Key Takeaways

Three Kurdish Tracks as the Binding Constraint: The IDR’s political viability is capped by three parallel Kurdish dynamics: the Baghdad-Erbil dispute over routing the corridor’s northern path through KRG territory, the Ankara-PKK peace process, and the integration of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian state. These are jointly necessary, not merely contributing, conditions. Progress on financing or diplomacy elsewhere cannot substitute for movement on all three; even if one stalls, the corridor’s near-term ceiling stays capped regardless of gains on the others.

Iranian Suspicion, not Acquiescence, is the New Baseline: The Iran war has slowed implementation of the Iraqi Development Road (IDR) project, while also strengthening the project’s case as an alternative trade route. Continued commitment from Iraq and its regional partners in Türkiye, Qatar and the UAE remains essential. The project’s fate will also depend on how Iran emerges from the war and whether Baghdad can manage Tehran’s underlying suspicion of the corridor as implementation advances.

Ali al-Zaidi government Must Sustain the Technochratic Apparatus: The new Ali al-Zaidi government appears committed so far, but commitment alone will not carry the project. Sustaining the technical cooperation committees, retaining implementation cadres through ministerial reshuffles, and attracting the financing needed to move from pledges to bankable capital are the tests that will determine whether that commitment survives governance shifts.

The IDR’s Value Long-Term and Institutional: If implemented with productive ecosystems such as planned and demand-driven industrial clustering along the route, the corridor can generate formal jobs and strengthen accountable Iraqi institutions. Its industrial nodes function as laboratories for state capacity, letting Iraq test and scale reforms in customs, tenders, regulation and service delivery, while deepening a regional economic interdependence that raises the cost of instability and conflict.

The IDR could Anchor Post-Conflict Reconstruction: If realized, the corridor could catalyze reconstruction and generate peace dividends across Iraq, Syria and Türkiye, particularly in conflict-affected areas along the corridor and its potential arteries.

A new order is emerging in the Middle East. It is anyone’s guess whether the new configuration will settle into stability, or slide toward fragmentation and disorder, or land somewhere in between. Progress on the Iraqi Development Road (IDR) project, a multibillion-dollar trade route in the making that envisions linking Basra’s Grand Faw Port to Türkiye and Europe, could help tilt the trajectory towards a better order.¹ As its implementation progresses – albeit at a slower pace than initially envisioned – a thicket of political, financial, and other hurdles still lies ahead. Sustaining commitment and support for the project will be key, including from the Iraqi government as well as the project’s external backers in the Gulf and Türkiye.

The Middle East war and the Hormuz crisis have strengthened the IDR’s strategic salience: the war has reminded regional actors that maritime trade through the Gulf is vulnerable not only to military escalation, but also to insurance costs, shipping delays and sudden disruptions in export flows. It has sharpened Iraq’s own exposure: when maritime routes become less reliable, Baghdad faces immediate pressure on oil exports, fiscal revenues and investor confidence. Against this backdrop, Ankara is attempting to position Türkiye as a comparatively secure trade, transport, and energy hub through a mutually reinforcing set of routes, including the Development Road and the Middle Corridor, the revived Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, and the Hijaz railway from Saudi Arabia and other planned land corridors through Syria.² For Gulf actors, too, though the IDR does not offer a replacement for maritime trade, officials across the region agree that northbound connectivity through Iraq and Türkiye can be a useful hedge against chokepoint disruptions.

Amid the fragility and uncertainty brought by the Iran war, Iraq has been caught in the crossfire. Iran-aligned armed groups became both targets of Israeli and US strikes and launched strikes against US military positions, including in the Gulf. Now, as conditions appear less volatile, Iraq’s new government is looking to bring the country back to its stability-fostering course. The IDR, or rather the vision that the project represents, holds an important place in that mission. Under former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani, Iraq pushed for progress on the project and managed to galvanize external support for it. The new al-Zaidi government now faces the challenge of regenerating that momentum amid cabinet turnover, entrenched corruption challenges and Iraq’s wider backlog of stalled public works. Early signals from the al-Zaidi government suggest commitment to the project while addressing corruption appears to be the immediate priority.

In June 2026, al-Zaidi reportedly cancelled railway and Baghdad airport redevelopment projects approved under the previous government in response to corruption allegations.³ This points to a likely recalibration: al-Zaidi may seek to distance flagship infrastructure projects from corruption-tainted procurement while preserving the IDR as a core element of his governing agenda. The new Iraqi government has yet to appoint the teams and institutional channels that would carry the project forward, and many members of the existing technical committees are expected to change. This may slow coordination in the short term, but it also gives al-Zaidi’s government an opportunity to reset the implementation process in a way that can help put the project back on track with strengthened oversight and other mechanisms. Turkish officials emphasise that Ankara and other external partners can provide technical support, but the final decision-making authority and the responsibility for implementation lie with the Iraqi authorities.

The IDR should be seen not only as a road project but also as part of Iraq’s search for a post-oil productive economy. If it progresses, the project may offer huge development payoffs for Iraq and its citizens. Besides revenues for Iraq from cargo trade through its territory, the IDR’s bigger domestic promise lies in what it can catalyse along the corridor. Official Iraqi framing anticipates industrial cities and parks tied to the road – along a rail and road spine – featuring logistics hubs and dry ports, free-trade and special economic areas, and new urban-service nodes linked to Grand Faw’s wider development process.

In mid-2025, the World Bank approved a $930 million program to modernize Iraq’s north-south rail backbone.⁴ The program is often cited as evidence of IDR momentum, though it is not formally ring-fenced for the corridor and overlaps with longstanding rehabilitation needs of the existing national network. Crucially, there may be unplanned multiplier effects: clustered, value-added ecosystems can also form bottom-up development around the corridor’s most functional nodes (major interchanges, rail terminals, border crossings, and warehousing/service concentrations) where time saved and predictable clearance procedures create natural incentives for assembly, packaging, cold-chain, repair and other light industrial services. If the corridor advances, the payoffs can be regional as well as domestic: increased trade and development, more accountable and stable Iraqi institutions and deeper regional economic integration.

Yet, these gains depend on port capacity, customs performance and the pace of progress on the project. But that outcome is far from assured amid regional volatility, uncertainty about the Iran-US war, Iraq’s domestic political woes, and financing uncertainties. routes are progressing at varying paces – most notably the India-Middle East Economic Corridor (IMEC), China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the so-called Middle Corridor. Furthermore, Ankara and Riyadh are discussing the revival of the Hijaz railway that would connect Saudi Arabia to Türkiye via Jordan and Syria. Some of these routes compete with the IDR for relevance and trade volume; while others may prove complementary if regional actors treat connectivity as a wider integration agenda rather than a zero-sum game.¹¹ Plans for other trade⁵ Politically, much will depend on whether the new al-Zaidi government and the corridor’s external backers in Türkiye and the Gulf can sustain alignment, move pledged support toward bankable commitments, and keep the project within a logic of regional integration. Similarly important will be whether potential regional dissenters in Iran and Kuwait, as well as local Iraqi actors, refrain from turning the project into a site of contestation. If cooperation holds, the IDR could demonstrate how regional middle powers can use connectivity to build leverage and steer a turbulent region toward a more stable trajectory.

For Türkiye, the IDR has become one of the most crucial files in its traditionally security-focussed Iraq policy. As the project’s most engaged external partner, in the last few years, Ankara has managed to move bilateral engagement with Baghdad from chronically difficult issues toward an infrastructure-and-development agenda. Türkiye already has significant downstream transport capacity and the decisive test is whether Ankara and Baghdad can translate that capacity into a durable progress on the IDR.

Key headwinds

Iraq’s internal politics, at least for now, remain the project’s most immediate test. Under former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani, the initiative became both a symbol of Sudani’s stabilization effort of Iraqi politics and a driver of it. Baghdad attracted external backing from Qatar, the UAE, and Türkiye (they signed a quadrilateral agreement in April 2024), and brought the World Bank into the fold.⁶ The new government, formed after some turmoil following the November 2025 Iraqi elections, is now in the process of restaffing government posts and institutions. It appears willing to remain on course to pursue a pragmatic foreign policy, including improving relations with Türkiye.

The post-election uncertainty before a new government could be formed illustrated how tightly the IDR is tied to Iraq’s wider regional balancing act. The Shiite Coordination Framework’s early move toward former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who is known to be close to Iran, intensified intra-Shiite jockeying and drew objections from Washington and several regional capitals. On 27 January, US President Donald Trump publicly criticized Maliki’s possible return and signalled that the US may reconsider support for Iraq should Baghdad move in that direction.⁷ The Coordination Framework ultimately shifted toward Ali al-Zaidi, a businessman and political outsider, whose government won parliamentary confidence on 14 May 2026, albeit with, for now, a partial cabinet in place and several key portfolios still unresolved.

Al-Zaidi’s early foreign-policy posture appears to be informed by hedging between the US and Iran and economic diplomacy. His government began with a partial mandate: only 14 of the initial 19 cabinet nominees secured parliamentary approval, leaving key portfolios, including defense and interior, unresolved and under his interim oversight.⁸ At the same time, Baghdad’s nomination of US-educated adviser Krikor Der-Hagopian as ambassador to Washington signals an effort to recalibrate ties with the US and move the relationship toward a more business-first agenda. Ankara and Gulf capitals are now watching what the formation of a new Iraqi government may mean for their relations with Iraq. Under former PM Sudani, Baghdad paired infrastructure-led stabilization with a more pragmatic foreign policy that sought to diversify its partnerships. The question is whether al-Zaidi can preserve that approach while managing US-Iran tensions, intra-Coordination Framework pressures, and the quota-system bargaining that shapes Iraqi state institutions. For the IDR specifically, what matters is whether the technical cooperation committees formed remain in place, whether the new government can attract more financing for the project, and whether implementation cadres can survive ministerial reshuffles.

The financing architecture is the largest unresolved variable. The World Bank’s $930 million IREM project is best understood as modernization of the existing north-south rail backbone rather than IDR-dedicated capital. Qatar and the UAE support remains politically important, but much of it is still at the MoU or pledge level. For a project variously estimated at roughly $17-20 billion, there are still several unresolved areas such as who will pay for the greenfield rail link, the road component, dry ports, industrial zones, security, and operations.⁹ Under current war conditions in the Middle East, Gulf pledges to the IDR are even more uncertain. The more plausible near-term entry point for external financiers is not the core port works, much of which is Iraqi-financed, but facilities along the route such as logistics depots, terminals and industrial service zones to which external investors can attach clearer revenue models.

This financing gap also has political and economic implications. Without transparent sequencing, procurement rules, and guarantees, the IDR could become another arena for muhasasa-driven competition over contracts rather than a disciplined infrastructure program. If anything, this internal contest for procurement and contracts poses a more immediate threat to implementation than potential other spoilers, since it touches on the governance ecosystem the overall project will require. Conversely, if Baghdad can turn the project into a phased financing architecture with clear public, Gulf, Turkish, multilateral, and private-sector roles, the IDR would become more feasible and more resilient to cabinet turnover.

Iran’s posture won’t decide the IDR’s fate, but it will shape the room for manoeuvre in implementing the project. Since the Gaza war reignited in October 2023 and the onset of the US/Israeli military campaign against it, Tehran has come under significant pressure. Iran’s regional proxy network – from Syria to Lebanon – has been significantly weakened. The Iran war exposed Tehran’s security vulnerabilities while also leaving the regime intact resulting in Iranian confidence in its abilities to withstand pressure. The US and Iran are still in talks and it is unclear whether they will come to a final agreement. If tensions spiral out of control again, this may be bad news for Iraq and the implementation of the IDR. This would significantly complicate not only the security but also attracting investments as renewed escalation would raise risk premiums, crowd out investment and turn progress on the IDR into a more contested terrain.

Although the corridor is often read as reducing Iran’s transit role, Tehran has so far avoided overtly sharp public opposition to it, partly because Baghdad continues to present the IDR as inclusive and potentially connectable to Iran through the Basra-Shalamcheh rail link. That framing could become harder to sustain if the IDR is framed primarily as a Gulf-Türkiye hedge after the Hormuz crisis. In that case, Tehran may read the corridor less as an Iraqi development project and more as part of a wider effort to bypass, encircle or contain it.

The main risk is not only formal Iranian objection, but obstruction through Iraq’s fraught political and security apparatus.¹⁰ A recent episode offered a concrete warning. During Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s 28 July 2026 visit to Ankara, his transport minister initially held back a Development Road agreement at the signing ceremony, with Iraqi media linking the hesitation to political objections associated with the Iran-aligned Badr Organization.¹¹ Al-Zaidi intervened publicly and the document was signed on the spot. While the reason for the hesitation was not officially confirmed, the incident raised questions about whether Iran-aligned actors may become more overt in contesting the IDR as implementation advances. Actors in Iraq close to or backed by Iran could act as spoilers by leaning on political levers in Baghdad to slow-walk decisions, by inserting factional interests into procurement, or by enabling disruptions along the route, including the Basra-Nasiriyah-Samawah stretch, the Baiji node, and the Mosul approach, where Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and elements of Hashd Brigade 30 have demonstrated operational capacity. Iranians will likely be watching with more suspicion after the war to make sure the IDR is not designed to encircle it further. Baghdad will therefore need to engage in active diplomacy to ensure Tehran does not see the project as threatening. It is unclear how Iran will emerge from this war and what the future of its forward-defence posture will look like. For now, it’s safer to assume Tehran is wary of the project than quietly tolerating it. The open question is how much of that wariness Baghdad can manage through diplomacy as implementation moves forward.

The Kurdish conundrum

Three cross-currents involving the region’s Kurds will help determine how far and how fast the IDR can progress – and how much of its potential Iraq and its partners can harness. First, Baghdad and Erbil remain at odds over the corridor’s exact route, including whether it will pass through the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) territory or largely bypass it.¹² Second, progress will hinge on whether the Ankara-Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) peace initiative stays on track.¹³ Third, much also depends on recent shifts in north-eastern Syria – which culminated in the 30 January ceasefire between Damascus and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and an understanding on a process for a phased return of central government authority to the northeast. If the current ceasefire holds and integration proceeds, a more stable north-eastern Syria could reduce cross-border tensions and open space for progress in the Ankara-PKK track. Over time, if regional integration advances, these shifts could temper intra-Kurdish rivalries across Iraq-Syria-Türkiye by raising the opportunity costs of rivalry and lowering the salience of resorting to armed means, and hence opening space for more cooperative, interest-based logics.

Baghdad and Erbil are at odds over the Development Road’s northern route. As currently planned, the corridor bypasses key KRG localities such as Duhok and Erbil, reaching Türkiye via a new border crossing (Faysh Khabour/Ovaköy) which Iraq and Türkiye agreed on opening. This new crossing is located between Duhok and Ninewa, with only a narrow strip passing through the Iraqi Kurdistan region. Ankara’s preference for Ovaköy over the existing Ibrahim Khalil crossing is significant: Ovaköy bypasses KDP-controlled commercial territory, gives Türkiye a direct federal-to-federal connection with Baghdad that does not depend on Erbil’s goodwill, and embeds the corridor in a southeast Türkiye development logic. Erbil is pushing to loop part of the route through Duhok – a change that would raise costs given the area’s topography but could deliver longer-term political gains by easing Baghdad-Erbil tensions. Ankara officials are not opposed to a formula Baghdad and Erbil can agree to as long as the project keeps moving. If the route continues to largely skirt the Iraqi Kurdistan region, it may fuel grievances among those who feel left out and undercut the longer-term political dividends the corridor may deliver.

The trajectory of Türkiye’s decades-old conflict with the PKK – which is designated as a terrorist organisation by Ankara, the US and the EU – is an important variable for the Development Road.¹⁴ Indeed, most public commentary on the IDR repeatedly flags the PKK issue as a leading potential spoiler for the project.¹⁵ Ankara’s ongoing peace process with the PKK, if it remains on track, could help reduce the conflict’s spillover risks for the project. The PKK’s May 2025 decision to disband, and Ankara’s continued commitment to the process, raise hopes for a resolution.¹⁶ On 10 August 2026, the Turkish parliament passed Law No. 7595 on Strengthening National Solidarity and Social Cohesion, setting out procedures for deferring investigations and prosecutions and postponing the execution of sentences for eligible PKK members once disarmament is officially verified.¹⁷ The measure creates a legal pathway for returnees and moves the process closer to implementation. The regional implications may also be broader: in an August 15 Al Jazeera interview, Erdoğan said Türkiye would continue to strengthen ties with Kurdish communities and safeguard their rights across the region.¹⁸ This signals an effort to improve Ankara’s relations with Kurdish communities across the region, potentially easing another set of political frictions around the IDR. If that scenario transpires, it could help stabilise the route’s northern segment, where the PKK has long maintained a presence and where the Turkish military has carried out intense operations over the past decade.

An end to the conflict could also reduce frictions between Iraqi Kurdish political actors for whom the PKK issue has long been a key fault line. Progress on these files could reduce security and political risks and, in turn, help attract more investment for the IDR. Furthermore, for Türkiye, the Ovaköy crossing can also write a domestic development story: Ovaköy opens into Türkiye’s Kurdish-majority Şırnak province, long marred by conflict and underdevelopment. If it progresses, the IDR could help accelerate the shift from a security-first lens toward a growth and development logic in parts of Türkiye’s southeast as well.

Moreover, if the peace process advances and Ankara no longer perceives a threat from the PKK in northern Iraq, this could pave the way for a gradual Turkish military drawdown from Iraqi territory. (Baghdad has long demanded this, viewing Turkish boots on the ground as infringements on Iraqi sovereignty). This, in turn, could add momentum to Baghdad-Ankara ties, which have been improving since 2024, including on security cooperation, oil trade, water management, as well as, of course, the IDR.¹⁹ The pace of the integration process of the Kurdish-led SDF into the Syrian state, which is ongoing, will be a factor in determining how sustainably the Turkey-PKK issue can be resolved.

In the long haul, the IDR could bring cross-border benefits by linking through arteries into Syrian territory. Some observers assess that a stabilised north-eastern Syria and a successful integration might one day allow the IDR to connect via arteries from Iraq towards Aleppo, Idlib and onward to Hatay into Türkiye and West-ward from there.²⁰ While that still is an uncertain scenario, the broader vision of regional integration beyond Iraq is enticing not only for Baghdad and Damascus, but also for Ankara and Gulf capitals. It is also a prospect that many conflict-weary Kurdish and other communities spread across the border areas between Syria, Türkiye and Iraq would welcome. If the project advances, it has the potential to help reduce divisions, raise opportunity costs for violence or disruptions and lock in gains from existing or future deals.

What is lost if the IDR stalls?

If the IDR stalls, Iraq loses more than a transport scheme: it loses a rare platform around which Baghdad can coordinate ministries, discipline procurement, connect infrastructure with local development, and keep Gulf and Turkish partners invested in Iraq’s state capacity. Türkiye and Gulf partners, in turn, lose a potential overland hedge at a moment when maritime chokepoints and regional escalation have become more salient. The cost would not arrive all at once; it would accumulate through delayed contracts, higher risk premiums, investor fatigue, and the gradual diversion of political and investor attention toward rival corridors.

If it advances, the IDR could anchor Iraq’s stability and productivity in a regional web of economic interdependence, strengthening the backbone of a more stable Middle East order and raising the cost of a slide back into instability. The project could also help Iraq build more resilient and trustworthy institutions by incentivising better governance and anti-corruption measures. Iraq has yet to settle on key areas of progress: while feasibility studies for the route have been mostly completed, there is still no detailed public financing map, and uncertainty around guarantees, procurement, and capital sequencing undermines credibility.

Some analysts also warn that rival Iraqi political actors may compete for financial gains through the project by pushing affiliated firms to benefit from the spoils, turning it into an arena of competition. Against this backdrop, the key question is whether the Iraqi state – regardless of who leads the next government – can institutionalise the IDR’s management through standing, cross-ministerial mechanisms with clear mandates, keep in place cadres driving implementation, institute more transparent procurement processes, and strengthen customs/regulatory coordination. That continuity would help carry implementation forward and protect progress from cabinet reshuffles and other domestic shocks. It would also bolster investor confidence.

Keeping Gulf partners engaged and turning their pledges into actual commitments will be crucial for Iraq. Qatari and UAE financing will be more durable if it arrives as patient, phased capital with clear rules, not as cash injections vulnerable to Iraq’s corruption schemes. Chinese contractors and investors could also show interest in the project given the recent Middle East war’s implications for Beijing. All the actors involved should keep in mind that progress on the IDR can deliver stabilising development. After all, it could become a critical artery for Gulf actors and Türkiye, growing trade not only south-north but also north-south. They should resist treating the IDR as a zero-sum contest over trade corridors and instead explore avenues for complementarity with IMEC and other connectivity projects in the making in the region.

The IDR’s viability will depend on how Iraq and the project’s external backers frame and implement it. It should remain within a logic of regional integration rather than exclusion. This includes Baghdad proactively managing upgrades to the Grand Faw Port, which Kuwait perceives as direct competition to its Mubarak Al-Kabeer Port. Amid ongoing tensions between the two neighbours, maritime diplomacy is ever more critical to ensure Kuwaitis do not view progress on the IDR as a threat to their own economic interests. Similarly, Baghdad should not assume that Iran views the IDR as non-threatening. It will need to manage Iranian suspicion, avoid presenting the corridor as an exclusionary Gulf-Türkiye project, and, where possible, keep open technical pathways for future connectivity with Iran, even if the ongoing war and continued US sanctions make any meaningful integration difficult for now.

If the project advances, however, and eventually comes to fruition, it could help build constituencies for stability across a war-weary region. Peace and stability, in turn, may become materially more rational and politically costlier to reverse. The corridor could offer people in Basra, Mosul, Duhok, Şırnak and Diyarbakır – and perhaps even across northern Syria from Hassekeh to Idlib – a ladder into formal work and local enterprise, not just a bypass for trucks and trains. It could become a driving force for cross-border post-conflict reconstruction and development. That prospect merits sustained effort to move the project forward.

Endnotes

¹ Ranj Alaadin, Iraq’s Development Road Project: A Path to Prosperity or Instability? Issue Brief. (Doha, Qatar: Middle East Council on Global Affairs, October 31, 2024), https://mecouncil.org/publication/iraqs-development-road-project-a-path-to-prosperity-or-instability/.

² Hürcan Aslı Aksoy, Turkey Capitalises on Hormuz Disruption: Connectivity as a Foreign Policy Strategy, (Berlin, Germany: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), May 5, 2025), https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/turkey-capitalises-on-hormuz-disruption-connectivity-as-a-foreign-policy-strategy.

³ “al-Zaidi yulghi mashroo’ay al-sikak al-hadidiyya wa tatwir matar Baghdad [Al-Zaidi cancels the railway and Baghdad airport development projects],” Al Rasheed Media, June 14, 2026, https://www.alrasheedmedia.com/2026/06/14/687424/

⁴ World Bank Group, “Iraq: New US$930 Million Project to Extend and Modernize Railways, Promote Regional Connectivity and Boost Growth,” press release, June 25, 2025, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/06/25/iraq-new-us-930-million-project-to-extend-and-modernize-railways-promote-regional-connectivity-and-boost-growth.

⁵ Alberto Rizzi, The infinite connection: How to make the India-Middle East-Europe economic corridor happen, (Berlin: Germany: European Council on Foreign Relations, April 23, 2024), https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-infinite-connection-how-to-make-the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor-happen/.

⁶ Burak Elmah, Rethinking Connectivity in a Multipolar World: Türkiye’s Development Road. Discussion Paper. (Istanbul, Türkiye: TRT World Research Centre, August 2025), https://researchcentre.trtworld.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Rethinking-Connectivity-.pdf

⁷ Jennifer A Dlouhy, “Trump Says US to No Longer Help Iraq If Al-Maliki Is Premier,” Bloomberg, January 27, 2026, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-27/trump-warns-us-will-no-longer-help-iraq-if-al-maliki-is-premier

⁸ ORSAM, What Iraq’s new government under Zaidi reveals, (Ankara, Türkiye: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, May 21, 2026), https://orsam.org.tr/en/yayinlar/what-iraqs-new-government-under-zaidi-reveals/

⁹ Giorgio Cafiero, Geopolitical Dynamics Surrounding Iraq’s Ambitious Development Road Project, (Washington, DC: Arab Center Washington DC, May 5, 2025), https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/geopolitical-dynamics-surrounding-iraqs-ambitious-development-road-project/

¹⁰ ORSAM, Fault line between Iraq’s official security agencies and PMF, (Ankara, Türkiye: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, March 31, 2026), https://orsam.org.tr/en/yayinlar/fault-line-between-iraqs-official-security-agencies-and-pmf/

¹¹ “Iraq PM publicly orders Transport Minister to sign Turkey corridor deal,” IraqiNews, July 28,2026, https://www.iraqinews.com/iraq/iraq-pm-publicly-orders-transport-minister-to-sign-turkey-corridor-deal/

¹² “Erbil, Baghdad yet to agree on Kurdistan’s inclusion in Development Road: PM advisor,” RUDAW, December 21, 2025, https://www.rudaw.net/english/categories/kurdistan/920961

¹³ International Crisis Group, The PKK’s Decision to Disband May Offer a Historic Chance at Peace, (Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, May 16, 2025), https://www.crisisgroup.org/stm/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkiye/pkks-decision-disband-may-offer-historic-chance-peace.

¹⁴ Özge Genç, “Analysis: PKK recalibrates from armed struggle to politics in Turkiye,” Al Jazeera, July 18, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/18/turkiye-pkk-analysis-recalibrates-politics

¹⁵ Nebahat Tanrıverdi Yaşar, From Frontline to Central Regional Node: Turkey’s Recalibration of its Regional Strategy in Iraq. SWP Comment 2025/C 43, (Berlin, Germany: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), October 10, 2025), https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/from-frontline-to-central-regional-node-turkeys-recalibration-of-its-regional-strategy-in-iraq

¹⁶ International Crisis Group, The PKK’s Decision to Disband May Offer a Historic Chance at Peace.

¹⁷ Law on Strengthening National Solidarity and Social Cohesion [Millî Dayanışma ve Toplumsal Bütünleşmenin Güçlendirilmesine Dair Kanun], Law No. 7595, Official Gazette [Resmî Gazete], No. 33344 (Aug. 18, 2026), https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/Yasama/Kanun/3270cca3-ed00-434b-aa64-019fd1c2dd00.

¹⁸ Ali Al Dafiri, “Erdogan says Egypt could join Turkiye-Saudi-Pakistan defence pact,” Al Jazeera, August 15, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/15/erdogan-says-egypt-could-join-turkiye-saudi-pakistan-defence-pact

¹⁹ Nebahat Tanrıverdi Yaşar, From Frontline to Central Regional Node: Turkey’s Recalibration of its Regional Strategy in Iraq.

²⁰ Soner Cagaptay, Turkey Wants to Stitch Iraq and Syria Back Together (Part 2), PolicyWatch 3941, (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute, October 8, 2024), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/turkey-wants-stitch-iraq-and-syria-back-together-part-2