The American public has delivered a crushing verdict on Donald Trump’s second-term presidency so far, handing Democrats an historic victory that swept Republicans from control of both houses of Congress. The scale and scope of the defeat were stunning. Democrats won Senate races in deep Republican strongholds like Texas, Kansas, and South Carolina—in some cases by huge margins—while even capturing some congressional districts deliberately redrawn to protect Republican incumbents. Neither unprecedented campaign spending nor aggressive gerrymandering could withstand the electoral “tsunami” widely considered an indictment of the president rather than an endorsement of the opposition.
Trump returned to office in 2025 promising to keep America out of foreign wars, restore economic prosperity, and “drain the swamp.” Instead, he dragged the country into a costly war with Iran, which disrupted global energy markets and sent the prices of gasoline and basic goods soaring.
Although the war was central to Trump’s unpopularity, it was not the Republicans’ only liability ahead of November 3. The president’s damaging tariff policy, the naked corruption of his administration, and his apparent indifference to the growing economic hardships of Americans all contributed to his evaporating support. While households struggled with rising prices as a result of his policies, Trump appeared preoccupied with building a White House ballroom, attaching his name to Washington landmarks, and monetizing his pardoning power. The contrast between his populist promises and presidential priorities became a source of deep anger and resentment.
But the election’s most consequential question now concerns what Trump does next in the Middle East. For months, he has discussed the midterms as a turning point in the direction of the war. Does the catastrophe of this political defeat now convince him to end his military misadventure, or does it drive him to escalate in a desperate attempt to salvage his legacy?
There are compelling reasons to believe the midterm results could push him toward a negotiated settlement. The war has become a political albatross for Trump and his party, and prolonging it risks compounding the damage ahead of the 2028 presidential election—campaigning for which, in effect, begins now. Potential Republican candidates, including Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, have strong incentives to distance themselves and the party from a conflict that has undermined their credibility with voters. This could create powerful restraining forces within Trump’s own cabinet.
In a surprise move, JD Vance posted on X the morning after the election that the sole reason for the loss—which he said Trump also admitted—was the war, while defending those calling for a diplomatic resolution to the conflict.
Trump himself may conclude that the costs of continuing outweigh whatever political or strategic benefits he might still hope to extract. Having failed to achieve his objectives through military force, he could try to salvage an agreement that allows him to end the self-defeating crisis and move on.
Yet the opposite calculation is equally plausible. Trump may regard the election as evidence that he has little left to lose politically. With Democrats controlling Congress, his domestic legislative agenda will face significant obstacles, while congressional investigations into corruption allegations could consume much of his remaining presidency. Foreign policy, where presidents enjoy considerably greater latitude, may become one of the few arenas in which he can still exercise power relatively unconstrained.
More dangerously, Trump may believe that the only way to rescue his legacy—and to protect Israel’s regional balance of power—is to create a different military outcome. Rather than accepting a negotiated settlement that leaves Iran with significant strategic leverage, he could conclude that renewed military escalation offers his last opportunity to secure the decisive victory that has eluded him.
Far from resolving the uncertainty of what to do, the election has created new incentives for the opposing choices. Trump has been given an undeniable popular referendum on ending the war, but potentially fewer political restraints against escalating it. For Iran and the Gulf states, whose security and economic futures remain hostage to the White House’s decisions, this choice is profoundly consequential.
The election is also an indictment of the traditional U.S.-Israel relationship and the influence of the pro-Israel lobby in American politics, which are viewed as key reasons Trump went to war in Iran. The sweeping results could portend a significant shift in the relationship’s dynamics.
Candidates critical of Israel and unconditional American support scored important victories, most notably Senators Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan and Troy Jackson in Maine. Their success came despite extraordinary spending by pro-Israel political organizations, including AIPAC, whose efforts to defeat critics of Israel were largely unsuccessful. The results suggest that the political costs of challenging the U.S.-Israel relationship have diminished considerably, while defending it unconditionally has become an increasingly difficult position to sustain.
Even Trump appears to recognize the changing political landscape. On election day morning, he announced that the United States would terminate its $3.8 billion in annual military assistance to Israel by year’s end, explicitly citing the political vulnerability created by candidates like El-Sayed. Whether this was a last-minute electoral ploy or a genuine policy commitment remains unclear. The existing assistance agreement runs through 2028, and Trump offered no explanation of how it would be terminated. Moreover, ending the current aid framework could simply be a sleight of hand as the military funding simply moves from Congress to the Pentagon.
Nevertheless, the announcement was revealing. A president who has been among Israel’s most unwavering supporters openly framed America’s longstanding military assistance as a political liability.
How deep this change goes will depend, in part, on the composition and priorities of the incoming Democratic Party-led Congress. The party’s electoral coalition encompasses progressives seeking a fundamental reassessment of American support for Israel and more centrist establishment Democrats who may remain committed to the relationship, even if they feel compelled to support superficial changes. The contest between these factions will help determine whether the election produces a fundamentally different relationship or one designed simply to placate the Democratic base’s increasingly negative opinion of Israel.
For AIPAC and the larger ecosystem of pro-Israel advocacy groups, the election represents a significant defeat, but not necessarily a decisive one. Their resources remain considerable, and the struggle over the relationship’s future is still in its early stages.
Finally, the Republican rout should not be mistaken for the demise of the MAGA movement. The populist, nativist, and isolationist sentiments that propelled Trump to power have not disappeared. If anything, the election may demonstrate their continued strength, particularly the desire to avoid military adventurism.
Trump was punished for betraying one of the core principles of his movement by initiating a war of choice against Iran. No matter how hard he tried to portray the military campaign as necessary to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program, most voters clearly disagreed. Yet that rebuke does not equate to an endorsement of the Republican neoconservatism that MAGA originally stood against, just as it likely exposes the unpopularity of the liberal interventionism long championed by elements of the Democratic establishment.
That distinction matters enormously for the future of American engagement in the Middle East, especially for a region irrevocably altered by the current conflict with Iran. For now, the issue is whether Trump interprets this overwhelming defeat as a warning to cut his losses or as a final opportunity to gamble for victory.
In Vance’s X post responding to the election, he outlines four steps he says would bring disillusioned Trump voters back to the party in 2028: ending the war, focusing on the cost of living, putting America first, and changing the U.S. relationship with Israel. The midterm results have made ending the conflict a political imperative for Trump’s prospective successors. But for a president with no electoral future to protect, the temptation to seek vindication on the battlefield may prove stronger still.
