The October 10, 2026, attack on King Khalid International Airport, and the casualties it caused, reveal how far the Houthi threat to Saudi Arabia has evolved. Described as the deadliest attack on the kingdom in more than a decade, it marks the latest stage in a military transformation that began 22 years ago in the Marran mountains. Understanding that transformation requires looking beyond the missiles in Houthi stockpiles to the sources that allow the group to replenish its arsenal and sustain its attacks.
During their six wars against the Yemeni state, the Houthis had not demonstrated an operational capability to launch ballistic missiles or attack drones. They relied on locally available weapons, equipment captured from government forces, and rugged terrain that made their strongholds difficult to reach. Those years taught the group how to fight, survive, and rebuild its forces. That experience later helped it absorb more sophisticated weapons, although it continued to need outside support.
The capture of Sanaa and the Houthis’ alliance with forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh widened their access to army stockpiles, military units, and technical expertise. These included Scud missiles and their North Korean variants, Tochka missiles, and air defense systems. Some of the latter were converted for use against ground targets under the Qaher name.
Access to both weapons and the personnel who could operate them proved decisive. The inherited arsenal gave the Houthis an initial capability, while military expertise provided a foundation for expanding its use.
Expanding the Reach of Attacks
Iranian support predated Operation Decisive Storm. Earlier smuggling incidents included the seizure of the Jihan 1 vessel in 2013. But the war that began in 2015 made this support increasingly important as demand grew for longer-range weapons, components, and technical expertise. The Houthis continued to use their inherited arsenal while acquiring new weapons, parts, and technology. These developments overlapped rather than unfolding in separate phases.
In November 2017, Saudi air defenses intercepted a Burkan-2H missile launched toward Riyadh, with debris falling near King Khalid International Airport. It was not the first attempt to strike the Riyadh area that year. These attacks demonstrated the growing reach of Houthi weapons, alongside the emergence of Qasef drones whose design was linked to Iran’s Ababil family. As sources of weapons multiplied and the Houthis became better able to apply technical knowledge locally, assessments based solely on known stockpiles became insufficient.
Local manufacturing and assembly assumed a larger role as the war continued. A Century Foundation study traces the beginnings of this shift to around 2018. The April 2022 truce therefore did not create the group’s industrial capacity, but it provided conditions in which existing capabilities could expand. The lesson extends beyond Yemen: a truce’s ability to reduce future threats also depends on measures to monitor rearmament and verify compliance.
The escalation of Red Sea attacks in late 2023 revealed a broader range of weapons being used against shipping, including anti-ship ballistic missiles. The US Central Command documented the use of this category of weapon in attacks that December.
A more varied arsenal gives the Houthis more options for exerting pressure. It does not, however, reveal the size of their stockpiles, their production rate, or how much each weapons system depends on foreign supplies. Those questions require separate assessment.
An intensive U.S. military campaign followed, ending in a ceasefire announced by Oman. The confrontation with Israel remained separate from that agreement. During the campaign, U.S. Central Command reported in April that ballistic missile launches had fallen by 69 percent and attack drone operations by 55 percent. These figures indicate a decline in attacks according to the U.S. assessment. Alone, they do not establish how quickly the Houthis could restore their operational tempo.
The same caution applies to the Houthis’ entry into the war involving Iran, when they launched missiles toward Israel on March 28, 2026. Their participation began almost a month after the war started. That delay alone cannot establish whether the group was responding to political calculations, operational constraints, or a desire to conserve weapons. Nor does the subsequent resumption of attacks reveal how much they relied on existing stockpiles, new supplies, or local production. Establishing the contribution of each is essential to assessing their ability to sustain attacks.
Local Production and Global Supply Networks
The Century Foundation study offers evidence of the growing importance of supply chains. It reports that more than 80 percent of the seized materials destined for the Houthis in 2024 and 2025 were intended for weapons production, rather than being complete weapons systems.
That figure applies to the materials examined in the report. It is neither a comprehensive measure of supplies reaching the Houthis nor an estimate of the locally manufactured share of their arsenal. It nevertheless supports a clear conclusion: focusing only on the smuggling of complete weapons overlooks a growing part of the threat.
Conflict Armament Research (CAR) provides more specific evidence. It identified specialized components, materials, tools, and testing equipment in shipments bound for the Houthis, indicating attempts to manufacture at least some parts of Iran’s Kheibar Shekan missile series. This points to greater industrial ambition. It does not prove that the group has successfully produced a complete missile. Possessing components and producing a reliable weapon remain distinct achievements.
Evidence linking suppliers in China to Houthi weapons programs also extends beyond this investigation. The U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on Shenzhen Rion, saying the company had shipped hundreds of components used to manufacture missile guidance systems to Houthi entities.
Taken together, these findings suggest that disrupting Iranian supplies, while important, would not address every source of Houthi military capability. Commercial networks allow the group to obtain parts, materials, and equipment from multiple markets. Technical knowledge, designs, and specialized components nevertheless continue to shape the limits of local production.
Measuring Recovery and Impact of Military Action
The October attacks demonstrate that the Houthis retain a consequential operational capability. They require a reassessment of its scale and sources. But they do not, on their own, establish the rate at which local production replaces losses. Nor does the discovery of components in an intercepted shipment prove that a particular missile model was used.
Comparing capabilities before and after military strikes requires sustained monitoring that distinguishes remaining stockpiles from resumed production and renewed supplies. Success must therefore be assessed through the lasting effect on the group’s capabilities, alongside the destruction of depots and launchers.
This distinction also matters on Yemen’s western coast. Government forces announced the recapture of Mokha and advances in coastal positions around Bab el-Mandeb following Houthi expansion. Announcing control over territory, consolidating that control, and securing maritime passage are separate achievements.
In comments to The Guardian, former Yemeni Prime Minister Maeen Abdulmalik Saeed highlighted coordination problems among government forces and said Taiz was under attack from four directions. His assessment reinforces the importance of coordinated command, but it cannot replace an examination of conditions on each front.
When Houthi threats to shipping near Bab el-Mandeb coincide with disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, the combined pressure constrains energy flows, trade, and alternative export routes. This effect does not require evidence that a single command structure directs operations at both chokepoints. Simultaneous threats and their overlapping consequences can, by themselves, reduce the flexibility of maritime routes.
Yemen’s position at the southern entrance to the Red Sea gives this threat significance beyond its borders. Its geography offers continuing opportunities to disrupt shipping. Turning that position into influence, however, depends on military capabilities, surveillance, supplies, and the balance of power on both sides of the passage.
Similarly, greater Houthi operational independence does not mean the group no longer needs Iran. Continued Iranian support does not eliminate the Houthis’ ability to act on their own initiative. A more accurate assessment would track how that dependence changes, where it diminishes, and where it persists.
A Coordinated Response
Addressing this transformation requires military, political, and economic measures that reinforce one another. A starting point is systematic cooperation with countries where procurement and export networks operate. This should improve end-user verification, help detect the diversion of goods and equipment into weapons programs, and disrupt intermediaries and companies whose involvement is established.
It also requires tracing the financing channels and revenues that allow the Houthis to keep purchasing supplies. The impact of these measures should be judged by how they affect procurement costs, delivery times, and the ability to replace losses.
Within Yemen, sustaining military gains depends on the state’s ability to unify military decision-making, coordinate its forces, and establish an enduring presence in recovered areas. Pressure on supply chains requires institutions capable of monitoring and enforcement. Battlefield advances also need effective administration to prevent the exploitation of divisions and the reopening of supply routes. Recapturing the coast will have lasting value if it produces sustained security and effective state authority, limiting the Houthis’ freedom to operate and rebuild.
Counting missiles in storage is no longer enough to understand the threat. The more revealing measure is the Houthis’ ability to replace losses and restore the pace of their attacks. An effective response must both destroy existing capabilities and impede their regeneration, making every loss slower and more expensive to replace—and more damaging to the group’s ability to sustain the war.
