During a recent television interview with Tamir Hayman, Israel’s former military intelligence chief mentioned that Israel had hoped to pressure Tehran at the outset of the war it launched with the United States in late February by instigating a Kurdish insurgency inside Iran. Hayman claimed, however, that this “centerpiece” of a wider plan to bring down the Islamic Republic was thwarted by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who persuaded U.S. President Donald Trump to abandon it.
While the Kurdish decision not to mobilize likely had multiple reasons, the anecdote points to a broader reality taking shape in the Middle East: Türkiye is increasingly acting as an obstacle to Israeli regional objectives.
This dynamic is most visible in Syria, where the collapse of the Assad regime created both opportunities and risks for regional powers. While Israel has since sought to prevent the emergence of a consolidated central authority to preserve its maximum freedom of action, Türkiye has prioritized the restoration of a functioning Syrian state capable of stabilizing the country and limiting the spread of conflict. These competing objectives have transformed Syria into the principal arena of a growing Turkish-Israeli rivalry, with both sides also working to shape U.S. policy toward their own ends.
Syria as the Central Arena
Shortly after the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, Syria became the foreground of Turkish-Israeli competition. Israel moved quickly to expand its military footprint in southern Syria, ostensibly to establish a security buffer zone extending beyond its existing illegal occupation of the Golan Heights. In so doing, Israel restricted the deployment of Syrian armed forces to the south as it stoked sectarian tensions in the Druze-majority region, while also encouraging an Alawite insurgency against the Al-Sharaa government in the country’s west.
In the northeast, Israel reportedly established discreet contacts with Kurdish factions, offering assurances of support. Israel’s air force also conducted strikes against Syrian military infrastructure, ports, and, in what was widely interpreted as a warning signal, government buildings in close proximity to the presidential palace in Damascus.
Ankara recognized that these actions risked entrenching ethno-sectarian divisions and foreclosing prospects for a stable Syria, posing direct security risks for itself. Turkish policymakers have long argued that instability in neighboring states ultimately spills across borders through terrorism, refugee flows, economic disruption, and transnational armed groups. As a result, Ankara’s priority has been the consolidation of state authority under the government of Ahmad al-Sharaa and the reintegration of Syria’s fragmented territories into a single political framework.
These differing positions with Israel produced a series of indirect confrontations. Turkish diplomatic efforts initially focused on legitimizing Al-Sharaa and his government in the international arena, which bore fruit when U.S. President Trump recognized the Syrian leader, with other world leaders following suit.
On the security front, Erdogan persuaded Trump to authorize the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria. At the same time, Turkish military assistance enabled the Syrian armed forces to suppress the Alawi insurgency and to pursue the integration of SDF elements into the national army structure. As a result, with the exception of the Druze region in the south, Syrian central authority has progressively been extended across the country’s territory. Notably, Ankara has also persuaded Washington not to enlist the help of al-Sharaa’s government in confronting Hezbollah in Lebanon, as Trump had recently suggested publicly.
From Israel’s perspective, however, the emergence of a more capable and unified Syrian state presents its own challenges. For decades, Israel has operated in an environment where neighboring states were weakened by internal conflict and political fragmentation. A more coherent Syria could eventually constrain Israel’s military freedom of action and alter the regional balance.
Why Does Türkiye Counter Israeli Regional Strategy?
Observing Türkiye’s role in disrupting its regional plans, Israeli frustration toward Ankara has grown considerably. A closer analysis, however, suggests that Türkiye’s actions are less a deliberate challenge to Israel and more an expression of its own security imperatives.
Türkiye has borne substantial costs from instability in neighboring states. Ankara could not remain passive in the face of what it perceives as destabilizing external interventions along its periphery. Its engagement in neighboring conflicts is therefore driven by considerations of security, economic continuity, and domestic order. Inaction, the Turkish calculus suggests, would ultimately invite turmoil inside Türkiye itself. Accordingly, Ankara has opted for an assertive regional posture, one that, by its nature, frequently runs counter to Israeli objectives in the broader region.
At the same time, international denunciation of Israel’s regional conduct, including from Donald Trump, is intensifying. Critics argue that continued militarization and territorial expansion do not serve the conditions for durable peace. From this perspective, Türkiye’s interventions may be understood as an attempt to uphold a regional equilibrium that most international actors nominally endorse. The broader economic ramifications of prolonged regional conflict—including elevated energy prices, for some—further underscore the argument that instability in the Middle East carries costs well beyond the immediate theater.
What Comes Next?
The covert dimension of Türkiye-Israel rivalry has given way to increasingly open contestation, with the risk of military confrontation no longer a remote scenario. Unsettled by Türkiye’s pro-Palestinian stance, Erdogan’s critical rhetoric toward Israeli leadership, and Ankara’s continued disruption of Israeli regional plans, Israeli officials have begun publicly characterizing Türkiye as an emerging threat following the Iran campaign. The language employed by Israeli officials has grown notably more adversarial, with Turkish counterparts following suit.
The growing antagonism has been reflected in each side’s media, where intense criticism of the other has become commonplace. Erdogan has also deliberately shifted his tone in recent public statements, explicitly asserting that Israeli military operations in Syria and Lebanon threaten Türkiye, which marks a departure from the more restrained messaging of earlier periods and carries the implicit warning of consequences.
This evolution did not occur abruptly. Ankara tolerated years of Israeli military operations in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Iran within certain thresholds. However, Israel’s deepening ties with Cyprus and Greece, which Türkiye interprets as an effort to contain it, appear to have materially shifted Turkish threat perceptions. Türkiye suspects that Israeli access to military bases in Cyprus and various Greek islands is intended to provide forward launch positions in the event of a war. There is also awareness in Ankara that Israeli lobbying efforts have, on occasion, sought to complicate Türkiye’s standing within NATO structures.
The transition from covert rivalry to open contention, therefore, reflects structural pressures on both sides. Türkiye’s objections are rooted in opposition to what it characterizes as Israeli expansionism, rather than any desire for armed conflict. Israel, for its part, appears increasingly resistant to the emergence of a Muslim-majority power that could meaningfully constrain its freedoms of action and expansion. Ankara’s public signaling—that it closely monitors Israeli plans, capabilities, and intentions—functions as a form of strategic communication intended to challenge Israel’s threats.
Nevertheless, the risk of miscalculation should not be dismissed. While previous periods of tension between the two states were ultimately managed through diplomatic channels and third-party mediation, the current environment is complicated by Israel’s confidence following its tactical military successes after October 7, its increasingly close working relationship with Washington, and its deepened security ties with Greece and Cyprus. This combination may contribute to Israel’s perception that strategic constraints on its actions have loosened.
The danger lies not in a single crisis, but in the accumulation of unresolved disputes across multiple arenas. Syria has become the focal point of Turkish-Israeli competition, but it is no longer the only one. Growing disagreements over regional security, the Palestinian issue, the Eastern Mediterranean, and each country’s relationship with Washington are steadily widening the gap between the two sides. As both Türkiye and Israel become more explicit in identifying the other as an obstacle to their regional ambitions, the rivalry is likely to become more visible, more consequential, and more difficult to contain. The future of Syria may be its immediate battleground, but the contest itself is increasingly about the shape of the regional order that emerges beyond it.
