In recent weeks, Israel has dramatically escalated its attacks in Lebanon, dealing a critical blow to much of Hezbollah’s top military leadership, including the late Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. In this interview with Afkār, Hamidreza Azizi, an Iran expert and security analyst, offers his insights on Tehran’s strategic calculus at this watershed moment, including on the nuclear file and its regional policy.
Afkār: You recently stated that Hezbollah has been the central component of Iran’s forward defensive capabilities. How devastating has the debilitation of Hezbollah over the past few weeks been to the Iranian strategic position established over decades?
Hamidreza Azizi: The importance of Hezbollah in Iran’s regional strategy stems from several factors. First and foremost, Hezbollah has been Tehran’s most loyal ally among its non-state partners in the region. Shared sectarian and ideological ties, along with Hezbollah’s firm belief—particularly that of Hassan Nasrallah—in Velayat-e Faqih and the leadership of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, have over the years solidified Hezbollah as Iran’s most dependable regional ally. These factors have ensured that, despite maintaining strategic autonomy within Lebanon and tactical agency in the region, Hezbollah always operates in full strategic coordination with Iran. None of the other members of the “Axis of Resistance” share all these characteristics. As a result, weakening Hezbollah, especially the loss of Nasrallah, deals a serious blow to Tehran.
From a military perspective, Hezbollah has had a unique role in Iran’s military doctrine known as “forward defense” or “offensive defense.” Hezbollah’s control over southern Lebanon, bordering Israel, is viewed by Iran as a tool to expand its strategic depth and gain direct access to Israel. Hezbollah was intended to compensate for two of Iran’s strategic disadvantages against Israel: geographical distance and military technological inferiority. Iranian missiles, placed in Hezbollah’s hands, used to serve as a deterrent, preventing Israel from taking direct military action against Iran. Weakening Hezbollah’s military capabilities increases Iran’s vulnerability to Israel.
Furthermore, since the assassination of Former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani in 2020, Hezbollah has played a central role in coordinating and commanding the “Axis of Resistance.” Therefore, dismantling Hezbollah’s command structure not only creates strategic confusion within the group but also results in a temporary leadership and control vacuum across the entire Iran-backed network in the region. Naturally, addressing these deficiencies would be time-consuming and costly for Iran.
ā: Iran’s credibility appears to be on the line. Why hasn’t the Iranian republic come to its most crucial ally’s defense?
HA: Iran’s reluctance to come directly to Hezbollah’s defense is due to two main factors: Iran’s limitations and Israel’s advantages.
First, Iran’s options for confronting Israel right now seem to be more constrained than ever. Its forward defense doctrine primarily relies on asymmetric military capabilities, including ballistic missiles, drones and the network of nonstate allies and proxies. While ballistic missiles and drones can inflict significant damage and influence adversaries’ strategic calculations, they are not suited for engaging in a full-scale or prolonged war. Many of Iran’s missiles cannot reach Israel, and its stockpile of effective long-range missiles is not unlimited. To compensate for these shortcomings, Iran has collaborated with non-state armed groups across the region to extend its geographical reach and gain direct access to its enemies. As previously mentioned, Hezbollah has been at the forefront of this network, playing a pivotal role in Tehran’s military calculations against Israel. Hezbollah was always intended to be part of Iran’s response, not the catalyst for it. Now, with Hezbollah significantly weakened and its leadership vacuum affecting other members of the “Axis of Resistance,” Iran does not consider itself capable of engaging in a war with Israel.
Second, Israel’s capabilities are a major concern for Tehran. Recent Israeli moves, including the assassination of Iranian commanders in Syria, the assassination of Hamas’ political chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, continuous strikes in Lebanon, and the elimination of almost all top-ranking Hezbollah commanders, demonstrate Israel’s deep intelligence penetration into the “Axis of Resistance.” Engaging in a conflict without first addressing these security gaps could have disastrous consequences and expose Iran to significant risks on its own soil. Additionally, the role of the United States, with its full support for Israel, cannot be overlooked. Washington’s potential involvement in an Iran-Israel conflict would only further complicate Iran’s challenges.
ā: In his speech to the UN General Assembly, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signaled that Tehran is “ready to engage” with Western countries on the nuclear file. What were the drivers of this posturing, and do you think recent events will change the Pezeshkian administration’s readiness to come to the negotiating table?
HA: Masoud Pezeshkian’s speech at the United Nations, while more conciliatory in tone than in the past, was not new in terms of content. Over the past few years, Iran has consistently expressed its willingness to return to the nuclear agreement. The primary motivation behind this stance is the country’s severe economic situation, which has left the government mired in a chronic domestic crisis. The “Look East” policy and the so-called “resistance economy” have clearly failed to resolve this crisis. Consequently, the decision to pursue negotiations and diplomacy extends beyond Pezeshkian’s administration and undoubtedly has the endorsement of the supreme leader.
The current regional crisis, which threatens Iran’s position, could shape Tehran’s diplomatic approach toward the West in two distinct ways. In one scenario, these developments might deepen the country’s mistrust of the West and introduce new obstacles to diplomatic efforts. Within Iran, some voices are already calling for an end to negotiations and advocating for the development of nuclear weapons as the “ultimate deterrent” against Israel. Should these voices gain enough traction within the system, Iran may move toward the most significant crisis in decades regarding its nuclear program and relations with the West.
In another scenario, Iran may recognize its limitations and take a more pragmatic approach in line with the concept of “tactical retreat” that Khamenei recently mentioned after the death of Haniyeh. In this case, Iran could accelerate its efforts toward a new agreement with the West, potentially extending beyond the nuclear issue to address regional matters as well, in order to avoid the threat of war, stabilize its domestic economy and restore its strength. However, given the deep-rooted tensions between Iran and the West, any reconciliation is likely to be temporary and will not result in a lasting resolution of their challenges.
