The U.S.-Iran war has so far failed to produce any decisive strategic outcome or end the threat hanging over the Gulf. Instead, it has ushered the region into a new phase of managed instability, characterized by cycles of escalation and de-escalation, with no clear political or military resolution in sight.
The war has placed the Strait of Hormuz at the heart of a struggle over the very meaning of power in the Gulf. Threats to navigation have not only targeted oil tankers, but also challenged a key principle underpinning the global economy: that maritime trade routes must remain insulated from political blackmail.
Furthermore, the conflict over Hormuz has escalated from a confrontation between Iran and the U.S. to being a test of the international system’s ability to safeguard one of its most critical strategic chokepoints. Will European and Asian industrial nations set aside their differences with Washington to forge an international alliance akin to the one that liberated Kuwait after the Iraqi invasion of 1990? After all, Iran’s ambitions regarding the Hormuz pose a danger comparable to those of Saddam Hussein’s regime in the Gulf and its desire to hold the global economy hostage.
A Barometer of Power
Tehran’s capacity to sow chaos grows in step with its success in turning the Strait of Hormuz into an instrument of strategic leverage. This also expands its ability to undermine the foundations of stability in a region that serves as a vital artery for the global economy. The Strait, by its nature, is not merely a geographical feature, but a sensitive barometer of power, revealing who holds the capacity to disrupt or sustain the global economy, and who can trigger inflation and recession in industrialized societies or influence their political choices.
It is against this backdrop that International Energy Agency chief Fatih Birol warned in mid-July that the global economy faces a renewed challenge, noting that markets are anxious and grappling with significant uncertainty. Consequently, Tehran seeks to control the Strait and flout international law by deploying fishing vessels and low-cost drones, even as NATO members debate the costs of projecting power.
This reality has redefined the Strait as a theater of competition that extends beyond securing navigation, to the redistribution of maritime influence itself through new regional and international alliances. Furthermore, multilateral initiatives—whether from within a European framework or through broader coordination with Gulf states—reflect a growing recognition that the security of Hormuz is no longer solely a Gulf issue, but one that has become integral to global energy security and the stability of international trade.
Yet for all their importance, these alliances do not alter a fundamental truth: the Strait of Hormuz cannot be managed not by naval power alone, but through delicate balances between deterrence and political acceptance, and between protecting vessels and preventing the sea from becoming an open arena for a war of attrition. Herein lies the strategic paradox: the more alliances expand to protect the waterway, the more tense and isolated Iran begins to feel. Consequently, the impact of these alliances extends beyond merely bolstering maritime security. It shifts the conflict to a broader arena in which European, American, and Gulf interests intersect with Iranian calculations that view the sea as an extension of sovereignty rather than simply an international waterway.
The future of security cooperation among Gulf states remains governed by a delicate equation: the need for a security bloc is mounting, yet the institutional capacity to realize it remains limited. Recent conflicts have demonstrated that no breach of a national defense system remains a purely domestic matter—instead, it rapidly evolves into a transborder threat, whether in the form of missiles, drones, or the disruption of maritime corridors. Nevertheless, under the current reality in the Gulf, we cannot talk of a fully unified defense umbrella, but rather, varying degrees of practical coordination, with more progress on bilateral partnerships, joint early warning systems, and partial air defense integration, than on the establishment of a robust collective security doctrine.
Thus, the future of security cooperation should not be measured by populist slogans, but by the Gulf states’ ability to transform shared anxiety over threats into a joint deterrence structure—even an incomplete one. In the realm of realpolitik, limited coordination can be worth more than a declared unity that fails when tested by crisis.
The Gulf relationship with the U.S. is also entering a phase of greater complexity than in the past. Washington will remain an indispensable partner for the foreseeable future, yet it is no longer capable of guaranteeing Gulf stability on its own. The American security umbrella remains significant in terms of weaponry, intelligence, and technical deterrence. However, it is no longer viewed as an absolute guarantee, but as a key component of a broader equation that necessitates diversified partnerships and enhanced self-reliance.
As such, the partnership with Washington appears to be a strategic necessity rather than an exclusive choice, given that the era of mutual interdependence ended two decades ago. Recent conflicts have demonstrated that the concept of “peace through strength” may succeed in delaying total collapse, yet it can neither establish a stable order nor address the root causes of conflict. Consequently, any European failure to play a global role in the Gulf, amidst the erosion of American deterrence, would signify a major shift in the structure of the international system, and marginalize the “Old Continent” within the emerging multipolar order. The future of the Strait of Hormuz, and the resulting realignment of international alliances in the Gulf, could mark a turning point in the reconfiguration of global power—particularly if the U.S. were to withdraw from the confrontation without securing decisive strategic gains.
Furthermore, Iran cannot be dismissed as merely the subject of a transient crisis that can be resolved through military strikes or sanctions. Iran is an enduring actor within the region’s architecture. This means that engagement with it is a long-term strategic imperative, not a military question that can be definitively resolved.
Indeed, despite the blows it has sustained, Tehran has not altered its behavior. Moreover, it continues to employ asymmetric tools to raise the costs on its adversaries—ranging from missiles and drones to maritime pressure and targeting vital waterways. Consequently, any realistic approach must be grounded in a dual realization: its behavior remains unsettling, but Iran is here to stay. The objective, therefore, is not to seek its downfall, but to identify political and security mechanisms that limit its ability to weaponize geography for perpetual extortion.
The dilemma comes down to a fundamental question: What does it mean when a major power confronts a regional state within a strategic environment that precludes a decisive military outcome? The conflict extends beyond nuclear issues and spheres of influence to the very definition of security. Washington exerts pressure to reshape the security landscape, while Tehran bets on a strategy of attrition, evasion, and cost-escalation—yet is also unable to achieve a decisive victory.
The Gulf states, then, face some inescapable realities: none of them can counterbalance Iran alone, nor can they rely entirely on the U.S. Practically, this necessitates building defensive capabilities to reduce their vulnerability and deepening partnerships with both the U.S. and other major powers, without becoming beholden to them. A third reality is that engaging with Iran—within rules that constrain its behavior without unconditionally legitimizing its policies—represents a realistic strategy for risk containment, rather than a strategy for definitively resolving the conflict.
