The consequences of the call by the founder of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Ocalan, for the group to disband are still reverberating—not just in Türkiye but also in the wider region.
Shifting alliances in Syria—exemplified by the recent agreement between the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian government—confirm that Ocalan’s message is not isolated or purely domestic but offers a crucial opportunity that could redefine everything from Türkiye’s security policies to the future positioning of Kurdish actors, shaping the next phase of regional power dynamics.
Ocalan, in a statement delivered from a Turkish prison in late February, called on the PKK to “convene your congress and make a decision. All groups must lay down their weapons, and the PKK should dissolve itself.”
The PKK leadership—from its longstanding command center in Iraq’s Qandil Mountains—responded to Ocalan’s call by declaring a unilateral ceasefire with final disbandment, as well as decisions on disarmament and other matters, delayed until the congress can be held in a month or two. Türkiye remains firm in its demand that all PKK-affiliated groups, including its Syrian offshoots, must disband unconditionally.
The PKK’s decades-long conflict with Türkiye has killed more than 40,000 people. Ocalan, in addition to being the leader of the movement ideologically, also led the group’s armed rebellion until his capture in 1999. The PKK is considered a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States and the European Union.
While Ocalan has advocated for ceasefires in the past, this is the first time he has called for the PKK to cease to exist. The reason for this is likely linked to shifts in Kurdish political movements, Turkish state strategy and broader regional realignments, especially the evolving dynamics in Syria.
Removing the Kurdish ‘Fear Factor’
The diminishing strategic value of armed struggle has coincided with the rise of Kurdish political actors, weakening the PKK’s role as a “fear factor” in Turkish politics.
Once instrumental in mobilizing nationalist votes for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), the PKK’s influence is fading as pro-Kurdish politics gain traction.
The Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) broke new ground in June 2015 by surpassing the 10 percent electoral threshold required to secure parliamentary representation – an achievement that pro-Kurdish parties had previously managed only by running independent candidates.
Today, the party now known as the Peoples’ Equality and Democratic Party (DEM) plays a pivotal role in elections as Kurdish votes shape Türkiye’s political landscape.
Against this backdrop, Ocalan’s call for the PKK’s disbandment is an effort to expand the space for Kurdish political representation within the democratic system.
Kurdish political mobilization through political parties has become more powerful and influential than armed struggle.
The growth has not been unimpeded as state-imposed restrictions have continued.
For example, Selahattin Demirtas, the former leader of the HDP and a former presidential candidate, remains imprisoned, and Kurdish politicians and activists accused by the government of being close to the PKK face harsh sentences under “anti-terror” laws.
After the 2024 municipal elections, the government once again appointed trustees in some Kurdish-majority municipalities, preventing elected mayors from the DEM party from taking office.
These restrictions, however, may begin to ease with the gradual normalization of pro-Kurdish politics, which could emerge as a result of the removal of the “terrorist” label from the broader movement and the construction of a new narrative that positions pro-Kurdish representatives as recognized political actors.
Türkiye’s Stake
For the AK Party, consolidating electoral support requires a delicate balance between addressing Kurdish demands—and gaining those votes—and maintaining Turkish nationalist backing.
Had this initiative to talk to the PKK been driven solely by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan without the involvement of Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli, who had long opposed any solution other than a military one, nationalist opposition to it would have been far more pronounced.
By having Bahceli invite Ocalan to address parliament and advocate for the “right to hope” —a measure supporting the release of individuals, including Ocalan, who have served 25 years—and engage in dialogue with DEM figures he had previously labelled as “terrorists,” the government has managed to preemptively contain hardline resistance, making the transition more politically viable.
A successful peace process could help rekindle support for the AK Party among Kurdish voters who had turned away from the party since the collapse of the Türkiye-PKK peace process in 2015 and the government’s turn towards Turkish nationalism—as well as attract a new generation of Kurdish voters.
On the other hand, opposition within Türkiye to such a development remains a wild card. Hardline factions within the government and in nationalist circles are likely to resist any perceived concessions to pro-Kurdish political actors.
Externally, the “Kurdish issue” has long been an obstacle in Türkiye’s foreign relations, particularly with Western allies and the EU, for which Türkiye remains a candidate country.
Concerns over rights and liberties, the undermining of Kurdish rights and political representation, the imprisonment of Kurdish politicians and Western support for Kurdish groups fighting ISIL (ISIS) in Syria have all contributed to tensions in Türkiye’s foreign relations.
By proactively managing this transition, Ankara could frame itself as the architect of Kurdish political normalization, strengthening its stance both regionally and internationally.
Meanwhile, the reality that neither Türkiye nor the PKK can achieve absolute victory militarily has become increasingly clear. The decline in active conflict within Türkiye has also reshaped public perception.
Türkiye’s military operations in Syria—Euphrates Shield (2016-2017), Olive Branch (2018) and Peace Spring (2019)—shifted the primary battleground from Türkiye’s border areas into northern Syria, where clashes between the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) and Syrian Kurdish forces continue.
This strategy has not only established Turkish-controlled zones but also altered the conflict’s geography, reducing direct threats to Türkiye while intensifying power struggles in Syrian areas like Afrin, Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad.
The PKK’s disbandment is not a done deal, however, and opposition parties, particularly the Republican People’s Party (CHP), which is desperately eager to end the AK Party’s 23-year rule, remain hesitant to support the initiative.
While the CHP officially endorses a peaceful resolution to the “Kurdish issue”, it is skeptical of a process led by Erdogan’s government, not knowing what may be unfolding in closed-door negotiations.
Moreover, the CHP is cautious about lending legitimacy to a process that could strengthen the AK Party’s appeal among Kurdish voters, particularly with elections in the future.
For now, it has adopted a wait-and-see stance because the only thing known is the intent of the PKK to dissolve rather than its actual mechanisms.
The Syrian Equation
Ocalan’s appeal reflects a broader shift as nonstate armed groups across the region face growing pressure to adapt for survival and legitimacy.
In northern Syria, a strategic priority for the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing—the People’s Defense Units (YPG), which is the core force in the U.S.-backed SDF—is preserving their territorial and political position.
Set up in 2003 as a PKK offshoot, the PYD came into its own in northern Syria and has been targeted in military offensives by Ankara and Ankara-supported groups in Syria, such as the SNA.
Ocalan may have been motivated by a hope that a disbanded PKK would result in fewer direct confrontations between Türkiye and the PYD, possibly helping the PYD keep a level of self-administration and rights within the new Syrian state and constitution.
An important step in this direction came on Monday when the SDF signed an agreement in Damascus with interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa for their forces to merge with the Syrian army and cooperate on several economic, social and political fronts.
Whether this will be enough for Türkiye to relent in its pursuit of the SDF depends on the details of the agreement and its implementation. So far, the agreement has been supported by Erdogan, who emphasized that the full implementation of the agreement would serve Syria’s security and stability and benefit all Syrians.
Public statements by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan previously showed that Türkiye aims to shape the terms of the PYD’s acceptance within a reconfigured Syrian framework by calling for the removal of foreign PKK elements, dismantling the YPG’s military leadership and integrating the PYD into the Syrian state without its armed wings or territorial ambitions.
What Is Likely to Follow?
A resolution of the “Kurdish issue” could enhance Türkiye’s diplomatic leverage, especially with European and American actors critical of its policies against Kurds domestically and in neighboring states.
A sustainable process may also ease tensions with Iraq and Syria, where Türkiye’s operations against Kurdish groups have caused friction. This would further strengthen security and economic cooperation with Baghdad and the new government in Damascus.
While legislative steps will play a crucial role in facilitating this transition, a well-defined roadmap with legal, political and social adjustments is necessary.
The focus will soon shift to the future of PKK fighters. According to intensifying public debate in Türkiye, several potential pathways exist.
Some may receive legal amnesty and reintegration support. Others may be absorbed into legitimate Kurdish political structures, and some senior leaders may be relocated to third countries with their current base in Iraq being a likely destination.
Ultimately, the sustainability of this process will be determined by meaningful democratic reforms, expanding cultural and political rights, safeguarding civil liberties and paving the way for a new democratic constitutional framework as a foundation of a more inclusive political order.
However, based on declarations by Türkiye’s state actors, the current vision does not include any of these major reforms. How the PKK’s dissolution could occur without these fundamental changes remains an open question. For its fighters, a legal framework will be a necessity for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.
While some figures within the DEM advocate for a fast-tracked process to consolidate their political standing and deliver gains for their constituents, AK Party politicians could be motivated by electoral concerns, seeking a resolution that neutralizes tensions without making deep structural concessions.
The PKK’s ceasefire is a notable first step, but its long-term viability depends on institutionalizing it, which a purely tactical or rushed settlement cannot provide.
At the same time, it is crucial to recognize that no peace process can be built on uncompromising demands or an idealized, frictionless roadmap.
Sustainable peace requires pragmatic solutions, gradual steps, and an acceptance that negotiations will involve setbacks, competing interests and the necessity of mutual concessions.
