The term “Gulf NATO” is often used in political discussions as a slogan or a theoretical concept, but its roots go much deeper. The idea would not be to create a new military alliance from scratch, but rather to develop the region’s existing security structure, which emerged with the establishment of the GCC in 1981 and developed over subsequent years with the creation of the Peninsula Shield Force, the first institutional attempt to translate the concept of common Gulf security into a military reality.
Today’s strategic environment is radically different from that which produced the Peninsula Shield in the 1980s. The Gulf’s challenges are no longer limited to traditional armies or border disputes. Rather, ballistic missiles, drones, cruise missiles and cyberattacks have all developed into tools capable of crossing borders within minutes and targeting airports, oil facilities, and vital infrastructure at any location in the Gulf.
The concept of a Gulf NATO is neither a passing fad nor an exaggerated vision. It could emerge gradually, perhaps led by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, to be joined by the remaining Gulf countries according to their interests and circumstances. The idea would not be to build an offensive alliance, but rather a system of deterrence able to protect the region’s security, transportation corridors and vital installations, an ever more pressing imperative after years of threats from missiles, drones and militias.
Establishing such a system could also serve as a step toward closer coordination between the Gulf states, starting out with defense and then moving to foreign affairs and energy, and even stretching to areas such as culture, media, and tourist visas. The Gulf countries have similar economies, share overlapping interests, and face the same challenges. Therefore, coordination is no longer merely a political option, but a strategic necessity.
Moreover, realistic efforts to establish such a regional defense system would not necessarily require them to launch straight into a comprehensive, fully-fledged military alliance. It could set out from the most urgent need of the moment: a unified command for air and missile defense, able to deal with ballistic missiles, drones, and cruise missiles, while linking operations rooms, radar installations, and early warning stations in the Gulf states into a single network. Today’s emerging threats do not account for borders any more than they differentiate between airports, ports, energy facilities, and cities.
Such a system would not be far removed from the experience of the Peninsula Shield, which was bolstered in 2009 with the creation of a Rapid Intervention Force whose practical utility became clear when the Peninsula Shield entered Bahrain in 2011 to protect the country’s security, stability, and vital installations. In the same way, a Gulf NATO could build on the same formula, but with cutting-edge tools: rapid intervention, early warning, unified air defenses, and joint operational command. After that, it could develop a joint maritime command, because Gulf security is inextricably linked to the Strait of Hormuz, Bab al-Mandeb, the Red Sea, and energy and trade corridors. Next would come a phase of air defense integration, followed by a joint Gulf intelligence system. Today’s wars do not begin with the launch of the first missile, but well before that, with information-gathering, monitoring, and analysis.
To be effective, a Gulf NATO could not remain confined within the geography of the Gulf alone. Gulf security demands regional depth. Pakistan is vital in this regard, by virtue of its long military relationship with Saudi Arabia in terms of training, consultations and exercises. This was formalized in their 2025 Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement, which stipulates that any aggression against one party is considered an aggression against the other.
Türkiye also enjoys advanced military relations with Qatar, and growing defense cooperation with Kuwait. It has also entered a new phase of military-industrial cooperation with Saudi Arabia, through a deal to sell it Bayraktar Akıncı combat drones and the localization of some drone components. Egypt is another political heavyweight among the Arab countries; it participated in the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, and has significant experience in military industries through the Arab Organization for Industrialization, jointly established with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the Emirates. For its part, Jordan has extensive security and political experience, lying in a sensitive location between the Gulf, the eastern Mediterranean and the Euphrates River.
Gulf security would also benefit from the return of stability to Yemen, Syria and Sudan. Stability in Yemen would protect the southern flank of the Gulf and the Red Sea, while a stable Syria would close a major corridor for militias. As for Sudan, which participated in the Gulf intervention in Yemen, its location on the Red Sea, human capital and military depth will be important when the Sudanese state recovers.
A Gulf NATO would also need a wide network of international allies. The U.S. is the Gulf’s main military partner, particularly in air and missile defense, maritime security and the surveillance of key corridors. Britain has a long history of involvement in Gulf security and a continuous military presence in the region, especially through its naval facilities in Bahrain. France is the European military partner with the biggest presence in the Gulf, especially its military presence in the UAE and its defense relations with other Gulf countries. As for Europe as a bloc, it is well suited to be a partner in energy security, defense technologies, protecting navigation, and building long-term partnerships.
China cannot be ignored in this context. Beijing does not represent a traditional security ally like Washington or London, yet it is an important partner for Gulf states to diversify their procurement of arms and build a broader margin of independence in defense. Saudi Arabia has long experience in this area, having turned to China as early as the late 1980s to obtain long-range Dongfeng ballistic missiles. China was also a major player in the regional arms market during the Iran-Iraq war, when Iraq also imported Chinese weapons. As such, Beijing has had a role in power equations in the Gulf and the Levant since well before its great economic rise over recent decades.
As such, a Gulf NATO would not start from a blank slate. It has operational precursors in the form of the GCC and the Peninsula Shield Force, which were among the earliest forms of collective defense in the Global South, following the advent of NATO and other Cold War-era alliances. However, they differ from many of those alliances in a fundamental respect: they were not imposed by a major outside power; rather, they emerged from a direct realization among Gulf leaders that they faced a shared threat, and that the security of the six states was indivisible.
While the Peninsula Shield Force did not evolve into a fully integrated security alliance in a strict military and institutional sense, it preserved the core of the original concept: a joint command, a shared threat, and the implicit principle that an attack on one Gulf state is not an isolated, local affair.
Ultimately, the goal is not to build an offensive alliance or engage in an all-out arms race. Rather, it is to shift from the concept of security coordination to one of collective deterrence, creating a system that renders any aggression against a Gulf state costly enough to prevent it from occurring in the first place.
More than 40 years after the GCC was founded, it appears that the challenge no longer lies in proving that Gulf security is interconnected, but rather in building the institutions and capabilities that translate this reality into practice. If the GCC has provided the political framework for this vision, and the Peninsula Shield Force can serve as its initial military nucleus, then a “Gulf NATO” could well represent the next phase in the Gulf’s security evolution.
