Cooperation between China and the United States in the Middle East has become a common topic of discussion between academics and experts these days. The two great powers have vested interests in the region that are jeopardized by its chronic instability and the growing threat of regional war. Cooperation between the two should be a necessity instead of an option. But among American policymakers, the logic of cooperation is not as self-evident.
Indeed, Beijing has good reason to be alarmed at the contentious outlook of Washington, which is paranoid about growing Chinese influence in the region. This mentality is encapsulated in the White House’s National Security Strategy Report of 2022, which defines China as a competitor, while in practice U.S. policy seems aimed at containing China. Even when there is talk of cooperation with Beijing among U.S. political figures, it is not really cooperation at all. Rather it entails Chinese subservience to the prevailing U.S.-dominated regional framework.
This position is not new. In the run-up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, China was asked to “cooperate” with the U.S. by supporting its military campaign within the United Nations Security Council, where China is a permanent member. Similarly, in 2011, China was petitioned by the U.S. to support the NATO interference in Libya, as well as U.S. meddling in Syria’s civil conflict.
In all these cases, U.S. military adventurism in the region clashed with China’s policy of non-interference. And in all these cases Chinese policy has been vindicated. Most Americans recognize that the invasion and occupation of Iraq was a massive mistake, and the important Middle Eastern nation is only beginning to stabilize itself after two decades of war and turmoil. Libya remains fractured and chaotic, plagued by violence and instability. And Syria underwent one of the most devastating civil wars in regional history. Yet Bashar al-Assad, who the U.S. sought to depose, remains in power.
Cooperation Amid Crisis
Today, Washington is seeking Beijing’s assistance in the Middle East once again. This time it entails supporting America’s post-October 7 policy vis-à-vis Israel-Palestine and the wider region. The main ask has been for China to use its influence with actors such as Iran to push for calm and contain a wider conflict.
While China supports this overall goal, it holds fundamentally different views on the sources of instability. First, China sees the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as stemming from decades of injustice toward the Palestinians. The U.S., on the other hand, adopts Israel’s security lens when addressing the problem and the means of resolving it.
This security-focused lens extends to the wider region. As Iran and its allies have confronted Israel and the U.S. militarily, Washington has pushed Beijing to help it extinguish the fires set by Israel’s disproportionate and punishing assault on Gaza, rather than work with it to bring about a lasting ceasefire.
Take the crisis in the Red Sea as an example. Shortly after the Yemen-based Houthi movement began targeting Israeli shipping around the critically important Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Gulf of Aden as a response to Gaza, U.S. officials urged China to help deescalate the situation by asking Iran to contain the Houthis. This would have demonstrated broad international support for the U.S. approach of targeting the symptom rather than the cause of the conflict.
After Israel bombed the Iranian embassy in Syria in April, U.S. officials and experts expressed the same kind of expectations that China should help to contain the fallout.
There is no denial that tensions in the Red Sea and the conflict between Israel and Iran are damaging to the region’s security, threaten Chinese interests, and impact global supply chains. However, U.S. and Israeli policies bear much of the responsibility for this, and it makes little sense for China to simply adopt a U.S. approach to the region that is fueling conflict rather than stability.
China’s overarching goals do not necessarily clash with those of the U.S., even with regards to Iran. Previously, the two powers cooperated on the Iranian nuclear file; the U.S. and China were both part of the P5 +1 group that forged the 2015 nuclear agreement. When the U.S. unilaterally pulled out of the agreement in 2018, Washington expected others like China to follow suit and join in the pressure campaign against the Islamic Republic. This was a non-starter as China thinks U.S. policy as extremely unreasonable.
Fundamentally, the U.S. wants others to adopt its perspective and approach to the Middle East while China desires cooperation in an equitable manner to address the core issues driving conflict and stability.
Since October 7, China has worked for a ceasefire at the UN Security Council and has supported the efforts of some Global South countries holding Israel accountable through mechanisms like the International Court of Justice. It has sought to help restore unity in Palestinian politics by hosting reconciliation talks in Beijing. And its past success in mediating a rapprochement between bitter rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia has paid off over the past ten months in helping Beijing work with critical regional actors to avoid a broader conflagration.
A Souring Mood
The future will no doubt see Beijing’s willingness to cooperate, as the region’s stability is critically important to China’s energy imports and supply chain. But it is unreasonable to expect China to continue to extend a hand to the U.S. if the latter continues to pursue disruptive and destructive policies. That is especially true in regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which lies at the heart of so much instability in the region.
Finally, Beijing is becoming increasingly frustrated with the hypocrisy underlying the U.S. approach to cooperation in the Middle East. On the one hand, Washington routinely asks for China’s help. But on the other, it does everything it can to pressure countries in the region to turn their backs on China on everything from infrastructure projects to high-tech collaboration. Such actions are souring China’s mood for cooperation.
In sum, China and the U.S. do have substantial shared interests in the Middle East, and the two can and should cooperate on a variety of issues, including green development, anti-piracy, anti-drug, and climate change issues, in addition to managing regional tensions.
However, despite China’s sincere desire for cooperation, the U.S. has neither sufficiently nor genuinely demonstrated the same. China does want to work with the U.S., but the partnership should not be defined unilaterally by Washington in an America-centered approach. And it certainly cannot mean China manages the mess the U.S. creates.
China openly advocates for “mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation.” Can the U.S. openly define its relations with China in the same way?
