Most Lebanese Reject Sectarian Rule. What’s Preventing Change?

Lebanon’s sectarian political system has survived civil war, economic collapse, and repeated waves of popular protest. Yet its endurance masks a striking contradiction: Most Lebanese appear to reject its organizing principles, but few are willing to take the risks required to challenge it. A nationally representative survey of 3,000 Lebanese citizens conducted by the authors in early 2026 helps explain why. Most respondents prioritize national identity, favor democracy, and view sectarian governance negatively. But they also fear that protest will be dangerous, personally costly, and unlikely to succeed.

The findings reveal a consequential gap between wanting political change and feeling able to achieve it. Citizens may consider collective action legitimate and potentially effective yet hesitate to participate until they have evidence that a particular mobilization can succeed. When enough people make that calculation, individual caution can weaken the collective capacity to challenge the system. This “wait-and-see trap” helps explain how sectarian rule can persist despite widespread dissatisfaction.

Political preferences beyond sectarian rule

Lebanon’s confessional power-sharing system organizes representation around religious affiliation, reserving its highest offices according to sectarian group. For example, the Lebanese presidency is reserved for a member of the Maronite Christian community, the prime minister for a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of parliament for a Shia Muslim. The system has barely evolved since it was established at independence in 1943, despite significant domestic violence and instability, economic collapse, and political tension. While the 1989 Taif Agreement that ended Lebanon’s civil war envisioned the abolition of political sectarianism, the goal has never been realized.

The confessional model’s durability can make sectarian loyalties appear to define what citizens want from politics. The survey’s findings challenge that assumption.

Asked to rank different dimensions of their identity, 60.8 percent of respondents placed national identity first. Nearly 90 percent considered democracy the most desirable form of government. More directly, 77.1 percent evaluated sectarian power-sharing negatively, and 75.8 percent opposed supporting parties organized around religious or sectarian orientations. These findings reveal substantial public support for political principles that extend beyond the existing sectarian order.

We describe this pattern as a “latent post-sectarian majority,” that is, converging majority preferences for national identification, democratic government, and alternatives to sectarian governance. This does not mean that a single political bloc shares every position, or that sectarian differences have disappeared. But it does suggest that established leaders cannot simply assume that governing in a sectarian community’s name means representing its political preferences.

The distance between citizens and institutions is also evident in perceptions of exclusion. Some 91.5 percent reported that authorities did not listen to them, while 96.5 percent believed the political system failed to ensure equal treatment. These responses reflect how citizens question whose voices count and whose interests the government serves. The puzzle is why such extensive grievances have not translated into sustained collective action.

The wait-and-see trap

The survey reveals a foundation for political engagement. Some 65.1 percent of respondents regarded peaceful protest as a legitimate means of political influence, while 84.1 percent believed collective action could be effective. Yet 57.7 percent expected a peaceful demonstration to fail to achieve its objectives, while 63.6 percent preferred to wait until the prospects of success became clearer before participating.

These positions are not contradictory. People can believe that acting together can make a difference while doubting that a particular demonstration will attract enough participants, sustain pressure, or secure concessions. The gap helps explain why widespread agreement on the desirability of change may generate little readiness to take the first step.

At the individual level, waiting offers a sensible response to this uncertainty. Early participants accept costs before knowing whether others will join. Those who postpone participation can watch a movement develop and reassess its prospects. But when enough people wait for visible evidence of strength, the movement struggles to assemble the support that would make success appear credible. Expectations of failure can thereby become self-reinforcing.

This is the wait-and-see trap: The reassurance potential participants seek depends partly on participation that has yet to occur. The survey does not establish this as the sole explanation for restraint, but it reveals a pattern consistent with it. Mobilization depends not simply on dissatisfaction, but on confidence that others will act and that acting together is worth the risk.

The costs of taking the first step

Those risks—or at least the perception of them—are substantial. Some 52.4 percent of respondents agreed to some degree that participating in a peaceful demonstration could expose them or their families to harm. When asked about a demonstration that might develop into clashes, 74.7 percent were unwilling or completely unwilling to participate. Including those who were somewhat unwilling raises the figure to 86.1 percent. The possibility of violence therefore places a substantial constraint on inclination to join.

The distinction between peaceful protest and possible confrontation matters politically. For someone already uncertain about success, the prospect of personal or family harm raises the threshold for joining further. The problem therefore concerns both recruitment and retention: a movement that initially attracts supporters may struggle to hold them if confrontation makes continued participation appear unsafe.

Material obligations reinforce that calculation. Some 59.6 percent agreed that participation could cost them work, money, or time, or interfere with family responsibilities. Almost half—45.2 percent—ranked these considerations among their two most important factors when deciding whether to participate. They are therefore more than incidental inconveniences; they occupy a central place in how many respondents weigh political action. These pressures can also limit how long participation lasts: Even citizens willing to join an initial demonstration may struggle to sustain involvement when repeated participation competes with earning a living and caring for family members.

Lebanon’s economic crisis makes those tradeoffs particularly acute. Some 95 percent of respondents assessed economic conditions negatively. Years into the country’s financial collapse and restrictions on access to savings, sacrificing earnings or time carries an immediate household cost. The hoped-for gains from reform, by contrast, depend on an uncertain collective outcome (see figures 1-2).

Here the experience of the 2019 uprising looms large. Beginning in October of that year, Lebanese took to the streets across the country in a movement remarkable for its geographic and cross-sectarian breadth. Protesters challenged not merely individual politicians but a political order that many blamed for corruption, economic decline, and failing public services. The movement helped force Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s resignation, but it ultimately failed to produce the systemic transformation many protesters demanded.

That experience appears to weigh heavily on how many Lebanese view mobilization today. Some 83.8 percent of respondents assessed the country’s recent protest experience pessimistically. For people who believe that the 2019 movement demanded enormous effort but produced limited political change, another call to the streets must overcome the expectation that effort and sacrifice may again yield little. Safety concerns, household obligations, and memories of disappointment all reinforce the incentive to wait.

Confidence in security, distrust in representation

Alongside these constraints, the survey reveals a sharp divide in institutional trust. Some 72.3 percent expressed distrust in the government, 63.8 percent in the parliament, and 73.7 percent in the judiciary. Meanwhile, 94.2 percent expressed at least some trust in the Lebanese Armed Forces, and 73.7 percent in security services (see table 1).

Table 1. Public Trust in State and Political Institutions

Note: Each institution was assessed by 3,000 respondents. “Total distrust” combines “no trust at all,” “do not trust,” and “somewhat distrust.” “Total trust” combines “somewhat trust,” “trust,” and “trust very strongly.” Percentages may not sum to exactly 100% because of rounding. Cells report frequencies, with percentages in parentheses.

Confidence is therefore concentrated in institutions associated with security, while representative and judicial bodies face widespread distrust. For reformers, this raises a difficult question: How can the desire for stability be reconciled with the reconstruction of accountable civilian government? Maintaining security may provide conditions for political participation, but it cannot resolve the exclusion and unequal treatment respondents describe.

Lebanon’s predicament is that dissatisfaction with sectarian governance can be socially widespread without becoming coordinated political power. For civic movements, the challenge is therefore to make participation appear both safe enough and consequential enough to justify its costs. Appeals to shared grievances alone are insufficient.

This helps explain one of the central paradoxes of Lebanese politics. A political system can survive substantial public dissatisfaction if challenging it requires individuals to bear immediate costs for uncertain collective gains. Lebanon’s sectarian order benefits from precisely this gap between what citizens say they want and what they believe they can achieve. Until enough Lebanese have stronger reasons to believe that others will join—and that participation can achieve meaningful change—rejection of the system may remain widespread while the system itself endures.

Acknowledgment: Research reported in this publication was supported by the Qatar Research Development and Innovation Council [ARG01-0514-230144]. The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of Qatar Research Development and Innovation Council.

Note on the methodology: The survey was conducted by Information International through tablet-assisted, face-to-face interviews with 3,000 Lebanese citizens aged 18 and older between January 28 and February 27, 2026. The sample covered all nine governorates and 26 districts, with allocation proportional to governorate populations using Ministry of Public Health estimates (2020). Localities and neighborhoods were selected to reflect confessional diversity, households through systematic random sampling, and respondents using the most recent birthday method, with substitution when unavailable and up to two follow-up visits. Participation was voluntary, anonymous, and confidential. The sample comprised 49.9% men and 50.1% women; the response rate was 72.3%.