In its September/October issue, Foreign Affairs published two different interpretations of the region’s future: “The End of the American Middle East,” by Marc Lynch, and “The New Old Middle East,” by F. Gregory Gause III. These perspectives have implications beyond the immediate impact of today’s confrontations. Has the order that governed the Middle East since the end of the Cold War truly come to an end? If so, what will follow?
Marc Lynch—a professor at George Washington University and director of the Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)—argues that the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran has exposed the crisis of the regional order Washington had fostered since the end of the Cold War. He highlights the limitations of a strategy built on military supremacy, containing adversaries, protective arrangements, and attempting to integrate Washington’s Arab allies and Israel into a unified security framework. Conversely, F. Gregory Gause III—also a professor and an expert on the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula—offers a more cautious assessment. While he recognizes the magnitude of the transformations the war has brought, he warns against prematurely declaring the birth of a “new” Middle East.
Wars may shift balances of power without necessarily creating new orders. The region may yet revert to the logic of open conflict, power balances, external intervention, and weak collective arrangements. Herein lies the value of considering both perspectives. Lynch writes of an end to one specific formulation of the regional order, while Gause emphasizes the persistence of the patterns of rivalry that have long governed the region. The comparison suggests that the existing order could decline without a stable alternative arrangement taking its place.
Waning Guarantees do not Spell the End for U.S. Power
Security relations between the U.S. and the Gulf states were built on the premise that a U.S. military presence would bolster their deterrence and provide protection when necessary. However, when those bases themselves become targets, when conflict reaches critical infrastructure such as airports and energy facilities, and when maritime traffic faces threats that this “protection” cannot swiftly neutralize, the question is no longer about the scale of the U.S. presence, but its effectiveness. Herein lies the nub of Lynch’s argument: the decline of any order does not necessarily begin with the withdrawal of the dominant power but may start when that power loses its ability to fulfill the very function that justified its presence in the first place.
This was underlined by remarks by former U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, who warned against assuming that conflict with Iran can easily be resolved. He noted that each side believes it can outlast the other, and that bringing the confrontation to an end would require skilled diplomacy. This highlights the limited chance of a decisive military outcome, as well as the possibility that an adversary might prolong a conflict and increase its costs. Drones and missiles can pose challenges even to advanced defense systems, while the disruption of a maritime corridor can simultaneously impact energy, trade and investment. It is therefore increasingly important for regional states to realize that security cannot depend solely on Washington’s willingness to defend its allies, but rather on regional states’ own capacity to protect their infrastructure, develop alternative supply routes, and enhance their rapid-response capabilities.
From this perspective, Lynch’s thesis of the “end of the American Middle East” reads as a discussion over the sustainability of U.S. hegemony, rather than forecasting the disappearance of the U.S. role. Washington remains indispensable, yet its ability to shape and enforce the rules of the regional order is increasingly constrained. At issue is the future of the framework through which the U.S. has hitherto managed its regional relationships.
Gause cautions against automatically assuming that major events will give rise to a new regional order. Wars may redistribute power, yet without establishing institutions that can manage competition or prevent conflict from recurring. The region has already undergone profound shifts: the direct confrontation between Iran and Israel, the targeting of Gulf states, transformations in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza, and disarray in the network of alliances.
The Arab world has experienced many wars, coups, and revolutions, the collapse of regimes and the rise of others. Yet time and again, it has reverted to its fundamental crises: the absence of a collective security framework, regional rivalries, external interference, and the myopic prioritization of national security over shared regional interests. Consequently, a shift in the balance of power will not mark the emergence of a new order unless it is accompanied by arrangements that limit interference in fragile states, develop mechanisms for managing disputes, and enhance the capacity of regional states to prevent conflicts from spilling across borders.
The Dilemma of a Security Alternative
Drawing on the perspectives of both Lynch and Gause, the Arab states must strive to translate their existing resources and capabilities into collective action that safeguards their interests. The Gulf states should learn from previous instances in which internal divisions have altered the balance of power—before such fragmentation further diminishes their ability to shape the region’s future.
The Gulf states are at a delicate phase in their relations with the U.S. Despite doubts over the reliability of American security guarantees, Gause argues that the Gulf states have no ready alternative. China has shown no desire to assume that role, nor could it project the power necessary to do so. The Gulf states must therefore maintain their partnership with Washington, while simultaneously strengthening their indigenous capabilities and security cooperation.
Arab states should not seek out an “alternative America,” but rather, ask how a greater Arab capacity can be built. One answer might be to consider a Gulf confederation, define its mandate, decision-making mechanisms, obligations on member states, and its potential to safeguard Gulf and broader Arab interests.
The first priority is to develop a shared assessment of the threats. Exchanging information and maintaining early-warning systems would help narrow the gap between detecting a threat and mounting a response, if grounded in clear procedures, defined responsibilities and regular joint exercises. The Arab region has financial resources, energy, a strategic geographic location, markets with investment potential, and human capital; yet it needs to translate these assets into organized power.
Undoubtedly, the Arab world can exert influence, whether over maritime security, food, energy, technology, supply chains, investment or defense. Yet this cannot arise from policies driven by regional rivalries, but from a baseline of shared Arab awareness regarding the interests at stake and the risks looming over the region. Perhaps this is the lesson from both Lynch and Gause: no one else will create the regional order that we ourselves need.
The U.S. prioritizes its own interests; Israel pursues its expansionist agenda; Iran fights to secure its influence and security; and Türkiye orbits within its own national interests. The Arab and Gulf states thus face a critical test: can they protect their own interests and exert influence over the emerging regional order?
A Test of Survival
The most serious risk confronting the Gulf states today is not that of attack from multiple fronts. It is the danger that each state is worn down individually, while any collective response falls short. The escalating conflict in Yemen, strikes on vital Saudi infrastructure, and threats to oil, trade and maritime navigation—compounded by the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz—reveal that Gulf security is no longer just a matter of borders or military defense. It has become a battle for the stability of the region’s economies and position in global energy and trade.
The GCC states must therefore re-evaluate their capacity for crisis management. They cannot afford to let intra-Gulf differences or isolated crises evolve into an open-ended process of strategic attrition. The Gulf does not need uniform policies, but it does need a binding, minimum level of defense coordination, protection of vital infrastructure, security of maritime corridors, and resolution of disputes through dialogue. The cost of failing to establish this baseline could well exceed what any single state can bear alone.
The decline of the regional order could lead not only to chaos, but to external powers stepping in to define what takes its place, leaving the states of the region once again as observers, rather than active participants. Lynch suggests that the U.S.-sponsored order may wane in efficacy, while Gause cautions that military and political shifts do not necessarily terminate long-standing patterns of rivalry.
Yet as existing arrangements erode, in the absence of a clear alternative, Arab states have an opportunity to shift from a passive to an active role, from seeking security guarantees to helping construct them, and from awaiting a new regional architecture to designing it. How much longer will Arab states defer the transformation of their existing resources and capabilities into collective action that can safeguard their interests? And will the Gulf states heed the lessons of history before division further diminishes their capacity to shape the region’s future?
