The Middle East has seen dramatic geopolitical shifts since October 7, 2023. From the war on Gaza to confrontations in Lebanon and Yemen, the fall of the Assad regime, the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran, along with Iran’s attacks on Gulf states and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, interconnected conflicts have impacted not only their belligerents but also the regional balance of power.
The new landscape is defined by four key powers. Iran and Israel have engaged in direct confrontation, incurring military, political and economic costs. By contrast, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye have avoided being dragged into this cycle of attrition, and made relative gains. On the eve of the Gaza war, Iran had a network of influence stretching from Gaza to Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, granting it strategic depth and tools to pressure its adversaries far from its own borders, avoiding the costs of direct confrontation. Yet in under three years, the structure Tehran had built over decades has suffered blows against most of its constituent links.
Hamas has lost much of its capacity, as has Hezbollah, along with much of its leadership. The Assad regime’s collapse in Syria severed Iran’s land corridor to Lebanon. Iran remains influential in Iraq, but this is increasingly vulnerable to U.S. pressure, and Tehran struggles to mobilize factions as a unified bloc. While Yemen’s Houthis remain a military asset, their shift to threatening maritime navigation and energy supplies has made them an international liability.
The losses were not limited to Iran’s proxies. Tehran lost command structures and communication networks that will take time to replace. Its nuclear program became far costlier to preserve or rebuild, and any future agreement could impose stricter constraints on enrichment and oversight. In the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran squandered a key asset by turning threats into active attacks on shipping, transforming the waterway from a tool of leverage into an international security issue. This prompted Gulf states and major powers to seek alternatives to prevent Iran from holding energy exports hostage in the future.
Tehran’s most profound loss lies in its relationship with Gulf states, which will require years to mend, even if the war ends tomorrow. Iran remains a key regional power, but a much diminished one. It has moved from fighting beyond its borders to waging war at home, and the proxies that formed its forward line of defense have been weakened and fragmented.
Israel: Military Superiority vs. Eroding Legitimacy
Israel entered October 7 with overwhelming military superiority, solid ties with the West and the historic prospect of normalization with Saudi Arabia. Yet Hamas-led attacks exposed a massive security and intelligence failure, and the subsequent wars have forced Israel to expand fronts from Gaza to Lebanon, Iran and Yemen.
Militarily, it has achieved undeniable gains: degrading Hamas and Hezbollah, targeting senior Iranian commanders, penetrating Iran’s security and military structures and helping dismantle key nodes of an influence network that had encircled it. Yet these gains have to translate into a stable political settlement. Gaza remains without a political solution, the issue of prisoners and hostages continues to exert domestic pressure, and metastasizing wars have made Israel’s security ever more reliant on American support.
Israel’s image abroad has also suffered major blows. Widespread sympathy following the October 7 attacks has given way to accusations of war crimes and grave human rights violations.
The extent of this decline is starkly reflected in polling. By spring 2026, an average of 67 percent of respondents in 36 countries had negative views of Israel. The Committee to Protect Journalists documented the killing of 259 journalists and media workers by Israeli fire up to June 2026. The war drove up military spending, the budget deficit and national debt; it harmed tourism and investment and necessitated repeated call-ups of reserve forces.
Israel’s greatest strategic loss, however, was the stalling of its regional integration. Prior to October 7, Saudi recognition was within reach, which would have opened a door to the wider Arab world. Yet subsequently, Riyadh conditioned any normalization on a credible pathway to Palestinian statehood, then signed a civilian nuclear agreement with Washington that was not conditioned on normalization. In Europe, the discourse shifted from expressions of concern to a review of the Israeli-EU Association Agreement, with proposals to suspend trade privileges and impose sanctions on extremist ministers—even if the bloc remains divided on implementing these steps.
Thus, in a fundamental paradox of the post-October 7 landscape, Israel appears militarily stronger vis-à-vis some adversaries, yet weakened in terms of legitimacy and unable to translate military superiority into a stable regional order.
Türkiye: Calculated Gains from the Sidelines
Türkiye has charted a different course. It has not been silent politically, especially over Gaza and the war on Iran, but has shunned direct military engagement. It has maintained contact with Washington, Moscow and Arab capitals and watched the belligerents exhaust one another, while keeping its military, economic and diplomatic tools readied for moments of transition.
Syria represents its greatest gain. The fall of the Assad regime rolled back Iran’s direct influence on Türkiye’s southern border, diminished Russia’s role and produced a government in Damascus with close ties to Ankara. Its main security gain was the decline of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which Ankara views as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Meanwhile, Washington, having excluded Ankara from the F-35 fighter jet program, is now keen to win it back.
Türkiye has also furthered its reconciliation with Saudi Arabia and the UAE while maintaining its strategic partnership with Qatar. Its relationship with Riyadh evolved into cooperation across defense, energy, trade and rebuilding Syria—a country that has ceased to be a point of Saudi-Turkish contention. Today, it is a theater for coordination, alongside projects aimed at linking Türkiye to the Gulf via Syria and Jordan.
Saudi Arabia: Winning through Restraint
Since October 7, Saudi Arabia has accrued steady gains, while Iran—its most significant regional security rival—has steadily lost influence. Riyadh has evaded war, yet watched the decline of a project that had threatened its security for decades, from Damascus and Beirut to Baghdad and Sanaa.
The Houthis’ position in Yemen has also shifted. Their attacks on shipping, threats in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, and naval blockade against Saudi Arabia have made the group a threat to global trade and energy security. Its alignment with Iran has deepened its isolation and pitted it against a broader array of international powers.
As for the Gulf, developments since October 7 have revealed the strength of the bonds between GCC states, despite persistent differences on certain issues. GCC members have declared their determination to prevent the war from expanding, supported a ceasefire, maintained channels for mediation, and refused to allow their territories to be used as launchpads for attacks against Iran. When Iranian missiles and drones targeted GCC states, their rapprochement shifted from political alignment to solidarity over security, and they invoked the right to collective defense and bolstered coordination with the U.S. and Europe regarding maritime and energy security.
This does not imply an absence of disagreements. Developments in the Yemen crisis, for instance, revealed sharp divergences between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Yet they moved to contain these tensions rather than allowing them to escalate into a rupture, thus bolstering Gulf strength and stability.
In summary, the aftermath of October 7 reveals that the outcomes of war are measured not in numbers of strikes, but in the enduring strength, legitimacy and alliances of the states involved. The region remains in flux: Iran has not collapsed, Israel has not lost its military superiority, and Saudi and Turkish gains still depend on issues that have yet to be resolved. Yet the general trend is clear. The utility of proxy networks and open warfare is diminishing, while the value of cohesive states, capable economies and flexible alliances grows. Since October 7, the balance of power has tilted in favor of nations that have preserved their institutions and their autonomy of choice, rather than those that have turned every crisis into a new battlefield.
