60 percent tariff, choose to respond with protectionist measures of their own, and with multilateral mechanisms for dispute resolution at the World Trade Organization suspended, the damage to the international trading system could prove irreversible.
Countries will face immense challenges adjusting their policies and economies to an emerging international system that is increasingly being driven by heightened economic nationalism and trade wars on top of the intensifying geopolitical competition between its two most powerful members, the U.S. and China. Those in the Global South will encounter growing constraints as they seek to balance their economic interests between the two superpowers. In many instances, such as access to advanced technologies and defense industries, countries will be forced to choose one side over the other. Global supply chains will be further reconfigured to accommodate national security concerns but also become weaponized for geopolitical ends. Smaller economies will seek cover from the instability in a renewed drive for regionalism and non-dollar based cross-border payment systems will proliferate.
The dislocation caused by Trump’s unilateralist, isolationist, America First economic agenda could very well bring to an end the era of economic liberalism.
Trump Is Bad News for UNRWA and the Palestinians Who Rely on It
In 2018, then-President Trump canceled U.S. funding for the UN’s Palestine refugee relief agency, UNRWA, which Biden partially resumed in 2021. Upon returning to the White House in January 2025, Trump is likely to resume the combative relationship with international institutions, including UNRWA, that characterized his first term. This does not bode well for displaced Palestinians, who rely on UNRWA and other UN agencies for basic services such as healthcare and education. UNRWA’s support is especially critical today, as it tries to deal with the devastating Israeli assault on Gaza that has killed over 43,000 people, including 28,000 women and children, crippled basic public services and created the onset of famine in Gaza.
Earlier this week, Israel dealt another blow to the Palestinian people by canceling its cooperation agreement with UNRWA, which had been in place since 1967. If Trump cuts U.S. funding to the agency again, it might be a second blow the agency cannot recover from. The Palestinian leadership and the global community need to be prepared for this possibility. They must also be ready to assertively play what few cards they have, including laying the responsibility on Israel, as an occupying force, for providing services to the Palestinian people. In the end, UNRWA serves a critical function, and it should not be let go unless a better, more permanent solution is in place.
For the Middle East, Trumpian Transactionalism Will Benefit Some and Hurt Many Others
Leaving institutionalists on the right and the left stricken mute, President Donald Trump was able to announce his victory as the 47th American president on the night of the election. For America, his victory likely ushers in another four years of chaotic internal politics, as Republican victories in heartland states give Trump a congress that will enable him to prioritize legislation and policies reviled by America’s traditional elites and the urban coastal populations. For the rest of the world, and the Middle East in particular, Trump’s victory will see a return to the transactionalism that characterized his first term. Several government leaders in the Middle East understood his transactional nature early on in his first term and played this to their advantage.
For the next four years, this transactionalism will allow Israel and the Gulf states to influence the Trump administration heavily towards their immediate policy designs and ambitions for the region. However, in terms of America’s long-term strategic role, Trump’s inability to see benefit in alliances, his suspicions of America’s traditional allies, and his obsession with tariffs and economic protectionism promise to usher in dramatic, unsettling changes to the world’s strategic framework and accelerate America’s retreat from globalization. In turn, while creating opportunities for some leaders in the Middle East, for most of the region’s population, it will likely allow a rise in political and economic insecurity not seen in the post-World War II era.
A Boost for Gulf Oil Ambitions but No Detour for Climate Goals
The re-election of Donald Trump may invigorate Gulf nations’ hydrocarbon ambitions, but it is unlikely to derail their climate agendas. Trump’s energy policies have historically favored fossil fuels, and his presidency could once again support the oil industry both domestically and globally, benefiting Gulf economies reliant on hydrocarbon exports. A U.S. administration less focused on climate regulations might reduce pressure on other producing countries to rapidly decarbonize, offering them short-term economic flexibility.
However, while a Trump presidency will provide a boost to hydrocarbon markets, it will not change the course for the Gulf states’ climate and energy transition strategies because what is driving decision-making on this front is not who is in the White House, but the Gulf states’ national economic and energy interests.
Gulf climate policies, including commitments to net-zero emissions and clean energy, are primarily driven by regional economic diversification strategies, aimed at reducing dependency on oil revenue, as well as growing domestic concerns over energy security. These long-term goals are less influenced by shifts in U.S. politics and more by the Gulf’s need to sustain economic stability amid a changing global energy market. As global financial flows increasingly favor green energy investments, Gulf nations recognize that remaining competitive means advancing in clean energy and sustainable development, balancing hydrocarbon ambitions with essential steps toward a diversified, resilient future.
Despite Differences in Style, Trump Likely To Carry On Biden’s Policies
In the Middle East, Trump (in his first term) wasn’t anti-Obama; Biden wasn’t anti-Trump; and Trump (in his second term) is unlikely to be anti-Biden. That doesn’t mean that these individuals are identical when it comes to the region. Particularly, in stylistic terms, they differ from each other substantially. Trump’s first term was characterized by personality-centric relationships, unpredictability, and the U.S. propensity to downsize its regional role. Plus, the U.S. idea of regional order was essentially premised on the concept of Arab-Israeli normalization and cooperation, buttressed by U.S. support, and either sidelining the Palestinian issue or giving Israel a free hand to do what it prefers.
These features also shaped Biden’s approach. Trump hastily and partially withdrew from Syria; Biden did the same in Afghanistan. The question of the predictability of the U.S. in the region wasn’t resolved during the Biden era. It will now be compounded by the second Trump term. Biden effectively continued in the footsteps of Trump in searching for a regional order that was premised on Arab-Israeli normalization—at the expense of Palestinians—strengthened by U.S. support. More ominously, Biden facilitated and supported Israel’s war on Gaza with full impunity. Trump will likely continue with this policy with even more rigor.
The major difference between them was that Trump pursued a hard containment policy towards Iran and primarily focused on China in terms of the presence of international powers in the region. In contrast, up until the Gaza war, Biden didn’t pursue such a hard containment policy towards Iran and focused on China and Russia (prioritizing Moscow’s regional presence over that of Beijing) in terms of external powers’ involvement with the region. Despite this, continuity, more than change, has defined the policies of American presidents towards the region, from Obama to Trump and Biden, and now back to Trump again.
Finally, the defining characteristics of Trump, unpredictability and impulsiveness, will influence his policies in the coming period. He can worsen the situation and bring the region closer to a full-fledged Iran-Israel war; or he can equally de-escalate the tension and prevent a war. Such unpredictability will only deepen the belief among regional actors that their hedging and balancing strategies remain a wise policy course.
Trump’s Victory Is an Opportunity
Donald Trump’s victory will generate a combination of optimism, frustration and unease in the Middle East, but it will not lead to dramatic changes to U.S. foreign policy in the region. The United States has long-running alliances, partnerships and commitments that will not be upended, including working with its allies to defeat ISIS, supporting Israel, and expanding ties with the Gulf states. Similarly, it has long-running tensions with Iran that could intensify, but this will be shaped by how Iran moves to engage the region in the wake of its escalation with Israel and the degradation of its proxies.
There could be a recalibration or review of some of these policies to account for Trump’s transactional approach to policymaking. But that should be seen by the Gulf countries as an opportunity for developing a collective security architecture premised on the interests and stability of the Gulf states—and the wider region—as much as the interests of the United States. This also presents an occasion for the Gulf countries to play a proactive role in ensuring the escalation with Iran does not result in a regional conflagration.
Trump’s Foreign Policy By Tweet Is Bad for America and the World
The main loser in the election is the stability and predictability of America’s foreign policy process. Whatever the sins of omission and commission of the Biden administration—and there were both—Kamala Harris was likely to respect the opinion of experts and the results of the inter-agency policy process. This would have led to more stable and predictable decision-making and greater consistency and coherence in American foreign policy overall.
Donald Trump’s approach will be highly personalized and ad-hoc, marked by a tremendous—and largely unfounded—faith in his ability to analyze situations, make decisions and negotiate solutions. His is a largely transactional approach grounded in a mistrust of both alliances and the institutions charged with framing American foreign policy. While in office or on the campaign trail, Trump has consistently been unwilling to be guided or restrained by his advisors.
Whether Harris’ approach would ultimately have been up to the task in an increasingly volatile and fraught international environment will forever remain an open question. But the return to foreign policy by tweet and impulse will inevitably be worse, and it will create an additional layer of chaos and uncertainty that will benefit only America’s adversaries.
Climate Trumps Politics: The Structural Shift to Global Clean Energy
While President-elect Trump has openly expressed skepticism toward the climate change consensus and reaffirmed his commitment to maintaining American, hydrocarbon-based energy independence, his administration’s policies may have limited impact on global climate change mitigation, especially when considering underlying structural trends. Despite the importance of international climate agreements, recent years have witnessed a robust, secular rise in renewable energy investment worldwide. For instance, in 2023, new wind and solar installations surpassed all other contributions to the global energy mix, and, by the end of 2024, clean energy investments are expected to exceed $2 trillion, representing approximately two-thirds of global energy investment.
A historical perspective reinforces this trajectory. Although the George W. Bush administration refrained from ratifying the Kyoto Protocol due to concerns over potential impacts on U.S. industries, this resistance ultimately slowed, but did not halt, the global momentum toward greenhouse gas mitigation. Therefore, while the United States occupies a central position within the global economic architecture, the opposition of a single, four-year administration is unlikely to fundamentally hinder the structural—and seemingly inexorable—advancements in renewable energy investments. These advancements, supported by the rapid growth of electric vehicle adoption, continue to shift the global energy paradigm away from traditional oil dependency.
Trump Could Move the Needle Again on Israel-Gulf Normalization
Donald Trump’s return to the presidency has many in the GCC asking about the implications for the region. On matters of security, in particular, Trump’s victory could be beneficial for most of the bloc. That is especially true for the UAE, as it will likely mean the resumption of previously stalled deals for the sale of F-35 fighter jets and armed drones. It will also boost the movement toward more states joining the Abraham Accords alongside the UAE and Bahrain, which signed normalization deals with Israel in 2020 under the auspices of Trump.
The Biden administration has repeatedly promised Saudi Arabia enhanced security ties with the United States, in addition to access to advanced military technology similar to what UAE received upon signing the agreements. Given the post-October 7 turmoil in the region, this has not been enough to move the needle. If Trump succeeds in putting out fires in the Middle East, however, including ending Israel’s genocide in Gaza along with the war in Lebanon and easing tensions with Iran, Saudi Arabia could be persuaded to join these accords and normalize relations with Israel. This will count as a huge win for Trump’s foreign policy.
Trump’s Return Means Heavy Pressure Ahead for Houthis and Yemen
A Trump victory likely represents a significant shift in American policy on Yemen, with his administration expected to adopt a tougher stance against the Houthis as part of a return to the “maximum pressure” policy on Iran. Trump will likely expand the scope of military operations taking place in Yemen, potentially targeting Houthi leaders and military infrastructure. He could grant U.S. forces greater latitude in addressing threats, with a possible escalation in maritime and air operations across broader areas.
Economically, Trump would focus on intensifying sanctions on the Houthis and their supporters, pressing the international community to join these efforts. While this strategy may worsen Yemen’s humanitarian crisis, Trump could view it as an acceptable cost to achieve his strategic objectives. This approach could also reduce short-term chances for a political solution but may shift the balance of power on the ground.
In relations with Gulf countries, Trump will likely be more responsive to Saudi and Emirati positions, supporting any military action against the Houthis by the Arab coalition and the internationally recognized government with expanded intelligence and logistical support. This support may be tied to larger military and trade deals with Gulf states.
Trump’s Transactionalism Could Benefit Sudan
The war in Sudan remains volatile given the fragility of the Jeddah Declaration, which has yet to be successfully implemented. The treaty, signed in May 2023, was an attempt by the United States, Saudi Arabia and the two main Sudanese parties to establish a ceasefire and create humanitarian relief channels amid Sudan’s escalating crisis.
Trump’s second term could foster peace rather than entrenching the war in Sudan. To some extent, Trump’s first administration was largely transactional with Sudan, focusing on removing the country from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list in exchange for joining the Abraham Accords and paying $335 million to compensate American victims of past terrorist attacks.
A renewed Trump presidency is likely to continue this approach, prioritizing U.S. alliances with key regional players like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE—countries with their own stakes in Sudan’s conflict. His close ties with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf allies may provide an avenue to leverage regional influence for a sustained ceasefire—whether under the Jeddah declaration or other initiatives. With U.S. pressure, regional players could be encouraged to support peace talks over military approaches, maintain pressure to uphold the ceasefire and promote stability in Sudan.
Trump’s Return Likely To Create Disruptive Space for Israel
Former U.S. President Donald Trump was elected as the 47th President of the United States—a victory largely driven by the hesitant and inconsistent approach of President Joe Biden’s administration on a number of issues, as well as his support for liberal policies that a large portion of Americans view unfavorably. Biden’s indecisive stance on addressing the genocide in Gaza, alongside unwavering support for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s policies, proved pivotal in reshaping opinions among a wide array of Americans, both Arab and non-Arab. The Biden administration largely ignored an emerging humanitarian coalition opposed to the genocide. Despite her efforts to break away from the administration’s indecision, Vice President Kamala Harris’ responses remained muted and cautious, refraining from pushing for meaningful change.
Donald Trump’s victory raises important questions about his expected policies toward the Middle East. However, it is first essential to consider the character of the newly elected president, which is notably different from the one who took office in 2017. His time in power has changed him, and his approach has evolved. Another significant point is his naturally rebellious political stance, which challenges the conventional norms of both domestic and foreign policy. In other words, he has a strong, personal perspective on events, and he imposes it.
In this context, considering his expressed opposition to the ongoing war on Gaza, even if he cannot immediately stop the conflict, Trump will likely create a disruptive space for the Israeli government and Netanyahu, despite the expected political pressures. Moreover, this will be Trump’s second and final term, which will naturally influence his approach to events and decision-making.
Arab Americans and Trump: The Ambivalent Love-Hate Relationship
For America’s 3.7 million Arab Americans, the 2024 presidential election was unlike any other. Members of the community found themselves between a rock and a hard place, having to choose between two very unfavorable presidential candidates.
On one hand, Vice President Kamala Harris was viewed as an extension of President Joe Biden and his unconditional support for Israel in its ongoing assaults on the civilians in Gaza, resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands of innocents, as well as the unfolding war in Lebanon and the threat of a potential region-wide escalation. On the other hand, Trump is no less of a supporter for Israel, bearing in mind promises to expand Israel’s geographic territory, not to mention his Islamophobic rhetoric and his anti-immigration policies, such as Muslim Travel Ban 1 and 2.
This resulted in many Arab Americans choosing to punish Harris and Biden under the banner, “In November, We Remember.” Some decided to vote for third party candidate Jill Stein, who has been exceedingly outspoken in her support for the Palestinian cause. Others, like the mayor of the Muslim-majority city of Hamtramck in Michigan, members of the Lebanese-American diaspora, and high profile Arab-American businessmen endorsed Trump.
In his victory speech, Trump acknowledged those who supported him, across different racial and ethnic divides, including Arab Americans and Muslim Americans, signaling a unique moment of recognition for an otherwise highly invisible or negatively profiled segment of American society.
Whether he will deliver to them is another matter, especially against his promises to Israel, his hardline immigration policies, and his pledge to “make America great again,” which many minorities interpret as making America “white” again.
Arab Americans may have punished Harris by denying her their votes in this presidential race, but it is certainly problematic that by doing so they simultaneously punished themselves by inadvertently helping Trump’s historic return to the White House, against all odds.
Allies at Any Cost
Under Donald Trump’s second presidential term, continuity rather than change will almost certainly predominate U.S. policy toward the Middle East. Washington has no intention of ending its unconditional support for Israel; it will continue sending arms shipments and allow Netanyahu to pursue genocide and ethnic cleansing in Gaza and the West Bank.
The Trump administration will undoubtedly continue favoring the exercise of military power over diplomacy in the region. It might even succumb, albeit reluctantly, to Netanyahu’s intent to drag his country’s closest ally into a war against Iran—especially if Trump again turns to the likes of Mike Pompeo and Robert Greenway to fill positions in his cabinet. Given that the power of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)—and other pro-Israel lobbying organizations—is unlikely to diminish an iota, that scenario is plausible.
This is evident in the rhetoric coming from Capitol Hill; numerous members of Congress signed a letter to French President Emmanuel Macron admonishing him not to suspend arms shipments to Israel. The U.S. will continue to put pressure on Arab governments not to undertake any forceful actions against Israel.
However, if Trump’s antiwar statements are genuine, it is conceivable that a shift in policy, albeit a small one, might occur. But the most likely scenario is business as usually since the U.S. will seek to preserve the status quo.