Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani’s July 4 visit to the Lebanese capital came at a highly sensitive moment in the region. It coincided with negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, mounting pressure over Hezbollah’s weaponry, and Arab and regional maneuvering that is reshaping the balance of power in the region—all in the shadow of the transformations fueled by the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran.
Shibani’s trip to Beirut had significant implications, particularly as the U.S. and regional actors have urged Damascus to engage in post-war regional arrangements—whether concerning border security, the future of its relationship with Hezbollah, or the restructuring of Lebanese-Syrian ties based on rules that differ from those that have governed them for decades.
This context raises fundamental questions over Syria’s efforts to redefine its relationship with Hezbollah, open new channels of communication with Lebanon, and manage the transitional phase, as the new regional balance of power demands.
Building New Bridges
The new Syrian leadership has sent messages to Beirut and the rest of the region regarding the nature of its relations with Lebanon, rejecting a return to any military or security role within Lebanon, which the Assad regime dominated from 1976 until 2005. However, Shibani’s visit to Beirut has signaled a notable shift in approach toward the Lebanese file—namely, a readiness to engage with Hezbollah and meet with the Lebanese parliament’s speaker, Nabih Berri.
All this points to a desire on the part of Damascus to establish a different approach toward Lebanon’s Shiite community, following years of estrangement in the shadow of the Syrian civil war. Since President Ahmed Al-Sharaa assumed power with the toppling of Bashar al-Assad, his government has avoided the rhetoric of vengeance against the forces that had long fought alongside the Assad regime—first and foremost, Lebanon’s Shiite armed movement Hezbollah. Damascus has also distanced itself from any attempt to revive any alliances that existed before the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in its relationship with Beirut.
The Syrian leadership has opted for a third path, based on detaching the legacy of the Syrian war from the demands of state-building, and driven by the priorities of restoring domestic stability, attracting investment, and reintegrating Syria into the Arab and regional spheres.
This is also reflected in statements by President Al-Sharaa over the past few months, in which he has emphasized that Syria has no intention of interfering in Lebanese affairs. He has stressed that Lebanon’s future must be determined by the Lebanese themselves through their constitutional institutions, free from any external domination or interference.
This is more than simply a message to the Lebanese audience. Rather, his statements serve as a message to states in the region and internationally that have floated the idea of tasking Damascus with security or political roles within a prospective settlement in Lebanon.
That said, Syria’s refusal to intervene in its neighbor’s affairs does not imply a complete withdrawal from the Lebanese file. Geography, shared borders, and security and economic issues make it difficult for Syria to remain detached from any arrangement concerning Lebanon. Accordingly, the Syrian leadership has adopted an alternative approach, based on political and diplomatic engagement and on building the state’s relations with Lebanon’s various constituent communities—while steering clear of any security or military track that might smack of the “tutelage” that characterized decades of relations between the two countries.
A Pragmatic Approach
Shibani’s meeting with Berri was of paramount importance, not only given the latter’s position within the legislative branch, but also his status as the figure best positioned to manage communication with the Shiite community, as well as his historic relationship with Hezbollah. This made their meeting particularly relevant to reopening channels of dialogue. Through this visit, Damascus signaled a shift in stance: it is prepared to manage, rather than prolong, disputes, and it will not refuse to engage with any Lebanese actor, provided this engagement serves the interests of both nations.
These messages come in the shadow of shared security and strategic challenges facing both countries. Like southern Lebanon, southern Syria is subject to ongoing Israeli occupation and attempts to impose new realities both on the ground and in the political arena.
Furthermore, Damascus views with concern any arrangement that Lebanon might reach directly with Israel, fearing it could disrupt the regional balance of power in a way that disregards Syria’s interests. The Syrian leadership sees the June 26 Lebanese-Israeli framework agreement as more than an internal Lebanese matter, believing instead that the agreement will have direct repercussions for Syrian national security and the future of the conflict with Israel. For Damascus, this necessitates the opening of channels of communication with various Lebanese political forces.
Shibani’s trip to the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli fits into this same context. By visiting a city long associated with the struggle against the Assad regime, he sent a clear political message: the “new Syria” has bases of political and social support within various communities in Lebanon. Furthermore, it emphasized that Syria’s relationship with Lebanon is no longer confined to traditional allies or specific political channels. Instead, it is moving toward engagement with various Lebanese constituencies that view the stability of Syria as a shared interest.
This stop on his visit also reflected a shift in the nature of Syria’s presence in Lebanon. Damascus aims to establish a form of influence based on political rapprochement, economic cooperation, and intertwined interests, in contrast to the security and military influence of the Assad regime up until 2005.
In this light, Shibani’s meeting with Berri and his Tripoli visit were complementary. While the former conveyed a message of engagement with the Shiite community, the latter underscored Syria’s desire to consolidate its presence within Lebanese urban centers that support its new political trajectory. This reflects an approach based on expanding Syria’s communication with diverse Lebanese forces to confront shared challenges—first and foremost, Israel’s expansionism and the redrawing of regional balances of power.
Damascus has recognized that the regional landscape has shifted, and that the stability of its borders and security interests necessitate engagement with key actors in Lebanon, regardless of the nature of their past relationships. Consequently, this engagement embodies a more pragmatic approach, driven by national security considerations and other interests, rather than ideological alignments or traditional alliances.
This dynamic cannot be isolated from the broader regional context. Syria’s rapprochement with its Arab neighbors, Türkiye’s role in fostering de-escalation among various factions, and the interest that Saudi Arabia and Qatar have shown in Lebanon’s stability are all driving the establishment of channels of communication. Such channels serve to minimize the likelihood of confrontation and allow for the management of disputes through political means.
It may be premature to speak of full reconciliation between Damascus and Hezbollah, just as it would be an exaggeration to view the Syrian Foreign Minister’s visit as a definitive turning point in their relationship. Nevertheless, his visit revealed a new approach by Syria, one based on managing Lebanese complexities through the lens of the state rather than regional axes, and on keeping open Syria’s channels of communication with various Lebanese communities.
Given Israel’s ongoing pressure on both southern Lebanon and southern Syria, along with the stalling of efforts toward a settlement between Israel and Lebanon, this engagement may emerge as a key factor in the relationship between Damascus and Beirut—and potentially in the nature of the regional balances that will emerge in the Levant in the months and years ahead.
