Alliance politics is returning to the Middle East in ways that recall earlier eras of regional competition, but with a far more complex geometry. Recent remarks by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu suggesting that a broader network of alliances is emerging around Israel, linking partners such as India, Greece, and Cyprus alongside other regional actors, reflect a wider reconfiguration of regional alignments accelerated by the current war. At the same time, Iran continues to operate through an entrenched network of partners and armed groups that extend its influence across several theaters.
For the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, this evolving environment presents a strategic dilemma that goes beyond balancing against Iran. The region is increasingly defined by two competing alignment projects. On one side lies Iran’s network of influence, built through missile capabilities, proxy networks, and pressure on regional infrastructure and maritime routes. On the other lies Israel’s effort to consolidate a broader strategic alignment stretching from the eastern Mediterranean to South Asia.
The Gulf now finds itself positioned between these competing projects. The challenge for GCC states is not simply managing threats but navigating a regional order in which others are attempting to shape the alliance structure of the Middle East.
Two Competing Alignment Logics
Iran’s regional strategy has long relied on asymmetric networks rather than traditional alliances. Tehran has cultivated relationships with armed non-state actors and political partners across the region that allow it to project influence across multiple fronts while maintaining strategic depth beyond its borders. Missile and drone capabilities play a central role in this networked strategy. Iran possesses a large ballistic missile arsenal capable of reaching targets across the Gulf. The integration of these missile systems with drone capabilities and proxy forces creates a multidimensional pressure architecture that can threaten shipping lanes, energy infrastructure, and military installations across the region.
Israel’s emerging alignment strategy reflects a different model. Rather than proxy networks, Israel seeks to build formal and semi-formal partnerships with states that share concerns about Iran’s regional behavior. Netanyahu has described a potential “hexagon” of strategic cooperation linking Israel and partners such as India, Greece, and Cyprus alongside other regional actors. This network connects multiple domains, including maritime security in the eastern Mediterranean, technological cooperation, intelligence sharing, and energy infrastructure. Israel’s normalization agreements with some Arab states have introduced another layer of complexity to this emerging structure.
The result is the development of two competing alignment logics shaping the regional order.
The GCC’s Strategic Dilemma
For GCC states, these developments create a complex balancing challenge, though not one in which all options are equally viable. Alignment with Iran is not a realistic strategic path. Repeated missile and drone attacks across the Gulf, pressure on maritime routes, and the targeting of infrastructure have transformed Iran from a potential security threat into a direct and immediate aggressor. These actions have reinforced the perception across the Gulf that Iran’s regional strategy relies on coercion rather than coexistence.
At the same time, a full strategic alignment with Israel presents its own complications. Israel’s behavior in the current conflict and its broader regional strategy, and assertive military posture across multiple theaters, raise significant political and strategic concerns. Israeli military operations have already spilled into the Gulf security environment, including an unprecedented attack in Qatar in September. For Gulf states whose priority is economic stability and regional de-escalation, being absorbed into such a security architecture carries significant risks.
Political realities also matter. The Palestinian issue remains a powerful mobilizing force across Arab societies, and Israeli military operations in Palestinian territories continue to generate widespread public anger. For Gulf governments, these domestic and regional sensitivities place clear limits on how far security cooperation can go.
As a result, the Gulf faces a multidirectional balancing challenge. Iran’s network poses direct military threats to regional infrastructure, particularly in the Strait of Hormuz—through which roughly one-fifth of global oil supply passes. At the same time, deeper integration into an Israel-centered alignment risks entangling Gulf states in broader geopolitical and ideological confrontations that do not serve their core interests.
The central challenge for the GCC, therefore, is not simply choosing sides but avoiding the strategic trap of being absorbed into alignment projects designed elsewhere.
Fragmented Threat Perceptions
Alliance formation difficulties in the Gulf are compounded by the region’s fragmented threat perceptions. GCC states differ in how they manage security concerns stemming from Iranian military capabilities. Some governments primarily address the threat through defense and deterrence, while others emphasize diplomatic engagement.
Perceptions of Israel also vary across the region, with some viewing Israel as a potential partner in confronting shared security challenges, while others are deterred by the political and symbolic implications.
These differences suggest that the GCC is unlikely to align exclusively with one external actor or network.
The Gulf Tradition of Strategic Autonomy
Historically, GCC states have pursued a strategy better described as strategic hedging rather than committing fully to a single alliance bloc. Gulf governments have cultivated overlapping security, diplomatic, and economic relationships with multiple actors and were all members of the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War.
Since the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, however, security cooperation with the United States has been the backbone of the Gulf’s deterrence architecture. The region hosts a dense network of American military facilities—in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates—that provide missile defense, intelligence integration, and rapid-response capabilities.
Still, Gulf states have sought to avoid turning this security relationship into a rigid bloc alignment that further polarizes the region. Maintaining diplomatic channels with Iran has been a deliberate component of this strategy. Geography alone makes complete disengagement with Iran impractical, given shared maritime boundaries, shared natural resources, and the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz.
The Gulf’s long-standing approach has therefore been to combine deterrence with diplomacy strengthening defense capabilities while preserving communication channels that help manage crises.
Policy Options for the GCC
As alliance competition intensifies, the GCC’s challenge is to design a security posture that preserves autonomy while reducing exposure to both Iranian coercion and unwanted strategic entanglement.
One option is deeper internal balancing within the Gulf itself. The GCC already has a Joint Defense Agreement, but its practical implementation remains limited. Greater integration in air and missile defense, intelligence sharing, maritime domain awareness, and protection of critical infrastructure would strengthen collective deterrence and reduce reliance on external actors.
A second option is diversifying external partnerships without collapsing into a rigid alliance bloc. Türkiye represents one such partner and offers military technology, drone capabilities, and naval expertise without the political burden attached to a closer alignment with Israel. In strategic terms, Türkiye gives Gulf states additional room to maneuver and helps prevent overdependence on any single security provider.
Pakistan represents another potential option. Long-standing military ties, training programs, and naval cooperation link Pakistan closely with Gulf security structures. Recent defense agreements, including a pact signed with Saudi Arabia in September, suggest that Gulf security thinking is beginning to expand beyond exclusively Western-centered guarantees. The value of Pakistan is not in replacing the U.S. but in adding strategic depth, manpower, and diversifying its security network with a major Muslim military power.
A third option is to develop a broader Arab security layer around the GCC by strengthening cooperation with countries such as Jordan and Egypt in areas including air defense coordination, intelligence sharing, and maritime security. Such a framework would not amount to a traditional Arab military alliance but could provide a politically sustainable regional security platform that is not defined by either Iran’s coercive network or Israel’s expanding alignment strategy.
A fourth option is structured cooperation with NATO. Through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, several GCC states already participate in NATO partnerships focused on training, interoperability, cybersecurity, and maritime insecurity. While NATO is unlikely to become the Gulf’s direct war-fighting umbrella, it provides valuable institutional frameworks for defence capacity building at a time when instability in the Gulf increasingly affects global energy and economic security.
This most realistic option is differentiated hedging within a Gulf-centered framework. GCC states will not rank threats identically or pursue the same external relationships, but they do not need matching foreign policies to build a coherent regional strategy. What they need is agreement on core red lines—protecting sovereignty, energy infrastructure, maritime lanes, and urban centers—while allowing enough flexibility in diplomatic and security channels. In practice, this means a layered strategy: stronger GCC defense integration, diversified external partnerships with actors such as the United Kingdom, Türkiye, Pakistan, and NATO, selective issue-based cooperation, and continued diplomatic engagement with Iran to manage escalation.
Avoiding the Region’s Alliance Trap
The return of alliance politics is reshaping the Middle East’s strategic landscape. As Iran consolidates its network of influence and Israel attempts to construct a broader alignment stretching across the eastern Mediterranean and beyond, Gulf states find themselves navigating a complex web of competing security projects.
For the GCC, the challenge is not simply choosing sides but preventing external actors from defining the region’s security architecture on its behalf. Strengthening internal Gulf coordination, diversifying external partnerships, and preserving diplomatic flexibility will be essential to maintaining stability in an increasingly polarized environment. In a region where alliances are shifting and threats are evolving, strategic autonomy may ultimately prove to be the Gulf’s most valuable asset.
