Although the memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the United States and Iran has been faltering since the moment it was signed, there is no longer a question for the Gulf states over whether an agreement can be reached, but rather the nature of such an agreement. That includes not just its nuclear program but its ability to rein in the behavior of regional actors within Iran’s network of influence, as well as its limitations.
The Gulf states’ public support for diplomacy reflects less a sense of reassurance than a realization that all-out war is simply not practical. Conversely, there is a growing conviction among Gulf leaders that any truce that neglects the issues of missiles, drones, and maritime security will likely collapse at the first test. The most recent violation of the ceasefire and MoU is a case in point, as Iran quickly responded to U.S. strikes not by targeting the U.S. or even Israel, but Kuwait and Bahrain.
The Gulf position can be summarized in a single equation: de-escalation is necessary, but it is not sufficient. Although any de-escalation with Iran is a strategic gain, at the same time, any agreement limited solely to the nuclear issue is a partial one, and any understanding that fails to address the reality of the regional threat posed by Iran through its proxies leaves the crisis without a real solution.
A Single Threat System
The basic problem is that Washington tends to compartmentalize the issues on the table, while Gulf states see the Iranian threat as an interconnected system—one that cannot be dismantled by pursuing American interests while deliberately ignoring those of Iran’s Gulf neighbors.
Furthermore, recent experiences of war and truce suggest that the Gulf states are not dealing with a coherent American administration that takes clear decisions; rather, they are learning how to navigate the tendencies of a president who is an expert in breaking agreements and dragging his allies—and even his own country—into conflict they do not seek.
Further still, there appears to be a fundamental shift in the nature of the threat Gulf states are facing. Tehran does not always respond directly to U.S. or Israeli attacks, but appears to be taking revenge on the Gulf states and attempting to drag them into the war, as indicated by recent attacks against Bahrain and Kuwait, as well as sporadic strikes on other Gulf states.
Washington’s ongoing targeting of Iranian energy facilities, bridges and other infrastructure, followed by Iran’s systematically directed and timed attacks, have turned the Gulf from a sideshow into the immediate sphere of the conflict. This transformation is redefining regional security. Vital regional infrastructure is now directly threatened, meaning that any understanding about Iran will have direct repercussions within the Gulf.
Over the course of the war, it has become clear that it will end with two parties at the table: Washington and Tehran. Despite the Gulf states bearing the brunt of the war, Washington initially sought to woo them to bear the financial burdens of the conflict, later shifting to demanding that Iran pay compensation and suggesting using frozen Iranian assets to compensate Washington’s Gulf allies.
Simultaneously, U.S. rhetoric has shifted from containing the escalation to weakening Iran’s strategic infrastructure, and back to talk of negotiations. Nevertheless, the agreement under discussion makes clear that Iran will emerge from the war strategically stronger, because the U.S. is waging it according to a fluctuating set of its own interests, rather than to protect its allies from the threats they face.
For the Gulf states, the nuclear file is no longer the primary source of concern. Three areas have become apparent that are even more sensitive: the security of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz; Iran’s ballistic missiles; and its network of drone-armed, non-state actors. From a Gulf perspective, these elements pose an immediate threat that is more pressing than any far-off nuclear danger. Therefore, any deal will be judged by the region on the practical question: Does it make the Gulf states safer, or render them pawns in an agreement that can be annulled overnight?
Between Two Contradictory Currents
Iran’s regional behavior cannot be separated from its domestic dynamics and the precarious balance between two camps: pragmatists, who see the easing of sanctions and a measure of external engagement as economically vital for regime survival; and a security-ideological camp that considers Iran’s regional network as an indispensable deterrent. This distinction has clear implications beyond the domestic sphere, playing a key role in negotiations with the West and driving intermittent escalations in Iran’s spheres of influence, as well as the use of external tension as a tool to reset the domestic balance.
As such, the Gulf states feel that no agreement can be trusted in the absence of a unified Iranian decision-making structure that makes its intentions clear. Otherwise, Tehran’s actions will always be questioned over whether they are building toward positive relations and the principle of good neighborliness or returning to the path of exporting the revolution and a continued preference for extremism and ideological interventionism.
Realism and Caution in the Gulf
The Gulf states recognize that the U.S. is reordering its strategic priorities, scaling back its direct military involvement in the Middle East to focus on Asia and Europe, and shifting toward managing crises rather than seeking to resolve them. Naturally, this shift does not imply a total withdrawal. Rather, it signifies a redefinition of U.S. deterrence, replacing direct security guarantees with a policy of “managing balances.” This inevitably undermines the Gulf states’ faith in U.S. guarantees, prompting them to diversify their international partnerships, bolster their indigenous defense capabilities, and seek more varied security arrangements. As the American commitment wanes, China and Russia are stepping in.
Yet the question remains: can lasting regional stability be achieved in the absence of clear deterrence?
While specific approaches vary among Gulf states, they share much in common. Saudi Arabia has supported a de-escalation deal, provided it encompasses broader security issues. Qatar has backed diplomacy as an opportunity for stability. The UAE has prioritized military readiness as a prerequisite for stability; Bahrain has emphasized the security umbrella; Kuwait has stressed neighborly relations and non-interference.
While the formulations differ, the essence remains consistent: There can be no agreement without comprehensive security, and no de-escalation without verifiable guarantees—principles repeatedly undermined by the U.S., Israel, and Iran alike.
Western and Arab perspectives largely converge on three key conclusions. First, while diplomatic agreements help contain and de-escalate tensions, they have failed to address the root causes of the conflict and resolve them in the long term. Second, the Gulf states back diplomacy, but remain skeptical of its effectiveness in the absence of enforceable guarantees. Third, despite interim political understandings, the risk of renewed escalation remains, in the absence of a comprehensive approach to tackling the region’s intertwined issues.
While the West views the objective as managing stability, the core problem from an Arab perspective is the absence of tangible security guarantees—especially given Israeli pressure on the Trump administration to reignite tensions whenever they subside, driven by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s desire to continue the regional destruction initiated by the war on Gaza, accelerate Israel’s expansion, and drag the Gulf into endless conflict.
Consequently, the rest of Trump’s term is unlikely to resolve Iran’s regional role. His administration—with its wildly vacillating, contradictory rhetoric—is geared more toward reconfiguring threat-management mechanisms than forging a comprehensive agreement that addresses the root causes of the conflict and bolsters regional security.
Gulf states realize this, viewing the deal on the table as limited, lacking in implementation mechanisms, and detached from Iran’s regional conduct and its persistent threat to regional security and stability.
The Gulf states believe that any agreement with Iran must recognize that while de-escalation is vital, it is not a substitute for lasting security. Genuine stability will require neighborly relations grounded in binding agreements with clear terms of implementation, ensuring a system of enduring deterrence—rather than interim understandings designed to manage tensions.
