Background

The Middle East has crossed a dangerous threshold. The paradigm of managed escalation that defined conflicts in the region—including along the Lebanese-Israeli border since the fragile November 2024 ceasefire—has been shattered. The catalyst for this shift was a systemic shock to the broader regional order: the massive, joint U.S.-Israeli military campaign launched illegally against Iran on February 28, 2026. According to Oman’s Foreign Minister, Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi, a diplomatic agreement on Iran’s nuclear program was “within reach.” Iran had reportedly agreed to refrain from uranium stockpiling and to down-blend existing stockpiles to “the lowest level possible,” commitments that would have gone further than the Obama-era Joint Common Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Yet the United States and Israel instead launched Operations Epic Fury and Roaring Lion, respectively, dragging the region toward a wider war. The offensive targeted Iranian intelligence headquarters, ballistic missile sites, and Revolutionary Guard facilities, leading to the assassination of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on the first day. The operation has redrawn the strategic map of the Middle East, particularly the Gulf, making previous diplomatic frameworks obsolete. At the time of writing, it remains extremely difficult to assess what happens next—whether in Iran itself, across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), or on other fronts, including Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon.

In the immediate aftermath of the initial assault, the conflict expanded across multiple theaters. Iran retaliated against Israel while launching an unprecedented wave of ballistic missiles and drone strikes against GCC states hosting American military assets. Iranian strikes were launched in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as well as sites in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar.

Initially, the Lebanese theater remained quiet. Hezbollah signaled it would not intervene militarily so long as U.S. airstrikes did not cross redlines, warning that an attack on  Khamenei would constitute one. In response to the February 28 breach, Hezbollah launched strikes on northern Israel on March 2, targeting a missile defense site south of Haifa with eight missiles and several drones. Two days later, on March 4, it escalated with a direct strike on the Haifa naval base using a “barrage of high-quality missiles.” Hezbollah framed these attacks as retaliation for the killing of Supreme Leader Khamenei and signaled a definitive end to the 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement.

Israel’s response was swift, overwhelming, and uncompromising. Discarding remaining tactical constraints, Israeli jets heavily bombarded the southern suburbs of Beirut (Dahiyeh) within two hours after Hezbollah’s attack on March 2 and issued mass evacuation orders for more than 50 towns and villages across southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley. This initial wave of intense strikes killed at least 52 people and injured nearly 150, prompting a mass exodus of civilians toward the north. As of this writing, the Lebanese front has become an active, unconstrained battlespace within a systemic regional war.

Policy Relevance

For policymakers, the current crisis necessitates a fundamental reconsideration of Lebanon’s strategic vulnerability. Simply put, the post-2024 ceasefire illusion that the Lebanese theater could be neatly decoupled from the broader U.S.-Israel-Iran confrontation has evaporated. Moreover, the rules governing military engagement have changed. Hezbollah and the Iranian regime previously calibrated their military actions carefully to manage external threats without triggering conflicts that could jeopardize their own existence and internal regime security.

Today, that restraint has eroded. The assassination of Iran’s leadership has forced the network of regional Iran-sponsored militant groups, known as the “Axis of Resistance,” into a strategic corner in which inaction may be perceived as a greater existential threat than escalation. For Iranian leaders, failing to respond could carry greater domestic political costs than risking a wider war.

The same dynamics apply to Hezbollah. By striking Israel directly, the group has prioritized its transnational ideological and military commitments to Tehran over its domestic obligations to Lebanon and the Lebanese people, exposing the perilously fragile country to a devastating retaliation it can scarcely afford. This is especially true given Lebanon’s grave economic crisis, which the World Bank has described as among “the most severe globally since the mid-19th century.”

At the same time, the dramatic expansion of Iranian retaliatory strikes into the GCC fundamentally alters the Middle East’s diplomatic and security landscape. Gulf states that had spent the past several years pursuing a highly pragmatic pivot toward pressure management and diplomatic de-escalation with Tehran are now active military targets. The region’s informal security buffer has been pierced. Traditional mediation mechanisms and financial guarantees for reconstruction are paralyzed. This is no longer a localized conflict; it is a multi-theater confrontation that threatens global energy markets, maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz, and the very survival of the Lebanese state structure.

Assessment of the Risks, Opportunities, and Trajectories

The current landscape carries catastrophic risks, with virtually no near-term opportunities for traditional diplomatic breakthroughs. Rapidly evolving dynamics—changing by the hour—are being shaped by Hezbollah’s strategic calculus, unprecedented political pushback from the Lebanese state, and the alarming vulnerability of the Gulf.

Hezbollah’s Fatal Strategic Calculus

Historically, Hezbollah’s leadership calculus has been constrained by Lebanese domestic realities. The organization understood that triggering a war capable of destroying Lebanon’s civilian infrastructure would be politically catastrophic among its economically exhausted constituency.

However, the assassination of Khamenei produced a strategic dilemma. Failing to respond would have shattered Hezbollah’s credibility as the vanguard of the “Axis of Resistance” and signaled a fatal weakness to Israel. Yet by choosing to strike, Hezbollah has dragged a bankrupt and politically paralyzed Lebanese state into a war it may not survive. The group is now locked in an existential struggle: it must demonstrate sufficient retaliatory capability to deter further Israeli ground incursions while attempting to survive an Israeli decapitation campaign similar to those recently executed in Tehran—and earlier in Beirut in September 2024 with the killing of Hassan Nasrallah, as well as the pager operation that left 26 dead and thousands wounded.

The Lebanese State’s Pushback and the Risk of Civil Strife

A critical, newly emerging dynamic is the overt confrontation between the Lebanese state and Hezbollah’s military wing. In a stark departure from the veneer of national unity typically maintained during past crises, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam publicly and forcefully condemned Hezbollah’s rocket fire as an “irresponsible and suspicious act” that fundamentally endangers national security. The government has demanded that Hezbollah surrender its weapons and restrict itself to political activity. Judicial authorities reportedly ordered the immediate arrest of those responsible for launching rockets from southern Lebanon, resulting in the arrest of twelve suspects.

This marks a profound fracture within Lebanon’s political order. The state—backed by significant segments of the Christian, Sunni, and Druze communities—is attempting to strip Hezbollah of its “resistance” legitimacy. Although the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) lack the hard power to forcibly disarm Hezbollah, this open political rupture drastically increases the risk of internal conflict. Should relentless Israeli bombardment displace hundreds of thousands of Shia civilians into areas dominated by other sectarian groups, the resulting demographic and economic strains could easily ignite widespread sectarian violence.

Recent experience offers a warning. During a wave of displacement last year, some localities refused to rent housing to residents fleeing Dahiyeh due to sectarian tensions. Lebanon, therefore, risks facing a dual catastrophe: external military invasion combined with internal civil strife.

The Gulf Vulnerability: From Mediators to Targets

The most dangerous external variable exacerbating the Lebanese crisis is Iran’s decision to expand the war by striking the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. Tehran’s objective is to impose a high cost on the United States by attacking the hosts of its regional military infrastructure. In doing so, however, it has fundamentally altered the security architecture of the Middle East region. Gulf states can no longer realistically position themselves as neutral mediators or impartial financial guarantors for Lebanon. Attacks on civilian infrastructure and U.S. military installations across the Gulf compel these states to activate defensive postures and shift to a wartime footing. Lebanon, consequently, is increasingly cut off from its traditional regional safety net. While acting historically as the region’s primary financial guarantor, no Gulf state is now likely to invest political capital in mediating for Lebanon or bankroll its recovery as it once did. Collectively, Gulf states provided at least $11 billion to Lebanon between 1963 and 2022.

Trajectories: The Shadow of Systemic Collapse

Scenario A: The Multi-Front War of Attrition.

The conflict settles into a prolonged and devastating exchange of strikes without a clear diplomatic off-ramp. Israel systematically dismantles Hezbollah’s infrastructure south of the Litani River while conducting targeted assassinations in Beirut. Hezbollah responds with daily salvos of drones and ballistic missiles targeting Israel. The Lebanese state survives but becomes a hollowed-out entity incapable of providing even basic services to its population. External actors such as France may intervene selectively through humanitarian assistance or limited support for security sector reform.

Scenario B: The Decapitation and Ground Invasion.

Emboldened by its operational success in Iran and its unprecedented operational collaboration with the United States, Israel’s war cabinet decides that air power alone is insufficient to permanently neutralize Hezbollah. The Israeli military launches a large-scale ground invasion of southern Lebanon aimed at establishing a deep, permanent buffer zone and eliminating Hezbollah’s Radwan forces, the elite assault unit trained for cross-border raids into northern Israel. This triggers maximum retaliation from remaining Iran-aligned groups in Iraq and Yemen, overwhelming regional air defenses and drawing the U.S. further into direct combat engagement.

Scenario C: The “Shock” Ceasefire.

The sheer scale of the regional destruction, combined with mounting civilian casualties and the severe disruption to global energy markets via the Strait of Hormuz, forces a panicked, unified international intervention. A UN Security Council-mandated cessation of hostilities is imposed, requiring the immediate deployment of a heavily armed international coalition force to separate combatants in Lebanon and enforce the disarmament of non-state actors. This scenario is the least likely. Conversely, Scenario A—a protracted, multi-front war of attrition—remains the most probable trajectory given the current diplomatic paralysis.

Recommendations

To navigate this unprecedented regional conflagration, stakeholders must immediately shift from conflict prevention—as this phase has already passed—to damage control and state preservation.

• Immediate Humanitarian and Evacuation Corridors: Traditional diplomatic sequencing has failed throughout the region, including in the GCC. The priority must be the establishment of internationally protected maritime and air corridors to evacuate foreign nationals and deliver emergency medical and food supplies directly to Lebanon. Rather than relying solely on compromised U.S. mediation, a coalition of European and Arab states must exert maximum diplomatic pressure to ensure that Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport and the Port of Beirut remain strictly operational and immune from military targeting.
• Ring-fencing the Gulf: Washington should urgently reinforce the air and missile defense architectures of its GCC allies and ensure sufficient military capacity for the duration of the conflict, which shows little sign of abating.
• Unified Deterrence and Isolation: The GCC must maintain a unified strategic front and political neutrality. While continuing to condemn the disproportionate nature of Israeli escalation in Lebanon, as well as defending their territories from Iranian retaliatory strikes, Gulf capitals should refrain from siding with the U.S. and Israel, which are conducting an illegal war of aggression.
• Targeted Support for the Lebanese State: Gulf states should channel emergency humanitarian aid directly and exclusively through the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Lebanese Red Cross. Strengthening the LAF remains the only viable mechanism to preserve basic state order and prevent Lebanon from descending into sectarian civil war.

Endnotes

1. “31 Killed and 149 Injured in New Israeli Airstrikes on Lebanon,” Qatar News Agency, March 2, 2026, https://qna.org.qa/en/news/news-details?id=31-killed-and-149-injured-in-new-israeli-airstrikes-on-lebanon&date=2/03/2026.
2. “Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah leader, killed in Beirut in Israeli strike, Al Jazeera, September 28, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/28/hassan-nasrallah-hezbollah-leader-killed-in-beirut-in-israeli-strike.
3. “Hezbollah says it targeted Israel’s Haifa naval base with missiles,” Gulf News, March 4, 2026, https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/hezbollah-says-it-targeted-haifa-naval-base-with-missiles-1.500462533.
4. “Israel orders evacuation of over 50 Lebanese villages ahead of air strikes,” Middle East Monitor, March 2, 2026, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260302-israel-orders-evacuation-of-over-50-lebanese-villages-ahead-of-air-strikes/.
5. “Hezbollah official says will not intervene in event of ‘limited’ US strikes on Iran,” Al Arabiya English, February 25, 2026, https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2026/02/25/hezbollah-official-says-will-not-intervene-in-event-of-limited-us-strikes-on-iran.
6. “Iran confirms Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei dead after US-Israeli attacks,” Al Jazeera, February 28, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/28/irans-supreme-leader-ali-khamenei-killed-in-us-israeli-attacks-reports.
7. “Peace ‘within reach’ as Iran agrees no nuclear material stockpile: Oman FM,” Al Jazeera, February 28, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/28/peace-within-reach-as-iran-agrees-no-nuclear-material-stockpile-oman-fm.
8. Adam Chamseddine and Heba Nasser, “Lebanon bans Hezbollah military activities after rocket fire on Israel,” Middle East Eye, March 2, 2026, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israel-kills-lebanon-hezbollah-attack-khamenei.
9. Alice Cuddy, Samantha Granville, Lucy Williamson, “Israel strikes Lebanon after Hezbollah rocket fire as Iran conflict widens,” BBC News, March 2, 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5y4v8g13wxo
10. Angie Mrad, “Lebanese Shia families displaced by war now trapped by identity,” Al Jazeera, July 26, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2025/7/26/dahiyeh-families-displaced-by-war-now-trapped-by-identity
11. Assaf Orion, Michael Eisenstadt, Holly Dagres, Patrick Clawson, Hanin Ghaddar, April Longley Alley, Richard Nephew, Epic Fury and Roaring Lion: From War Scenarios to Pressing Postwar Questions in Iran. Policy Analysis. (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 1, 2026), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/epic-fury-and-roaring-lion-war-scenarios-pressing-postwar-questions-iran.
12. Frank Gardner, “Allies of US in the Gulf bear brunt of Iran attacks,” BBC News, March 2, 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1jk922dgjgo.
13. Helene Sallon, “Hezbollah returns to its core identity: Defending Iran,” Le Monde, March 3, 2026, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/03/03/hezbollah-returns-to-its-core-identity-defending-iran_6751069_4.html.
14. Jonathan Yerushalmy and Dan Milmo, “Hezbollah device blasts: how did pagers and walkie-talkies explode and what do we know about the attacks?” The Guardian, September 19, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/sep/18/hezbollah-pagers-what-do-we-know-about-how-the-attack-happened.
15. Justin Salhani, “Israel Intensifies War on Lebanon After Hezbollah Attack.” Al Jazeera, March 2, 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/3/2/israel-intensifies-war-on-lebanon-after-hezbollah-attack.
16. Narim Berjawi and Abdulsalam Fayez, “Lebanese army detains 12 Hezbollah members after rocket fire on Israel,” Anadolu Ajansi, March 3, 2026, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/lebanese-army-detains-12-hezbollah-members-after-rocket-fire-on-israel/3848780.
17. Sascha Bruchmann, Martin Sampson, Nick Childs, Dana Allin, Hasan Alhasan, The US-Israel campaign in Iran. Online Analysis. (London: IISS, March 2, 2026), https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2026/02/the-us-israel-campaign-in-iran/.
18. Tarek Chouiref, “Hezbollah claims rocket, drone strike on Israeli missile defense site near Haifa,” Anadolu Ajansi, March 2, 2026, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/hezbollah-claims-rocket-drone-strike-on-israeli-missile-defense-site-near-haifa/3845853.
19. Tarek Chouiref, “Lebanon’s prime minister says rocket fire from country’s south ‘irresponsible,’ vows action to prevent escalation.” Anadolu Ajansi, March 2, 2026, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/lebanon-s-prime-minister-says-rocket-fire-from-country-s-south-irresponsible-vows-action-to-prevent-escalation/3845862.
20. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Aid as Economic Statecraft in a Turbulent Region: Gulf Bailout Diplomacy, (London: IISS, 2023) https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2023/11/Gulf-Bailout-Diplomacy/
21. World Bank Group, “Lebanon Sinking into One of the Most Severe Global Crises Episodes, amidst Deliberate Inaction,” press release, June 1, 2021, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/05/01/lebanon-sinking-into-one-of-the-most-severe-global-crises-episodes