Media coverage of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz during the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran has focused overwhelmingly on the disruption of energy supplies to global markets. Yet this narrow waterway also connects Gulf fertilizer producers with farms across Africa, Asia, and beyond. The disruption of these agricultural inputs threatens to increase global hunger while revealing to governments worldwide the risks of organizing critical supply chains around economic efficiency alone. The next global food crisis may not began with a drought, but with the disruption of a shipping route.
The number of people experiencing hunger declined steadily—both as a percentage of the global population and in absolute terms—until 2014. Since then, progress has stalled and, in many places, reversed, driven largely by conflict in countries such as South Sudan, Yemen, and Ethiopia. Unlike those crises, however, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz represents a systemic disruption with global implications. The COVID19 pandemic demonstrated how vulnerable interconnected food systems are when planting, harvesting, processing, transportation, and trade are interrupted. The Hormuz blockade has made visible yet another critical vulnerability: the global fertilizer supply.
Farms around the world rely on agricultural inputs, from seeds to pesticides. Less visible, but equally important, are fertilizers that replenish soil nutrients. Urea, ammonia and sulfur help farmers increase yields. Approximately one-third of the world’s seaborne trade in urea and ammonia fertilizer transits via Hormuz, while roughly half of the world’s seaborne sulfur shipments transit the waterway. Prices for these commodities rose rapidly following the outbreak of conflict. Although the Arabian Peninsula is typically viewed as a net food importer, it occupies a critical node in the global agricultural system because ammonia and urea are produced from natural gas, of which Gulf countries possess abundant reserves.
The importance of these agricultural inputs cannot be overstated. Delayed fertilizer shipment leaving the Gulf today could mean lower maize yields in Kenya, weaker rice harvests in Southeast Asia, or higher wheat prices across North Africa months from now. The World Food Program forecasted that a prolonged conflict in the Gulf could push 45 million people into hunger. Even if the conflict ceases entirely and Hormuz reopens for trade, the impact on the agricultural system will take multiple growing seasons to sort out. That is because agricultural production operates on seasonal cycles, with many countries north of the equator planting in the spring—when the bulk of the disruption took place—affecting the summer and fall harvests. The immediate inflationary and supply shocks, therefore, may represent only the first wave of the blockade’s impact. The United Nations projects that food prices could increase further toward the end of 2026 and into 2027.
In response to these immediate shocks, governments and the World Food Program need to proactively strengthen safety measures. Early warning mechanisms and targeted distribution systems have proven highly effective. Regional approaches to procurement may be more cost-effective and timely. These initiatives will ensure the food is available and accessible for those who are most impacted by immediate disruptions.
Over the medium term, governments and other actors across the food system need to reduce risk by improving domestic production and diversifying import sources. This is more challenging than it may seem. The private sector procures commodities from the lowest-cost providers to maximize profits and remain competitive, often creating concentrated dependence on a small number of supplying countries. Diversifying import sources often requires additional interventions, such establishing strategic food reserves. Stockpiles and reserves need not necessarily be within one’s own borders, particularly for critical exports. Governments can also put in place catalysts to encourage change, such as facilitating the development of new trade networks via exchange visits, bilateral trade agreements, and procurement requirements to support diversification objectives.
One challenge governments now face is deciding which commodities to consider strategic. For ASEAN, there is a regional mechanism for rice distribution during times of emergencies. China has a robust strategic reserve for a wide range of commodities. Many governments are likely asking themselves whether fertilizer should also be included on their strategic reserve lists. Qatar recognized the risk by incorporating fertilizer into its strategic reserve in the national food strategy of 2018. Strategic reserves provide valuable buffers against supply disruptions, although they also involve significant financial and logistical costs. There is no one-size-fits-all model for establishing and operating them, but the Hormuz blockade experience is likely to encourage more governments to establish strategic reserves or expand existing ones.
Strategic reserves, however, only buy time; they do not eliminate vulnerability. Diversification is not just about purchasing from different suppliers. It is also about transforming how critical inputs are produced. Over the longer term, reducing dependence on geographically concentrated fertilizer production will require investment in new technologies, alternative agricultural inputs, and farming systems that rely less heavily on conventional fertilizers. Investing in innovations that can transform systems can create economic advantages well beyond domestic resilience.
The Iran war and the geopolitical tensions that resulted from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz had an immediate shock on global energy markets. Yet this framing captures only part of the story. In addition to hydrocarbons, Hormuz is a vital route for fertilizers, sulfur, aluminum, helium, polymers, and other strategic commodities. Disruptions to these supply chains have implications that extend well beyond energy, affecting food security, healthcare, advanced manufacturing, and technology. Helium shortages, for example, threaten everything from MRI machines to semiconductor production.
These interconnected disruptions are also reshaping how governments think about governance itself. In years past, policymakers prioritized efficiency, lean supply chains, and minimizing costs. The Hormuz blockade experience has reinforced the importance of resilience, redundancy, and strategic flexibility. Governments are increasingly recognizing that essential systems cannot be managed solely according to market efficiency when geopolitical shocks can disrupt critical supplies overnight. The closure of Hormuz ultimately reveals a broader lesson: governments can no longer govern solely for efficiency. They must govern for resilience. The future belongs not to the countries that can operate at the lowest cost, but to those that can absorb shocks, adapt quickly, and keep essential systems functioning when disruptions occur.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Middle East Council on Global Affairs.
