Lebanon is expected to soon enter a third round of preliminary, ambassador-level talks with Israel under the auspices of Washington, aimed at paving the way for direct, high-level negotiations. Yet internally, Lebanon is a mess. The country’s president, prime minister, and speaker of parliament—all hailing from different religious sects according to Lebanon’s confessional system—cannot agree upon a framework, or even an ultimate objective to the talks.
All the while, the country continues to be attacked by Israel’s military, despite a ceasefire agreement reached in April. This has led Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri to insist that negotiations cannot take place until the fighting stops completely. With Washington pushing for direct talks, however, refusing to negotiate could mean the Lebanese government is held responsible for any escalation, opening the door to wider Israeli military operations. Yet if it engages in negotiations “under fire,” it cements the power imbalance at the table and risks confrontation with the factions in Lebanon opposing direct talks altogether.
The result is a dilemma of immense complexity, in which the Lebanese government is facing multiple overlapping pressures from Israel, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and its own fractured domestic political environment. For the time being, Lebanon appears trapped, unable to find a viable path forward.
The Israeli Strategy: Managing Time and Imposing Facts on the Ground
Out of all parties to the conflict, Israel has the most explicit objectives. It does not view the truce as a transitional phase toward a resolution, but rather as an opportunity to continue reshaping the battlefield environment in its interests. This is evident in its efforts to establish a military presence in strategic areas and to create a permanent buffer zone, entrenching a new security paradigm that will be difficult to alter at a later stage.
On the ground, Israel is pursuing a two-pronged pressure strategy against the Lebanese state: First, maintaining continuous, low-intensity military engagement to keep the country in a state of perpetual attrition and crisis. Second, holding the Lebanese government responsible for any setback in the negotiation process, particularly regarding Hezbollah’s disarmament, thereby justifying subsequent military escalation. In this sense, Israel seeks not only to achieve gains on the battlefield but also to reshape the political landscape in Lebanon, pushing it toward policies that align with Israel’s security demands. Ultimately, the goal is to reposition Lebanon within Israel’s sphere of influence and impose long-term security and political obligations on the state.
American Pressure: Imposing the Process, Not the Outcome
Washington has adopted a somewhat different approach, focused on coercing Lebanon into the negotiation process rather than demanding predetermined outcomes. Washington seeks to draw Beirut into open-ended talks that can be managed at a later stage, while linking them to broader regional tracks, particularly negotiations with Iran.
To do this, Washington is employing a combination of incentives and pressures. It is offering the promise of a comprehensive ceasefire, an Israeli withdrawal, and the launch of a reconstruction process, in exchange for Beirut taking steps to reorganize its internal security situation, most importantly the disarmament of Hezbollah.
However, Washington’s approach reflects a simplistic understanding of Lebanon’s highly complex internal dynamics, failing to appreciate the tremendous risks and dangers to domestic stability of pushing for Hezbollah’s involuntary disarmament through state coercion.
The Saudi Factor: Domestic Stability as the Key to a Settlement
In contrast to the American approach, which seeks to reshape Lebanon’s political order through external pressure, Saudi Arabia’s role—and that of Arab states more broadly—appears focused on stabilizing the country from within before engaging in a broader regional bargaining. Riyadh’s efforts are aimed less at pushing Lebanon toward direct negotiations or high-level political meetings with Israel than at preventing state collapse, preserving Lebanon’s political equilibrium, and restoring a minimum level of institutional cohesion.
This approach reflects several overlapping considerations. First is the desire to preserve the stability of the Lebanese state and prevent the slide into a political vacuum. Saudi policymakers appear convinced that any governmental collapse would rapidly spiral out of control. Accordingly, Riyadh has sought to encourage a more unified Lebanese position by strengthening coordination among the president, prime minister and speaker of parliament in an effort to reinforce the state’s negotiating power.
Secondly, Saudi Arabia is keen to prevent Lebanon from descending into civil conflict, particularly between the major sectarian communities. Riyadh views such a scenario not simply as a Lebanese crisis, but as a wider regional threat that could unsettle already fragile regional balances. For that reason, Saudi efforts increasingly frame domestic progress through the lens of reviving the 1989 Taif Agreement that ended Lebanon’s civil war.
Third, this camp supports only a limited negotiation process—one narrowly focused on ending the war and stabilizing the security situation, rather than pursuing a comprehensive peace agreement or steps toward normalization with Israel. This position aligns with the Saudi approach, which continues to link normalization explicitly to the creation of a Palestinian state.
In this sense, Saudi Arabia is not presenting its approach as an alternative to the American one, but rather as a parallel framework aimed at managing its repercussions and preventing external pressure from becoming a source of domestic conflict inside Lebanon.
Lebanon’s Central Weakness: Internal Division
Lebanon’s internal fragmentation remains its greatest vulnerability. The absence of a clear political consensus over the nature of negotiations, as well as over Hezbollah’s weapons, role, and long-term objectives, significantly limits the state’s ability to negotiate effectively.
The problem extends beyond competing positions. Lebanon lacks a unified strategic vision altogether, leaving it vulnerable to external pressure and undermining its ability to impose conditions of its own.
As such, Lebanon faces not so much a decisive historical moment as a profound strategic dilemma. International pressure, internal division, and the country’s deep entanglement in wider regional dynamics all limit its capacity to make sovereign decisions—whether to engage fully in negotiations or in open confrontation—for the foreseeable future.
At the core of the crisis lies not just disagreement over which path to pursue, but the inability of the Lebanese political system to reach a consensus on any path at all. And yet, a choice must be made. Simply rejecting negotiations does not preserve the status quo, but opens the door to a wider military escalation, given Israel’s constant readiness to exploit any political vacuum or internal discord.
Although the sitting Lebanese government appears desperate to avoid entanglement with the conflict in Iran, any realistic approach to resolving Lebanon’s crisis must necessarily address it as part of a broader regional equation, not as an isolated issue. The country’s trajectory will remain closely tied to the evolving balance of power among regional forces, particularly the relationship between the U.S. and Iran, which limits Lebanon’s ability to set its own course.
The primary challenge, then, is managing a prolonged transitional period at the lowest possible cost until a more stable regional landscape emerges.
