The joint U.S.–Israeli strikes against Iran that began February 28—culminating in the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—sent shockwaves through the Middle East and immediately raised fears of a wider regional war. Within hours, those fears appeared justified. Tehran retaliated not only against the United States and Israel but broadened its battlefield to include the Gulf states, launching ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and waves of drones across the region.
Despite the scale of Iran’s response, however, the Gulf did not descend into chaos, nor were its states drawn directly into the conflict. Physical damage remained limited, casualties were relatively few, and daily life largely continued. The reason is increasingly clear: the Gulf’s expensive air and missile defense systems have performed largely as intended, and its militaries have operated them effectively.
For years, Gulf defense spending was dismissed by critics as excessive or prestige-driven. But the current crisis has demonstrated the strategic logic behind these investments. By successfully intercepting incoming threats and protecting civilian populations and critical infrastructure, Gulf defense systems have allowed regional states to maintain strategic restraint—remaining outside a war they neither started nor wish to fight.
Defensive denial in practice
For more than a decade, Gulf states have invested heavily in modern air and missile defense systems, building layered architectures centered on anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. These investments are now demonstrating their operational value.
Across the region, defensive systems have engaged a wide spectrum of incoming threats: ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, loitering munitions, one-way attack drones, and even tactical aircraft. Early detection, multi-domain interception, and coordinated engagement have worked together to shield civilian populations, military installations, and critical infrastructure from Iranian strikes.
Initial operational data illustrates the scale of the defensive effort. Iran has launched more projectiles toward the Gulf states than toward Israel, despite presenting Israel—and the U.S.—as its principal adversaries in the conflict. Yet interception rates across the region have exceeded 90 percent in most categories.
As a result, the vast majority of targeted infrastructure—including airports, energy facilities, and urban areas—has remained operational. Where facilities were temporarily closed, it was largely for precautionary reasons rather than because of successful strikes. Iran’s strategic objective of creating widespread disruption and panic across the Gulf has therefore largely failed.
This experience highlights an important strategic concept: defensive denial. The ability to blunt incoming attacks reduces the immediate pressure on states to escalate in response. When governments can protect their citizens and critical infrastructure, they gain the strategic space to exercise restraint rather than retaliation.
In this sense, the Gulf’s defensive capabilities are not merely military tools. They function as stabilizing instruments during moments of crisis, allowing states to absorb aggression without being forced into direct participation in an unnecessary war.
Limits of missile warfare
Operational data from the current conflict also sheds light on the evolving balance between offensive and defensive capabilities in modern warfare.
Interception rates for ballistic and cruise missiles have been particularly high. In several engagements, defensive systems achieved near-total neutralization of incoming salvos. However, the data also reveals some gaps when it comes to countering one-way attack drones, which remain more difficult to intercept due to their low altitude, slower speeds, and smaller radar signatures.
These challenges are already prompting adaptation. Gulf militaries are rapidly integrating new capabilities, refining tactics, techniques, and procedures, and deploying additional systems to address these vulnerabilities. The current conflict will likely accelerate efforts to develop more robust sovereign capabilities to counter evolving drone threats.
Another key lesson from the crisis has been the importance of early warning systems and civil defense mechanisms. In Qatar, continuous communication with the public across multiple platforms played a critical role in reducing casualties during missile interception events.
Most reported injuries were not caused by direct strikes but by falling shrapnel and debris from successful interceptions. In many cases, injuries occurred when individuals failed to follow shelter-in-place directives. This underscores the importance of public preparedness and civil defense infrastructure as essential components of a comprehensive defensive architecture.
A conflict that will leave a scar
Even when the current conflict eventually subsides, its political consequences for Gulf–Iran relations will likely endure.
The repeated targeting of Gulf states by Iranian missiles, drones, and aircraft—particularly against civilian infrastructure, airports, and energy facilities—will inevitably shape regional threat perceptions for years to come. These experiences will likely influence Gulf policy toward Iran long after the immediate crisis ends.
Indeed, Gulf–Iran relations may now be at their lowest point in decades, potentially even more strained than during the 1980s, when the Gulf Cooperation Council was first established in response to perceived Iranian threats in the wake of the Islamic Revolution.
Another major lesson from the conflict has been the importance of long-standing security partnerships between Gulf states and Western allies. The effectiveness of regional air and missile defense networks reflects decades of cooperation, joint training, and defense acquisitions with Western partners.
In some cases, these partnerships have translated directly into operational support. British fighter aircraft, for example, have reportedly participated in intercepting Iranian drones and cruise missiles as part of the Qatar–United Kingdom joint Typhoon squadron.
Far from reflecting dependency, these partnerships increasingly resemble mutual security arrangements in which allied capabilities reinforce regional defense systems and help close critical capability gaps during moments of crisis.
The events of this war also serve as a powerful counterargument to longstanding criticism of Gulf defense spending. While these investments are indeed substantial, the current threat environment demonstrates their necessity. In a region where missile and drone threats are persistent and escalating, robust defensive capabilities are not a luxury—they are a strategic requirement.
What more can be done?
Several policy lessons have emerged from this episode.
First, Gulf states should maintain the strategic restraint they have demonstrated thus far and avoid being drawn into direct participation in a war they did not start. Defensive denial—protecting territory and deflecting aggression without escalation—should remain the guiding principle.
Second, the operational data generated during this conflict represents a valuable strategic resource. Gulf militaries have long planned for precisely this type of scenario. The real-world performance of defensive systems will provide crucial insights into emerging threats, adversary tactics, and areas requiring further technological development. These lessons should inform future research and development as well as procurement decisions.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the crisis highlights the need for deeper GCC defense integration, particularly in air and missile defense. Greater coordination in early warning systems, intelligence sharing, joint procurement, and synchronized defensive architectures would significantly enhance regional resilience.
Strategic uncertainty ahead
The broader trajectory of the war remains uncertain. Iran’s military capabilities appear to be steadily degrading under sustained U.S. strikes. Yet the post-conflict landscape may bring its own risks.
One potential danger is the possibility of state collapse or severe instability within Iran. The collapse of state authority—similar to what occurred in Iraq or Syria—would introduce a new and unpredictable source of regional instability.
Another factor is the potential for Israeli regional policy to shift if Iran is significantly weakened or fragmented. An emboldened Israel operating in a transformed strategic environment could introduce additional uncertainties for the Gulf states.
From a strategic foresight perspective, the regional order is already undergoing profound change. Gulf policymakers will need to carefully assess how these shifts will reshape the Middle East’s security landscape.
An Iran weakened or destabilized, alongside a more assertive Israel, could both represent future sources of instability. In response, Gulf states may find it increasingly important to strengthen relations with other middle powers in Europe and East Asia—countries that are also deeply affected when the norms of the rules-based international order come under strain.
If current trends continue, the coming decade is likely to present even greater challenges to that order—and to the stability of the Middle East.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Middle East Council on Global Affairs.
