The fall of the Assad regime in Damascus represents a critical turning point in the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. Beforehand, Syria functioned as a strategic link supporting Iranian influence from Tehran to Beirut and onwards to Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, making it a crucial component in the so-called “Axis of Resistance.”
Recent setbacks to this axis stemming from war with Israel and its Western partners have put Yemen’s Houthis in a difficult position, denying them a vital logistics and training hub in Syria and forcing their Iranian patron to reassess how it distributes its limited resources among its remaining allies. This poses a major challenge to the Houthis, who must also reconsider their own strategies and political and military options, with potential knock-on implications for questions of war and peace in Yemen.
Navigating New Regional Dynamics
Over the past decade, Damascus has provided the Houthis with a vital space for the training and transporting of fighters, including hosting dedicated training camps in coordination with Lebanon’s Hezbollah. The takeover of Syria by a government unfriendly to these interests and activities means the Houthis have lost one of their most important sources of strategic support. This change also affects Iran’s ability to manage its network of regional allies, presenting the Islamic Republic with difficult choices. Iran could decide to compensate for the loss of Syria, and thus the supply corridor to Hezbollah, by intensifying support for the Houthis as the new spearhead of the resistance axis. Yet, given that Iran’s past support for the Houthis was never acknowledged, this could create more complications and punitive pressure from the West, as well as upset the warming relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
On the other hand, retreating from its regional strategy could be interpreted as a sign of weakness. This might encourage Iran’s adversaries to exert yet more pressure. Perhaps the most likely option is for Tehran to reconsider its calculations across the entire region and search for a new approach to preserve what remains of its influence.
Iran’s re-strategizing is also likely to affect the situation inside Yemen, where Saudi Arabia may be seeking an advantage in the evolving dynamics. So far, Riyadh has opted for a policy of “strategic distancing” from the Houthis, preferring to turn any potential confrontation into a domestic, intra-Yemeni conflict with involvement by the United Nations. This is a wise calculation, reflecting Riyadh’s deep understanding of the complexities of Yemen and the likely repercussions of another direct encounter with the Houthis.
Indeed, Riyadh will likely avoid any provocation that undermines the relative stability it has achieved on its border after a temporary truce was brokered in April 2022, which has been indefinitely prolonged beyond the agreed upon date. The Houthis, for their part, are keenly aware of Saudi Arabia’s sensitive position, and the group has made it known through its media outlets that it has the ability to escalate regionally should any military action be taken against it.
It is also notable that the Houthis have succeeded in expanding their network of regional alliances since the events of October 7, 2023. From Iraqi militias to the Somali Al-Shabaab movement, and through smuggling networks stretching from the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea, the Houthis are building an alternative system aimed at compensating for a potential decline in Iranian support. This new strategic positioning could offer the group room for maneuver beyond its traditional support base.
As such, Saudi Arabia faces a strategic dilemma: the historic opportunity to redraw its map of influence in Yemen risks an open confrontation with a Houthi movement able to rely on more complex alliances and more advanced military capabilities.
In contrast to the increasing pressure and isolation faced by the Houthis, the country’s internationally recognized government is presented with a strategic opportunity to rebuild its legitimacy and expand its influence. However, capitalizing on this opportunity will require a comprehensive vision that goes beyond military gains against the Houthis, building a model of governance that can respond to the aspirations of all Yemenis and preserve delicate regional balances.
If open war does ultimately resume in Yemen, Saudi Arabia is likely to lead from behind, finding ways to support the central government without direct confrontation, and hoping to benefit from the cover of growing international intervention against the Houthi threat to maritime traffic around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Trump Targets the Houthis Early
The changing dynamics affecting the Houthis are not limited to the region. Just days after returning to office, U.S. President Donald Trump issued an executive order re-designating the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), which will go into effect in March.
Unlike the “special designated global terrorist” classification adopted by the Biden administration, the FTO designation imposes comprehensive sanctions against any entity that interacts with the group, whether directly or indirectly. This reflects a shift in American strategy, from a policy of containment and limited deterrence to one of all-out confrontation. It is a response to the growing awareness in Washington that the Houthi threat has spilled over the borders of Yemen, becoming a strategic challenge that threatens the security of global navigation and U.S. interests in the region.
The Trump administration’s move puts in place a multi-dimensional system that isolates and besieges the Houthis in overlapping spheres. Politically, the movement finds itself increasingly closed off from the international community, and its ability to participate in political negotiations is diminishing. Economically, it faces a financial blockade that restricts its access to the global banking system. Logistically, there are growing restrictions on the support and supply networks that have long sustained it.
Perhaps most importantly, the U.S. decision could expose the Houthis to being treated like transnational terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda, with a military target on the backs of their leadership and infrastructure.
That said, imposing this decision is not without adverse effects and practical challenges. The consequences for humanitarian activities, including the delivery of aid to civilians, represents a major dilemma that will only snowball as time passes. Given that roughly two-thirds of Yemen’s population lives in Houthi-controlled areas, implementing the sanctions without punishing the majority of Yemenis will be extremely difficult. Furthermore, the Houthis may respond to increased pressure by escalating militarily.
Yemen’s Path Forward
In sum, the fall of the Assad regime and the re-designation of the Houthis as a terrorist organization have reshaped the regional landscape in ways that demand recalibrations by all actors involved. For the Houthis, the loss of a major logistics hub in Syria and heightened U.S. sanctions create immediate pressures on their supply lines and strategic alliances. Iran, facing its own set of economic and political constraints, must decide whether to compensate for the Houthis’ setbacks or scale back its support—a dilemma that carries risks of greater Western pressure and the potential unravelling of its warming ties with Gulf states. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is keen to protect the stability of its borders and avoid direct military confrontation but cannot ignore the Houthis’ expanding network of alliances or the possibility of renewed conflict. The broader Middle East remains volatile amid conflicts in Gaza and continued tensions over Iran’s nuclear program. As humanitarian concerns intersect with new sanctions, and as the Houthis hint at escalating to bolster their position, Yemen’s path forward will hinge on how effectively each stakeholder adapts to these fast-evolving geopolitical realities.
