Five years in, the Russia-Ukraine war has evolved into a protracted, costly confrontation that has drained the military and economic resources of both belligerents. Yet neither side has fully managed to impose its will on its adversary.
This prolonged war of attrition is also defining the nature of the hybrid warfare that dominates today’s strategic debates. While not a new concept in international relations, hybrid warfare has gained growing significance due to technological advancements, the expanding array of technical tools available to states and the constraints governing their use.
Hybrid warfare combines conventional military power with intelligence, covert operations, cyberattacks, sabotage, economic pressure, information and narrative warfare, media disinformation and the use of proxies. These tools enable a state to weaken and exhaust an adversary without necessarily triggering full-scale escalation or total war.
The appeal of this model in inter-state conflicts has grown in recent years, as military superiority has proven less capable of achieving decisive political outcomes, and as technologies have become available that can be employed at varying levels of intensity and escalation, at a relatively low cost, while offering states the option of plausible deniability regarding their use.
Consequently, hybrid warfare has evolved into a primary instrument for managing a state of attrition that can be summarized as: “no war, no peace.”
Hybrid Warfare as a Multipronged Strategy
This kind of warfare is increasingly on display in Europe. Concurrently with the conventional military conflict between Russia and Ukraine, several European nations have faced acts of sabotage, cyberattacks, misinformation campaigns and attacks on infrastructure. European governments and institutions have attributed a number of these operations to Russia. These tools pose a unique threat in that they can exert pressure below the threshold of direct military confrontation, thereby blurring the line between war and peace.
In the Middle East, the U.S.-Israeli confrontation with Iran presents a more complex model. Prior to the broad, direct confrontation that began on February 28, the parties had for decades engaged in a shadow conflict akin to hybrid warfare, encompassing intelligence operations, assassinations, sabotage, cyberattacks, proxy warfare and limited military strikes. However, the conflict since October 7, 2023 has eroded many of the previous constraints, leading to the more direct use of conventional military force.
Yet resorting to conventional military confrontation has resulted neither in a definitive political resolution, nor a total victory for either side, nor a long-term settlement. While Israel and the U.S. have managed to inflict severe damage on Iran’s political and military leadership—with joint strikes killing high-ranking officials and inflicting massive economic losses—they have failed to eliminate Iran’s clout or impose a political settlement.
Despite the U.S. naval blockade and intensified economic sanctions, Tehran has retained means of retaliation and leverage through its ability to disrupt international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, utilizing it as a tool for strategic and economic pressure. This highlights the nature of hybrid warfare: the outcome of the conflict no longer hinges solely on missiles and aircraft, but on the integration of military power, the economy, energy, maritime corridors, intelligence and cyberspace.
This logic is also evident in Iranian political discourse. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has spoken of a confrontation combining military, economic, and psychological warfare. Statements by Mohsen Rezaei, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, reflect an approach of integrating military deterrence with maritime and economic pressure—alongside conditional negotiation. From this perspective, negotiations and war are not contradictory, but parallel tracks within a single strategy aimed at raising the cost of exerting pressure on Iran, while maintaining the widest possible margin for Tehran to maneuver.
The question of how to address Iran will doubtless occupy a central place in Israel’s post-war strategic thinking. A divergence of views between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his electoral opponents—including former Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot—reflects a broader debate on how to translate military achievements into a sustainable security reality and prevent Iran from rebuilding its capabilities once the direct confrontation ends.
Building National Resilience
Regardless of who leads the next Israeli government after October 27 elections, a clear geographical and military dilemma remains. While Israel might be capable of repeating its airstrikes, intelligence operations and cyber-attacks against the Islamic Republic, it lacks the ground capabilities that would be needed to wage a full-scale war against a country of Iran’s size.
It is also difficult to envision the U.S. easily transitioning to a large-scale ground war against Iran. Consequently, a continued hybrid war may become an increasingly attractive alternative, allowing for sustained pressure without incurring the costs of total war.
This could signal a broader return to intelligence, covert, cyber, and sabotage operations targeting individuals and facilities linked to Iran’s nuclear, missile, and drone programs, while maintaining a limited and selective use of conventional military force. In this scenario, the objective would not be to occupy Iran or achieve a conventional military victory, but rather to disrupt its efforts to rebuild its capabilities, drive up the associated costs and keep the regime under constant pressure.
Israel may view this campaign of attrition as a means to weaken the Iranian regime over the long term. However, it is far from certain that it would lead to its collapse, a scenario that would depend on internal developments within Iran.
Another, equally important, arena is the war of narratives. Throughout the conflict, Iran has sought to present its version of events to the international public, targeting Western audiences with the specter of a “forever war.” It has leveraged AI, traditional and social media to influence how the war and its outcomes are interpreted, while exaggerating certain military achievements. The impact of these narratives has extended to academic and media debates concerning the war’s objectives, and to assigning responsibility for its continuation and consequences.
Conversely, Israel and the U.S. have worked to advance a narrative emphasizing their military superiority and the destruction of Iranian capabilities, while employing the tools of information warfare. Thus, the battle to interpret events and identify which side achieved its objectives—or bears responsibility for the war’s continuation—has become an integral part of the conflict itself.
A state can no longer afford to prepare for its next war solely as a military confrontation. As hybrid warfare spreads, a state’s national security will increasingly depend on its ability to maintain operations and institutional cohesion under pressure, rather than merely the capacity to repel military attacks.
This requires building a comprehensive sense of national preparedness that integrates military, security and economic institutions, along with the private sector and critical infrastructure, into a unified system. It also entails bolstering economic resilience by diversifying trade routes, energy sources and supply chains, while securing ports, communications and financial systems. Furthermore, it demands strengthening societal resilience against disinformation, polarization and psychological campaigns, while maintaining public trust in institutions and preserving social cohesion during crises.
Consequently, the state of “no war, no peace” may no longer be merely a transitional phase between wars, but rather a defining characteristic of the emerging regional and international order. As the cost of conventional warfare rises and decisive victory becomes increasingly elusive, waging hybrid warfare becomes an ever-more attractive option.
From Ukraine to Europe, and from Israel to Iran, preparedness for future conflicts will be measured not only by the number of aircraft and missiles a state can deploy, but also by its capacity—and that of its economy and society—to endure, adapt and function under pressure. In a world where the boundaries between war and peace are blurring, national resilience itself may emerge as a primary source of strength and deterrence.
