By any standard of the American presidency, the first 100 days of Donald Trump’s second term have been eventful, to say the least. From the dismantling of government institutions to the imposition of protectionist trade policies to the launching of negotiations with Iran and Russia, the implications of Trump’s early agenda have been far reaching beyond America’s borders. To give a better understanding of what the past 15 weeks have meant for the Middle East and North Africa, or signaled what may be coming for the region over the remainder of Trump’s four years in office, Afkār has collected commentary from more than a dozen scholars from the Middle East Council on Global Affairs. In this Council Views, we share insights and analysis on everything from the effects of trade tariffs and energy policy for Gulf oil exporters to sanctions on Syria and the future of Gaza.
–Omar H. Rahman, Editor
Contents
Navigating the Trump Administration’s Tumultuous Tariff Policies – Nader Kabbani
USAID and the Collapse of U.S. Foreign Aid – Paul Dyer
What to Expect from Trump’s Visit to the Gulf – Frédéric Schneider
An Aggressive Mideast Posture Risks Long-term Stability for Short-term Deterrence – Rashid al-Mohanadi
From Pressure to Talks: Reviving U.S.-Iran Diplomacy – Hamidreza Azizi
The Path of Least Resistance and Most Repression – Mouin Rabbani
Trump’s Policy Toward Iran – Mahjoob Zweiri
The Growing Appeal of Homegrown Security Frameworks – Rory Miller
The End of the Affair: Europe on Its Own – Dalia Ghanem
The GCC Walks a Tight Rope Between China and the U.S. – Adel Abdel Ghafar
Trump’s Syria Stalemate Is Undermining the Country’s Transition – Haid Haid
Erdogan and Trump, Again: Between Tactical Praise and Political Peril – Özge Genç
The Maghreb’s Strategic Dance in the U.S.-China Rivalry – Yahia H. Zoubir
The Limitations of Washington’s Yemen Policy – Faozi Al-Goidi
Navigating the Trump Administration’s Tumultuous Tariff Policies
Since assuming office in January 2025, the Trump administration has used the threat of higher tariffs as a means of negotiating new trade deals and securing policy concessions from countries across the world—friends and adversaries alike. Indeed, the administration’s first targets were its neighbors, Canada and Mexico, as a means of pressuring them to do more to limit the flow of drugs and migrants into the U.S. On April 2, the administration announced a 10 percent tariff on most countries, with additional levies on those that have maintained large trade surpluses with the U.S. While the administration has paused action as it negotiates bilateral trade deals, its strategy will have a long-term impact on the global economy and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).
For most MENA countries, the proposed tariffs are not likely to have a major direct impact. Most MENA economies have a fairly balanced trade portfolio and may even benefit in the short run. The U.S. attracts only 4 percent of the MENA region’s total exports. Indeed, only six MENA countries were targeted with tariffs higher than the 10 percent baseline: Syria (41 percent), Iraq (39 percent), Libya (31 percent), Algeria (30 percent), Tunisia (28 percent) and Jordan (20 percent). Of these, the only MENA country with significant exposure to U.S. tariffs, relative to the size of its economy, is Jordan, which has a free trade agreement with the U.S. Jordan sent more than 22 percent of its exports to the U.S. in 2022 and must find a way to negotiate a new deal without compromising its economic and geopolitical interests.
For other MENA countries, much of the impact of proposed U.S. tariffs is likely to be indirect. First, raising trade barriers would increase production costs and reduce global demand. A global recession would hurt everyone. Second, energy suppliers will be affected. In April 2025, the price of Brent crude oil—a global benchmark—fell to under $65 per barrel for the first time since 2021, after it had averaged $81 in 2024. Lower energy prices will impact oil producers, as well as non-oil economies that rely on remittances, investments and development aid from their oil-producing neighbors. Third, renegotiated trade deals will have ripple effects. For example, negotiating higher exports of U.S. natural gas to Asian economies would reduce demand for Gulf exports. In order to mitigate these adverse consequences, MENA economies need to increase regional integration and intra-regional trade. They should also develop stronger linkages with other economies of the Global South.
USAID and the Collapse of U.S. Foreign Aid
Donald Trump’s administration moved early and aggressively against the United States Agency of International Development (USAID). For Trump, its shutdown served as a strong signal to his base of his commitment to the “America First” agenda, while posing minimal political costs given the limited domestic interest in foreign aid (as contrasted with cuts to social safety nets and defense). For the international aid community and countries dependent on U.S. foreign assistance, it was a shock that had immediate costs in terms of project funding and the welfare—if not lives—of beneficiaries.
Across the MENA region, the harm of humanitarian and development funding cuts has been borne by those in the most desperate situations, struggling to meet basic needs in the context of conflict and natural disaster. It has been particularly devastating for refugees and the people of Gaza, Iraq, Syria and Yemen, where the U.S. had provided a large share of international aid. Broader cuts in development aid have been felt across the region–particularly by children, youth and women—as programs focusing on education, healthcare, entrepreneurship, access to finance, civil society and other foundations for economic development were shuttered overnight.
Following aid suspensions, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced waivers for humanitarian aid, but expected distributions failed to materialize due to a collapse in institutional capacity, administration infighting and resistance from the Department of Government Effectiveness (DOGE). Reflective of this policy chaos, the administration formally cancelled World Food Program (WFP) contracts at the beginning of April, but renewed WFP funding in Ecuador, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria within a week. At the same time, the administration withheld funding for Afghanistan, Gaza and Yemen to put political pressure on the Taliban, Hamas and the Houthis, respectively.
In the long-term, Trump’s approach to aid will do more damage to U.S. interests than anywhere else. The vacuum will be filled by Europe, China, BRICS and other MENA countries as they strengthen their own global and regional positions. Washington’s rejection of aid as a core element of soft power will empower international competitors and undermine its own hard power interests by creating conditions for fragility and conflict. Even as the administration begins sending out the limited aid it has approved, the cynical conditionality Trump has attached to proffered aid will only weaken popular support for the U.S. in receiving countries while rallying support for its foes.
What to Expect from Trump’s Visit to the Gulf
President Donald Trump’s first foreign trip will lead him to the Gulf, with stops in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE and “other places.” The decision to go to Riyadh—also Trump’s first destination during his previous term—was probably spurred by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s announcement to invest $600 billion into the U.S. economy. The UAE, not to be outdone, pledged $1.4 trillion, or almost three times the country’s GDP. Whether these statements—conveniently timed to help Trump out of an investor confidence nosedive—are serious is doubtful.
Beyond Gulf cash injections into the U.S. economy, Trump and his interlocutors will have many urgent issues to discuss. While the GCC has remained on the sidelines of Trump’s trade-war rollercoaster, the bloc has little to gain from a global economic crisis. The oil price has also dropped precipitously from its Ukraine-war spike—too low for both Trump and MBS, although no mutually agreeable course of action is apparent.
Generally, Trump’s visit comes at a time when Washington has little to offer to the Gulf. Economically, trade has declined: GCC exports to the U.S. are negligible, and China has overtaken the U.S. as the largest source of imports. Moreover, critical arms imports from the U.S. are bogged down with use restrictions, cancellations and export bans, while certain products, like air defense systems and the F-35 jet, underperform for their price tags.
Geopolitically, the value of the U.S. military umbrella has declined. Successful Houthi attacks on Saudi oil installations and the group’s persistent disturbance of Red Sea traffic have demonstrated its limits. The Houthis remain a formidable foe for the U.S. and Saudi Arabia despite all efforts to defeat them.
Meanwhile, Trump’s Gaza “plan” was met with Arab skepticism. Saudi Arabia and Qatar insist that any deal must include Palestinian statehood—an elusive goal with the two-state solution long dead in the water. Concerning Iran, Gulf governments would welcome a détente but fear that years of their own rapprochement efforts may be jeopardized if U.S.-Iran talks fail and Washington’s war hawks prevail.
Overall, GCC members are reluctant to trust the U.S. with Trump at the helm, given his willingness to turn against former allies. As a result, both parties have pivoted to China. The GCC has done so amicably—with trade, renminbi-denominated oil, Belt and Road Initiative investments, and ties to BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—while the U.S. has been hostile. How much substance will result from the upcoming talks with a president known for his “strategic indecision” remains, therefore, questionable.
An Aggressive Mideast Posture Risks Long-term Stability for Short-term Deterrence
In the first 100 days of Trump’s second term, U.S. military engagement in the Middle East has surged, reshaping the regional security landscape and testing Washington’s defense commitments. This renewed assertiveness is driven by a revived but somewhat light touched “peace through strength” strategy—reminiscent of the Reagan era—where overwhelming force is seen as the ultimate deterrent. U.S. airstrikes in Yemen, the redesignation of the Houthis as a terrorist organization, and escalating pressure on Iran signal a deliberate reassertion of American dominance. Trump’s posture is clear: deter adversaries, reassure allies and re-establish U.S. primacy in a multipolar and increasingly fragmented region.
While regional partners such as Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have largely welcomed America’s muscular return, the costs of this posture are beginning to surface. Washington’s unwavering support for Israel—particularly amid its ongoing military operations in Gaza and the West Bank—has become a flashpoint. These actions, while framed as national security measures, are increasingly viewed as politically motivated and domestically driven, aimed more at bolstering Israeli leadership under domestic pressure than achieving long-term stability. The result is growing Arab skepticism, heightened regional anger, and increased volatility, with America’s role perceived less as stabilizer and more as enabler of conflict.
Threats to “bomb Tehran” if nuclear negotiations fail, bolstering U.S. naval presence in the Red Sea, and vocal support for Israeli operations all contribute to a combustible mix. Militant threats may have been temporarily suppressed, but deterrence without diplomacy risks becoming a countdown to miscalculation.
The best-case scenario for the U.S. is that “maximum pressure” forces Iran and its regional surrogates to recalibrate, leading to a de-escalation of tensions and the strengthening of U.S.-aligned security architectures. In a worst-case scenario, a single misstep—such as a retaliatory strike from or towards Iran or a regional flashpoint spiraling out of control—could ignite open conflict, drawing in American allies and forcing the U.S. into a high-cost war. Most likely, however, is a long period of brinkmanship: where force is used to manage rather than resolve threats; where alliances harden, but volatility persists; and where America’s re-engagement ensures short-term deterrence at the expense of sustainable peace.
From Pressure to Talks: Reviving U.S.-Iran Diplomacy
Upon returning to the White House, one of President Donald Trump’s first moves was to reinstate the “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran via an executive order. Like in his first term, the policy focuses on tightening economic constraints, particularly targeting Tehran’s oil exports, in an effort to coerce the Islamic Republic to alter its regional behavior and nuclear ambitions.
Despite this renewed pressure, Trump has also signaled a desire for diplomacy. While maintaining that Iran must never acquire nuclear weapons, he has expressed a preference for resolving the issue through negotiation rather than military confrontation. In a notable diplomatic gesture, Trump sent a direct letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Unlike a similar message in 2018, this letter received a response, mediated through Oman, which paved the way for three rounds of bilateral negotiations—first in Muscat, then in Rome, then again in Muscat.
The timing of Trump’s announcement about the talks was particularly significant. He made it public during a joint press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, underscoring a growing divergence between U.S. and Israeli priorities. While Israel continues to advocate for preemptive military action, Trump appears determined to test the diplomatic path first.
Nevertheless, the U.S. has made it clear that military options remain on the table. In response to Iran-backed Houthi activities in the Red Sea, Washington has significantly increased its military presence across the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, sending a strong signal to Tehran about America’s willingness to act if necessary.
This dual-track strategy—combining economic and military pressure with diplomatic outreach—has arguably succeeded in drawing Iran back to the negotiating table, despite Khamenei’s earlier categorical rejection of talks with Washington. Still, Tehran has drawn firm red lines: it refuses to dismantle any part of its nuclear infrastructure and rejects any discussion of its military capabilities.
Within the Trump administration, internal divisions persist. The “America First” camp, led by special envoy Steve Witkoff and Vice President JD Vance, advocates for a pragmatic, narrowly tailored agreement. In contrast, hawkish figures like Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Advisor Mike Waltz push for maximalist demands that risk derailing progress.
A final wild card is Israel. Feeling increasingly sidelined, it may resort to covert or overt actions to undermine the diplomatic process—moves that could provoke Iranian retaliation and derail negotiations. Trump’s ability to manage Netanyahu and harmonize U.S.-Israeli objectives will be critical to the success of this renewed diplomatic effort with Iran.
The Path of Least Resistance and Most Repression
As the Trump administration marks 100 days in office, U.S. policy towards Israel and the Palestinians remains mired in confusion and contradiction. Washington initially compelled Israel to accept a ceasefire agreement it had consistently rejected, then proposed the mass expulsion of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip to the Arab world. It engaged in an unprecedented dialogue with Hamas, and thereafter gave Israel license to intensify its genocidal military campaign and impose the most brutal siege since Leningrad.
Its erratic and unpredictable nature notwithstanding, several tentative conclusions can be drawn about the Trump administration’s approach. Its Middle East priorities clearly lie elsewhere: negotiations with Iran, maritime security in the Red Sea, and economic opportunities in the Gulf Cooperation Council states. Within this framework, and absent significant countervailing pressure from regional governments or sabotage of its priorities by Benjamin Netanyahu, Washington appears comfortable to let Israel go its merry way. This constitutes the path of least resistance, both domestically and within the senior ranks of the administration. It will most likely require a crisis to revise perceptions and, potentially, priorities.
Two key issues to monitor are Israeli annexation of the West Bank and Washington’s posture toward international institutions. With respect to the former: Will the Trump administration formally recognize Israel’s illegitimate claims of sovereignty, or maintain the policies of previous administrations in supporting Israel’s tightening grip without explicitly endorsing it? And will the U.S. deploy the nuclear option vis-à-vis international organizations, such as the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, to ensure Israel can continue to act with impunity and avoid meaningful accountability?
A curious feature of U.S.-Israeli relations is that Washington tolerates more criticism and condemnation of itself than it does of Israel. And within the U.S., in contrast to the Middle East, the Trump administration will continue to prioritize Palestine—specifically the repression of solidarity with the Palestinian people and opposition to Israel. As we have seen with the campaigns against students and universities, these initiatives are being conducted not only for their own sake but also serve as battering rams to reconfigure governance in the U.S. in a manner that generates substantial support, and only symbolic resistance, from the country’ elites.
The Growing Appeal of Homegrown Security Frameworks
Like their counterparts globally, Gulf leaders have been working to limit the fallout from President Trump’s unpredictable and transactional approach to politics.
This endeavor has taken two forms. The first, and more substantive, has been to demonstrate their value to the president on his priority issues. These include Saudi mediation efforts to end the Russia-Ukraine war and Oman’s facilitation of discussions on halting Iran’s nuclear program. The second is making promises of astronomical investments in the U.S. that the president can take very public credit for.
This approach is understandable. For more than three decades, an embrace of U.S. hard power capabilities has underpinned the strategic doctrines of the Gulf states. The result has been a neglect of serious political and financial investment in regionally based security frameworks, as well as a reluctance to deepen security relations with extra-regional actors beyond Washington.
Yet, the first 100 days of Trump’s second term have crystallized the need for new security frameworks that do not rely on American hard power to ensure regional order.
Such thinking is not only in response to Trump’s election victory. It reflects long-term changes in patterns of power in the international system, rising skepticism over the legitimacy and effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy, and growing difficulty in maintaining a consensus with Washington on critical security issues.
But Trump’s first 100 days have intensified local efforts to build alliance frameworks to effectively defuse geostrategic competition and sectarian division. In doing so, the Gulf states are deploying agile diplomacy and strategic positioning to include key regional and external players.
On April 17, two meetings illuminated these efforts. The first was during Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman Al Saud’s visit to Tehran, where he met with Iran’s supreme leader. The second was a meeting in Moscow between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, during which the emir invited Putin to visit Doha.
This inclusive approach—which is novel compared to the ways that Gulf states have traditionally responded to regional insecurity—has been relatively cost free for now, because it currently overlaps with Trump’s foreign policy ambitions vis-à-vis Russia and Iran.
It is unclear how long Trump’s enthusiasm for this local proactivity will continue and whether Gulf states can effectively sustain a narrative in favor of alliance frameworks as instruments of consensual power that promote order over interests.
What is already evident is that Trump’s first 100 days have helped consolidate a regional consensus that homegrown security frameworks are vital for the region’s future stability, security and order.
The End of the Affair: Europe on Its Own
The first 100 days of the Trump administration have laid bare a stark reality: the transatlantic partnership, once the bedrock of the Western-dominated global order, is fracturing. From Vice President JD Vance’s outlandish territorial claims on Greenland and the humiliation of Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, to the White House’s bizarre trade accusations, Trump’s message could not be clearer: “The EU is screwing us,” he claimed recently. The European Union’s absence from the table of negotiations with Russia on Ukraine, and the tone of trade talks—not negotiations, but unilateral decisions—speaks volumes. The U.S. is charting its own, destructive course.
While European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen maintains a characteristically conciliatory tone in Brussels, many member states are far more vocal in their alarm. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk rightly stated: “It’s striking but it’s true. Right now, 500 million Europeans are begging 300 million Americans for protection from 140 million Russians who have been unable to overcome 50 million Ukrainians for three years.” Like Tusk, all EU leaders must recognize what is at stake. This is not a time for technocratic navel-gazing or lengthy, tedious procedures. The world is highly competitive, and the EU’s historical ally is going rogue, abandoning the very principles of cooperation it once championed. The EU needs to act now, with urgency and resolve.
That urgency is underscored by the demands of European citizens themselves. Recent polls reveal that 66% want the EU to play a greater role in protecting them against global crises and security risks, and an overwhelming 89% believe EU member states should act more united in the face of global challenges. This reflects a crucial truth: the EU has repeatedly demonstrated a remarkable capacity for swift, cohesive action when facing existential crises. The COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine and the ensuing energy crisis are stark reminders of the EU’s ability to act decisively and with unity. Coordinating the interests of 27 member states is a monumental challenge, but history has shown it can be done, and the present moment demands it.
This is the EU’s moment of truth. It must move beyond soothing tones and embrace a new era of agility, speed, pragmatism and innovation. The choices made today will determine whether the EU emerges stronger and more sovereign, or diminished and vulnerable, in a world where its oldest ally has become its newest challenge.
The GCC Walks a Tight Rope Between China and the U.S.
Donald Trump’s reelection paved the way for a trade war that has intensified geopolitical and geoeconomic competition with China. Washington has imposed sweeping tariffs on Chinese goods, reaching a whopping 145% on most imports, abandoning the earlier selective approach in favor of full-blown economic confrontation. Beijing has vowed to retaliate “to the end,” putting the $582 billion trade between both sides at risk. This escalating showdown is reverberating in the Gulf, where China’s close economic ties with GCC states could be strained by Sino-American friction.
In mid-April, major stock markets in the GCC fell amid uncertainty over shifting U.S. trade policies, and growing concerns about the impact of the escalating trade war on their own economies. In the longer term, the U.S.-China confrontation and higher U.S. tariffs could indirectly harm Gulf hydrocarbon exports by decreasing the energy demand of its major trading partners. If energy prices fall as a consequence, it could lead to lower government spending and hurt broader sectors of GCC economies.
The GCC’s deepening economic ties with China are indirectly exposed to the new trade turbulence. In recent years, China overtook the U.S. as the largest purchaser of Gulf crude oil, becoming Saudi Arabia’s biggest crude customer and overall most important trading partner. The United Arab Emirates similarly counts China as its leading trade partner, with bilateral trade exceeding $86 billion in 2023. A U.S.-China decoupling threatens to unsettle these trade relations. Gulf logistics hubs like the UAE—historically vital intermediaries linking Chinese suppliers to Western markets—face risks from shifting trade routes and new restrictions, imperiling shipping, ports and supply chains.
Over the next period, the GCC will increasingly feel the strain as they navigate economic and security crosswinds between their top trading partner—China—and their main security guarantor, the United States. Fortunately, the diplomatic tool kit of the six GCC states is fully geared towards a strategy of balancing and hedging between both superpowers. Their approach continues to be to maximize benefits from both relationships, while minimizing any commitments that would alienate either side. However, as tensions between the U.S. and China grow, not only in trade but also in any potential conflict between both sides over Taiwan, the hedging and balancing strategy will increasingly be tested, making the tightrope walk ever trickier.
Trump’s Syria Stalemate Is Undermining the Country’s Transition
In his first 100 days, President Donald Trump moved quickly on many fronts, but Syria was not one of them. U.S. policy remained unchanged—a carryover from the previous administration. This was not strategy; it was disinterest. Despite Syria entering a critical transition period, Trump has yet to appoint a strong team to manage the file.
While many countries may have welcomed continuity in U.S. policy, Syria was hoping for a drastic shift in engagement. The absence of change has meant the continuation of sweeping U.S. sanctions, threatening the very stability they were once meant to secure.
These sanctions were designed to isolate the regime of then-President Bashar al-Assad, but he was ousted last December. Assad’s removal should have cleared the way for recovery and reform. Instead, outdated sanctions remain in place, misaligned with Syria’s post-Assad landscape and increasingly counterproductive.
The Caesar Act, the most punitive of these measures, includes theoretical humanitarian exemptions. In practice, it casts a wide shadow. Banks, investors and businesses avoid Syria entirely, fearing legal and financial repercussions. The result: a paralyzed economy at a moment when the country desperately needs space to stabilize and rebuild.
The damage is real. Local businesses, civil society organizations and transitional authorities—the very actors tasked with rebuilding Syria—are being squeezed out of the process. They cannot pay workers, import fuel or repair infrastructure. Without the ability to deliver services or rebuild trust, they risk losing legitimacy before having a chance to govern.
The fallout would not stop there. Syria’s collapse would fuel migration, strain neighboring countries and create openings for extremist groups. A failed Syria is not just a Syrian problem—it is a regional one.
Trump needs to pivot. Lifting sanctions now would not reward a group with a problematic past—it would signal a shift toward pragmatic diplomacy. It would allow the U.S. to help shape Syria’s transition and future, instead of punishing its residents by default.
The coming weeks are decisive. Trump’s choices will determine whether Syria stabilizes or slips back into chaos. Sanctions once served a purpose. Now, they are holding the country hostage to a past that no longer exists.
Erdogan and Trump, Again: Between Tactical Praise and Political Peril
Trump’s first term set the template for Erdogan’s current playbook: transactionalism over institutions, personal rapport over policy alignment, mutual disregard for liberal norms, and strongman solidarity and direct backchanneling. In his first term, Trump enabled Türkiye’s Operation Peace Spring by abruptly withdrawing U.S. troops from northern Syria, urged Erdogan to show restraint in his offbeat tone—“Don’t be a tough guy”—and later eased U.S.-Turkish tensions by facilitating the release of the American pastor Andrew Brunson from Turkish custody after sanctions triggered a lira crash.
Now, with Trump back in office, the personalized and transactional foreign policy dynamic seems to have returned. During a press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in March 2025, Trump commented about Erdogan that “I happen to like him, and he likes me… we’ve never had a problem,” adding to Netanyahu, “If you have a problem with Turkey, I think you’ll work it out.” These were not throwaway lines.
In 2025, Erdogan is once again capitalizing on Trump’s selective vision. The arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu in March drew no reaction from Washington. The silence was telling.
In Syria, with the Assad era over and a new transitional government led by Al-Sharaa in place, Türkiye sees an opportunity to entrench itself as a key post-conflict stakeholder. Notably, Turkish officials now refer to the SDF by name rather than as “PKK/YPG”—a tactical shift. U.S. mediation between the SDF and Damascus on integration has helped ease Türkiye’s security concerns in Syria and, in turn, created space for progress on its domestic peace track with the PKK. Trump’s disinterest in Kurdish autonomy work’s in Türkiye’s favor. Ankara’s likely strategy: push the PKK to disarm, tolerate an SDF-Damascus integration, and position itself as a counter-ISIS partner in a regional alliance.
Tensions between Israel and Türkiye in Syria have prompted Trump to step back into a mediator role, pushing for a deconfliction deal. Erdogan, for his part, maintains anti-Israel rhetoric for domestic optics–despite youth protests and arrests over Gaza at home—while quietly sustaining trade and backchannel diplomacy with Tel Aviv.
Trump sees his ties with both Netanyahu and Erdogan as leverage to pause hostilities and counter Iran’s nuclear ambitions. With the “Axis of Resistance” weakened after Assad’s fall, Türkiye has re-emerged as a difficult but necessary partner. Erdogan understands this and uses it; offering regional containment of Iran, influence in Syria, and control over the Kurdish question, while keeping communication open with Tehran. Türkiye clearly does not want a further escalation between Israel and Iran.
Being “liked” by Trump may buy Erdogan room to maneuver, but it is a precarious position. Trump’s favor is conditional and his policies are erratic. A Panorama Türkiye survey from April 2025 shows that 72 percent of Turkish respondents across political affiliations believe Trump’s presidency is bad for Türkiye, reflecting broad concern over the volatility it may bring.
The Maghreb’s Strategic Dance in the U.S.-China Rivalry
As the global power struggle between the United States and China escalates, the Maghreb finds itself balancing on a geopolitical tightrope. While not a direct battleground, the region is increasingly influenced by this strategic contest, which impacts everything from security alliances to infrastructure development.
China’s expanding economic presence offers the Maghreb alternatives to traditional Western influence. Significant investments through the Belt and Road Initiative, particularly in energy and infrastructure, have spurred regional growth. Algiers, for instance, has strengthened its ties with Beijing, signing ten major agreements in April 2025. Meanwhile, Morocco, despite its strong military relationship with the U.S., has embraced Chinese ventures in renewable energy.
However, this engagement comes with challenges. Maghreb nations face pressure to choose sides as U.S. policymakers oppose Chinese ascendency—often framing it in stark ideological and security terms. This is evident in the Trump administration’s warnings about the influence of China and Russia, alongside expanded U.S. security agreements, such as Algeria’s first-ever cooperation pact with Washington signed in January.
Still, these countries remain hesitant to commit to one side. Instead, they have embraced strategic hedging—pragmatically cultivating ties with both powers. Tunisia, for instance, offsets its reliance on Western military aid by deepening economic cooperation with China, while Mauritania navigates between the two to drive development, even as concerns about Chinese involvement in critical infrastructure persist.
However, Washington’s transactional diplomacy—such as its recognition of Morocco’s claims over Western Sahara—and the proliferation of Chinese technology like Huawei’s 5G amid U.S. sanctions, highlight the growing complexity of foreign alignment decisions.
If the U.S.-China rivalry hardens into a global binary, the Maghreb’s strategic flexibility could be significantly constrained. For the time being, however, regional leaders are proceeding with caution—seizing opportunities from both sides while striving to steer clear of deeper entanglements.
Trump’s Policy Toward Iran
Iran’s nuclear program has carried over from Donald Trump’s first term as one of the president’s top foreign policy priorities. While he has not jettisoned the failed “maximum pressure” approach from the last time, Trump is now pursuing negotiations aimed at preventing nuclear armament with much more vigor.
To this end, the U.S. president has reached out personally—albeit indirectly—by sending a letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei via the United Arab Emirates. Iran responded with a message delivered to Washington via Oman, preparing the way for recent talks in Muscat and Rome. A third round of expert-level talks on technical issues was held in Muscat on April 26, demonstrating a rapid diplomatic engagement.
The negotiations come amid Israeli skepticism about the diplomatic track and assertion that the option of military action should remain on the table—something Tehran interprets as a direct Israeli provocation.
Despite this, the negotiation atmosphere may be a sign of hope that a breakthrough will be achieved. The Trump administration appears interested in achieving a swift diplomatic victory and a better deal than the one signed in summer 2015. The talks’ focus on the nuclear program without a discussion of regional issues is a positive signal, which may be linked to Iran’s diminished regional position due to the fall of the regime of former President Bashar Al-Assad in Syria and the weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Iran, for its part, is negotiating in the hope that an agreement will lead to the lifting of economic sanctions, the negative impact of which is increasing daily on Iranian society. Sanctions relief would help assuage domestic criticism of the country’s economic issues.
Much hinges on the U.S.-Iran talks. The alternative, according to American threats and Israeli incitement, will have significant repercussions for the region and the world, especially for global energy security. The parties’ success in reaching an agreement may lead to some sort of regional calm in the Middle East; but failure will undoubtedly lead to further instability and the possible collapse of more states and alliances.
The Limitations of Washington’s Yemen Policy
Since re-designating the Houthis as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization” in January, President Donald Trump’s administration has escalated its military campaign against the group inside Yemen. The U.S. recently launched airstrikes on Houthi positions, aiming to punish them for disrupting maritime traffic in the Red Sea and deter Iranian influence. This escalation is part of a broader strategy to hold Iran accountable for Houthi activities and to use Yemen as leverage in negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program.
In practice, the airstrikes seek to degrade Houthi military capabilities by targeting suspected underground facilities and possibly senior leadership. However, their effectiveness remains questionable due to the Houthis’ decentralized structure, the group’s manipulation of media narratives, and the lack of precise information regarding outcomes.
What is certain is that these operations, coupled with sanctions, are exacerbating Yemen’s humanitarian crisis, particularly given the heavy reliance of populations in Houthi-controlled areas on imports and foreign aid. As such, the U.S. campaign risks reinforcing the Houthis’ self-narrative as a victim of foreign aggression, while deepening the suffering of the civilian population.
The future trajectory of these strikes remains uncertain. On the one hand, U.S. pressure could compel the Houthis to scale back their attacks, particularly in the Red Sea. On the other hand, it could provoke further escalation, whether at sea, through ground offensives on fronts such as Marib or Taiz, or externally by targeting Saudi and Emirati interests. Another crucial variable is the fate of U.S.-Iranian negotiations; Tehran may seek to de-escalate the Yemen front to secure more favorable terms in nuclear talks, leaving the Houthis more exposed.
However, the current U.S. policy suffers from the absence of a comprehensive and sustainable vision for Yemen. Without coupling military strikes with coherent political, economic and humanitarian support, and without vigorous diplomacy to bring together Yemeni and regional actors, Washington’s chances of achieving its long-term objectives appear slim. Absent such a vision, the U.S. is unlikely to fundamentally weaken the Houthis or push them into serious peace negotiations. Moreover, bureaucratic disarray in Washington and poor coordination with regional allies further limit the prospects of success.
Looking ahead, Washington’s options cannot be limited to military action alone. The crisis will likely persist without a balanced mix of military pressure, diplomacy through credible regional intermediaries, and economic support for liberated areas to enhance the appeal of the Yemeni government. The most probable scenario is a protracted, low-intensity conflict that continues to exact a high humanitarian and strategic cost, with Yemen remaining an open arena for complex regional rivalries. Ultimately, Yemen appears to be a pawn in a larger game, the details of which may be decided in closed rooms far from Sana’a and Aden.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Middle East Council on Global Affairs.