Editor’s Note
The relevance of public opinion in the Middle East and North Africa is a question often debated but little understood. Given the high prevalence of autocracy, surveys of popular sentiment are limited, while freedoms of speech and press are not the norm. Indeed, as thousands of political prisoners freed in recent days from the Sednaya dungeon in Syria attest to, the street is not often a safe venue for political expression in the region, and a lack of protest does not signify an absence of objection.
Still, the disconnect between popular opinion and government policy does not obviate the importance of the former, particularly in the context of such profound and disturbing developments as have transpired over the past 14 months. An unfolding genocide in Gaza has been viewed daily on the screens of people everywhere. Younger generations in the MENA and beyond are internalizing the most extreme violence imaginable, the inability or unwillingness of their own governments or the international system to stop it, and the involvement of Western powers—long the standard bearers of the human rights agenda—in perpetrating it. A new understanding of the world is being shaped in ways we cannot yet comprehend.
Indeed, the shifts in public opinion, and the deepening anger and alienation are real, even if reactions are not instantaneous. At some point in the future, this new politicization or radicalization will find expression in the world.
To shed some light on this subject, Afkār has invited several experts to examine the shifts seen in public opinion over the past year and what they may signify for the present and future of the region.
– Omar H. Rahman, Editor of Afkār
The Enemy of My Enemy Is My Friend
Michael Robbins, Director and Co-Principal Investigator, Arab Barometer
As China reemerged as a major actor in the Middle East and North Africa over the past decade, particularly through its Belt and Road Initiative, Arab publics initially held very favorable attitudes toward the world power. Yet as this relationship deepened and the scope of engagement became clearer, positive views of China began to fall.
That trend has reversed over the past 14 months, however, as support for China dramatically improved in the wake of the events that followed October 7, 2023. Less an outcome of what China has done to improve its image, the change is largely a result of souring views of the U.S. that have led Arab publics to turn toward a Chinese alternative.
When Israel began its military campaign in Gaza following Hamas’ October 7 attacks, President Joe Biden pledged “ironclad” support for Israel. As bombs started to fall on Gaza, the views of MENA citizens shifted against the U.S. By chance, Arab Barometer was fielding a survey in Tunisia in the three weeks before October 7 and the three weeks that followed. Prior to that day, U.S. favorability in Tunisia stood at 40%; by October 27, it plummeted to just 10%. At the time, Tunisian views of China were relatively static.
Surveys conducted in the months that followed confirmed this drop in favorable opinion of the U.S., where in Jordan, Mauritania, Lebanon and Iraq favorability fell between 23 and 7 points compared with surveys completed before October 7. Meanwhile, China’s favorability increased in all those countries, with the exception of Mauritania, rising between 6 and 16 points.
The survey results make clear that the sudden increase in China’s favorability is unlikely to be a result of its response to the Gaza conflict. In the surveys following October 7, Arab Barometer included a question that asked respondents to name the country (or countries) they thought most committed to defending Israeli rights and to defending Palestinian rights. Majorities of at least 60% in all countries where this question was asked said the U.S. was committed to defending Israeli rights. For China, at most 14% said it was committed to defending Palestinian rights, while no more than 13% said it was committed to defending Israeli rights. Thus, the U.S. has been perceived as extremely one-sided in this conflict while China is effectively seen as peripheral.
Given that views of China had been declining between 2019 and 2022, it is clear that the sudden increase in support for China is the result of China being the primary rival to the U.S. Or, put another way, Arab publics are following the logic of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”
As China seeks to make inroads across MENA, citizens in the region will be more welcoming than before. And, despite the prevalence of authoritarian regimes in the region, the views of Arab publics are relevant for this global competition. Many leaders are likely to see this as an opportunity to not only increase foreign investment from China, but also to placate the demands of their citizens on this front. For example, the recent state visit of President Xi Jinping to Morocco, a long-time U.S. ally, was the first ever visit by a Chinese leader and comes amid deepening ties between China and Morocco. Beijing is benefitting from public sentiment across the region and will seek to take advantage of this opportunity as part of its global competition with Washington.
The Axis Still Faces Resistance
Hamidreza Azizi, Nonresident Fellow, Middle East Council on Global Affairs
The ongoing Israeli war on Gaza has claimed tens of thousands lives, the majority of whom are civilians, and displaced millions more. This crisis has profoundly affected public opinion in the Arab and Islamic world, thrusting the Palestinian issue back into the spotlight. Leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran, positioning themselves since the 1979 Islamic Revolution as staunch supporters of the Palestinian cause and the hub of the “Axis of Resistance” against Israel, have sought to capitalize on this shift in attention to bolster their image in the region. However, more than a year into the war, regional public opinion toward Iran remains mixed and inconsistent.
A January 2024 survey by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, conducted with 8,000 respondents across 16 Arab countries, revealed that 48% viewed Iran’s stance on the Israeli war on Gaza favorably, while 37% expressed a negative view. This marked a departure from post-Arab Spring trends, during which Iran was largely viewed unfavorably. Simultaneously, the survey highlighted a declining image of the United States in the Arab world.
Despite these initial shifts, subsequent surveys suggest that changes in public perception of Iran’s regional role have been neither as significant nor as lasting as Tehran may have hoped. A July 2024 Arab Barometer report showed that in Kuwait, Jordan, Palestine and Lebanon, favorable views of Iran remained low, ranging between 15% and 36%. Furthermore, majorities in these countries identified Iran’s political influence and nuclear program as significant threats to their national security.
Even among Palestinians, perceptions of Iran have fluctuated. A September 2024 survey of residents in parts of the West Bank and Gaza reported a 16-point drop in satisfaction with Iran’s performance. This decline was largely attributed to Iran’s failure to retaliate after the Israeli assassination of Hamas’ political chief Ismail Haniyeh on Iranian soil in late July. When Iran eventually launched a missile strike on Israel on October 1 in response to the killings of Haniyeh and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, Palestinian opinion remained split. While 49% of Palestinians believed the attack would benefit their cause, 47% anticipated adverse repercussions.
These findings suggest that Iran’s efforts to support the “Axis of Resistance” and its vocal backing of the Palestinian cause have not translated into a significant or consistent improvement in its standing within Arab public opinion. Factors such as sectarian differences; the perception that Iran uses Arabs as front-line actors and engages directly only when attacks reach its territory; and its alleged use of the Palestinian cause to advance its own regional ambitions continue to make its role a contentious one.
How Social Media Distorts Public Opinion
Marc Owen Jones , Nonresident Senior Fellow, Middle East Council on Global Affairs
Social media is not a good indicator of public opinion. This misconception stems partly from social media’s accessibility—anyone with an internet connection can create an account and share their views. However, several critical factors prevent social media from serving as a reliable barometer of public sentiment.
Perhaps most importantly social media platforms are not created equal. Each has distinct “affordances”—technical features that shape how users interact and express themselves. X’s (formerly Twitter) character limit encourages brief, unnuanced statements, while Instagram’s visual focus does not necessarily encourage meaningful discussion in the comments section. These structural differences create platform-specific encounters that are not always useful in harvesting representative data on specific issues.
Power dynamics within social media networks significantly distort representation. Influence accumulates around certain nodes—be they celebrities, politicians or viral personalities—creating echo chambers that amplify specific viewpoints while marginalizing others. This concentration of attention is further complicated by proprietary algorithms that determine content visibility, often prioritizing engagement and emotive content over factual accuracy. Elon Musk’s takeover of X—and subsequent boosting of his own tweets and those he agrees with—is testament to this, as is Meta’s censorship of pro-Palestinian content.
The demographic skew of social media platforms presents another significant distortion. Usage varies considerably by age, education level and socioeconomic status. Younger, more urban and more educated populations tend to be overrepresented among users, while certain demographics—particularly older adults and rural populations—may be significantly underrepresented. This skew extends to platform preferences, with older populations more likely to be found on Facebook and users in various countries favoring different platforms.
Perhaps most concerning is the manipulation of these systems through bots, troll farms and coordinated influence campaigns by states or other actors. As an example, a 2020 study estimated that a quarter of all tweets about the climate crisis were produced by bots on an average day. The ease of creating anonymous accounts and the lack of robust verification systems makes it difficult to distinguish authentic public discourse from artificial amplification. The monetization of platforms also encourages influencers to take dark money to promote certain politics.
The international nature of social media platforms further complicates their relationship to public opinion. Views expressed on these platforms often cross national boundaries, making it difficult to isolate domestic public opinion from international influence. Understanding these limitations is crucial for policymakers, researchers and citizens who seek to gauge public sentiment. While social media may offer valuable insights into certain aspects of public discourse, it should be understood as just one component of a broader ecosystem of public opinion indicators, including traditional polling, focus groups and community engagement.
Why the South Is No Longer Listening to Europe
Dalia Ghanem, Senior Fellow and Program Director, Middle East Council on Global Affairs
The global geopolitical landscape is being reshaped by rising powers like China that are challenging the West’s traditional dominance. This shift is particularly evident in the Middle East and North Africa, where the European Union is struggling to maintain its relevance, especially among its traditional Arab partners. Several factors have contributed to this decline— primarily a widespread perception of weakness and a lack of strategic coherence in EU foreign policy.
This perception of weakness predates Israel’s recent war on Gaza. A 2023 poll by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and Oxford University revealed that the world views the EU as lacking hard power and unimpressive in its ability to project strength. This is compounded by bureaucratic inertia and siloed decision-making, hindering the EU’s ability to react swiftly and decisively to global events.
The EU’s inconsistent stance on the war on Gaza further damaged its credibility. While some member states condemned Israel’s actions, others hesitated and are still hesitating despite Israel’s genocidal campaign, exposing internal discord. In contrast to the EU’s strong, unified response to the war in Ukraine, its double standard on Gaza has harmed its reputation in the Arab world and beyond. The damage may be long-lasting, perhaps irrevocable, even if some in Brussels seem to believe relations with Arab partners will simply return to business as usual after the war. The disconnect between the EU’s actions and its expectations towards partners in the Global South risks further alienating key allies and diminishing its influence on the global stage.
Adding to the EU’s challenges is the rise of new geopolitical players, particularly China, which has made significant inroads in the Middle East through strategic investments and assertive diplomacy. Beijing’s success in brokering the Iran-Saudi rapprochement agreement in 2023 and its vocal support for a ceasefire in Gaza contrast sharply with the EU’s perceived equivocation and internal divisions. Consequently, many in the Global South see China as a more reliable and influential partner.
The EU would benefit from addressing its internal divisions and adopt a more coherent and assertive foreign policy, if it wishes to regain credibility and relevance. This requires prioritizing collective action over national interests and engaging with the Global South on its own terms, recognizing the diverse perspectives and priorities of its partners. Failure to adapt will further marginalize the EU on the global stage and diminish its ability to shape a world order that reflects its values and interests.
Public Opinion on Gaza Signals a Regional Turning Point
Yasmina Abouzzohour, Nonresident Fellow, Middle East Council on Global Affairs
More than a year since its onset, the war on Gaza continues to dominate public discourse across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Survey data collected by the Arab Barometer in Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Palestine (the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem) and Tunisia between 2023 and 2024 reveal a shared concern for Palestinians, pessimism about peace prospects and waning confidence in existing mediation efforts.
What do MENA citizens think of ongoing events? For 81% of respondents, the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories is seen as a threat to national security interests. In addition, 64% of respondents view Israel’s blockade of Gaza, in place since 2007, as an act of terrorism. Over 78% hold the same views of Israel’s bombing campaigns in Gaza, 73% of its cutting off electricity and water supplies, and 63% of its forced displacement of over a million civilians.
What of the prospects for peace? Skepticism about the feasibility of a two-state solution is widespread across the region, with 71% of respondents doubting the Israeli government’s commitment to this resolution and 32% doubting the Palestinian leadership’s commitment. The latter is compounded by the stark dissatisfaction with the leadership within Palestine: 60% of Palestinians view the Palestinian Authority as a burden, and 78% support President Mahmoud Abbas’s resignation.
Who could resolve the conflict? Confidence in mediation efforts is low across the board. Only 5% of respondents think the United States is committed to defending Palestinian rights. For the European Union, this number is just 6%. Public disillusionment with past diplomatic efforts is evident, with fewer than 17% of respondents seeing various parties as suitable brokers of a fair political solution. Qatar (27%) and the United Nations (22%) inspire greater confidence, perhaps due to their humanitarian efforts and vocal advocacy for Palestinian rights.
These findings paint a clear picture: Across the Middle East and North Africa, the Gaza conflict is amplifying disillusionment with diplomacy and mistrust in mediators. As the humanitarian toll rises, the call for effective mediation grows louder. It remains unclear who will step up to the challenge, but a new approach to addressing the crisis is urgently needed.
Egypt on Gaza: Between a Rock and a Hard Place
Ahmed Morsy, Visiting Fellow, Middle East Council on Global Affairs
With the genocide in Gaza unfolding on its border, Egyptian soldiers in eyeshot of the countless horrors, and the threat of mass Palestinian displacement into the Sinai, the situation is perhaps felt more fully in Egypt than in any other country in the region.
While there are no credible public opinion surveys in Egypt, it’s unlikely that popular support for Palestine is waning especially given the mass atrocities that are being livestreamed daily. Afterall, the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty was never warmly embraced by Egyptians. Palestine is historically a mobilizing cause for the public, and this makes the regime aware that allowing any protest in support of Palestine, no matter how small, could escalate and threaten its control. Even when President Abdelfattah El-Sisi called on Egyptians to rally in support of his policies on the war, some of the protests were later violently dispersed as chants started veering off course. Hence, it is not surprising that after more than a year since October 7, 2023, around 150 people have been detained or investigated by the security services for participating or campaigning peacefully against Israel’s actions, according to the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR). Other points of evidence exist in the opinion pieces and reporting of independent media outlets like Mada Masr and almanassa, as well as the instances of Egyptian soldiers on the border of Gaza defying their commands and engaging in firefights with their Israeli counterparts.
While the government is most likely aware of the deepening well of public anger, it also finds the need to balance between public frustration, and its security obligations and the country’s economic hardships. Moreover, Egypt is not only beset on its borders by the genocide in Gaza, but also ongoing conflicts in Sudan and Libya, with varying degrees of volatility. Together, Egypt is facing heavy security and socio-economic pressures, which have also allowed the regime opportunities to boost its diplomatic positioning and plea for much needed economic assistance. So far, Egypt managed to mobilize support from Westen partners to fend off announced Israeli plans to displace Palestinians from Gaza to Sinai; and to receive financial lifelines from the United Arab Emirates, the European Union and the International Monetary Fund to overcome its structural economic weaknesses and alleviate some of the war’s impact.
The space for and impact of public opinion exists somewhere there, between the minds and hearts of a sympathetic public and of a regime that is struggling to protect the state’s interests as it sees them.