This article was originally published in Arabic and has been translated into English.
Even over the years prior to the latest Israeli-American war on Iran, the Gulf security environment had undergone a profound reshaping in terms of patterns of strategic interaction. This had shifted the region from a phase of restrained pressure and mutual deterrence toward a more complex model based on limited military engagement, using diverse tools across multiple fronts. This shift took place within the context of an escalating U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran, including waves of reciprocal strikes, the targeting of vital infrastructure in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, and intensified threats to strategic maritime routes in the Gulf—most notably the Strait of Hormuz. Furthermore, sudden changes in Tehran’s decision-making structure have played a role in reshaping the balance of power between its political and military institutions, directly impacting patterns and operational limits of escalation.
The latest developments suggest that rather than a full-scale conventional war, the conflict today is following a model of high-cost, gradual escalation that combines limited military operations with economic and energy pressures, closely intertwined with cyber and information warfare. In this context, the Gulf states have become an integral part of the conflict’s operational theater, given their geographical location at the heart of the global energy system, their strategic military partnerships, the presence of foreign military bases and facilities, and their economies’ close integration with the global energy sector and international commerce.
In the early stages of the latest crisis, there were fleeting signs that Washington sought deconfliction, yet this came in the form of tactical arrangements aimed at time management, rather than a solid pathway to de-escalation. This was accompanied by limited attempts at negotiation, primarily aimed at reining in the crisis rather than resolving it. However, subsequent developments revealed that this temporary de-escalation was a cover to allow the U.S. to reshape the theater of operations and complete its buildup of air, naval, and intelligence assets, the largest American deployment since the buildup to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. This included the deployment of platforms capable of carrying out rapid strikes deep inside Iran and across the region. Such a pattern of deployment reinforces the hypothesis that the military deployment was not solely a tool for applying military and diplomatic pressure, but rather a pre-emptive, operational preparation for the use of force, within a calculated strategy of escalation.
From Deterrence to the Direct Use of Force
The shift from the threat of force to carrying out direct strikes deep inside Iran, along with Iran’s subsequent retaliatory strikes against U.S. bases and targets in the nearby Gulf states, has redrawn the line between deterrence and the actual use of force. It demonstrated that the negotiations leading up to it were more a means of managing the escalation than a path to resolving it for good. Washington employed Traditional tools of deterrence, such as troop buildups and public warnings, to justify the shift to limited, selective military operations. Consequently, the framework of deterrence transformed from a means for regulating behavior into one for legitimizing the gradual use of force, plunging the region into a spiral of escalation based on asymmetric strikes and a gradual expansion of targets, all without yet reaching the stage of all-out war.
The Strait of Hormuz has emerged at the heart of this crisis, as a crucial lever of economic and strategic deterrence. The narrow waterway is world’s most important oil and gas transit route, serving as a conduit for some 20 million barrels per day in 2024—nearly one-fifth of global consumption of petroleum liquids. Other estimates suggest that around a quarter of seaborne oil in the world passes through this narrow artery. This level of global dependence means that any threat to disrupt navigation through the Strait can apply pressure on markets across the world, by hiking shipping and insurance costs, increasing price sensitivity to shocks, and disrupting the supply chains that underpin major industrial economies, particularly in Asia, which imports the largest share of oil and gas exports passing through the route. Therefore, by targeting the Strait of Hormuz in order to exert pressure on its adversaries, Iran aims to reshape the region’s economic geography into an indirect tool of deterrence, compensating for its limited capacity to engage in a large-scale conventional confrontation with major powers while simultaneously allowing it to impose costs on the international community for the ongoing escalation.
Externally imposed changes to the structure of Iran’s political and security leadership—including Israel’s assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on the first day of the assault—are key to explaining certain shifts in the trajectory of the conflict, as the targeting of key figures and power centers within the Iranian hierarchy realigns the roles of military and political institutions. Direct attacks on decision-making centers typically lead to moments of institutional confusion that may allow for the rise of more hardline actors, particularly—in Iran’s case—within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its affiliated security institutions. This explains the discrepancy between Tehran’s political rhetoric, which has at times sought to reassure the Gulf states that they would not be directly targeted, and its pattern of operations, which have included strikes on Gulf cities, including both military and civilian assets. This contradiction can be interpreted either as part of a disinformation campaign and narrative management strategy, or as an indication of certain executive branches’ growing autonomy in military decision-making, leading to a battlefield posture relatively unconstrained by traditional diplomatic considerations.
The current pattern of escalation indicates that the region is gradually sliding toward a complex model of hybrid warfare, in which traditional military means are integrated with cyber, economic, and media tools, within a single, multi-dimensional theater of operations. In addition to missile and drone strikes and direct air strikes, this also includes escalating cyber warfare operations targeting energy networks, financial institutions, and telecommunications. The Gulf states have faced a surge in cyberattacks targeting banks, airlines, and government service platforms. This has been accompanied by an information war aimed at shaping public opinion and reframing narratives of legitimacy and threat, as well as various forms of maritime disruption such as the harassment of ships, limited sabotage operations, and tanker seizures—practices with some history in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, and which are essential features of hybrid warfare in the region.
While there has been a slight decrease in the intensity of direct Iranian strikes following an intense wave at the start of the war, this should not be interpreted as an indication that the escalation is over. Rather, it may reflect a calculated shift from a phase of intense shock to one of prolonged attrition. In this context, the redeployment of launch platforms and a reduction in the intensity of strikes can be understood as an Iranian attempt to diminish the vulnerability of its military assets to being detected and targeted, coupled with more cautious management of long-range munitions stockpiles in light of the expanding battlefront and the emergence of multiple theaters of operation. This shift also intersects with internal arrangements related to the rebalancing of decision-making centers within the Iranian regime following the strikes that targeted its top leadership, thus presenting decision-makers with more complex calculations of risk and opportunity.
Resolving the Conflict and Rethinking Gulf Security
In this fast-moving context, the Gulf states have become the epicenter of the conflict, whether through Iranian strikes on American and other foreign bases that they host, or through direct damage or missile and drone threats to their cities, energy facilities, and airports. Today, they face several key challenges, including potential strikes on energy infrastructure, ports, and offshore platforms; the increased threat to freedom of navigation through the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz; and the expanding scope of cyberattacks targeting financial, energy, and communications systems, with the resulting impacts on their economic and financial stability. These developments affect the Gulf’s position in the global economy through disruptions to energy and trade supply chains and the growing risk to maritime assets in strategic waterways. This compels the GCC states to reassess their defense arrangements and their relationships with both international and regional powers.
The situation today points to three possible scenarios for the conflict in the Gulf. The first, and the most likely in the foreseeable future, involves a persistent, gradual escalation over the long term, with a limited number of strikes alongside ongoing economic and maritime pressure, while avoiding the cost of sliding into a full-scale conventional war. The second scenario would involve an unintended escalation resulting from a miscalculation or a major strike that crosses undeclared red lines. This could open the door to a horizontal expansion of the conflict to new fronts, along with broader involvement by international and regional powers. The third scenario is that of a temporary, tactical de-escalation that would allow the parties to reposition themselves and rebuild their capabilities without dismantling the structures and tools they use as levers of reciprocal pressure. This would keep the region in a persistent, overarching state of “no war, no peace.”
The transformations underway suggest that Gulf security can no longer be managed through unilateral national approaches or a total reliance on the American security umbrella. Rather, it has become a collective regional issue, requiring a restructuring of the system of joint deterrence and defense. In this context, the Gulf states may shift from a model of security dependence to one of conditional alignment. This would entail maintaining their military partnership with the U.S. while simultaneously expanding their cooperation with other international partners, as well as developing their own air and missile defense, cybersecurity, and maritime security capabilities. The Gulf states’ ability to formulate a collective vision for regional security—one that balances the demands of deterrence with those of economic stability and integration in the international energy system—will be a crucial element in shaping the features of stability and security arrangements in the Gulf over the coming decade.
