Since returning to office on January 20, 2025, Donald Trump has issued 67 executive orders, more than double any other president in American history. Given that some of those orders have serious implications for the Middle East and North Africa, Afkār has compiled views from Middle East Council on Global Affairs scholars to analyze some of the ways these decisions are affecting the region, on issues from health policy and vulnerable populations to the Gaza Strip and Iran.
Editor’s Note
Donald Trump’s first month in office has been a whirlwind of disruption, both domestically and internationally. From attacks on the administrative state—targeting agencies like USAID—to protectionist economic policies and a freeze on international financial assistance, his administration has put the world on notice that the next four years will be anything but business as usual from the global superpower. The abrupt shifts in policy have sent shockwaves worldwide, leaving allies and aid-dependent nations scrambling to adjust.
The speed and unpredictability of decision-making in Washington have been jarring, particularly as critical humanitarian programs for the world’s most vulnerable populations are being abruptly dismantled. Countries, including those in the Middle East that rely on U.S. assistance, are reeling from the fallout. Yet this volatility also erodes trust in America’s reliability as a partner, raising concerns about the stability of the global order it has long underpinned. If this trajectory continues, the unraveling of that order should accelerate.
Trump’s recent remarks on Gaza’s future stand out as some of the most unorthodox, bewildering, and potentially dangerous statements ever made by a U.S. president on any issue. Given Gaza’s prominence in global consciousness over the past 16 months, his approach is likely to have consequences far beyond Gaza’s narrow borders, shaping international responses and geopolitical alignments in ways that remain unpredictable.
– Omar H. Rahman, Editor of Afkār
Another Illusion
Donald Trump’s harebrained proposal to assume U.S. ownership of the Gaza Strip, permanently relocate its Palestinian population, and rebuild it as the “Riviera of the Middle East,” is as outrageous as it is infeasible. A combination of reality, protests from within his own base, and the immediate, public and categorical rejection by Washington’s closest Arab allies should ensure it is stillborn.
After initially claiming his ideas were received with universal acclaim, Trump has nonetheless responded to the vocal opposition by digging in his heels and doubling down on the idea. Still, no element of the “plan” has practical, legal, political or moral merit.
The initiative’s broader significance lies not in the details, but in what it represents. Most importantly, it is part of a broader, concerted U.S.-Israeli-led effort to redefine Palestine as a humanitarian, rather than political, question. Instead of seeking to resolve it by addressing core issues, such as statelessness, self-determination and decolonization, the ceiling of Palestinian aspirations is reduced to housing, employment and social services. Trump’s plan consists of an attempt to turn the clock back to the 1950s and 1960s, when Palestinians were defined as a refugee problem subordinate to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
That paradigm failed, and so will the attempt to resurrect it. Neither the Palestinian people, nor the region, will accept the premise that Palestinians must have no role in determining their future, and that their future must be designed to serve Israeli and Western interests rather than their own.
Trumps Aid Freeze Threatens Vulnerable MENA Populations
President Trump’s decision to freeze U.S. foreign assistance has immediate consequences for vulnerable populations in the MENA region that depend on the aid, and the situation could become dire if extended beyond 90 days. The move has already put on hold life-sustaining programs, including food aid and cash assistance for displaced populations in famine-stricken Sudan, where community kitchens have been forced to close; and in Gaza, where humanitarian organizations warn that the decision could further interrupt the life-saving work of large field hospitals.
The orders have also compromised vital humanitarian efforts in Syria, where the U.S. is the largest foreign aid provider. In Lebanon, the suspension threatens critical support to refugees, internally displaced people and host community members, including with food assistance, health services and education programs. As both Syria and Lebanon are in the midst of political transitions, long-term disruptions to aid are also likely to slow stabilization efforts.
Moreover, the freeze highlights a larger problem with the global aid system—how shifting donor priorities put vulnerable communities at risk. Foreign humanitarian aid has long been an extension of foreign policy, but Trump’s orders are a reminder that political agendas, not humanitarian and development needs, often determine aid decisions. To mitigate this risk, it is imperative to foster and strengthen global responsibility around development, ensuring that vulnerable communities are protected from the consequences of erratic and volatile donor decisions.
Aid Cuts Will Usher in an Unprecedented Global Health Challenge
Kamel Senouci and Nejla Ben Mimoune
In a matter of weeks, the U.S. government has withdrawn most of its international development aid. In 2023, USAID, the federal agency for development aid, had a budget of $40 billion and provided financial and technical support to more than 130 countries worldwide. In the health sector, this support was critical in funding prevention and treatments for several deadly childhood diseases. Other major health programs are on the chopping block, including funding for AIDS treatment and the World Health Organization (WHO).
The consequences of these funding cuts will be severe and long-lasting. In the coming period, millions of people worldwide may be unable to access essential treatments, and preventive measures may no longer be in place to protect children, pregnant women and others. The impact will be felt most acutely by vulnerable communities, leading to deteriorating health outcomes on an unprecedented global scale.
While there is little that the international community can do to fully compensate for these cuts, there are opportunities for the Global South to step up and assume a greater role in financing and managing its own health systems. Some countries have already demonstrated their ability to increase domestic health funding and reduce reliance on external donors. For example, South Africa now produces 50% of the HIV treatments distributed to its affected population; and India, the world’s largest vaccine producer, has supplied affordable yet high-quality vaccines that have saved millions of lives throughout the Global South.
The Doha Global South Health Policy Initiative aims to create a dedicated platform where Global South countries can exchange experiences and develop collective strategies to strengthen their health systems. This initiative is just one step forward, but the current public health crisis underscores the urgency for deeper collaboration. The Global South must seize this moment to establish sustainable solutions and take its rightful place in shaping global health policy.
Egypt’s Dilemma and Trump’s Nakba 2.0
It is no secret that Israel has long dreamed of pushing Gaza’s population into neighboring countries in what can only be termed as a “second Nakba.” Now the idea has permeated the new U.S. administration, with President Trump proposing to permanently relocate Gaza’s entire population and turn the coastal territory into a U.S.-held “riviera,” echoing comments made by his son-in-law Jared Kushner a year ago. Both Egypt and Jordan have so far objected to U.S. pressure for this population transfer, which under international law would amount to mass forcible displacement.
While there are some unconfirmed reports that the U.S. is trying to leverage Egypt’s dam dispute with Ethiopia to pressure Cairo to accept Gazans in Sinai, Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi has come out on multiple occasions to say this would not be acceptable. Most recently, Sisi said in a speech that, even if he does accept Gazans on a temporary basis until the territory is rebuilt, “Egyptians would take to the streets to say no.”
While Egypt is under economic pressure, and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam remains an existential crisis for the country, the government understands that there is nothing temporary about accepting Gazans into Sinai. Not only would such a transfer add pressure on services already overstretched by refugees from multiple regional conflicts, but it would also have a negative impact on Egypt’s security. Hamas and other militants may enter into Egypt as part of the transfer and use Sinai as a base to attack Israel, and potentially other targets in Egypt. While it is still too early to know if Trump is serious about this proposal or if it is merely a negotiating tactic, one thing is clear: the transfer of Gaza’s population would have profoundly negative consequences for Palestinians, Egypt, the region and the world.
Tehran Under Pressure
As expected, in the early weeks of his second term, President Donald Trump signed a memorandum reinstating the “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran. The campaign aims to severely curtail Iran’s oil revenues and block Tehran from circumventing sanctions through stricter regulatory measures in the oil and financial sectors.
Notably, Trump issued the directive as a memorandum rather than an executive order, making it legally less binding. Unlike in his first term, the president’s rhetoric this time signaled a more conciliatory approach. He expressed a willingness to negotiate with his Iranian counterpart Masoud Pezeshkian and emphasized his preference for resolving tensions diplomatically rather than fully enforcing the pressure policies. Despite Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s presence in Washington at the time, Trump avoided mentioning a military option against Iran. These factors led many analysts to interpret his approach as an openness to diplomatic engagement.
Iran’s initial response was cautiously optimistic. Foreign Minister Seyyed Abbas Araghchi indicated that if Trump’s sole objective was preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons, a resolution might be attainable. However, this prospect quickly dimmed after Supreme Leader Seyyed Ali Khamenei unequivocally rejected negotiations with Washington. Citing past experiences—particularly the failure of the 2015 nuclear agreement—Khamenei dismissed diplomatic engagement as futile.
Some analysts believe Khamenei’s stance is a strategic maneuver to shield himself from the potential fallout of unsuccessful talks. However, his firm rejection has significantly constrained Pezeshkian’s administration, giving hardliners ammunition to criticize any attempt at diplomacy with Trump. This internal political friction narrows Tehran’s room for maneuver. Meanwhile, given Trump’s unpredictability, failure to respond to his overtures within a certain timeframe could push the U.S. toward a more aggressive stance and further escalate tensions.
The Maghreb’s Gamble
With Donald Trump back in office for a second term, two issues are dominating the attention of Maghreb leaders: the persistent American demand to normalize relations with Israel, and the fate of Western Sahara, a festering dispute that has ignited dangerous tensions between Algeria and Morocco. On the eve of Trump’s inauguration, however, a telling cartographic signal emerged. The CIA updated its world atlas to include Western Sahara as part of Moroccan territory, in line with Trump’s 2020 commitment to Rabat for joining the Abraham Accords. While the latest move was interpreted in Rabat as a positive sign of continued American support, the leadership is still awaiting further tangible commitments such as the promised opening of a U.S. consulate in Dakhla, the capital of the claimed Moroccan administrative region Dakhla-Oued Ed-Dahab. Although a tentative opening was announced for November 2024, it is still not up and running.
In Algiers, the mood is one of deep suspicion. The specter of U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a vocal critic of the Algerian leadership, looms large. While a senator in 2022, he called for sanctions against Algeria for its continued import of Russian arms despite the invasion of Ukraine, raising the potential that Algeria may become a target of Rubio’s State Department. Moreover, Algiers remains steadfast in its opposition to normalization with Israel and unlikely to shift its position on the Western Sahara. This stance risks a collision course with Morocco, which would further exacerbate regional tensions.
Tunisia, like Algeria, maintains a united domestic front against normalization. Reflecting popular sentiment, President Kais Saied has unequivocally stated his refusal to countenance any such move. This stance effectively removes Tunisia from the immediate equation, though the undercurrents of regional rivalries and external pressures remain.
Libya, meanwhile, represents an enigma. Whether it will even feature on Trump’s immediate agenda for the Maghreb remains uncertain, adding another layer of complexity to an already volatile regional landscape.
The Maghreb’s leaders thus find themselves caught between the demands of external powers, the pressures of domestic opinion, and the enduring legacy of regional disputes.
Avoiding the Vacuum in Syria
Withdrawals leave voids. America’s withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 left a void that was subsequently filled by Iran and its allies; and then by ISIS in 2014. The decision to exit had far-reaching implications for regional and international security. Syria in 2025 is no different.
A potential U.S. withdrawal from Syria presents considerable security risks. Even as a new Syria takes shape under the rule of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the country’s security landscape continues to be composed of disparate militant forces, including the Islamic State and offshoot fundamentalist groups that pose challenges to global security. As it stands, the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is the only actor capable of preventing ISIS and its ilk from mounting a comeback by exploiting the post-Assad transition period.
At the same time, SDF’s continued control of northeast Syria antagonizes America’s crucial regional ally, Türkiye, which has emerged as the most influential external actor in the post-Assad era due to its relationship with HTS. Yet neither Türkiye nor HTS have the on-the-ground capabilities or bandwidth to take on the mantle of America’s counter-terrorism partner in the war against ISIS.
In this context, an immediate American withdrawal is not the answer. It could also open the door for Iran and Russia to re-enter Syria, which presents an alternative set of challenges to U.S. interests. Instead, Washington must develop a framework for its relationships with Türkiye and the SDF that is premised on the SDF assuaging Turkish concerns, while developing power-sharing arrangements in the northeast that replace the SDF’s monopoly on power with inclusive governance and that integrates the SDF-controlled region into the wider political and constitutional framework that will eventually emerge.