For the past two decades, Lebanon has been of limited strategic importance for Türkiye, notwithstanding Turkish development projects—especially in Beirut and the North—and efforts to foster diplomatic ties with the Lebanese state and balanced relations with Lebanon’s various political factions. Türkiye has not viewed Lebanon as a primary sphere of influence, in contrast to Syria, Iraq, and Libya.
Today, this approach appears to be shifting, not because Türkiye intends to turn Lebanon into a new zone of influence, but because transformations in Lebanon’s vicinity have increasingly linked the country to Ankara’s direct interests.
The key to understanding this shift lies in Syria. The fall of Bashar al-Assad and the rise of a new, Turkish-allied government in Damascus have altered Lebanon’s strategic hinterland. For the first time in decades, Syria acts less as a barrier to Turkish influence in Lebanon than as an economic, political and security bridge between Ankara and Beirut. This means Türkiye’s view of Lebanon is closely tied to its broader vision for Syria and the Middle East.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has explicitly included Lebanon within a sphere that Türkiye deems integral to its own national security. In June, he warned that Israeli attacks on Lebanon and Syria now threatened Türkiye itself, whose security begins not at its southern borders, but “in Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut.”
Rather than a political comment at a moment of crisis, this rhetoric reveals an expansion in Türkiye’s definition of its security sphere in the Levant—one that demands stabilizing Syria and Lebanon and preventing Israel from imposing new security realities in either, in order to maintain the balance of power in Türkiye’s neighborhood.
Turkish-Israeli Rivalry
Erdoğan’s comments came amidst a growing clash between Türkiye and Israel, particularly over Syria. Israel seeks broad freedom of action to prevent the emergence of security or military constraints. Conversely, Türkiye believes that stability in Syria requires rebuilding a state and an army capable of asserting their authority across Syrian territory. This contradiction culminated in Israeli strikes on the Abu al-Duhur airbase in northern Syria on August 18, prompted by reports of a potential Turkish military presence there.
This adds to the importance of Lebanon, which Türkiye no longer views as a separate file from Syria or the emerging regional balance of power. Israel’s continued occupation of parts of Lebanese territory, future security arrangements in southern Lebanon, and the fate of the UNIFIL peacekeeping force will all impact the nascent security architecture along the Israeli border. Consequently, Ankara is gradually shifting from declarations of solidarity with Lebanon to showing willingness to participate in more sensitive security arrangements.
This was clearly evident in a July 30 visit to Ankara by a delegation including Joseph Aoun, the first Lebanese president to visit Türkiye in 17 years, with discussions heavily focused on security issues.
Erdoğan announced that Türkiye would support Lebanon’s security and sovereignty after the withdrawal of the UNIFIL mission—whose mandate expires at the end of 2026—linking this to continued support for the Lebanese Army and state institutions.
This reflects Türkiye’s broadening view of Lebanon. Ankara is not positioning itself as a mediator between Lebanon and Israel—nor is it equipped for such a role—but seeks a seat at the table when new security arrangements are discussed. Essentially, Türkiye is attempting to turn from an ally into a key regional player whose interests and capabilities must be factored into any restructuring of the Lebanese landscape.
Beirut Looks to Ankara
Lebanon’s diplomatic outreach to Türkiye signals an effort to diversify its regional relationships and capitalize on evolutions since the fall of the Assad regime. This runs parallel to political and military contacts and cooperation since the 2010 military framework agreement.
Türkiye’s importance to Lebanon stems from its major political and military clout, which comes without direct involvement in Lebanon’s internal divisions. Furthermore, Ankara’s close relationship with Syria’s new leadership grants it a role in issues that Beirut would struggle to address alone—including borders, security, transport, and trade.
Consequently, they share a fundamental interest in Syria’s security, a national security priority for Ankara—hence Erdoğan’s willingness to help foster Lebanese-Syrian dialogue—that also offers Lebanon the prospect of better-controlled borders and eased security and economic pressures.
Türkiye seeks to prevent any confrontation with Israel from escalating into a full-scale war, strengthen the Lebanese state and army, and reconnect Lebanon to regional trade and transport networks. A stable Syria could turn Tripoli and Beirut ports, alongside other Lebanese transport and energy infrastructure, into important links in trade corridors linking Türkiye to Syria, the eastern Mediterranean and Arab markets.
These ties are not free of disagreements. Lebanon’s agreement with Cyprus, demarcating their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), sparked Turkish objections—despite Türkiye acknowledging that the area concerned lies beyond its own continental shelf.
Its objection stems primarily from its stance on the Cyprus issue and claims that the agreement disregards the rights of Turkish Cypriots. This highlights another facet of their relationship: as Türkiye’s engagement in Lebanon deepens, Beirut will find itself compelled to balance ties with Ankara against partnerships with other eastern Mediterranean nations.
Türkiye’s Limits
Despite its outreach, Türkiye has not established Lebanon as a direct sphere of influence. The country is a crowded arena: Saudi Arabia has re-established a political presence; the U.S. and France are deeply involved in security and political matters; and Iran retains deep ties with Hezbollah. Türkiye appears to be seeking a role that complements those of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Western nations, rather than competing with them—especially as the Syrian crisis established a foundation for coordination between Ankara and key Arab capitals.
The issue of Hezbollah is testing this approach. Ankara does not advocate for a confrontation with the group, and is instead proposing incorporating the question into a broader settlement that restores the Lebanese state’s monopoly on arms and military decision-making, in exchange for de-escalation and pressure to end Israel’s aggression and occupation.
In this context, it has proposed talks involving Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and the Lebanese government, aimed at transporting Hezbollah’s Bekaa Valley missiles to Iran and removing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) personnel. Through this approach, Türkiye seeks both to curtail Iran’s military influence and strengthen the Lebanese state, without dismantling Hezbollah by force.
The biggest constraint here is Israel. Türkiye’s willingness to participate in post-UNIFIL arrangements comes as its escalating rivalry with Israel in Syria renders any Turkish security presence near the Israeli border highly sensitive. Consequently, Türkiye is better positioned to play a role in the political and security settlement for southern Lebanon than to impose a direct military presence there.
Lebanon is unlikely to experience a rapid expansion of Turkish influence akin to the one seen elsewhere. It is more likely to move gradually, deepening ties with state institutions, enhancing military and security cooperation, increasing economic engagement and consolidating links with Syria. Post-UNIFIL arrangements will serve as a litmus test for its role; Türkiye’s inclusion in a new international framework would mark its evolution from a political and economic partner to an active player within Lebanon’s new security architecture.
Therefore, the question is no longer whether Ankara desires a greater role in Lebanon, but rather how it can cultivate that role without turning the country into another arena for its rivalry with Israel. Its success will hinge on its ability to portray its presence as supporting the Lebanese state and complementing the Arab and international consensus over the country.
Lebanon could therefore present a different model for Türkiye’s new policy in the Levant: a less direct presence than in Syria, yet more institutional and durable than its role in Lebanon over the past 20 years.
