The Trump administration’s decision in early 2025 to suspend military aid to Ukraine—resuming it only after Kyiv agreed to negotiate with Moscow in March—marks a turning point in transatlantic security. It has forced Europe to reassess its strategic posture amid a conflict that began with Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and escalated into a full-scale war in 2022.
Ukraine has depended heavily on Western aid, with the U.S. providing over $50 billion in military support by 2024, including advanced systems such as HIMARS mobile artillery rocket systems and Patriot air defense systems. The aid pause—driven by U.S. domestic politics and a strategic pivot to the Indo-Pacific—exposed Europe’s security vulnerabilities, validating long-standing warnings from leaders like France’s Emmanuel Macron about over-reliance on Washington.
While the shift raises a pressing question about Europe’s ability to build its independent defensive capacity, the implications extend beyond the continent to places like the Gulf. With the Trump administration signaling its intention to back away from security alliances, can the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), who are also reliant on U.S. military backing, prepare for a future of diminished American support?
Prospects for European Defense Autonomy
European security has long depended on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), with the U.S. contributing around 70 percent of alliance defense spending, as of 2023. Past attempts at European military integration—such as the failed 1954 European Defence Community and the 2017 PESCO initiative—have struggled due to diverging national interests and fiscal imbalances.
The Ukraine war and wavering U.S. support have reignited debates on Europe’s strategic autonomy. So far, Germany has launched a €100 billion Zeitenwende fund to revamp its military; Poland expanded its forces to 200,000 troops; and France is advocating raising NATO’s defense spending target to 3.5 percent of GDP, up from 2 percent.
However, financial investment alone will not secure strategic autonomy. Achieving it requires overcoming deep-rooted structural and industrial dependencies—a politically sensitive, long-term endeavor.
Europe’s defense posture remains deeply intertwined with the U.S., especially in procurement and logistics. The F-35 fighter jet program is emblematic: eight European NATO members plan to acquire over 600 jets by 2030, enhancing interoperability but tethering them to U.S.-controlled maintenance and software systems.
European platforms also rely on U.S.-origin technologies—semiconductors, systems, and intellectual property—governed by International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which permit Washington to block exports. This vulnerability became clear in 2019 when Turkey was ejected from the F-35 program over its purchase of Russian S-400 systems.
To reduce reliance, the EU has launched the European Defence Industrial Strategy and the €800 billion “ReArm Europe” initiative, aiming for defense self-sufficiency by 2035. Still, meaningful autonomy remains a distant goal, leaving Europe exposed to shifts in U.S. policy.
Strategic Lessons for the GCC: Diversification of Security Partnerships
Europe’s experience holds critical lessons for the GCC, whose security architecture has similarly depended on U.S. guarantees since the 1991 Gulf War. The American military presence—including the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain and Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar—underpins regional stability, backed by arms deals exceeding $130 billion between 2015 and 2023.
However, the U.S. pivot to Asia—reflected in the 2021 AUKUS pact between Australia, the U.S. and UK, and increased naval deployments in the South China Sea—raises questions about the sustainability of that support.
The GCC is already preparing for further retrenchment by the U.S. Diversifying security partnerships has become a strategic necessity. Initial steps have included defense cooperation with China, with Saudi Arabia procuring the supply of CH-4 drones in 2017, and South Korea’s defense and nuclear technology partnerships with the UAE. Meanwhile, Türkiye’s Bayraktar TB2 drones have gained popularity in the region, and the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020 between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain opened access to Israeli capabilities in missile defense and cyber security, among other areas.
Enhancing GCC Defense Self-Sufficiency
Beyond diversification, the GCC must develop indigenous defense capabilities to reduce external vulnerabilities. Europe’s industrial constraints highlight the urgency of this task. Although the GCC has made progress, efforts remain fragmented.
Regional security and defense integration offers a viable path forward. Coordinating the production of defense consumables such as ammunition and spare parts—alongside building maintenance and sustainment infrastructure and capabilities—would bolster resilience. Developing interoperable command-and-control systems, intelligence sharing and fusion, and secure communications is equally critical for joint operations.
The Peninsula Shield Force, the military arm of the GCC established in 1984, provides a foundational mechanism for regional defense integration. Its limited operational history, however, reflects underutilized potential. Notably, during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the GCC—with U.S. and allied support—acted militarily, proving the alliance’s willingness to go to war for a member state.
A more recent step, albeit modest, was the 2024 publication of the GCC Joint Security Vision—only the second major security document after the 2001 Joint Defense Agreement. The vision reiterates collective defense principles akin to NATO’s Article 5, stating that “any attack on one is an attack on all,” while going a step further and adding that “any threat on one is a threat on all.”
It also outlines shared goals such as peaceful conflict resolution, counterterrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. However, the document falls short of addressing key security threats or outlining mechanisms to counter them. Ideally, this joint security vision needs to evolve into a Joint Capability Plan—defining procurement strategies, standardizing equipment and establishing joint doctrines and exercises to ensure interoperability and operational coherence.
Challenges abound
There are several obstacles that continue to impede integration. Chief among them is institutional inertia. Defense establishments in the GCC have traditionally operated in silos. Reforming these entrenched institutions is no easy feat. Although there has been a recent push to conduct major institutional reforms, starting with the UAE in the 2010s and current overhaul programs within the Saudi ministry of defense, there is still significant work to be done.
Second, internal rifts—such as the 2014 diplomatic crisis and the 2017 Qatar blockade—have historically delayed cooperation. Although the 2021 Al-Ula Accords brought a degree of reconciliation and stability in intra-GCC relations, these efforts at mending ties need to persist for further defense cooperation and integration to be achieved.
Third, divergent foreign policies within the bloc pose obstacles. For instance, the UAE and Bahrain’s normalization with Israel may create friction with other members like Qatar and Saudi Arabia, who have not taken similar steps as of now.
Nonetheless, the institutionalization of collective defense mechanisms is paramount. Without formal structures, coordination and resilience will remain limited.
GCC vs. Europe: Who Has the Harder Job?
Both blocs face unique hurdles in building independent defense capabilities. The GCC, despite its diverse procurement history—including purchases from Russia, China and even North Korea—has greater flexibility in integrating non-Western systems. Europe, by contrast, relies almost exclusively on U.S. and intra-European defense technology.
However, Europe boasts a more mature and technologically advanced defense industrial base, albeit underfunded since the Cold War. Revitalizing it could pave the way for greater independence.
The GCC is investing heavily in its defense industries but faces a steeper climb, given the nascency of its industrial base and the need to align six diverse – in comparison to the 27 member states of the EU – states under a unified vision.
Navigating a Multipolar Security Landscape
The suspension of U.S. military aid to Ukraine underscores the fragility of security arrangements premised on American hegemony. For Europe, decoupling from U.S. technology and regulatory frameworks remains a formidable challenge, despite increased investment and policy initiatives. Full autonomy is a long-term goal, constrained by industrial and political complexities.
For the GCC, the parallels are clear. While members have not yet been subject to the same relational disruption as Europe, continued reliance on U.S. security guarantees poses significant risks amid shifting global priorities. By diversifying partnerships, investing in domestic defense industries, and enhancing regional coordination, the GCC can begin to mitigate these vulnerabilities before they evolve into significant problems in the not-so-distant future.
In an increasingly multipolar security environment, strategic autonomy is not optional—it is essential. Achieving it requires foresight, unity, and sustained commitment to building a regional, resilient, independent and integrated defense capabilities, and designing a regional security architecture with the GCC at the center.
