Trump Faces a Tough Midterm Test

The United States is approaching a politically sensitive event: congressional midterm elections. The November 3 poll will serve less as a traditional contest between candidates and more as a direct referendum on President Donald Trump’s performance over the first half of his second term. Having begun radically restructuring his country’s relationship with the world, from Ukraine to China, Venezuela, Iran, and the broader Middle East, he now faces a rapidly deteriorating economic and political landscape at home. This places the future of his entire agenda, both foreign and domestic, dependent on the election results.

Recent opinion polls have revealed a sharp drop in support for Trump as the election approaches. Between August 28 and September 1, his approval rating fell to its lowest level since the start of his second term. More significantly, this decline is no longer confined to independent voters or opponents; it has spread to his own Republican base, where support fell more than two percentage points to 72% also a record low in this demographic.

Other polls confirm this trend, though figures vary. By August 31, Trump’s national approval rating had fallen to 35%, with 59% disapproval, while another measure showed a record low 33% approval. Even within his base, while the numbers vary, the overall trend remains clear, polls show support among Republicans dropping to just 79%, a 12-percentage-point decline since the start of his term. Across polls, an unprecedented erosion of Trump’s popularity has occurred, even among his own supporters.

Faced with this decline, Trump has attacked the polls, labeling them “fake” and demanding that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) take steps against media outlets publishing them. Analysts suggest this reaction reflects an awareness of the electoral danger these figures pose, rather than a genuine belief that the data is false.

Trump’s Economic Challenges

The economy is central to Trump’s electoral crisis. Roughly two-thirds of registered voters disapprove of the way Trump is handling the economy, while two-thirds also report that their personal financial situation is not keeping up with rising prices. On inflation and the cost of living, which directly affect voters’ daily lives, Trump faces 82% disapproval on the cost of living alone.

These indicators align with concerning economic data. The price of diesel, vital to American industry and agriculture, has reached a record of $6.179 per gallon. The total public debt passed $40 trillion. The 10-year Treasury yields have been increasing since March 2026, reaching its highest peak of 5.31% on October 5, 2026 since 2002. This increase was driven by fears of soaring government borrowing, expectation of Federal Reserve rate hikes and the energy-driven inflation tied to Iran war. These pressures reach consumers in different ways. Consumers will be affected directly by the increased Diesel and other goods prices. Higher Yields affect mortgage rates and fixed rate loans pricing while the rise causes investors to demand more compensation, resulting in increased debt. Above figures present a difficult political challenge because of its direct impact, unlike foreign diplomatic or military successes, which are easily marketed in the media but do not directly affect voters’ finances.

Furthermore, a report revealed that Trump and his family earned more than $1 billion in profits from cryptocurrency ventures in the past year. This sparked public outrage and signaled that concerns about conflicts of interest are beginning to spread even among his own supporters.

During Trump’s two terms to date, the federal government has been shut down for a total of 161 days, two full closures, 2 partial closures and one Department of Homeland Security (DHS) closure. This reflects fierce disputes between Republicans and Democrats over the expiration of health insurance subsidies and the law-enforcement powers granted to federal immigration agents.

In contrast to the three previous shutdowns during the current Trump administration, both parties, Republicans and Democrats, have sought to pass temporary funding legislation and avert a fourth shutdown right before the midterm election, for fear that voters, already frustrated by the high cost of living, would also blame them for the disruption of government services. This tactical shift reveals that each side recognizes its vulnerability among impatient voters. Neither party wanted to risk blame for a shutdown just before the midterm election; however, the funding fights will resume afterwards.

Redistricting and Party Competition

To offset the anticipated political losses stemming from their declining popularity, Trump and the Republican Party are weaponizing the process of redrawing district lines, through partisan gerrymandering. With his direct backing, Texas passed a new electoral map that could secure Republicans five additional congressional seats. The conservative-majority Supreme Court approved the change in April 2026 despite allegations that racial criteria were used in drafting it. Missouri and North Carolina followed suit with similar maps, each designed to add a Republican seat. North Carolina’s map is in use; however, Missouri’s map was blocked by its state’s highest court based on the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court not to be used in the November elections, allowing all eligible voters in the state to decide their state’s fate. Several other Republican-led states also enacted new maps, some of which are still under legal challenge.

Democrats in California countered with a map, passed by a ballot measure, that could give them five additional seats in that state. However, Virginia Democrats’ efforts were struck down by the state’s Supreme Court. This competition means the courts and state legislatures are shaping the electoral map and, potentially, the power balance of Congress before voters cast their general election ballot.

The United States is experiencing a notable structural paradox: sharp polarization among political leaders alongside growing public disengagement from traditional party affiliations. About 47% of Americans have declared that they do not identify with either of the two major parties, the highest level it has measured in more than a decade that may reflect a widening gap between party elites and the general public.  Groups identified within the Democrats stand at 27%, against 26% for the Republicans, and 47% for the independents, making independents the largest voting group in the country, in which they end up voting for either of the two main parties or smaller third parties.

Concurrently, the Democratic Party is grappling with an internal structural crisis, evident in 2026 with the growing influence of progressive New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani, the symbol of a striking internal rebellion against traditional leadership. This was followed by a series of progressive victories, including wins for Janeese Lewis George in the Washington, D.C. mayoral primary, Chris Rabb in Philadelphia House primary, and Graham Platner in Maine Democratic primary for the U.S Senate, all at the expense of established Democratic figures and the momentum of Mamdani’s movement.

Democratic minority leaders in Congress, Chuck Schumer and Hakeem Jeffries, both from New York, now find themselves unable to influence party politics in their home state as three House candidates Mamdani backed in New York won in the U.S. Congress, defeating Jeffries endorsed incumbents. This raises some serious questions about their ability to lead the party at the national level as the midterms approach. Democrats are divided over the significance of this shift; while some moderates warn that a move to the left could lead to major defeats in crucial swing districts, others view this momentum as an opportunity to reshape the party’s identity ahead of the 2028 elections.

Compounding this is a deep generational divide. Younger Democrats have long complained about their aging party leadership, a grievance exacerbated by the recent deaths of several elderly members of Congress. Senator Lindsey Graham became the sixth member of Congress to die in office in July 2026, while partial changes in leadership have not resolved tensions between dissatisfied younger members and traditional leaders seeking to retain their positions.

Assessing the November Elections

November’s midterms will cover all 435 seats in the House of Representatives and 35 of the 100 seats in the Senate, alongside 39 gubernatorial elections across states and territories. In the current Senate, the Republicans hold 53 seats to 47 held by Democrats and their independent allies. In the House, the Republicans hold an even slimmer margin; Democrats would need to flip some seats that Trump won in 2024 to secure a majority of 218. Gubernatorial races can carry longer-term strategic significance, particularly in states where governors have the power to veto legislative redistricting plans or authorize redistricting commissions that will influence the 2031 cycle. However, the process will vary by state and by  the governors who will still be at the office at that time.

Historically, U.S. midterm elections have not gone well for sitting presidents, whose respective parties have lost House seats in 20 of 22 midterm elections since 1938. This pattern doesn’t necessarily apply to the 2026 midterm election outcome, but it creates an unfavorable baseline for Republicans that are defending a narrow majority. Trump’s declining popularity and public dissatisfaction with the economy underscore further challenges. Though some redistricting efforts may improve Republican positions, their overall House control remains uncertain.

Republican strategist Whit Ayres has summarized the historical statistical relationship between presidential approval ratings and the scale of losses facing the president’s party: when approval exceeds 50%, the party loses seats, but in limited numbers; when it falls below that level, the historical average loss is around 32 seats. Given Trump’s current approval ratings, this benchmark places the Republican majority in the House in serious jeopardy.

Trump’s foreign policy is closely tied to his domestic electoral calculations. Facing a tough test in November, he needs to present himself to voters as having “ended wars” and freed the United States from costly commitments, an approach complicated by the US-Iran war that has pushed fuel prices higher, while simultaneously acting rapidly and decisively over security in the country’s own “backyard.” His administration has already touted the early January 2026 operation to arrest Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro as a swift, decisive victory, but this stands in sharp contrast to the ongoing, complex and unresolved conflicts that are hard to present as political success, including the U.S.-Iran war and the unresolved issues of Gaza and Ukraine.

The U.S.-Iran war that started in February 2026 is the foreign policy issue most directly tied to voters’ budget. The war cost about $43.6 billion as of September 3, including an additional $1.5 billion for fuel, while estimates were roughly $38.1 billion on August 1, with an estimated increase of $2 billion to $3 billion per month as the war continues. The larger burden falls on households through fuel prices, with regular gas at $4.30 per gallon and diesel at $6.32 as of October 18. The estimates show that the war has cost the average U.S. household nearly $2,000, including an energy portion that is growing by $50 per week at current fuel prices, shifting public opinion against the war. These figures interconnect the war, the prices, and Trump’s diminishing popularity, although it is not the only front that determines the vote choice; however, it carries more weight than the other fronts.

Venezuela appears mainly as the counterexample of the Trump administration’s quick success, and Gaza and Ukraine as conflicts whose diplomatic efforts are part of the election agenda. Gaza presents a particularly complex interaction between domestic and foreign policy. Trump wants to present the political process he imposed on Gaza (Board of Peace Road Map), including the potential disarmament of Hamas, as a victory before the November elections. Yet, the core plan has been stalled. The Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is stalling on implementing the roadmap due to his own electoral calculations as Israel is heading toward early parliamentary elections on October 27, just days before the U.S. midterms. This simultaneous timing creates two conflicting sets of incentives for the leaders. Netanyahu has reasons to delay any concession that Israeli voters might perceive as a sign of weakness, while Trump is eager for a ready-made “victory” to showcase to his own electorate. This rare overlap in the allies’ elections places the issue of Gaza directly a hostage to their respective electoral calculations.

Furthermore, other volatile foreign policy issues are likely to complicate the American electoral calculations, such as faltering diplomacy with Moscow over Ukraine, Washington’s temporary trade truce with Beijing, and renewed war in Yemen. These issues may reinforce the perception of an administration facing multiple external pressures. Their electoral effect is mostly felt when linking domestic and foreign affairs. The results of November’s vote will not be viewed in Washington merely as a referendum on domestic policy; they will also serve as an indicator of the American voters’ tolerance for the costs of simultaneous engagements on multiple foreign fronts, especially as voters feel they are the ones bearing the costs.

Conclusion

As Trump heads into the midterm elections, he faces a difficult situation: low approval ratings, an economy that most Americans believe is heading in the wrong direction; and a crisis of governance reflected in the government shutdowns. On the opposing side, the Democratic Party is undergoing a profound generational and ideological shift, one that might weaken it in the short term but could reshape it in the long run.

Although disputes over electoral boundaries may mitigate the Republicans’ projected losses and retain more support for Trump in the House of Representatives, the cumulative weight of historical, economic, and polling data, including the Democrats’ steady lead in average public preference for congressional control, points to a difficult outcome for Trump and his party in November 2026. Republicans losing their House majority, even by a narrow margin, would grant the Democrats effective legislative tools and oversight mechanisms for the first time since Trump’s return to the White House. Conversely, a continued Republican majority, despite Trump’s low approval ratings, would give the president the political cover to pursue his current course with fewer Congressional checks, although courts have been the main constraint so far.

What makes this election consequential for foreign policy is that its results will not only shape the balance of power within Congress, but also the extent to which Trump can sustain his unconventional foreign policy approaches with Beijing and Moscow, and with handling the crises involving Gaza, Lebanon, Iran, and Venezuela. This all depends on how far a Democratic House could force change on the policy area. A Democratic House could increase political and legislative pressure on Trump’s approaches through hearings, spending conditions, and public pressure, but not force a radical change.

The midterms could serve as an early test of the balance of power within the Democratic Party itself ahead of the 2028 presidential nomination race. The progressive wing, among whose most prominent figure is New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani, could claim momentum if progressive-backed nominees performed well in competitive districts, while moderates could hold that faction responsible for any setbacks in crucial swing districts. Mixed results are also likely; however, a single midterm election will only offer an incomplete picture of the partys’ long-term direction. Ultimately, the United States approaches the elections with the realization that Trump’s foreign and domestic policies are no longer separate. Rather, voters will assess their combined effects in just a few weeks.