The ongoing military escalation between Washington and Tehran could be a prelude to an open-ended confrontation with even more dangerous regional consequences. Such a prospect should compel regional states to raise their level of preparedness to protect their political, economic, and security interests. Yet Baghdad—the capital most exposed to the repercussions of these developments—remains governed by a political system mired in peripheral disputes and superficial measures that fail to address the root causes of the grave, multifaceted crises looming ahead.
Baghdad’s lack of preparedness stems from several factors, including the war’s effects on the government’s financial resources. Most notably, however, the structural fragility of the Iraqi state and the fragmentation of its decision-making authority are a stark reminder of the dangers that could materialize should a full-scale regional confrontation erupt. Some armed groups remain capable of operating outside the mechanisms established by Iraq’s official security institutions, and they pay little heed to the rhetoric of “neutrality,” treating it as a slogan that can be disregarded without consequence.
Outlaw armed militias have recently rejected calls to surrender their weapons outright, while some have issued cryptic signals in an apparent attempt to exploit the anticipated September deadline—the date agreed upon for the “complete withdrawal” of foreign forces. Baghdad now appears headed for an increasingly difficult confrontation with an emboldened militia establishment whose power extends across the military, political, parliamentary, and economic spheres. Yet no plan exists to contain a departure from the established course—whether under a scenario of open confrontation, a refusal by the militias to disarm, or a decision by the U.S. administration not to withdraw its troops, justified by the need to protect companies and uphold agreements, some of them signed during Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s recent visit to Washington.
Iraq’s “domestic resilience” suffers from an underlying weakness, particularly in the aftermath of what became known as the “Dawn Offensive,” a sweeping anti-corruption campaign launched by al-Zaidi that has led to the arrest of dozens of individuals, including current and former lawmakers. The campaign created deep fissures within the ruling political establishment, leading some forces to believe that they alone were being targeted while others feared that they would be next. The result has been a crisis of confidence within Iraq’s political blocs—one that could translate into institutional disarray and an inability to manage state bodies or maintain control over critical decisions.
Against this backdrop, Baghdad has plunged into a profound and alarming economic crisis. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the sharp decline in Iraqi oil exports, which account for roughly 90 percent of the state’s budget, have left the government unable to devise swift solutions to avert public anger that could erupt at any moment—particularly if the crisis begins to affect the salaries of public-sector employees and pensioners, as well as the vast numbers of Iraqis dependent on social welfare.
Externally, tensions in Iraq’s relations with the international community and neighboring countries—particularly the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—are increasingly apparent, as reflected in recent Saudi and American responses. These strains coincide with recurring allegations that attacks against those countries have been launched from Iraqi territory. Taken together, these crises present a dangerous outlook: should the region slide into another war, Baghdad could find itself virtually isolated abroad and bereft of leverage at home.
Meanwhile, the United States is intensifying its military build-up in the Middle East, with dozens of strikes concentrated around the Iranian city of Ahvaz, near the Iraqi border and close to the Gulf states. Israel has also raised its level of military readiness, potentially laying the groundwork for a return to direct participation in the war.
Another development—whose dangers to the region have received comparatively little attention—is the formal launch of Israel’s election campaign following the dissolution of the Knesset. Israel has now entered a decisive 90-day period leading up to the vote. With Benjamin Netanyahu facing mounting and multifaceted domestic pressure over his political future, he could resort to major escalatory measures as a means of escaping his predicament at home.
An Israeli return to the fight would deepen the conflict’s complexity and could prompt Iran to mobilize affiliated groups across the region, particularly in Iraq—among the countries most exposed to the fallout of further escalation. This risk is compounded by the presence of U.S. interests on Iraqi soil and by outlaw militias’ continued possession of missiles and drones that could be used against American assets or Gulf states.
During the initial 40-day phase of the war, Baghdad failed to prevent the outlaw militias from joining the escalation, raising the prospect that they could repeat the scenario in any future confrontation. Al-Zaidi—who held lengthy talks with U.S. President Donald Trump and made numerous commitments to rein in the militias and bring all weapons under state control—would face a serious predicament: all his assurances to Washington could unravel the moment the first drone is launched from Iraqi territory.
Trump, who is seeking swift results, may then conclude that the Iraqi government is being evasive and merely buying time, without asserting effective control or taking tangible action on the ground.
These developments, for which Baghdad appears wholly unprepared, could plunge the country into a sovereignty crisis no less dangerous than those it has faced in the past. Should drones or missiles be launched from Iraqi territory, the United States and Israel would have a pretext to strike inside Iraqi cities, as occurred previously when the headquarters, weapons depots, and commanders of armed militias were targeted. The Iraqi government would also face diplomatic and economic pressure, and potentially U.S. sanctions against individuals and institutions believed to support militia activities.
The danger is no longer hypothetical. The attacks on Kuwait’s Abdali area—particularly amid allegations that Iraqi groups were responsible—along with other attacks that Saudi Arabia and Jordan allege were launched from Iraqi territory, place Baghdad on a direct collision course with its Gulf neighbors. Baghdad’s tendency to respond to such complaints by merely forming investigative committees exposes the official establishment’s inability to exercise control on the ground. It also sends an unmistakable signal that decisions of war and peace lie beyond the authority of state institutions—particularly if the escalation reaches a level at which Iran considers every option to be on the table.
The problem is not confined to the official authorities; it extends to political forces as well, particularly the Coordination Framework, a council of major Shia parties that has so far demonstrated its inability to rein in the outlaw militias refusing to surrender their weapons. The bloc’s already strained relationship with the government, amid the latter’s anti-corruption campaign, could become a further liability if Washington concludes that Iraq’s assurances are not matched by concrete action on the ground.
The Iraqi government’s reliance on limited, reciprocal strikes against these groups is a potentially disastrous gamble that could unravel rapidly. Baghdad must recognize that the current moment no longer allows for verbal assurances to external parties and cautious observation. It requires an immediate shift toward strategic planning and urgent action, free from the miscalculations that have consistently left Iraq reacting to events rather than anticipating them and protecting its national interests.
An “open confrontation” scenario requires Baghdad to establish a high-level crisis center immediately and raise its readiness to protect critical infrastructure such as airports, oil installations, and diplomatic missions. It must also tighten surveillance along the borders and at suspected missile- and drone-launch sites; conduct a transparent investigation into the Abdali incident in coordination with Kuwait; activate direct channels of communication with Washington, Tehran, and the Gulf capitals to reaffirm that Iraqi territory may not be used to launch attacks; and mobilize a unified domestic political position that confronts those internal forces unilaterally dragging the country into war.
The coming hours and days will be a genuine test of the new government’s ability to defend Iraq’s sovereignty, prevent the country from becoming an arena for settling regional scores, and retain control over decisions of war and peace. Rapid developments on the ground demand that the government move beyond merely monitoring events, by developing emergency plans and building the resilience needed to withstand the storms ahead.
The turbulent history of this region—and Iraq’s own experience—has taught us that regional crises do not permit cost-free neutrality. A state that cannot deny the use of its airspace and territory, that fails to strengthen its “domestic resilience,” and that is deemed incapable of exercising effective authority will inevitably share the cost of the conflict and become one of its victims.
