War and Peace: Lebanon on a Knife Edge

Lebanon is at a critical phase, perhaps the most delicate and dangerous in its modern history, as the war raging on its soil and a chronic, escalating domestic crisis intersect with developments across the region. After the launch of direct negotiations with Israel and the start of face-to-face talks between the United States and Iran in Islamabad, a temporary American-Iranian truce is holding, but the Strait of Hormuz is still blocked, and Lebanon teeters on a cliff edge.

Lebanon and Israel held a preparatory round of talks at the ambassadorial level in Washington on April 14, and a second session is scheduled for April 23. The Lebanese government has reiterated that the first meeting was a preliminary discussion aimed at achieving an immediate ceasefire, before moving onto other issues. In the interim, a 10-day ceasefire was announced on the evening of April 16. To date, the Lebanese government has avoided discussing any direct negotiations that might be perceived as conceding Lebanese sovereignty or offering Israel normalization “free of charge.” It has repeatedly stated that the objective of any direct negotiations would be to achieve a final and comprehensive ceasefire, Israel’s withdrawal from the territories it currently occupies, the release of all the hostages it is holding, the deployment of the Lebanese army to conflict zones to maintain security, and the return of migrants to their villages to begin reconstruction.

Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s public statements have ranged from an outright rejection of negotiations – describing them as treason, collaboration, and normalization “for free” –  to a more pragmatic stance of accepting the talks on the precondition that a ceasefire must be in place first, although the movement emphasizes that it is not itself bound by the outcome of any direct talks between Lebanon and Israel. The latter, for its part, has expanded its operations in the south and engaged in “negotiations under fire” in order to impose its own demands: first and foremost, the complete disarmament of Hezbollah.

This situation assessment examines Lebanon’s predicament, one that reflects not merely a momentary crisis linked to the ongoing war, but rather a deeper structural flaw underpinned by the fragility of the political system and Lebanon’s position at the crossroads of wars and foreign interventions. All this has combined to bring Lebanon to its current state of deep turmoil.

The Weak State: A Theoretical Framework

Echoing Joel S. Migdal’s theory of the “weak state”, the Lebanese state suffers from three major weaknesses: the state’s failure to enforce its authority throughout the country, the erosion of its political legitimacy, and severe economic fragility. These deficiencies limit its ability to formulate a national defense strategy, or to negotiate with Israel from a position of strength, balance and stability. This renders it hostage to both internal and external power dynamics, and even more so when the two intersect.

One might argue that Lebanon embodies the model of a “partially failed state,” whereby it retains some semblance of statehood, with institutions that appear to function, but which are incapable of performing their basic duties. Perhaps the most significant of these failures are Lebanon’s weak security control over certain regions and groups, widespread and deepening corruption, the collapse of the judiciary, a mounting economic crisis, and excessive dependence on foreign aid — not to mention the presence of sharp internal political and social divides.

Hezbollah’s Dilemma

In this scenario, the role of Hezbollah as a “non-state actor” must also be analyzed. Hezbollah represents a classic case of an armed actor that possesses social legitimacy within its constituency, but undermines the sovereignty of the state it operates in. While the movement sees itself as providing military deterrence against Israel and ensuring social protection for citizens (under the slogan: “We protect and build”), it simultaneously deepens Lebanon’s internal divisions and undermines the foundations of the state.

Combined with Hezbollah’s alignment with a regional agenda, this precipitates a decline in the movement’s legitimacy and presence, especially beyond its own constituency, and politically within the Lebanese society.

This situation reflects a security paradox, in which a non-state actor considers itself a vital provider of security to protect the country, given the weakness of the state, yet simultaneously represents one cause of this weakness—even if it does not admit it. In short, Hezbollah is evolving into a political and economic burden: it is militarily powerful but domestically isolated; it possesses some financial resources but lacks the capacity to carry out reconstruction and development; and it represents a significant segment of the population, but lacks consensus or support among other key groups. Today, Hezbollah is facing a complex crisis: a relative military decline on one hand, and both domestic and external pressure on the other. All of this increases its dependence on Iran.

Since the government, on March 2, 2026, imposed an immediate ban on Hezbollah’s military and security activities, deeming them illegal, and demanded that it surrender its weapons and restrict itself to political activity, the security paradox has become more pronounced and dangerous: Hezbollah cannot be disarmed by force, nor can Lebanon be left without a functioning state.

Predicament of the Lebanese State

The Lebanese state, for its part, suffers from an even more profound predicament: political fragility in the form of a weak – or absent–monopoly of violence, due to the presence of Hezbollah, a powerful, armed, non-state actor with military and organizational capabilities far exceeding those of the Lebanese army. That army, despite being a national institution, has a limited arsenal, and cannot engage in any confrontation with a state like Israel. This structural imbalance of power weakens the state’s ability to exercise its full sovereignty, making it hostage to complex domestic and external power dynamics.

Added to this are the deep sectarian divisions within the Lebanese society, which have repeatedly manifested as civil wars and internal conflicts over the decades, rendering state institutions incapable of forging a national consensus on issues of security and defense. Thus, security in Lebanon in practice is under the responsibility of state and non-state actors, a scenario that deepens the fragility of the political system and leaves the country vulnerable to regional and international interference.

On top of all this, Lebanon has been suffering from a severe economic crisis since 2019. The currency, the Lebanese pound, has lost more than 98% of its value, leading to hyperinflation and slashing the value of citizens’ savings, with no real rescue package in sight and delays in efforts to reach a final agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Lebanon has thus resorted to a fragile “resilience economy,” dependent on limited cash inflows and remittances, amidst economic contraction and escalating inflation.

Furthermore, the Lebanese government’s approach to the current crisis has been marked by hesitation and fragmentation, stemming from the intensity of domestic tensions and fears for national unity, given the prospect of disintegration of institutions—particularly the army. The government has focused on taking full control of security, but without any real prospect of success, and nor does it have a viable alternative, given Israel’s continued violations of the November 27, 2024 ceasefire agreement and the silence of the international community, supposedly entrusted with implementing the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 (intended to end the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah) and other relevant international resolutions.

Moreover, the state’s inability since 2019 to address the ever-worsening economic crisis, coupled with the ongoing war in the south and the growing challenge of housing and supporting displaced people in Beirut, places the government and the country in a highly precarious situation.

Israel’s Strategy of Hard Power

Israel’s strategy can be interpreted through the lens of “hard power” in international relations, whereby it seeks to impose its will through military force, while engaging in negotiations as political cover. This reflects the model of “offensive realism,” which argues that states strive to maximize their power by dominating their immediate surroundings. Throughout the most recent war, Israel has escalated its military operations in Lebanon beyond traditional deterrence, expanding the “buffer zone” in the south and targeting civilian infrastructure to pressure Hezbollah’s support base and create divisions in Lebanese society.

Israel’s attacks on villages and towns in south Lebanon have triggered an unprecedented wave of mass displacement, with more than 1.2 million people forced to flee. It has also committed horrific massacres: as of April 16, Israel’s offensive had killed 2,196 people and wounded 7,185. Israeli air strikes also targeted the main government building in Nabatieh, killing 13 members of the State Security forces. Up until April 16, Israeli operations and incursions had been concentrated in a border strip 8-10 kilometers deep, and it was attempting to carve out a buffer zone south of the Litani River.

April 8 was the most intense day of the war. Within just a few minutes, Israel launched over 100 airstrikes on Beirut, its southern suburbs, and other areas, killing 254 people and wounding 1,165—the highest daily toll since the start of the war. This prompted the Lebanese government to declare a national day of mourning. The attack came immediately after the announcement of a ceasefire agreement between the U.S. and Iran, sending a signal that Lebanon was excluded from the agreement and that Israel considers it a separate battlefield.

Israel also intended to demonstrate that Hezbollah would not find a safe haven even in the capital, and that pressure on civilians could weaken the movement’s base of support. This indicates that Israel is prepared to disregard previous norms in managing the conflict. The strikes also heightened fears of Lebanon sliding into a full-scale confrontation.

It has become clear that Israel is pursuing a multi-pronged strategy aimed at weakening Hezbollah’s military capabilities—or rather, ending its armed presence in the south, if possible, and pushing the Lebanese state to disarm it, ultimately leading to a reshaping of Lebanon’s domestic political balance. To this end, Israel has relied on firepower to instigate widespread displacement, generate internal pressure on the Lebanese state, and attempt to force the Lebanese army and government to confront Hezbollah on its behalf.

The 10-day truce, which was extended, is perhaps the best near-term indicator of where the situation is heading. Everything hinges on three factors: Firstly, the fate of U.S.-Iranian negotiations and the truce between them; secondly, the situation on the ground in the south—specifically, the extent of Israel’s commitment to the truce, given that it has declared that the deal does not demand its withdrawal from the occupied territories, and has even established a security zone several kilometers deep along the border; and thirdly, the position of Hezbollah, which may see itself as not bound by the agreement as long as its conditions are not met, effectively linking the movement’s stance to the outcome of the Pakistan negotiations.

Global Helplessness

The lack of international will to resolve the Lebanese problem reflects a crisis in the global order. Washington is coordinating closely with Israel and providing cover for its operations, while Europe focuses its efforts on avoiding direct involvement in the conflict, clinging instead to diplomacy and de-escalation. European nations have refused to take part in any effort to force the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, only going as far as declaring their readiness to secure it once the fighting has stopped. While the U.S. strongly pushes for negotiations, viewing them as a tool for managing the war politically rather an opportunity for a final settlement, some European countries (particularly France and Spain) are pressing for a ceasefire in Lebanon, while others such as Canada and Britain, along with the UN, are focusing on the humanitarian aspect as the displacement crisis worsens.

A few statements from European governments—France, Germany, and Spain—have condemned the Israeli attacks and called for them to end, while the European Union has described them as an “unacceptable violation.” However, the war with Iran has highlighted the bloc’s inability to forge a unified foreign policy.

Arab governments, namely Egypt and the Gulf states, are attempting to contain the conflict, but lack the capacity to impose solutions. While Egypt sees the stability of Lebanon as part of its own national security, it lacks direct leverage. The Gulf states have financial and political tools, but cannot impose a domestic settlement due to the complexities of Lebanon’s political landscape, not to mention the fact that they are preoccupied with addressing the war’s repercussions for their own economies.

The Gulf states’ positions vary between neutrality and limited support; Saudi Arabia and Qatar have called for a comprehensive de-escalation, emphasizing respect for Lebanese sovereignty, while the other Gulf countries have focused on countering Iran’s influence. Qatar has affirmed its commitment to supporting Lebanon through economic and humanitarian aid. Türkiye, for its part, is observing the developments carefully without getting directly involved. It views Lebanon as part of a broader negotiating landscape that includes Iran and Gaza; in other words, it sees Lebanon as part of a network of regional conflicts, and is content with making statements and sending humanitarian aid, given that it lacks direct influence or effective tools of leverage. This diplomatic vacuum has left Lebanon, for the first time, exposed: an open arena for settling scores, in line with the concept, from security studies, of a “gray zone.”

Complex overlaps are at play between the U.S., Iran, Israel, and Lebanon, each of whose strategic interests intersect with its domestic calculations. Which factors, then, will be decisive in determining the course of conflict and the current negotiations? First is the American-Israeli pressure. Washington is seeking to keep negotiations open with Iran and prevent a truce between them from collapsing, while giving Israel room to maneuver in Lebanon. This explains President Donald Trump’s efforts to put in place the 10-day ceasefire. Israel is making demands with implications that reach north of the Litani River, declaring its refusal to allow Hezbollah to remain strong or to maintain its arsenal throughout Lebanon.

As for Hezbollah, which insists on a ceasefire as a precondition for negotiations and refuses to concede anything under military pressure, it has adopted a strategy of remaining steadfast, stalling for time, and tying the question of Lebanon to that of Iran. This strengthens its political position but pushes other forces to support the government and demand a state monopoly on the use of arms. The Iran-U.S. truce and the regional cover offered by Tehran also help to explain this situation. Iran insists on including a ceasefire in Lebanon in its negotiations with Washington, threatening to withdraw from the talks unless Israel halts its attacks. Iran views the negotiations between Lebanon and Israel as an attempt to weaken the “axis of resistance.” However, at the Islamabad talks, it focused on the nuclear issue and the Strait of Hormuz, demonstrating that international priorities do not directly include Lebanon.

As for domestic risks, Lebanon is caught between Israeli escalation and its own entanglement with the Iranian issue. Israel is seeking to drive a wedge between the state and Hezbollah. Simultaneously, popular demonstrations have exacerbated Lebanon’s fragile domestic situation, raising the specter of internal strife or civil conflict. Israel is seeking to impose security arrangements that would effectively give it tutelage over Lebanon; meanwhile, Hezbollah and Iran are working to ensure that the movement remains a powerful force within the political system. This leaves Lebanon hostage to power struggles between Washington, Tehran, and Tel Aviv, posing the ever-present risk of chaos or a new civil war.

Direct Negotiations with Israel

The negotiations underway between Lebanon and Israel do not necessarily signify normalization. At their core, they are an attempt to manage or de-escalate the conflict, not a gateway to normalization, which would entail establishing full political and economic relations—something most factions in Lebanon have thus far rejected. Nor are the negotiations the result of a ceasefire on the ground. The fact that they are taking place while the fighting continues demonstrates that they are more of an attempt to manage the crisis than to resolve it. These are the first direct Israeli-Lebanese negotiations since the collapse of the May 17, 1983 accord, a draft peace agreement signed between the Lebanese government and Israel but nullified before it was implemented, due to widespread public rejection, Syrian pressure, and shifts in the international and regional balances of power.

Lebanese officials and the public are themselves divided over the talks, which weakens the government’s negotiating position. The Presidency is inclined toward negotiation, albeit cautiously: it was President Joseph Aoun who proposed the initiative to launch direct talks on March 9, and tasked Beirut’s ambassador in Washington with attending the preliminary meetings.

Similarly, the Prime Minister’s office is working to demonstrate the legitimacy of the option of a peace deal, in accordance with the Arab Peace Initiative, proposed at the 2002 Arab Summit in Beirut. Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, while allied with Hezbollah, has agreed in principle to the negotiations. Berri’s Amal Movement has rejected demonstrations that accused the Prime Minister of treason, and its ministers have voted in favour of his decisions. Berri has also sent an envoy to Saudi Arabia.

The government has refused to link the Lebanese track to the Iranian one, believing that this would turn Lebanon into a bargaining chip in a wider conflict. Rather, it has emphasized that the nation’s higher interest requires a negotiating track led by the Lebanese state itself, to reaffirm Lebanon’s borders and the state’s national role.

Milestones in Negotiations

Historically, all understandings and agreements between Lebanon and Israel have been limited and temporary, tied to the circumstances of war and the relevant security or economic context, while far removed from any comprehensive political framework. They have certainly not reached the level of a comprehensive peace agreement or full normalization. They have instead served as vital tools for alleviating military and economic pressure, and have remained the subject of domestic and regional controversy.

Lebanon has had several rounds of indirect negotiations with Israel. The most prominent, which led to a deal signed on April 26, 1996, known as The Grapes of Wrath Understandings, prohibited the targeting of civilians and the use of villages as launching pads for attacks, while recognizing the right to self-defense. The agreement also established a monitoring committee (comprising the U.S., France, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel). This was not a peace agreement, but rather a mechanism for containing escalation. It also granted Hezbollah implicit legitimacy as an organized force committed to certain rules of engagement, and it strengthened the movement’s popular and political standing. Furthermore, it presented Hezbollah as an indirect party to negotiations through international mediation, giving it regional weight and turning it into a key tool of leverage for Syria and Iran. The agreement remained an informal political-security understanding that allowed for continued resistance against Israel, within a legal and diplomatic framework.

Next came the UN Security Council Resolution 1701 of August 11, 2006, which ended the war of that summer (known to the Lebanese as the July War). Resolution 1701 stipulated a cessation of hostilities, an Israeli withdrawal, the strengthening of UNIFIL, and the deployment of the Lebanese army south of the Litani River, where the state would have a monopoly on arms. This was a pure security agreement, backed by the UN, and internationally binding. It represented an attempt to restore state control in the south, posing a challenge to Hezbollah, which had rebuilt its strength in both the north and the south, making it more powerful domestically than the state itself, and enhancing the movement’s regional image. However, the agreement itself, and Hezbollah’s acceptance of it, placed the movement in violation of international law, giving Israel diplomatic leverage.

Then came the U.S.-mediated maritime border agreement over the Karish offshore gas field, signed on October 27, 2022. This demarcated the countries’ shared maritime border and facilitated gas exploitation. This agreement placed Karish under Israeli sovereignty and allowed it to begin exploiting its gas commercially, while opening the door for Lebanon to develop the Qana field, although this has yet to begin. The agreement, which Hezbollah accepted, gave Israel international legitimacy, but without political normalization with Lebanon. During this period, the issue of offshore gas and the demarcation of maritime borders became central to the negotiations, as it represented an opportunity for Lebanon to escape its economic crisis. Yet the country remains an arena for regional conflict.

This was followed by a November 27, 2024 deal ending Hezbollah’s hostilities with Israel in support of Gaza, in the wake of the October 7 attacks. Brokered by the U.S. and France and based on Resolution 1701, it stipulated a permanent cessation of hostilities, sharing of intelligence, U.S.-French oversight, and security guarantees for Israel against Hezbollah and Iran. While it did not imply normalization, it reflected a shift in the balance of power, exerted direct international pressure on Hezbollah, and weakened its legal and diplomatic position. However, Hezbollah portrayed it as a “political victory,” because it prevented a full-scale war. For the first time, the U.S. acted as a direct guarantor, elevating the agreement to something close to a binding international framework.

These understandings have consolidated Hezbollah’s role as an unofficial but implicitly recognized actor, granting it popular and regional legitimacy while keeping it under growing international pressure. They have also demonstrated a recurring pattern of establishing ceasefires, with the gradual introduction of restrictions and international pressure.

Possible Scenarios

The first and most likely scenario involves “negotiations under fire,” which could either collapse or lead to a temporary truce. This could mean that military operations continue, Israel’s positions harden, and the war would expand both south and north of the Litani River. The broad outlines of such a scenario are evidenced by events on the ground. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is using negotiations as a cover for continuing military operations and the Israeli Security Cabinet has declared that the fighting will continue until Hezbollah is disarmed. This scenario is the most likely according to the logic of a “limited war.” It would also lead to the failure of negotiations due to Hezbollah’s rejection of Israel’s conditions, while Israel would exploit the Iranian-American truce to concentrate its most intense military effort on Lebanon to weaken Hezbollah militarily before the signing of any agreement.

For Lebanon, this scenario could have a range of domestic repercussions. It would reinforce the narrative of Hezbollah and its allies that Israel does not want peace, and could unite some popular forces behind the principles of ​​steadfastness, resistance, and refusing to make concessions. Furthermore, this scenario would weaken the Lebanese government in the eyes of the international community, increase Lebanon’s isolation, and exacerbate the economic and humanitarian crisis, with continued displacement and destruction in Hezbollah’s strongholds—the south, the Bekaa Valley, and Beirut’s southern suburb of Dahiyeh. Israel may also continue to strike civilian targets in Beirut itself, as happened on April 8. Moreover, this scenario could open the door to a full-scale escalation if Netanyahu feels that negotiations are wasting time without achieving his objectives. He might then launch a broader ground operation than is currently underway, and intensify Israel’s airstrikes, plunging Lebanon into open conflict and threatening a domestic conflagration that could lead to state collapse, turning Lebanon into a failed state.

The second scenario is a partial agreement, similar to the ceasefire announced on the evening of April 16. This would rely on the acceptance of a cessation of military operations (Israel has stated that this would only apply to air strikes, and not to its ongoing occupation) and addressing the humanitarian situation, but without entering into a comprehensive settlement. That would mean a return to the “framework of understandings” model: a temporary “ceasefire” without a final resolution to the issue of weapons. This might temporarily satisfy both sides—Lebanon’s desire to halt the destruction, and Israel’s quest to alleviate international pressure—but it would not prevent any future escalation. This could be termed the “fragile settlements” model.

This scenario would chime with several regional factors. Iran and Hezbollah reject any final settlement that might compromise the weapons of the resistance, meaning a partial agreement is a more realistic scenario—as seen in the temporary truce Washington has already imposed. On top of this is Lebanon’s domestic situation; the Lebanese government is seeking to alleviate the crisis, while for now, there is regional opposition to any final settlement. Also worthy of mention are Lebanon’s bitter political divisions, both officially and among the public, regarding the feasibility of negotiations. The resistance camp sees them as a concession, while the other side sees them as a necessary step to reduce the pressure on the country. Therefore, a partial deal would not resolve Lebanon’s political divisions, but merely freeze them temporarily, while simultaneously weakening the possibility of reaching a consensus that would allow for a comprehensive settlement. Such an agreement would remain fragile and unsustainable, but it would temporarily alleviate military and economic pressure, providing the government with political breathing room vis-à-vis the international community, and open the door to urgently needed humanitarian aid.

In contrast, the third scenario would revolve around a comprehensive settlement whereby Hezbollah, under American pressure, would be obliged to disarm in areas south of the Litani River, while the Lebanese army and international forces would deploy there, in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal and a cessation of hostilities. This scenario echoes the idea of a “forced peace,” and is one of cautious optimism. However, it would require official Lebanese engagement and demand a state capable of ending Hezbollah’s armed presence and extending the state’s full sovereignty over its territory. Hints of this lie in the official Lebanese approach of consolidating state control in Beirut, and in the Lebanese government’s continued emphasis on the principle of the state’s monopoly over the use of force. The potential domestic repercussions would include a radical transformation of Lebanese politics, a redrawing of domestic balances, the demarcation of borders, long-term security guarantees, and an openness to offshore gas investment and international support for reconstruction.

However, it could also provoke popular resistance from currents opposed to normalization. Moreover, it would present Hezbollah with an existential dilemma: should it continue as a resistance force, or transform into a purely political party? Such an arrangement would also require broader regional understandings involving Iran and the Arab states, as well as a Lebanese national consensus, something that has yet to emerge.

Despite international support for a final agreement that includes the disarmament of Hezbollah and the demarcation of Lebanon’s borders, this scenario currently seems unlikely due to strong domestic and regional opposition.

The most probable scenario at present is the continuation of negotiations under fire, or a partial agreement or temporary truce — not a comprehensive settlement — based on a ceasefire and control over the border. This is despite growing international support for the negotiations. However, it remains possible that this truce will collapse due to Israel’s continued military operations, internal Lebanese divisions, and the opacity around the Iranian-American negotiations and the outcomes they might produce. A comprehensive settlement remains a distant prospect, but it could become possible if the balance of power shifts or major regional understandings are reached.

Conclusion

Lebanon’s current crisis reveals the interplay between the country’s fragile internal structure and the regional and international pressures it faces. In other words, the crisis cannot be understood in isolation from Lebanon’s fragile domestic dynamics and the volatile regional context. The continuation of these dynamics threatens to transform Lebanon into an open battleground or the model of a chronically dysfunctional state, unless a new political and economic approach is developed that transcends the existing framework, rebuilds the state’s legitimacy, and is based on the concepts of genuine sovereignty and consensual legitimacy. Otherwise, Lebanon will remain hostage to the games of world powers. Thus, Lebanon faces an existential test: either it can rebuild the state’s legitimacy and reform its sectarian political system, or it will slide toward the model of a chronically dysfunctional state, plagued by perpetual civil wars.

This Situation Assessment is written by Saoud El Mawla, visiting senior fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs. 

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Middle East Council on Global Affairs.