Since late February, when the United States and Israel launched joint strikes against Iran under Operation Epic Fury and Operation Rising Lion, respectively, the Gulf states have been drawn into a war not of their making and not in their interests. For years, the Gulf states carefully diversified their security strategies, deepening ties with the U.S., expanding diplomatic engagement with Iran and Israel to varying degrees, and cultivating a wider network of regional and global partnerships.
Yet these efforts did not prevent Iran from subjecting them to unprecedented attacks—in both scale and intensity. Nor did they trigger direct intervention from key partners. Instead, the Gulf states have relied primarily on local defense capabilities developed over decades with external support. The war has highlighted a critical lesson: partners are most valuable when they enhance strategic autonomy, preparedness, and combat effectiveness rather than when they promise external protection.
Beyond Security Guarantees
Uncertainty over Washington’s long-term commitment to regional security had already pushed the Gulf states to diversify their partners in recent years. A U.S. emphasis on greater burden sharing, articulated extensively in the latest U.S. National Defense and National Security Strategies, accelerated this shift, encouraging deeper ties with other powers, such as Pakistan, India, and Türkiye—all of whom are, notably, U.S. allies.
The Gulf approach has therefore been carefully calibrated to avoid friction with the United States, broadening security ties without undermining their core strategic relationship. This strategy has produced tangible outcomes, including the 2025 Pakistan-Saudi mutual defense agreement, expanding UAE-India security coordination, and deepening Gulf-Türkiye security cooperation.
The current war, however, has revealed a fundamental tension in the assumptions underlying this strategy. Alliances do not necessarily translate into direct support during crises. The expectation of intervention, long embedded in regional security thinking, has ultimately proven unreliable and unsustainable.
Strategic Constraints
The Gulf’s key security partners have stopped short of directly managing the spillover from Iran’s retaliatory strikes across the region, constrained by their own strategic priorities and national considerations. The U.S. and Pakistan, exemplify these dynamics.
The United States
The United States remains the Gulf’s most deeply embedded security partner. Its systems have been central to regional air defenses, enabling interception rates exceeding 90 percent. This success is the product of decades of Gulf investment in U.S. military armaments and infrastructure, extensive training of Gulf personnel, and the deep integration of American systems in regional security architectures.
Despite reports indicating that the war has significantly strained U.S. stockpiles, Washington continues to support regional security capacities. On March 19, the U.S. Department of State announced a $16.5 billion arms package to the region, covering the UAE, Kuwait, and Jordan. This support, however, has clear limits. The Gulf states’ repeated appeals for Washington to avoid targeting Iranian civilian infrastructure were not heeded, leaving them vulnerable to continued retaliatory strikes.
This epitomizes the dual role the U.S. is playing in this war. While its military systems have been indispensable to Gulf defense, Washington’s instigation of the war and its reluctance to manage its regional consequences have contributed to the crisis the Gulf now faces.
Pakistan
For Pakistan, the war has served as the first real test of its landmark 2025 mutual defense agreement with Saudi Arabia. The pact’s use of explicitly binding language—rare in regional security partnerships—created some expectation of direct Pakistani involvement, which has not materialized.
Islamabad’s restraint reflects a complex strategic calculus, shaped by domestic political and economic pressures, the need to carefully manage its relationship with Iran, and ongoing security challenges along its borders. As a result, Pakistan’s role is likely to remain diplomatic rather than military, aligning with actors such as Egypt and Türkiye.
This underscores the broader point that even formal mutual defense alliances are constrained by national interests. A state’s commitments alone do not determine its behavior in high-intensity conflicts.
The Gulf Adapts to New Strategic Realities
The war with Iran has reinforced a shift already underway in Gulf strategic thinking. The true value of alliances lies less in the promise of security guarantees than in their ability to equip partner states with the resources, technology, and training needed to defend themselves. The Gulf states should therefore prioritize partnerships that can enhance their preparedness and adaptability.
The war has also revealed key trends likely to define the future of warfare, particularly the growing reliance on cheap drone technology. The appeal of these drones stems primarily from their low cost and ease of mass production. Tehran’s Shahed drones have figured prominently in the conflict, with over 4,000 launched against the Gulf states since late February.
While the Gulf states have had some prior experience dealing with drones, they have not previously faced the scale or intensity of Iran’s current attacks. This escalation has necessitated a greater focus on leveraging diverse technologies and operational experience in drone warfare.
In this context, Ukraine has emerged as a significant actor, given its experience countering the Russian Geran variant of the Iranian Shahed. The Gulf states are already seeking to leverage Ukraine’s experience, as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE all signed defense agreements with Kiev in late March. These deals could potentially enable the integration of low-cost Ukrainian systems such as the Sting interceptor into Gulf defense capabilities.
These dynamics illustrate what will likely emerge as a defining lesson of this war. In an increasingly fragmented and unpredictable international environment, Gulf states must continue to strengthen their domestic capabilities to effectively counter evolving threats. This requires prioritizing resilient supply chains, capacity building, and the development of indigenous capabilities. Alliances will remain critical, but their value will increasingly be measured by their ability to enhance partners’ capabilities rather than guarantee direct intervention.
