The war in Iran marks a major inflection point in the security outlook and external partnerships of Gulf countries. In many ways, it mirrors the geopolitical awakening that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine triggered for Europeans after 2022. Like their European counterparts, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states now face the dilemma of relying on a security partner—the United States—that remains indispensable yet increasingly perceived as a liability. At the same time, they both confront an enduring and proximate threat from a neighbor whose governing regime is unlikely to disappear. And, as in Europe, GCC countries are divided over how best to navigate this strategic dilemma.
These parallels create new opportunities to deepen cooperation between Europe and the Gulf. Although ties have expanded in recent years, they have remained limited in scope. The war in Iran gives renewed relevance to the EU-GCC Strategic Partnership adopted in 2022, particularly its focus on maritime security and energy resilience.
The Crisis Imperative
For Europe, a stronger security role in the Gulf is no longer optional. The conflict has underscored the region’s centrality to European interests. The disruption of the Strait of Hormuz has triggered an energy shock that is reverberating across Europe. While the continent’s direct dependence on Gulf hydrocarbons is relatively limited, it remains highly exposed to global price volatility, with significant consequences for inflation and economic competitiveness.
These vulnerabilities build on earlier disruptions. Since 2023, insecurity in the Red Sea has forced shipping routes to circumnavigate the Cape of Good Hope, adding more than 10 days to transit times, increasing costs, and weakening supply chain resilience. More broadly, instability in the Middle East carries direct security implications for Europe, including risks linked to irregular migration and terrorism.
The interconnectedness of geopolitical theatres further amplifies these effects. The war in Iran has indirectly benefited Russia by driving up energy prices and thereby diluting the impact of European sanctions, while also straining Western military resources—particularly air defense systems—that might otherwise support Ukraine. At the same time, Washington has leveraged its security role in Europe to press for alignment on its Middle East policy, exposing the growing tension within the transatlantic relationship.
A Stronger Security Role?
As the United States appears increasingly unreliable as a security partner in the Middle East, Europeans face mounting pressure to develop a more autonomous security agenda in the region. Strengthening partnerships with GCC countries will be central to this effort. The post-war context may accelerate this trend, as Gulf states themselves seek to diversify their security relationships and reduce their dependence on Washington.
Several European countries have already taken steps in this direction. France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and the Netherlands rapidly deployed assets to support Gulf partners against Iranian strikes. France led the most visible effort, dispatching the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, Rafale fighter jets, and additional naval assets, while also providing air defense support. The UK reinforced its regional bases and prepared air patrols over the Strait of Hormuz, while Italy reportedly deployed naval forces and considered providing advanced air defense systems. These contributions were widely welcomed in the Gulf.
At the same time, most European governments distanced themselves from U.S. offensive operations, refusing to provide support. This position triggered significant pressure from Washington, including explicit threats to scale back its commitment to NATO. In response, France and the UK promoted the idea of an alternative, defensive maritime coalition for the Strait of Hormuz, excluding the United States and aimed at safeguarding freedom of navigation following a ceasefire.
Beyond military measures, the crisis has also revived discussions on reducing structural vulnerabilities in global energy flows. European and Gulf partners are already exploring infrastructure projects designed to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, including expanding Saudi pipeline capacity accessing the Red Sea, developing overland logistics corridors across the Arabian Peninsula, increasing refining and storage capacity outside the Gulf, and strengthening links between Gulf exports and Mediterranean markets.
Continuing Headwinds
Yet significant uncertainties remain regarding the medium to long-term trajectory of Europe-Gulf relations. For European governments, Ukraine will continue to dominate strategic priorities. The war in Iran has intensified the dilemma between reinforcing Europe’s eastern flank and maintaining U.S. support for Ukraine, on the one hand, and expanding security engagement in the Middle East on the other. Berlin’s cautious approach toward Washington illustrates the political constraints Europeans face in balancing these priorities.
The only silver lining of the Iran war for European countries is the rapprochement between Ukraine and Gulf countries, which has largely come through the anti-drone cooperation that has emerged as Gulf states have sought Ukrainian technological advancements to defend against Iranian low-cost drones. Whereas these states had previously steered clear of taking a strong stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, such a development—alongside Russia’s military cooperation with Iran—could bring the Gulf states closer to the European position.
Still, some GCC members may hesitate to fully invest in the relationship with Europe. While diversification away from the United States remains a long-term objective, their immediate priority is likely to secure stronger U.S. guarantees and capabilities to counter Iran. In this context, they may continue to prioritize relations with Washington over deeper engagement with Europe. European military support, while appreciated, remains limited relative to the scale of the threat, and Europeans have so far played only a marginal role in diplomatic efforts with Iran.
Economic cooperation—another pillar of the Europe-Gulf partnership—may also face headwinds. Plans to expand collaboration in renewable energy, green industries, and advanced technologies remain relevant, but heightened regional instability in the Gulf could dampen European investor confidence and delay major projects.
Domestic political dynamics further complicate the picture. Within the GCC, tensions—particularly between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—could make it difficult for European partners to maintain balanced relationships, and they will be keen to avoid being drawn into intra-Gulf rivalries. Within Europe, the rise of populist forces in key states such as France may also constrain political appetite for deeper engagement with the Gulf, as these parties tend to be inward-looking and anti-Islam in their ideologies.
The war in Iran, therefore, presents both an opportunity and a test for Europe-Gulf relations. While it underscores the strategic logic for closer cooperation, it also exposes structural constraints, chief among them the continued security dependence of both regions on the United States. Paradoxically, this dependence is both the main obstacle to, and the strongest argument for, a deeper partnership. In the longer term, the conflict may accelerate the emergence of a more fragmented international order shaped by middle powers seeking greater strategic autonomy and more flexible alignments. In such a context, Europe and the Gulf are likely to find that their interests converge more often, and that their need for each other becomes increasingly difficult to ignore.
