After a transformative few weeks that have seen its political map change drastically, Yemen is once again at a dangerous crossroads. The risk of escalation and renewed confrontation remains real, even as sustained efforts are being made to prevent such an outcome. Recent events have underscored just how narrow the margin for error has become, and how quickly political miscalculation could tip an already fragile equilibrium into deeper instability. A failure to de-escalate at this moment of heightened tensions could have major ripple effects in Yemen and the wider region.
In early December, advances by forces loyal to the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Yemen’s east—including the strategically important provinces of Hadramawt and Al Mahra, which border Saudi Arabia and Oman, respectively—prompted a sharp response from Saudi Arabia and the internationally-recognized Government of Yemen. Led by the president of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), Rashad al-Alimi—with Saudi Arabia playing a decisive and central role—the response has been measured and responsible, emphasizing restraint, de-escalation and respect for Yemeni sovereignty, and seeking to manage escalation rather than accelerate it. In response to the crisis, Alimi declared a state of emergency, cancelled a security pact with the United Arab Emirates and called for the withdrawal of all its forces from Yemen, while requesting Saudi military support to stabilize the situation.
Within days, following unprecedented Saudi public statements admonishing the UAE and even a Saudi airstrike on a shipment of armored vehicles allegedly supplied by the country, Abu Dhabi announced a complete military withdrawal. In early January, Saudi-backed government forces reasserted control over the contested territories and expanded their control all the way to Aden. In a dramatic turn of events, the STC’s leader, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, disappeared by reportedly escaping by sea to Somaliland and from there on a plane to Abu Dhabi, according to Saudi public statements, and the STC delegation in Riyadh announced dissolving the STC and shutting down all its operation, although this declaration is still disputed by some of the remaining leadership and followers of the STC.
In this delicate moment of Yemen’s history, active diplomacy is needed to safeguard what remains of Yemen’s political and economic foundations. That is why the request by the president of the PLC for Saudi Arabia to host a comprehensive dialogue bringing together all southern factions—and Saudi Arabia’s decision to welcome and host this process, framed explicitly around dialogue, inclusivity and just solutions to the “southern cause”—represents an important step in the right direction. The initiative matters because it shifts the prevailing political dynamic away from unilateralism and toward process. By creating space for all southern voices to be heard, it lowers the risk of miscalculation, reassures anxious constituencies and helps contain tensions that could otherwise spill into economic disruption or military escalation. It also acknowledges that Yemen’s southern cause is real, historically rooted and politically sensitive—and that it can only be addressed through dialogue rather than confrontation.
Yemen cannot afford another round of fighting, let alone among ostensibly allied forces. Yemen’s economy has eroded quietly over the course of a decade of conflict, with real GDP per capita plummeting by an estimated 58 percent, pushing most of the population into poverty. Nearly 49 percent of Yemenis are facing acute food insecurity. Yemen is now ranked as the third-poorest country in the world, yet it is facing unprecedented aid funding shortfalls, with the 2025 UN Humanitarian Response Plan funded at only 25 percent. This is why restraint and diplomacy are not just political virtues. They are material necessities. Short-lived disruptions to ports, crossings, airspace and administrative coordination have outsized effects on food availability, fuel prices and access to basic services. Signals of fragmentation—real or perceived—affect confidence in the currency, disrupt fuel and commodity imports, and weaken already fragile revenue streams. The humanitarian implications are equally stark. Preserving economic continuity and humanitarian access requires political actors to recognize that escalation, however limited or localized it may appear, carries national consequences.
This is not to ignore the fact that Yemen’s political landscape is diverse, contested and deeply shaped by sub-national and historical grievances. Southern political aspirations, in particular, are neither new nor artificial. They reflect lived experience and long-standing demands that cannot be resolved through denial or postponement. But there is a critical distinction between acknowledging political realities and hardening them into irreversible outcomes. History suggests that unilateral steps, taken outside inclusive political frameworks, tend to narrow options rather than expand them. Dialogue, by contrast, preserves space—space for negotiation, compromise, and the gradual construction of consensus.
The decision to pursue an inclusive southern dialogue is supported by Saudi Arabia and welcomed by a growing number of regional and international actors. This reflects an understanding that Yemen’s unity, stability and future legitimacy can only be sustained through process, not proclamation. Yemen does not need sweeping declarations or grand bargains at this stage. What it needs is disciplined, confidence-building action along four fronts.
First, the proposed southern dialogue should be time-bound, inclusive and focused on principles and pathways rather than final-status outcomes. Its value lies not in immediate resolution, but in preventing fragmentation while building shared ground.
Second, the economy and humanitarian operations must be insulated from political escalation. This includes safeguarding ports, financial institutions and supply chains from political pressure, and ensuring continuity in economic management. In practice, this requires a clear commitment by Yemeni political actors—supported by Saudi Arabia and other partners—ringfencing economic and humanitarian decision-making from factional contestation, while reaffirming the government’s authority to act in these domains. It also includes a long-overdue cabinet reshuffle, giving the prime minister the political space to rationalize decision-making and manage the day-to-day affairs of the government without undue political interference. Finally, it means a strategic empowerment of local authorities and a careful recalibration of the powers and responsibilities of central vs. local executive authorities. In a fragile context like Yemen’s, coherent executive authority is not a luxury—it is a prerequisite for restoring confidence.
Third, regional coordination must continue to privilege stability over tactical advantage. Yemen’s survival as a functioning state depends as much on external alignment as on internal compromise. In this regard, Saudi Arabia’s role as the principal regional actor—anchoring de-escalation, supporting inclusive political processes, and leading economic stabilization in coordination with regional and international partners—will be essential to preventing renewed fragmentation, especially as regional actors, including the United Arab Emirates, adjust their roles following recent developments.
Finally, Yemen’s leaders must continue to demonstrate that the principle of restraint is not exclusive to temporary crisis management, but a governing standard that places institutional continuity and social cohesion above short-term political gain. This includes avoiding unilateral political or military moves that pre-empt dialogue and resisting the use of economic or humanitarian levers as instruments of pressure.
The risks of failure are not abstract. They include the alienation of southern constituencies whose political aspirations remain unresolved—creating space for renewed mobilization outside institutional frameworks. Yemenis may once again miss a rare opportunity to address this enduring fault line through dialogue, thereby entrenching division rather than laying the foundations for a more stable state.
If leaders choose restraint over escalation, inclusion over exclusion and stability over symbolism, Yemen can still navigate this passage without tipping into a deeper crisis. The alternative would be far harder to reverse, and after a decade of conflict, Yemenis can no longer afford further suffering driven by political miscalculation.
