On June 26, Lebanon and Israel signed a U.S.-sponsored framework agreement in Washington aimed at ending the war across their border, organizing a gradual Israeli withdrawal, and restoring the Lebanese state’s monopoly over security decision-making and the use of force on its territory. Yet the crux of the agreement lies not in its content, but in its feasibility in light of the fact that it is subject to conflicting interpretations.
Israel views the deal as a security framework linking its withdrawal from Lebanese territory to the disarmament of Hezbollah, while the Lebanese state presents it as a pathway to restoring its sovereignty and ending the Israeli occupation. Hezbollah, meanwhile, interprets the accord as an attack on its own role and military presence. All this means that the crucial question is not whether the agreement is good or bad, but whether any agreement can be implemented if the parties concerned cannot agree on its interpretation.
What does the Agreement Say?
Political wrangling aside, the text of the deal reveals four main components:
1. A declaration of intent to end the state of war between Lebanon and Israel, and to transition gradually toward a lasting peace and normal neighborly relations.
2. The restoration of the Lebanese state’s full monopoly over arms and decisions regarding war and peace, to be achieved by disarming all non-state armed groups and deploying the Lebanese Army across the country’s entire territory.
3. A gradual Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory, carried out in phases and contingent upon verification that security arrangements have been implemented.
4. The launch of a process for reconstruction and support for the Lebanese economy under American and international auspices, all linked to progress in implementing the security and political commitments outlined in the agreement.
On paper, these objectives appear logical. Indeed, they represent the aspirations of most Lebanese: ending the war, allowing for the return of the displaced, post-war reconstruction and restoring the role of the state. However, Lebanon’s experience with past agreements gives grounds for caution.
Lebanon has witnessed numerous milestones in its negotiations with Israel: the 1949 armistice agreement; the May 17 Agreement of 1983; the Israeli withdrawal from the South in 2000 and the adoption of the Blue Line; UN Security Council Resolution 1701, ending the July 2006 war; and the maritime border demarcation deal and understandings of late 2025. Yet while their objectives and circumstances have varied, these agreements have one thing in common: they have fallen or stumbled, not only over their content, but over imbalances of obligations, domestic Lebanese divisions, and shifts in the balance of power and political will.
Consequently, the latest agreement cannot be viewed as a fresh start. Rather, it is another chapter in a long process that has yet to yield sustainable peace. Any agreement must be measured not only by its objectives, but by the balance between obligations and guarantees it entails. As such, implementing this deal will be far more complex than the text itself.
Conflicting Interpretations
The challenge with the agreement lies in the fact that there is no single interpretation of it. The divergent interpretations outlined above reflect more than just differences in rhetoric; they could determine the fate of the deal once the process moves from writing the text to implementing it.
Israel’s stance appears unambiguous. From the outset, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and senior Israeli officials have repeatedly stressed a single point: Israel will not fully withdraw until it is satisfied that the threat posed by Hezbollah has been eliminated.
In this sense, Israel believes that its primary achievement lies not in the signing of an agreement with Lebanon, but in establishing the principle that Hezbollah must disarm as a prerequisite for any withdrawal. Under this interpretation, an Israeli withdrawal is not Lebanon’s right, per se, but an outcome contingent on certain security conditions being met.
Conversely, the Lebanese state frames the agreement as the first step toward restoring its sovereignty. The presidency and the government both view the accord as an opportunity to end the occupation and redeploy the army to the border areas, enabling residents to return to their villages, attracting aid and investment, and re-establishing the state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of force and over decisions of war and peace.
These goals undoubtedly reflect the aspirations of the majority of the Lebanese public. However, the success of this vision hinges on a fundamental question: Will the agreement actually lead to a full Israeli withdrawal, or will it make such a withdrawal conditional on terms that could remain open-ended indefinitely?
Hezbollah, while it is not a party to the agreement, figures prominently in most of the document’s provisions. The agreement addresses disarming the group, dismantling its military infrastructure, blocking its funding, and terminating any security or military role it might play. Consequently, the movement views the agreement not as an accord between two states, but as a scheme to liquidate the “resistance” under American auspices; it believes the Lebanese state went to Washington to sign a document that secures for Israel gains that it had failed to achieve through war.
Any observer who assumes that Hezbollah will stand idly and watch this process unfold is ignoring the reality of the Lebanese landscape.
Herein lies one of the agreement’s paradoxes: a key party responsible for its implementation is not a signatory to it. If Hezbollah perceives the agreement as an attack, how can it be implemented? Can the Lebanese state impose it by force? Can the Lebanese Army engage in a domestic confrontation, even as Israel maintains its military presence in parts of the South? The agreement offers no clear answers to these questions — an omission that is arguably one of its most critical weaknesses.
The American and Israeli Dimensions
It is worth noting a further political perspective on the deal. Following the U.S.-Iran truce deal in Islamabad, the prevailing impression was that Washington had opted for regional de-escalation — a move that might compel Israel to make concessions against its will, first and foremost a withdrawal from southern Lebanon as part of a broader package of understandings. However, the Israeli-Lebanese agreement has altered the landscape. Instead of the Lebanese file remaining part of the U.S.-Iran track, it has been decoupled and transformed into an independent series of negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, under direct American sponsorship.
From this perspective, the Washington agreement can be viewed as an attempt by the Trump administration to achieve two simultaneous goals: maintaining its understanding with Iran, while reassuring Israel that its interests vis-à-vis Lebanon will not be sacrificed in any regional deal. This has shifted the underlying philosophy of the negotiations. The question is no longer when Israel will withdraw from Lebanon, but rather whether Lebanon will meet the conditions to see about such a withdrawal.
This does not necessarily mean that Washington has abandoned its understandings with Iran. Rather, it suggests an effort to decouple the two tracks and to grant Israel greater latitude in interpreting the conditions of any withdrawal.
Opportunities and Flaws
Despite the controversy surrounding it, the opportunities the agreement presents to Lebanon cannot be denied. However, the realization of these opportunities will hinge on how the deal is implemented.
Yet the agreement raises questions no less significant than its actual provisions. It stipulates neither a binding timeline for the Israeli withdrawal nor an independent arbitration mechanism to resolve disputes over the interpretation of its obligations. The U.S. remains the sole international authority for verification and monitoring.
Complicating matters further is the deal’s open-ended definition of “self-defense,” which could allow Israel to continue its military operations should it deem that the Hezbollah threat remains. Israeli withdrawals from “pilot areas” could evolve into a successful model for confidence-building—but conversely, they could drag on as a prolonged transitional phase, if assessments of their success remain subject to shifting political and security considerations.
Herein lies the agreement’s fundamental flaw: Lebanon’s obligations are specific and measurable, whereas Israel’s commitment to withdraw remains contingent upon assessments that are effectively in its own hands and those of the U.S. Consequently, Lebanon’s fulfillment of its obligations becomes a prerequisite, while that of Israel is a deferred outcome.
This raises another legitimate question: Will the framework agreement become another deal whereby Israel maintains its military presence, on the grounds that the conditions for withdrawal have not yet been met? This question arises not out of pessimism, but from historical experiences that cannot be ignored.
The Challenge for Lebanon
The success of the agreement will not depend solely on the stance of Israel or Hezbollah. It will also hinge on the Lebanese state’s ability to forge a domestic consensus regarding its implementation. Restoring the state’s authority over decisions of war and peace cannot be achieved merely by signing a document. It will require broad political backing, capable institutions, an army that enjoys public support and legitimacy, and a clear plan for managing the post-withdrawal phase and post-war reconstruction.
Furthermore, any process of disarmament or security restructuring in the South will remain fragile unless it is accompanied by a domestic political approach that prevents the agreement from becoming a new source of division within Lebanon. The risk is not only that Israel stalls over its withdrawal, but also that the agreement triggers a domestic confrontation over the meaning of sovereignty and who holds the ultimate authority over security in Lebanon.
As things stand, the framework agreement remains more of a promise than a reality. While it could provide an opportunity to end a protracted war and restore the role of the Lebanese state, its success hinges on a process of implementation whose terms and parameters are interpreted differently by each of the parties. Israel views withdrawal as an outcome following the completion of security arrangements, whereas the Lebanese state regards the agreement as a gateway to restoring its sovereignty and ending the occupation. Crucially, Hezbollah perceives the deal as a threat to its very existence, meaning that the movement is a decisive factor in implementing the deal, despite not being a signatory to it.
Herein lies the fundamental paradox: each party implicated in the deal views it through a different lens. Consequently, its future will be determined not merely by its content, but by the balance of power, political will, and potential for transitioning from signing the deal to actually implementing it.
Over recent decades, Lebanon has seen numerous agreements falter after they collided with political and security realities. The question today is this: Will the Washington agreement succeed in breaking this pattern, or will it join the ranks of agreements undone not by weak wording, but by the impossibility of implementing them?
