Throughout the U.S.-Iran war, the question of Yemen has remained central to the calculations of regional and international actors. Two key factors are at play here. The first is the potential for the Houthi movement, which controls the capital Sanaa and areas home to approximately 70 percent of Yemen’s population, to become more deeply integrated into the Iranian axis. The second is the prospect of the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait acting as an alternative energy supply corridor, in light of the escalating risks surrounding the Strait of Hormuz. This is highlighted by the failure of military confrontation to resolve the issue of the world’s maritime corridors becoming theaters of international conflict.

This has further complicated the conflict in Yemen itself. The country’s fate increasingly depends on the stances of the coalition backing its internationally recognized government, as well as on geopolitical repositioning in relations with regional powers.

The Houthis: From Restraint to Blockade

The Houthi group, officially known as Ansar Allah, has long been viewed as little more than an Iranian proxy in the region, executing the Islamic Republic’s agenda without hesitation. However, recent developments point to a more complex dynamic in their relationship. Despite the Houthis’ close ties to the Tehran-led “Axis of Resistance,” and the massive military and logistical support the group receives from its Iranian backers, the Houthis have not always participated directly in regional conflicts based solely on Iranian directives. Rather, they make decisions based on domestic considerations and their own strategic calculations regarding their survival and control within Yemen.

The Houthis’ entry into the latest war is not an impulsive decision. Rather, it unfolded in stages; having halted their attacks on Israel and international shipping following the October 10, 2025 ceasefire agreement on Gaza, the Houthis resumed launching ballistic missiles at Israel on March 28, 2026, explicitly declaring that they were entering the war in support of Iran. Yet it was notable that for weeks the group refrained from resuming strikes on Red Sea shipping. Observers interpreted this as a tactical truce, pending an Iranian signal, as well as reflecting the group’s desire to preserve its strength rather than dispersing it across multiple fronts—particularly given its preoccupation with domestic threats in southern Yemen and the increased U.S. naval presence in the region.

However, this pattern radically shifted in early June. On June 8, following a direct exchange of fire between Tehran and Tel Aviv, Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree announced a total ban on Israel-linked shipping in the Red Sea, designating any Israeli asset as a legitimate military target. The group threatened to escalate further, implicitly hinting that it maintained the strategic option of closing the Bab al-Mandab Strait should the war expand or other nations become directly involved.

The data starkly reveals the nature of this threat. Houthi attacks on commercial vessels declined to just seven operations in 2025, down from approximately 150 the previous year. Conversely, the group carried out 125 strikes against targets inside Israel during the first 11 months of 2025.

This disparity reflects a strategy of “deterrence by denial”—one that the Houthis have mastered—by which an attack on a single tanker is enough to force other vessels to alter their routes. Thus, the group’s strength is measured not by the size of its arsenal per se, but rather by its ability to continue posing a critical threat.

Undoubtedly, successive U.S. and Israeli airstrikes, ranging from the U.S. “Operation Rough Rider” campaign of 2025 to targeted operations against the Houthis’ leadership, have degraded their capabilities, but have fallen short of eliminating them. However, the movement has a structural weakness in the form of its reliance on Iranian arms supply lines, making it vulnerable whenever the pressure on Tehran intensifies.

Nevertheless, the Houthis retain an ambitious regional vision, and are seeking to secure a pivotal leadership role within the “Axis of Resistance.” At the same time, they recognize that frittering away their military strength in an ill-conceived, all-out confrontation could undermine their negotiating and political standing within Yemen, particularly in the face of an escalating economic crisis and public pressure.

Given this calculus, the Houthis’ involvement in the regional conflict hinges on a delicate and cautious balance that weighs their ideological commitment to the Palestinian cause and the Iranian axis against the need to preserve their domestic military and political standing in Yemen. This complex balancing act makes it difficult for the international community to predict the group’s next move, or to rely solely on indirect pressure exerted via Iran.

The Red Sea and International Security

Instability in the Strait of Hormuz has reshaped the strategic importance of the world’s maritime corridors. The Red Sea, already the conduit for approximately 12% of global trade and nearly 15% of seaborne trade, quickly became an alternative artery for Gulf oil exports following disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz. Consequently, any additional threat to the Bab al-Mandab Strait at the sea’s entrance would now entail a greater impact for energy markets than the earlier wave of unrest in 2023–2024. Since late 2023, major shipping companies have been forced to reroute via the Cape of Good Hope, adding about 10 days to voyage times and doubling shipping costs between Asia and Northern Europe. This shift resulted in a record slump of around 65% in traffic​​ through Bab al-Mandab compared to 2023 levels, coinciding with the complete cessation of shipping operations at the port of Eilat.

Against this backdrop, the international response to threats in the Red Sea has evolved from limited, ad-hoc measures to a more comprehensive, institutionalized security effort. From United Nations Security Council Resolution 2722 in January 2024, which condemned the attacks, to a string of international briefings throughout 2025 and 2026, the issue has been a prominent fixture on the international agenda. The international response is no longer limited to a U.S. military presence; in February 2024, the European Union launched “Operation Aspides,” a mission with an explicitly defensive mandate focused on maritime protection and escorting commercial vessels, thereby cementing the security of the waterway as an integral component of European and global security. These stakes have only risen as the Iran war has left both of the region’s chokepoints exposed at once. With the Strait of Hormuz disrupted, the Houthis have repeatedly signaled that closing the Bab al-Mandab remains on the table, a threat they renewed alongside the recent escalation against Saudi Arabia.

On the ground, according to data from the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the U.S. Maritime Administration, Houthi attacks were not merely symbolic posturing, but constituted an organized, impactful campaign. The IMO had recorded 69 confirmed incidents by November 2024, followed by several significant attacks in 2025, targeting major commercial tankers. A Maritime Administration advisory indicated that the Houthis had carried out over 100 separate attacks on commercial vessels between November 2023 and October 2025, with repercussions for more than 60 countries. The group used a diverse arsenal including aerial suicide drones, drone boats and submarines, and both ballistic and cruise missiles, transforming the threat from a minor economic nuisance into a complex danger to global maritime safety and the stability of supply chains.

These complexities have compelled regional states to adopt distinct political approaches driven by their respective national interests. Egypt’s economy has suffered perhaps the most drastic impact, with revenues from the Suez Canal dropping by approximately 60 percent in 2024. Nevertheless, Cairo has remained cautious, arguably viewing the protection of the shipping lane as a non-negotiable matter of national security yet simultaneously avoiding any direct military alignment that could drag it into regional conflicts incompatible with its domestic stability. This complex situation underscores that Red Sea security is no longer an issue that could be resolved solely through military means or traditional deterrence; rather, it has become a multifaceted problem requiring comprehensive political settlements in which international dynamics intersect with regional interests.

There is a strategic dimension to all this that observers often overlook, despite its severity: namely, the environmental cost. Disruptions at the Strait of Hormuz have intensified pressure on the Bab al-Mandab Strait as a vital alternative shipping route. The growing risk of massive spills in the ecologically sensitive waters of the Red Sea is a critical factor in the corridor’s long-term viability. Any disruption or attack there could transform the region into a mobile environmental disaster, with consequences for nations across the Middle East, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Horn of Africa. Indeed, due to its circular currents which trap leaked substances within its waters, the Red Sea is particularly vulnerable to the potential repercussions of attacks on tankers.

Events have demonstrated that this danger is far from hypothetical. A case in point is the UK-owned bulk carrier MV Rubymar, which the Houthis struck in the Bab al-Mandab Strait in early 2024. It sank two weeks later, taking with it approximately 21,000 tons of ammonium phosphate fertilizer and hundreds of tons of heavy fuel oil. It left behind an oil slick stretching for dozens of kilometers that threatened coral reefs, fisheries, and desalination plants.

A few months later, the Houthis attacked the tanker MT Sounion, setting fire to some 150,000 tons of crude oil. The region narrowly escaped an environmental catastrophe, thanks to the vessel being successfully towed away without the oil leaking. Similarly, the FSO Safer, a floating storage unit anchored off Yemen’s Red Sea peninsula of Ras Issa with 1.1 million barrels of oil aboard, was a ticking time bomb until the UN defused the threat through a complex transfer operation in 2023. Any failure in that operation could have instantly destroyed the livelihoods of around 200,000 people, polluting the air across a vast area. Such costs would transcend political boundaries, threatening Arab and African littoral states alike.

Humanitarian, Economic and Political Challenges

Against this military and political backdrop, Yemen faces immense challenges that threaten its very existence as a state. The political situation remains in a limbo between war and peace, amidst deep, persistent institutional fragmentation and the presence of multiple power centers, each armed and each asserting its de facto authority on the ground. Intense efforts by the UN to transform fragile stability into a lasting peace are running up against the intransigence of the warring parties, a lack of trust, and the subordination of Yemeni decision-making to regional and international agendas. This fragmentation runs through the anti-Houthi camp itself. A UAE-backed offensive in the south in December 2025 was reversed by Saudi-backed government forces within weeks, ending with the expulsion of the remaining UAE forces and splitting the coalition that had waged war on the Houthis since 2015.

Economically, Yemen has paid a colossal price for years of war. Real GDP contracted by 43 percent between 2015 and 2024, while nominal GDP per capita collapsed from $1,430 in 2014 to just $433 in 2024, a fall that pushed Yemen from the world’s 40^th poorest country before the conflict to its 3^rd poorest. It is suffering from a catastrophic fiscal and monetary schism, reflected in the existence of two central banks pursuing conflicting policies—one in Sanaa and the other in Aden. This is exacerbating the world’s worst humanitarian crisis and driving an ongoing collapse in the value of the rial, eroding citizens’ purchasing power.

Any serious attempt to revive the economy will by necessity require rebuilding Yemen’s state institutions and unifying its monetary and fiscal policies. And even the more optimistic projections remain fragile, with the forecast 2.5 percent annual growth by 2030 hinging on the success of political negotiations, the resumption of oil exports, and the continued inflow of international aid, which has markedly declined of late. Yet the goal itself appears elusive, given the Houthis’ ongoing economic warfare, aimed at bolstering their own resources at the expense of the national economy and the general public. Furthermore, reconstructing the country’s devastated basic infrastructure will require billions of dollars and decades of work. Yemen’s role in the current regional landscape means it is no longer merely a “backyard” for outside powers to settle scores; rather, it has become a key hub that directly influences global security and economic dynamics.

Today, the country’s fate is subject to three intertwined equations: a maritime blockade that could be blown up or be defused by negotiations between Tehran and Washington; an internationally recognized government riven by internal fractures and a regional struggle for influence; and a deepening humanitarian crisis exacerbated by a rapidly widening funding gap.

These realities suggest four potential scenarios for Yemen moving forward. The first is a path of fragile de-escalation, contingent on the U.S.-Iran MoU holding, along with a resumption of traffic via the Strait of Hormuz. The second would see sustained militarization as the “new normal,” whereby international shipping adapts to the reality of rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope. A third, worst-case scenario would involve the collapse of the current understandings, leading to escalation and the simultaneous closure of both straits—an event that would trigger a major supply shock for energy markets.

The final possibility is one of domestic implosion and the military fragmentation of the state, independent of developments in the maritime arena. The strikes on Sanaa airport on July 13, the Houthi attack against Abha airport in response, and the group’s declared end to the war’s “de-escalation phase” have made fragile de-escalation markedly harder to reach, pushing the situation toward sustained militarization and raising the risk that the current understandings collapse altogether.

Conclusion

Consequently, the international community must shift away from its traditional approach toward the Houthis. The group should no longer be viewed merely as an Iranian proxy, but rather as a complex, pragmatic local actor with a semi-independent agenda, thus necessitating a dual strategy of deterrence and negotiation that targets their domestic calculations and direct interests. This in turn requires that any future regional agreement be linked to an explicit provision governing the security of the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, alongside support for the establishment of a joint, apolitical security framework that unites the Arab and African littoral states, rather than relying on ad hoc alliances or passive maritime escort operations that fail to dismantle arms-smuggling networks or proactively deter offensive capabilities.

On the UN and the political process, the world body’s Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg should leverage the momentum generated by recent prisoner release agreements and the push for dialogue over the southern question, to create an inclusive framework that addresses the root causes of the structural fissures within the Yemeni state. It is also vital to insulate Yemen’s economic institutions—first and foremost the Central Bank—from the political conflict, and to safeguard their autonomy, which is a prerequisite for financial stability, accompanied by international support packages subject to rigorous oversight mechanisms to ensure that funds are not diverted to finance the war effort.

On humanitarian relief, donors must bridge the unprecedented funding shortfall and ensure that any political or diplomatic pressure is linked to the unconditional release of detained UN personnel so as to guarantee that aid reaches the areas of greatest need. Addressing these humanitarian challenges is not merely a domestic imperative; it has become a strategic necessity for regional security, given the fragility of the security architecture in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait. This is particularly relevant as the tensions in the Strait of Hormuz reveal the deep interconnectedness of maritime corridors, energy security, and international trade.

Ultimately, achieving a sustainable political settlement in Yemen would bolster the stability of regional states, mitigate the risk of the conflict spreading, and foster an environment better equipped to withstand further geopolitical crises, thereby safeguarding international maritime security and enhancing prospects for development and regional economic integration.