Key Takeaways

MENA Remains Pro-Democracy: Despite low confidence in political institutions, and the collapse of the Arab Spring’s democratic moment, the majority of MENA citizens still prefer a democratic government. Even in countries with widespread disillusionment, autocracy is not seen as a better alternative.

Democracy Dignity: Citizens conceive of democracy as dignity, prioritizing social and economic outcomes over procedural features such as elections, reinforcing that performance is the underlying feature of democratic legitimacy.

Dignity Priorities Shift with Local Stressors: In contexts battered by economic or security shocks (e.g., Tunisia, Lebanon), provision of basic needs tops the list; elsewhere (e.g., Morocco, Kuwait), equality and rule of law lead.

Reform Starts with Outcomes, Not Procedures: Anti-corruption enforcement, safety guarantees, reliable courts, and targeted economic safeguards are the entry points for rebuilding trust. Electoral reforms without parallel progress on these dignity benchmarks are unlikely to shift public attitudes.

Introduction: Rethinking Democratic Support in MENA

Despite a notable erosion of confidence in political institutions and the collapse of the Arab Spring’s democratic promise, ¹ the majority of citizens across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region continue to express strong support for democracy.² In countries like Tunisia, where President Kais Saied dismissed the prime minister, froze parliament,³ and later dissolved it, eight in ten survey respondents still consider democracy the best form of government.⁴ This trend is consistent across other countries, including Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania, Iraq, and Palestine.⁵ Even in Lebanon, which faces severe political and economic crises, a significant portion of the population continues to back democratic governance, despite a slight decline in recent years.

Why, then, does public support for democracy endure across the MENA region, even as the initial promise of improved governance following the Arab Spring failed to deliver concrete results? Resolving this puzzle requires revisiting what ordinary citizens mean by democracy, or dīmuqrāṭiyyah. Formal definitions of democracy largely focus on institutional procedures: open competition, regular elections, party pluralism, the alternation in office, and the protection of civil liberties.⁶ However, this definition may not capture the entirety of what MENA citizens value in their political systems.

This issue brief argues that delivering dignity has become an important standard by which the region’s publics assess democracy. For MENA citizens, the primary features of democracy are not elections or procedural frameworks, but the tangible outcomes the system delivers. In this context, citizens continue to support democracy because they see it primarily as a system that secures basic needs, ensures justice, and provides security. As revealed through a novel survey experiment, these desires equate to a system that provides citizens with dignity. This clarification of how democracy is perceived helps explain why citizens in the MENA region continue to prefer democracy over any other form of government.

Building on recent survey evidence from the Arab Barometer, which questioned more than 15,000 respondents from eight countries, face-to-face between 2023 and 2024, this issue brief explores three key areas.⁷ First, it examines the attitudes of MENA citizens toward democracy. Next, it explores the specific attributes that citizens believe are essential to democracy. Finally, it explores the concept of dignity, demonstrating its connection to public perceptions of democracy and providing a fresh framework for understanding support for democracy in the region.

MENA Citizens Want Democracy    

The perceived failure of the pro-democracy Arab Spring uprisings has not translated into widespread support for autocracy. Asked whether a non-democratic government might be better, majorities in only three countries agreed; in the other five, fewer than half said the same. Even in countries where democracy’s economic record is met with skepticism, larger percentages expect corruption, civil rights violations, and poor services to be worse under autocratic rule. Support for democracy may, therefore, endure to some extent, as Winston Churchill observed: “Democracy is the worst form of government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” Despite the frustrations presented by democratic systems, the alternatives remain less appealing.

That belief is expressed by a large and growing majority (see Figure 1). Across the MENA region, support for democracy reaches at least 73% in all countries surveyed—from 85% in Kuwait to 73% in Morocco and Lebanon.⁸ Since the 2021–22 survey round, net endorsement of the statement has climbed 19 percentage points in Morocco, seven in both Jordan and Tunisia, and six in Iraq, only slipping in Lebanon (by 7 points).

Source: Arab Barometer Wave VIII, 2023–2024.

Responses to other questions reveal that this commitment runs deeper. When respondents were asked for a stronger endorsement—that democracy is always preferable as a system of governance—solid majorities still agreed in Jordan (70%), Tunisia (65%), Morocco (60%), Iraq (56%), Palestine (56%), and Mauritania (54%). Only in Lebanon did a minority agree, at 47% (see Figure 2).⁹ Over the most recent two-year interval, that endorsement has increased by 16 percentage points in Morocco and five in Jordan, held statistically steady in Tunisia, Iraq, Palestine, and Mauritania, and slipped by five points in Lebanon. Viewed over a six-year horizon, it has also risen markedly in both Tunisia and Palestine.¹⁰

Source: Arab Barometer Waves V, VI, VII, and VIII, 2016–2024.

Note: This question was not fielded in Kuwait

At the same time, the pandemic-era spike in pessimism over the performance of democracy has begun to ebb. Since 2022, the proportion of respondents who believe democracy leads to weak economic outcomes has decreased by 12 percentage points in Mauritania, 10 in Kuwait, and seven in both Jordan and Morocco. Anxieties about democracy producing indecision and insecurity have dropped by seven points in Lebanon and five in Mauritania, stabilizing or rising only marginally elsewhere.

Still, these fears about democracy do not necessarily translate into support for authoritarian rule. Rather, survey participants judge non-democratic governance as worse on each of these three criteria. Majorities across the region, ranging from 73% in Iraq to 72% in Jordan and 71% in Tunisia, believe that non-democratic systems lead to weak economies and that such systems are indecisive and poor at maintaining order. Unsurprisingly, fewer than 40% regard autocracy as better than other systems in five of the eight states, with Kuwait again the least enthusiastic, at 36%.

In summary, the majority of citizens in the MENA region embrace democracy as a concept. They see this form of governance as better than non-democratic governance, and most affirm that it is always preferable to other forms of government. Yet they do not see it as a perfect system or a panacea; they fully grasp that democracy has key limitations, including potentially weak economic outcomes, indecisiveness, and instability. Despite these perceived shortcomings, perceptions of the concept of democracy remain very positive across the MENA region.

The idea that MENA publics’ understandings of democracy differ from its formal definition is not new. In 2010, Fares Braizat highlighted that citizens across the region were evenly divided between those defining democracy primarily by its political or economic characteristics. However, he argued that this was really a false dichotomy, with democracy being seen as a solution to economic problems.¹¹ More recently, the Arab Opinion Index has found that very few across MENA see democracy as an economic system, with the majority focusing on its political aspects. In 2022, pooled results showed that “34% defined democracy as the guarantee of political and civil freedoms, 20% viewed it as the guarantee of equality and justice among citizens, 14% focused on participation and the institutional aspects of a democratic system for example alternation of power, separation and control between authorities, 6% saw it as the guarantee of security and stability, and 5% defined it as the improvement of economic conditions.”¹² Additionally, Hannah M. Ridge has found that “the preferred [political] condition for the average Egyptian and Moroccan has multiparty elections, few barriers to political participation, an official religion but no role for religious leaders, low unemployment, and good baseline public welfare.”¹³ This finding highlights that citizens in at least some MENA countries place high importance not just on elections, but also on improved economic conditions.

Democratic Priorities: What Citizens Value Most

This persistent gap between institutional reforms and the unmet needs of MENA citizens points to a dissonance between formal political systems and lived realities. The hopes generated by the Arab Spring have largely gone unrealized, and citizens continue to face the same everyday pressures that triggered the 2011 uprisings. In some cases, like Tunisia, the economic situation is even worse, with GDP per capita lower today than at the time of the country’s revolution. Parliamentary seats have changed hands, electoral formulas have been revised, and cabinets have been reshuffled—yet electricity still falters, corruption still thrives, and wages still lag behind prices.¹⁴ This highlights a critical challenge for political reform: until the performance of governance aligns with the demands of citizens, procedural changes are likely to have little effect on public trust.

Against this backdrop, the survey tested six attributes that people might deem “very essential” to democracy: equality before the law, personal safety, freedom from corruption, guaranteed civil rights, reliable access to basic necessities, and free and fair elections. These items represent a mix of concepts, including elections, the most basic feature of representative democracy; civil rights and political equality, which are commonly defined as necessary features of a democracy; and three outcomes that might be byproducts of a democracy but are not generally considered inherent to such systems. Notably, across the MENA region, what is often considered the most essential feature of democracy is one that is generally not seen as inherent to this political system. Across the region, majorities ranging from roughly three-quarters to over 90% consider each attribute except elections to be “very essential” to democracy, whereas only about two-thirds extend that judgment to elections. In seven of the eight countries, elections trailed the five other attributes by at least 10 percentage points (see Figure 3). The only exception was Mauritania, where two-thirds of respondents considered elections “very essential.”

Source: Arab Barometer Wave VIII, 2023–2024.

Note: respondents answered the following survey question: “Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential pillars of democracy. Please let me know if you believe each is a very essential, somewhat essential, not very essential or not at all essential pillar of democracy.”

Country-specific patterns refine and reinforce this hierarchy. Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, and Mauritania place legal equality first. In Kuwait, the figure hovers in the mid-90s; in Jordan, it exceeds 80%, while in Morocco and Mauritania, it reaches 71%. In countries grappling with particular fiscal or security strain, citizens place higher priority on securing basic necessities, including in Tunisia (91%), Iraq (86%), Lebanon (85%), and Palestine (78%). Even in these countries, legal equality, tackling corruption, and personal safety cluster close behind, while elections remain sixth.

A more nuanced examination reinforces the importance of outcomes. First, freedom from corruption earns widespread support—between 80% and 85% of respondents in each country label anti-corruption action as indispensable. Follow-up questions confirm that direct exposure drives this urgency: roughly 40% of Tunisians, one-third of Jordanians, and half of the Lebanese respondents report having paid at least one bribe for a routine government service in the preceding year. Second, personal safety attracts near-identical endorsement. Fear of violent crime remains elevated in large urban centers, and localized violence in southern Iraq and parts of Lebanon continues to shape daily risk calculations.

Recent economic trends help explain the hierarchy of priorities. When growth collapses, jobs vanish, or prices spike, citizens tend to blame democracy for failing to deliver material well-being. For example, Morocco’s real GDP shrank by more than six percent in 2020—its worst post-independence slump; Jordan’s unemployment rate hit an unprecedented 25% in the first quarter of 2021; oil-rich Kuwait still ran a central-government deficit equal to just over 26% of GDP in the 2019/20 fiscal year; and Mauritania’s consumer inflation peaked at 11% year-on-year in December 2022, before policy tightening cooled prices.¹⁵

Similar trends affected much of the world as a result of the coronavirus pandemic. As other regions struggled with the economic fallout of public health closures, MENA citizens’ concerns about democracy’s economic performance appeared to rise. One in two Jordanians agreed that democracy is weak on the economy, while 39% held this view in Kuwait, 36% in Morocco, and 31% in Mauritania. Large percentages across these countries considered democratic governments indecisive. Taken together, these macro shocks sustain the public perception that bread, services, and dignity matter more than the procedural act of voting. This keeps outcome-based attributes of democracy at the top of the hierarchy, and free and fair elections at the bottom.

Democracy as Dignity

When protestors took to the streets during the Arab Spring, few directly called for dīmuqrāṭiyyah. Instead, common slogans focused on bread, dignity, and freedom. These demands centered more on clear outcomes than on the political system that would provide them. To better understand how the demands of the Arab Spring relate to the concept of democracy in the minds of ordinary citizens, Arab Barometer developed a survey experiment to probe how MENA publics understand democracy as compared with karāma (dignity). Karāma, a ubiquitous slogan at demonstrations across the region, was selected among the three main demands of the Arab Spring, given that it seems to encompass the other two—it is difficult to achieve dignity if one’s basic needs are not met or one’s basic freedoms are not respected.

To ascertain how democracy and dignity differ, the survey split each national sample. One-half of respondents across all countries judged six items—rule of law, corruption-free government, provision of basic needs, civil rights, personal safety, and free elections—as essentials of democracy. The other half ranked the same six items as markers of dignity. Because the wording and order of questions were identical, any significant gap would indicate that citizens perceive the two concepts differently.¹⁶

They do not. In seven of the eight countries, the attribute that tops the democracy list also tops the dignity list. The near-identical rankings for democracy and dignity suggest that MENA citizens do not distinguish between the two concepts in a meaningful way. For them, democracy is not just a political process, but a social contract that ensures fairness, safety, and opportunity. Where institutions are performing well, citizens prioritize the rule of law and equality as essential for both democracy and dignity, as seen in Kuwait and Mauritania (see Figure 4). However, in fiscally or politically strained cases—including Tunisia, Iraq, Palestine, and Lebanon—basic necessities take precedence. In Jordan, where public finances are tight but core institutions remain stable, equality before the law and provision of basic needs share first place. Morocco is the lone outlier: equality ranks above basic needs as a pillar of democracy, while the ordering reverses for dignity, with a single-digit gap.

Source: Arab Barometer Wave VIII, 2023–2024.

Note: respondents answered the following survey question: “Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential pillars of dignity. Please let me know if you believe each is a very essential, somewhat essential, not very essential or not at all essential pillar of dignity.”

At the other end of the hierarchy, elections consistently place at the bottom of both lists, with Mauritania the lone mid-tier exception (around 67%).¹⁷ Averaged across all six attributes, the democracy–dignity difference is typically three percentage points, and never more than five, placing it well inside the survey’s margin of error. Bigger spreads (seven to 11 points) appear only where basic needs are concerned, and always favor dignity, possibly underlining how urgently households prioritize material security.

These findings challenge two common assumptions. First, MENA citizens are not judging their political systems by procedural yardsticks imported from civics textbooks: they are judging by performance. Second, skepticism toward parliaments and parties does not automatically translate into enthusiasm for authoritarian rule, because the benchmark of dignity remains unchanged. Where governments fail to reduce crime, curb corruption, or stabilize prices, elections have limited value, while the aspirations attached to the word democracy remain. Conversely, arrangements that improve these outcomes gain legitimacy even if they fall short of conventional electoral standards.

The implication is that for MENA citizens, the legitimacy of democracy rests on its capacity to deliver dignity, encompassing equal justice, corruption-free administration, personal safety, and a secure economic foundation. Elections remain important, but primarily as a means of achieving those outcomes. Where governments fail on these benchmarks of dignity, procedural upgrades alone will not restore confidence; where they succeed, even imperfect electoral arrangements gain acceptance.

Toward a Dignity-Based Democratic Model 

The latest survey evidence from across the Middle East and North Africa reveals a region at a crossroads, where citizens themselves are redefining the meaning and viability of democracy. While the euphoria of the early 2010s has faded, the commitment to democratic ideals remains remarkably persistent, even amid widespread disappointment in political institutions and leaders for failing to deliver meaningful change. This resilience is not rooted in nostalgia or abstract theories of government, but in a hard-earned recognition that real legitimacy is built on a foundation of personal dignity.

For many in the region, the word “democracy” has become inseparable from the basic assurances that shape everyday life: that the law is applied equally, that personal safety is a right, not a privilege, that officials act with integrity, and that economic hardship is not the perpetual cost of citizenship. The public’s patience for reforms that prioritize procedures over substance is wearing thin. Instead, citizens judge their governments and the political systems that support them on the evidence of tangible progress: whether corruption has genuinely declined, whether justice is more accessible and less arbitrary, and whether basic goods and services are within the reach of all.

This transition carries direct consequences for those working to build or restore democratic legitimacy. The familiar cycle of constitutional amendments, electoral reforms, and party restructuring has lost much of its power to inspire. What now resonates for MENA publics is the visible and measurable improvement that affects people’s sense of fairness and hope for the future. Governments seeking to regain trust must confront this reality by placing dignity at the center of their agendas. That means going beyond headline reforms to address the root causes of disillusionment, be it through safeguarding judicial independence, rooting out everyday corruption in service delivery, or creating credible safety nets against economic shocks.

Civil society’s contribution is equally vital in this evolving landscape. The organizations most likely to win public trust are those that can translate complex reforms into relatable benchmarks, such as reducing waiting times for basic services, documenting reductions in street-level bribery, or increasing the responsiveness of local officials to citizens’ complaints. By shining a light on both setbacks and successes, and by mobilizing communities around shared standards of dignity, civil society can help sustain the pressure for meaningful reform and prevent reform fatigue from taking root.

While the risks of stagnation and renewed authoritarian appeal are ever-present, the data provide grounds for cautious optimism. The relative lack of widespread support for autocratic alternatives, even in the face of institutional breakdowns, signals an underlying hope that democracy can still be made to work—providing it is reoriented toward concrete results. This creates an opening for leaders willing to set aside old templates and genuinely engage with what people need most. The opportunity lies in delivering better governance in tangible ways, such as making procurement processes more transparent, investing in safety initiatives that immediately reduce risk, or launching digital tools that streamline bureaucratic processes and limit opportunities for petty corruption.

Moreover, the pathway to rebuilding trust does not need to rely on sweeping reforms that promise transformation overnight. Incremental improvements—such as enhancing the consistency of legal decisions, strengthening social safety nets, or ensuring that wages keep pace with inflation—can be effective in restoring confidence. Indeed, it is often the steady, predictable progress in these areas that signals to citizens that their voices matter and their well-being is a political priority.

Based on these findings, the legitimacy of political institutions in the MENA region will be shaped less by how often elections are held and more by whether the promises of dignity and fairness materialize at the local and household levels. The practical test for every leader, policy innovator, and advocate of reform is to show that change is possible, that dignity is attainable, and that democracy, far from being an empty label, can deliver on the aspirations that sparked calls for change over a decade ago. Every step that moves the needle toward fairness, safety, and inclusion will be a step toward restoring the legitimacy and durability of democratic governance in the minds of MENA citizens.

If these standards are embraced, there is every reason to believe that the publics across the region will become more committed to democracy, defend it against threats, and push for further progress. If they are ignored, the consequences will be not only disappointment, but a slow erosion of the social trust and collective hope that hold societies together. In this sense, the true renewal of democracy in the region will be measured not by the grandeur of new institutions but by the everyday experience of justice, security, and opportunity, delivered not just in words but in the concrete realities of ordinary life. Meeting that challenge is now the defining task for all who care about the region’s future.

Endnotes

¹ It should be noted that there is no single definition of democracy in academic or popular usage. In the academic literature, the minimalist definition proposed by Joseph Schumpeter places free and fair elections as an absolute requirement for democracy. Yet many other definitions focus on additional aspects, including guaranteeing basic civil rights and protections for minorities, among others. Existing evidence from MENA and beyond suggests that ordinary citizens have different conceptions of the term. The goal of our analysis is to explore these differing definitions. By necessity, we do not use one consistent concept of the term democracy throughout this piece. For the most part, we focus on giving voice to how MENA publics understand the term, with the key takeaway that this differs substantially from the standard definition of democracy found in academic textbooks. We do not assess whether any specific definition is “right” or “wrong,” but rather seek to highlight empirically these different understandings and assess the implications of this divergence.

² The exact question wording (in Arabic and English) for each item in this analysis is available from the Arab Barometer website: https://www.arabbarometer.org/surveys/arab-barometer-wave-viii/.

³ “Tunisia’s Alarming Regression under Kais Saied,” Le Monde, May 29, 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2024/05/29/tunisia-s-alarming-regression-under-kais-saied_6673011_23.html#; Tarek Amara and Angus McDowall, “Tunisian crisis escalates as president dissolves parliament,” Reuters, March 30, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/tunisian-parliament-defy-president-with-full-session-2022-03-30/.

⁴ Arab Barometer, “Arab Barometer Wave VIII: ‘Among the following, which is the main pillar of democracy? Democratic systems may have problems, yet they are better than other systems.’ (Tunisia),” Dataset (September 2023–July 2024), accessed May 21, 2025. https://www.arabbarometer.org/survey-data/data-downloads/

⁵ Arab Barometer. “Arab Barometer Wave VIII: ‘Among the following, which is the main pillar of democracy? Democratic systems may have problems, yet they are better than other systems.’ (Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine),” Dataset (September 2023–July 2024), Accessed June 27, 2025, https://www.arabbarometer.org/survey-data/data-downloads/

⁶ Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

⁷ The data employed in this analysis comes from the Arab Barometer: Arab Barometer Wave VIII. Dataset (September 2023–July 2024). Accessed May 2, 2025, and from Michael Robbins, Democracy in the Middle East & North Africa, Arab Barometer Thematic Report (Princeton: Arab Barometer, May 2025), https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/ABVIII_Democracy_EN.pdf.

⁸ Arab Barometer, “Arab Barometer Wave VIII. Dataset (September 2023–July 2024),” Accessed May 2, 2025.

⁹ Arab Barometer. “Arab Barometer Wave VIII. Dataset (September 2023–July 2024),” Accessed May 2, 2025.

¹⁰ Robbins, Democracy in the Middle East & North Africa.

¹¹ Fares Braizat, “The Meanings of Democracy: What Arabs Think,” Journal of Democracy 21(4): 131-138, 2010.

¹² Arab Center Washington DC, Arab Opinion Index 2022: Executive Summary (Washington D.C.: Arab Center Washington DC, August 1, 2025), https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/arab-opinion-index-2022-executive-summary/.

¹³ Hannah M. Ridge, “Democratic commitment in the Middle East: a conjoint analysis,” Political Science Research and Methods 12(2): 285-300, 2024, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/political-science-research-and-methods/article/democratic-commitment-in-the-middle-east-a-conjoint-analysis/9129EC94CA61EC5232B8441060200167.

¹⁴ Jessica Obeid, “MENA’s Electricity Demand Crunch and the Path to Sustainability,” Arab News, March 9, 2025, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2593006; Manuel Pirino and Kinda Hattar, “CPI 2024 for the Middle East and North Africa: Corruption Linked to Authoritarianism, Calls for Reform Emerging,” Transparency International, February 11, 2025, https://www.transparency.org/en/news/cpi-2024-middle-east-north-africa-corruption-linked-authoritarianism-calls-reform-emerging; Roberta V. Gatti, Daniel Lederman, Nelly Elmallakh, and Jesica Torres, “Balancing Act: Jobs and Wages in the Middle East and North Africa When Crises Hit,” Economic Research Forum, November 28, 2023, https://theforum.erf.org.eg/2023/11/20/balancing-act-jobs-and-wages-in-mena-when-crises-hit/.

¹⁵ World Bank Group Data, “GDP Growth (Annual %) – Morocco,” accessed May 12, 2025, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=MA; “Jordan Unemployment Rates Jump to 25 % in First Quarter of 2021,” Middle East Monitor, June 22 2021, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20210622-jordan-unemployment-rates-jump-to-25-in-first-quarter-of-2021/; World Bank Group, Macro Poverty Outlook: Country-by-country Analysis and Projections for the Developing World (Washington DC: World Bank, April 2021), 161, https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/77351105a334213c64122e44c2efe523-0500072021/related/mpo-sm21-mena.pdf; World Bank Group, Macro Poverty Outlook: Country-by-country Analysis and Projections for the Developing World (Washington DC: World Bank, April 2024), 1, 260, https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/77351105a334213c64122e44c2efe523-0500072021/related/mpo-sm24.pdf.

¹⁶ Robbins, Democracy in the Middle East & North Africa.

¹⁷ Robbins, Democracy in the Middle East & North Africa.