The U.S.-Israeli war on Iran has reminded the world that despite its digital nature, the global economy remains reliant on maritime corridors, energy markets, raw materials, and states’ ability to safeguard supply chains. Disruptions to navigation via the Strait of Hormuz and the ensuing turmoil in global markets have exposed the vulnerability of relying on a handful of strategic trade routes, demonstrating that power is measured not only by technological prowess but also by the ability to secure the supply of energy and essential commodities during times of upheaval.
It’s precisely for this reason that, among its many geopolitical fallouts, the US-Iran war is fueling an intensifying U.S.-China rivalry in Africa. Both nations are seeking to consolidate their influence on the continent, reflecting the resurgence of “hard geography” as a decisive factor in the global economy.
This competition spans strategic corridors and infrastructure, maritime and military security, strategic resources, and the protection of trade routes—notably around the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Guinea. Disruptions to maritime traffic have highlighted the strategic importance the global economy places on the Bab El-Mandab Strait, the Suez Canal, and African coastlines bordering key trade and energy routes.
Corridors and Minerals
Following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the quest for alternative trade routes has made Africa key to global economic security, especially given its reserves of critical minerals and its strategic location overlooking key routes linking producers to international markets. This has lent importance to projects such as the Lobito Corridor railway project linking Angola, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), all rich in copper and cobalt.
Just as oil was a primary driver of international conflict in the 20th century, critical minerals will play a similar role in the 21st. The shift toward electric vehicles, renewable energy, AI and precision military industries will require minerals that are not uniformly distributed across the globe. Accordingly, mines have evolved from purely economic assets into strategic ones—a dynamic closely linked to the U.S.-Iran war.
This gives Africa a pivotal position. The DRC alone accounts for over 70% of global cobalt production—essential for batteries, electronics, and certain defense industries. Zimbabwe has significant lithium reserves; Guinea is rich in bauxite (for aluminum); South Africa and Namibia both have diverse mineral resources.
China already has a substantial foothold in Africa, gradually accumulated through trade, loans, infrastructure projects, state-owned enterprises, and political fora such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Beijing is the leading trade partner for many African nations. African exports to China were worth some $99 billion in 2024, against imports of some $179 billion, reflecting a widening trade gap in Beijing’s favor.
By contrast, total trade in goods between the U.S. and Africa amounted to just $83.4 billion in 2025. While influence cannot be measured solely by trade volumes, these figures reveal a structural contrast: a ubiquitous Chinese presence in markets and infrastructure versus a more selective U.S. presence centered on security, investment, and trade programs.
China has not merely maintained its traditional presence; it has expanded its tariff-exemption policy for 2026 to include imports from 53 African nations, and authorized South Africa’s Standard Bank and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) to clear yuan transactions across 19 African countries. These moves reveal that beyond infrastructure and mining, Beijing seeks to construct a commercial and financial sphere that sidelines the dollar, cementing its own influence in the infrastructure and mining sectors, and through more selective financing.
Conversely, Washington recognizes that its economic footprint in Africa does not match that of Beijing, particularly regarding infrastructure and trade, so it is attempting to re-engage through economic security. The U.S. vision for Africa extends beyond aid or counter-terrorism; it now has a broader strategy to reduce its own reliance on China in its key supply chains. Critical minerals lie at the heart of this strategy—specifically the U.S. need for cobalt, copper, lithium, graphite, and rare earth elements, in the production of which China is a global leader. A $50-million U.S. investment in a South African rare earths project is a case in point.
The conflict between the U.S. and Iran has reinforced this trend. The Lobito Corridor connects mining regions in Central Africa to the Atlantic Ocean, facilitating the flow of minerals to Western markets while bypassing routes dominated by Chinese-linked firms. This has gained new significance as the DRC has moved to tighten its controls over cobalt exports, coinciding with U.S. efforts to secure more transparent mineral sources.
The U.S. resurgence extends beyond the economy and minerals. A significant U.S. military presence has emerged through major exercises such as African Lion and Justified Accord, which focus on regional security and enhancing the operational readiness of African forces. They show that Washington views Africa simultaneously as a hub for minerals, trade corridors, and security.
Africa’s Options: Negotiation or Dependency
African countries are neither mere victims, nor entirely independent political actors. While the continent boasts valuable resources, a strategic location, and a vast market, it also grapples with debt, inadequate infrastructure, institutional fragility, and the rivalries of external powers. Transforming room for maneuver into bargaining power requires a clear political and economic vision.
While Beijing is seeking to maintain its presence in Africa, Washington is prioritizing reducing its own reliance on China by establishing alternative trade corridors, financing mineral projects, incentivizing private sector investment, and linking Africa to Western supply chains. Other powers—such as European countries, India, Türkiye, Russia, and Japan—are also seeking footholds on the continent.
This diversity of actors offers African nations an opportunity; a broader range of partners widens the scope for negotiation. Yet there is a risk of division, whereby African states compete against one another to offer the same concessions under weaker terms. Accordingly, there is an urgent need for greater African coordination regarding minerals, ports, debt, and industrialization, to prevent the continent from becoming an open arena for the conflicts of others.
The U.S.-Iran conflict has demonstrated that the international order is shifting toward a more volatile phase. This gives Africa a more critical position in U.S. and Chinese calculations. China holds the advantage of long-standing engagement and a deep economic footprint, yet it faces mounting constraints regarding debt, local acceptance, and the evolving geopolitical landscape of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Meanwhile, the U.S. is attempting a comeback, but needs to translate its rhetoric of partnership into concrete projects, funding, and technology transfer.
Three scenarios can be envisioned for the future of this rivalry. The first involves an escalation of strategic competition, with Washington accelerating the creation of alternative supply chains in Africa, while China counters by deepening its commercial, financial, and infrastructural presence. The second entails managing the rivalry without direct confrontation, whereby Washington and Beijing continue to compete in Africa through economic, financial, and technological means. The third scenario is one of renewed dependency, whereby African nations become divided among external blocs, accepting unfavorable terms for financing and resource extraction.
The challenge for Africa lies not in choosing between Washington and Beijing, but in building the negotiating capacity to transform external partnerships into levers for industrialization and sovereignty, rather than mere mechanisms for perpetuating dependency.
