Over roughly the past year, a perception has taken hold in the mainstream press and on social media that Pakistan’s relations with the United Arab Emirates are in decline. Driven primarily by the notion that the UAE’s relationship with Pakistan’s rival, India, is ascendant and that Pakistan has drifted closer to Saudi Arabia, the negative sentiment has been further aggravated by the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran and Islamabad’s cautious response to defending its Gulf allies.
Yet given the deep historical, institutional, and economic ties between Pakistan and the UAE, it is more likely that this belief is misplaced and that the sense of turbulence is largely media-driven hype.
Robust Ties
The relationship between the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan has long been anchored in shared faith, cultural affinities, and mutual support. Beyond their close geographic proximity, Pakistan was among the first countries to recognize the UAE in 1971 and played a significant role in building the new state’s institutions. Pakistani officers helped develop the Emirates’ armed forces, especially the air force, with its first five Chiefs of Air Staff drawn from Pakistani officers. Pakistan also played a foundational role in launching Emirates Airline, providing aircraft on wet-lease, pilots, and operational personnel in its early years.
The UAE, in turn, became one of Pakistan’s most important partners, supporting the country to build major road, health, education and water schemes on the one hand, and providing assistance during floods and natural disasters on the other. Most importantly, Abu Dhabi supported Pakistan’s economic stability through central bank deposits and development financing, complemented by substantial private sector investment.
Over time, the relationship evolved into a broad strategic partnership. The UAE became Pakistan’s third‑largest trading partner with bilateral trade exceeding $10.9 billion in 2024, a major investor with public and private investment of more than $10 billion in the past two decades, and the host of roughly two million Pakistani expatriates whose remittances constitute a vital lifeline for Pakistan’s economy.
Is the Relationship Cooling?
Given the trajectory of robust ties, a sudden downturn—if real—would be striking. Five major incidents that took place over the past year reveal the divergence between official positions and prevailing media perceptions.
May 2025 India-Pakistan Crisis
The India-Pakistan military crisis that erupted in May 2025, which brought the two nuclear powers to the brink of war, was one of the earliest issues that the media portrayed as a point of strategic divergence between the UAE and Pakistan. One mainstream account claimed that the crisis “crystallized” the differences and “deepened mistrust,” arguing that decision-makers on both sides held starkly divergent views, with the UAE moving closer to India. The official record, however, tells a different story.
During the crisis, Abu Dhabi urged restraint and a resumption of diplomatic efforts—a stance mirrored by Pakistan’s other close partners, such as China, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Türkiye. At the official level, no public evidence of UAE-Pakistan divergence exists.
The sharp contrast between this media narrative and the actual official positions of both governments became even more pronounced in the episodes that followed.
Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA)
When Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) in September 2025, some media outlets argued that this signaled strategic divergence with the UAE as Islamabad moved closer to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to New Delhi. They retrospectively presented the UAE-India letter of intent for a Strategic Defense Partnership signed in January 2026 as a response to the SMDA. The matter of fact is that Abu Dhabi-New Delhi relations had long been strengthening.
Notably, the UAE made no statement on the SMDA and continued its traditional diplomatic engagement with Pakistan, as evidenced by reciprocal visits: UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan traveled to Pakistan in December 2025, and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari visited the UAE in January 2026. During these visits, both countries reviewed the full spectrum of bilateral ties and reaffirmed their intent to deepen cooperation across trade, investment, energy, defense, and people-to-people links.
Pakistan’s Delayed Response
The U.S.-Israel war on Iran contributed significantly to the perception that UAE-Pakistan relations were fraying.
During the conflict, Iran launched missiles and drones at all GCC states, with the UAE facing the brunt of the Iranian aggression. Despite the severity of the threat, the overall response of Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif’s government was meek. Its condemnation of the Iranian strikes was folded into broader calls for restraint rather than issued as a clear, standalone denunciation—falling conspicuously short of what Abu Dhabi might expect from a close strategic partner.
At the same time, Pakistan assumed an active mediatory role, with its civilian and military leadership conducting intensive shuttle diplomacy with Tehran. While maintaining functional relations with Iran is a strategic necessity for Pakistan, those ties have historically been less significant than its relations with the UAE. Given this disparity, the spectacle of Pakistani leaders extending exceptional hospitality to Iranian delegates, at a time when Iran was directly threatening Emirati interests, was likely to have been poorly received in Abu Dhabi.
Former Pakistani ambassador to the United States Hussain Haqqani captured this dynamic when he remarked that “the UAE was shocked that Pakistan did not support them against Iran, and Pakistan was shocked that the UAE was shocked.” Yet such assessments remain largely speculative. Publicly available evidence indicates that the UAE refrained from criticizing Pakistan’s position, and neither government issued statements expressing concern over the other’s policies.
Repayment of loans
Against the backdrop, Pakistan’s repayment of $3.5 billion in UAE loans was portrayed as yet another sign of strain. Media outlets speculated that the repayment was linked to the UAE’s purported unhappiness with Pakistan’s lackluster response. A report claimed the UAE sought repayment days before Pakistan helped secure a ceasefire in the Iran war, and sensationalized it by stressing that the repayment constituted 21 percent of Pakistan’s total foreign exchange reserves.
These interpretations were wide of the mark and contrary to official positions. In reality, the UAE loans were long overdue. In 2018, Abu Dhabi had deposited $3 billion into the State Bank of Pakistan to support its balance-of-payments position. It rolled over the deposit several times before both countries mutually agreed on a final repayment in January 2026.
Pakistan’s Foreign Office dismissed claims of political motive as “misleading and unfounded,” clarifying that the loans were repaid upon maturity. It also reaffirmed bilateral ties, describing the relationship as a “longstanding, fraternal partnership built on trust and strategic cooperation across trade, investment, defense and people-to-people ties.”
Deportations Related to Security Threats
Perceptions of a rift were further amplified by the deportation of Pakistani nationals from the UAE after the start of the war. Following the April 2026 uncovering of an alleged terrorist network, the UAE launched a nationwide crackdown, deporting thousands of workers, many of them Pakistani Shiite Muslims. Media coverage frequently presented the measures as evidence of worsening bilateral relations.
In reality, the deportation of more than 7,500 expatriates represented only a fraction of the approximately two million Pakistanis living and working in the UAE. Abu Dhabi took these measures in the wake of a terror plot, which was widely condemned. The measures were consistent with contemporary practices that states adopt to ensure their security. For instance, Pakistan had recently deported thousands of refugees on similar security grounds.
Crucially, both Pakistan’s Interior Ministry and Foreign Office defended the UAE’s deportations as routine administrative actions driven by immigration violations and legal infractions, rejecting claims that they targeted any specific nationality or sectarian group.
The Risk of Not Addressing False Narratives
The narrative of a cooling UAE-Pakistan relationship rests largely on selective reporting, decontextualized events, and the absence of authoritative public commentary. Neither government has indicated that the partnership faces fundamental challenges. Abu Dhabi chose not to publicly criticize on Pakistan’s mutual defense pact with Saudi Arabia or its measured response to Iranian strikes on the Gulf, while Islamabad repeatedly rejected claims of a diplomatic rupture and reaffirmed the strategic nature of the relationship.
Nevertheless, perceptions matter. The persistence of narratives portraying bilateral ties as strained carries risks of its own. Both governments would be well served to examine why such perceptions gained traction despite continued bilateral cooperation across political, economic, and security domains. Left unaddressed, a manufactured narrative can gradually acquire the force of reality.
