Since President Donald Trump’s Gulf tour in mid-May, U.S.-Syria relations have evolved significantly. Washington’s lifting of its most crippling sanctions on Syria, the appointment of an American envoy to the country, Trump’s meeting with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh and the reopening of the U.S. ambassador’s residence in Damascus all illustrate a new reality in bilateral relations, a little more than six months after Bashar al-Assad’s fall.
Viewed from Moscow, which had spent years pouring military, financial and diplomatic resources into propping up the Assad clan’s rule, this trend of normalization has profound strategic consequences. The shift in Washington and other Western capitals toward a more conciliatory stance on Sharaa’s government threatens to erode Russia’s entrenched advantage in Syria and, by extension, the rest of the Levant. A deeper Western rapprochement with Damascus risks diminishing Moscow’s leverage, with potentially far-reaching implications for its military posture in both the Middle East and parts of Africa.
It is not only the U.S. that is establishing cordial ties with the new rulers in Damascus. The United Kingdom, members of the European Union and the bloc itself are following suit, establishing new relationships with post-Assad Syria. London has been engaging with Sharaa’s government diplomatically and providing humanitarian assistance. In March, it lifted sanctions on Syria’s central bank and oil sector to foster closer ties with Damascus, also removing sanctions on key security and intelligence agencies the following month.
In February, French President Emmanuel Macron became the first Western head of state to speak to Sharaa by phone, addressing terrorism, the Syrian population’s aspirations and Macron’s commitment to lifting sanctions too. Then in May, France became the first European country to host the new Syrian president, underscoring its aspirations to serve as a diplomatic conduit between Damascus and the rest of the world.
Similarly, Italy dispatched its foreign minister, Antonio Tajani, to Damascus roughly a month after Assad fell to meet with Sharaa and Syria’s top diplomat, Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani, who subsequently visited Rome after taking part in a Brussels donor conference for Syria. Tajani has emphasized Italy’s quest to serve a bridging role between Damascus and the EU, which began lifting sanctions on Syria in February before removing the majority of them in May.
Sharaa’s government has many incentives to build on this diplomatic momentum with the U.S., U.K. and EU. These dynamics suggest that post-Assad Syria is likely to be increasingly oriented toward Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, Türkiye and the West.
Russian Reorientation
This pivot will have important repercussions for Russia. The Assad regime’s collapse in December 2024 represented a humiliating defeat for Russia and a major challenge to Moscow’s foreign policy—not only in the Middle East, but globally. Assad’s fall fueled doubts over Russia’s status as a rising global power capable of acting as a credible security guarantor for Middle Eastern states.
At the same time, given the historical tensions pitting Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and other anti-Assad rebel groups against Russia, a key ally of the former regime, it was reasonable to expect strong anti-Moscow sentiment to influence the politics of post-regime-change Syria.
Nevertheless, Russian officials have taken steps to pursue a partnership with Sharaa’s government, which the new leadership in Damascus has appeared open to embracing, out of the same raw pragmatism that has also characterized the Kremlin’s approach to dialogue with Syria’s Sunni Islamist rebels-turned-rulers.
Even in the months immediately following Assad’s ouster, as the U.S. and other Western powers upheld Assad-era sanctions, analysts had good reason to conclude that the new authorities in Damascus would be nudged toward the backer of their erstwhile foe. From the Kremlin’s perspective, the persistence of stringent U.S. sanctions in the wake of the former regime’s collapse created a unique opportunity for Russia to maintain its strong foothold in Syria and exert some degree of influence over the post-Assad political order.
In late January, a delegation led by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov visited Syria to further Moscow’s bid for influence in post-Baathist Syria. Then, on February 12, Sharaa had his first phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who pledged Moscow’s support for Syria’s territorial integrity and national unity.
In the months following the regime’s fall, Russia also sent Syria cash shipments, providing the war-torn country with crucial relief from currency shortages, and assisted with fuel and wheat deliveries. It also expressed willingness to play a role in reconstruction efforts, underscoring its ability to maneuver in post-Assad Syria in ways that U.S. allies and partners in the region could not due to Washington’s secondary sanctions.
In Syria to Stay?
In this evolving situation, the Kremlin is likely to regard the Trump administration’s engagement with Syria with considerable wariness. Russia will need to recalibrate its approach to safeguard its interests and adapt to shifting geopolitical currents that are pushing Syria’s new rulers closer to the West. However, Damascus will probably avoid entirely burning bridges with Moscow, even as it rebuilds relations with the Kremlin’s adversaries. Russia still has cards to play, which Damascus is unlikely to disregard, particularly as key questions about the future of Syria’s engagement with the West remain open for now.
On the security side, Russia has military bases in Tartus and Khmeimim that it seeks to maintain—even as the Trump administration withdraws U.S. forces from the country. Thus, depending on potential security challenges in the country, Russia could play a useful role in matters that the U.S. would not, particularly concerning a potential resurgent threat from the Islamic State (ISIS).
Russia may also see economic openings in Syria. Even after Western countries lifted most of their sanctions on Syria, it remains too early to tell how much the U.S. and Europe will invest in the war-ravaged country moving forward. There are risks of overcompliance by Western entities, especially banks, because of sanctions on Syria that have yet to be lifted. Additionally, insecurity and Syria’s lack of a transparent and functioning financial system might cause Western business executives and investors to be reluctant to invest in the country. Ultimately, if Western governments, businesses and investors cannot offer Damascus what it needs, Moscow could fill the void. It could also leverage its position as Syria’s major supplier of oil since the previous regime fell late last year in order to keep Damascus relatively close to Moscow.
Policymakers in the new government are also likely to see risks in relying on Trump, whose unpredictability raises the possibility of a sudden shift in Washington’s Syria policy. Nor is there any way to predict with any certainty how Trump’s successor may approach the “New Syria.”
Should the U.S., U.K. and EU’s interest in the country wane, Western powers reassess their support for al-Sharaa as misguided, or extremist factions succeed in toppling the current regime, both Trump and European leaders may distance themselves. These scenarios underscore why Damascus is unlikely to fully sever ties with Moscow in favor of a complete alignment with the West, even if it is currently encouraged by signals from Washington and key European capitals.
One symbolically important question relates to the printing of Syria’s currency. Throughout the war, Syrian pounds were printed in Russia. Today, discussions are underway for Germany and the UAE to take over this role. Such a change would highlight Syria’s pivot from Moscow toward the Gulf and the West.
Looking ahead, Western powers are likely to prioritize curbing Russian influence in post-regime-change Syria. As Sharaa’s government seeks to cultivate partnerships with the U.S., U.K. and EU, while avoiding a rupture with Moscow, Damascus will have to be careful to navigate both risks and opportunities stemming from the Russian-Western rivalry.
