The Gulf’s Conundrum: Connecting Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab

In early September, the question of whether Tehran would link pressure in the Strait of Hormuz to pressure in the Bab al-Mandab Strait ceased to be hypothetical. The Houthis in Yemen seized the city of Mocha and its strategic port on September 10. As government forces withdrew, they extended their control to the Dhubab district, which directly overlooks Bab al-Mandab, at the mouth of the Red Sea, and to Mayyun (Perim) Island, located within the strait. They also seized control of the islands of Zuqar and Hanish. With this, Yemen’s entire Red Sea coast slipped beyond the control of its internationally recognized government for the first time since 2015, even if reports from the ground suggested, at the time of writing, that Houthi control of Dhubab remained incomplete and clashes were still underway.

Reports indicate that the offensive was directed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in an attempt to open a new front in the confrontation with the United States. Tehran had reportedly urged the Houthis to escalate their attacks on Saudi Arabia, promising them increased funding and weaponry along with the deployment of senior IRGC officers. This situation assessment argues that these events mark a qualitative shift by the Houthis, from controlling Yemeni territory to influencing one of the world’s most vital arteries for energy and trade.

An Illusory Separation

For years, the U.S. and other Western powers have treated the Red Sea crisis as a Yemeni issue concerning freedom of navigation, while addressing threats in the Strait of Hormuz as part of their own direct confrontation with Iran. This separation is bureaucratically convenient, yet strategically flawed. For Iran, the two gateways cannot be treated in isolation. In July, Tehran asked the Houthis to prepare to close the southern gateway to the Red Sea should the U.S. target the Iranian electricity grid; on the 20^th of that same month, the Houthis announced a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia. In other words, the link between the two straits was explicitly declared even before it translated into an offensive on the ground.

This connection is most alarmingly reflected in a dramatic reversal of numbers. Flows of oil and petroleum liquids through Hormuz plummeted to 4.9 million barrels per day (bpd) in the second quarter of 2026, down from 21.6 million bpd in the fourth quarter of 2025 (prior to the start of the conflict), a decline of nearly 77%. The first quarter, covering the initial phase of the shock, had seen flows of approximately 14.9 million bpd. Conversely, flows through Bab al-Mandab rose from 5.4 million bpd in the fourth quarter of 2025 to 8.1 million in the second quarter of 2026, representing nearly eight percent of total global oil supplies.

This increase illustrates a move that lies at the heart of the issue: Saudi Arabia rerouted a significant portion of its crude away from Hormuz, instead pumping it via its East-West Pipeline to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. This saw loading volumes at Yanbu surge from around 240,000 bpd in August 2025 to approximately 3.5 million bpd this June. Thus, the Houthis have now established their presence on the corridor that Riyadh had adopted as an alternative outlet to bypass the troubled eastern chokepoint. This presents a critical paradox: the more difficult the situation at Hormuz becomes, the more important the Bab al-Mandab Strait becomes, and so do the Houthis in Iran’s strategic calculus.

Source: The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)’s Short-Term Energy Outlook (August 2026), based on tanker tracking data; Yanbu loading data via Vortexa.

The image of a thriving alternative corridor did not last long. In August, after the Houthis announced their blockade on Saudi Arabia, loadings at Yanbu fell to roughly half their July levels, and Riyadh resorted to rerouting more shipments via the Suez Canal, a longer and costlier route for Asian customers, while the average volume of disrupted production in the region rose to 6.7 million barrels per day in August, up from five million in July.

This was reflected in traffic via the Suez Canal, which saw a partial recovery: 1,340 ships passed through in July 2026, generating $505 million in revenue, a 42% year-on-year increase and the highest monthly figure since December 2023. However, comparing these figures to the period prior to the Red Sea crisis reveals the limitations of this recovery. Approximately 2,300 ships transited the canal in April 2023, a year in which the canal achieved record annual revenue, topping $10 billion. Yet traffic this year has fallen by about 60% compared to 2023.

The Houthis as a Maritime Geopolitical Actor

While controlling Sanaa has granted the Houthis domestic authority, and controlling the vital port of Hodeidah provided a maritime outlet, control over Mocha, Dhubab, and Mayyun elevates them to an entirely different status: that of a non-state armed actor with geographic clout over an international corridor linking the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, and the Mediterranean. Mayyun derives its exceptional strategic value from the fact that it divides the strait into two shipping channels, enabling whoever controls it to monitor both passages simultaneously.

This does not imply that the group can completely close the strait or control every vessel passing through it. However, it does better equip it for maritime surveillance, selective targeting, mine-laying, and the use of missiles and drones, thereby enabling it to impose security, insurance, and economic costs. This impact was evident even before its recent advance. When the Houthis imposed a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia in July, shipping traffic through Bab al-Mandab dropped by approximately 24%. Furthermore, the area of the Red Sea designated as a war-risk zone was extended roughly 800 kilometers northward to include Jeddah and Yanbu, thereby necessitating further insurance hikes. By late July, the cost of insurance for transiting Bab al-Mandab had reached about 0.5% of a vessel’s hull value, compared to roughly 0.1% for sailing along the western Saudi coast toward the Suez Canal. In response, Riyadh has stopped relying solely on the market, instead approving the establishment of a national facility to underwrite war risks for cargo and vessels, managed by the Saudi Reinsurance Company. This move implicitly acknowledges that insurance costs have become a matter of sovereign concern, rather than a purely commercial variable.

The most alarming indicator is the compounded commercial impact: rerouting a shipment of Saudi crude to Asia around Africa, rather than through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, adds approximately 10,000 nautical miles and 34 days of sailing time. This raises the fuel bill for a single voyage from roughly $1.26 million to $2.87 million, in addition to about $1 million in extra transit fees. These, of course, are the figures for a single trip; the cumulative impact manifests as a reduction in the number of voyages a fleet can complete annually, representing a contraction in actual transport capacity, not merely an increase in direct costs.

From Territorial Control into Negotiating Leverage

It is likely that the Houthis are not immediately seeking to push for more territory but rather to consolidate the new status quo. Mocha, Dhubab, Mayyun, Hanish, and Zuqar are not merely pins on a military map; they are negotiating chips. If the group succeeds in cementing its hold on them, it will enter any future negotiations regarding Yemen, the Red Sea, or Saudi Arabia from an entirely different position. Discussions would no longer be confined to Sanaa Airport, Hodeidah Port, salary payments, or economic restrictions; they would extend to the security of one of the world’s most vital maritime corridors.

The calculus is clear: military control generates geopolitical influence, that influence transforms into bargaining power, and that bargaining power can be leveraged to secure political and economic gains. This is the very same equation Iran has tried and tested in the Strait of Hormuz. Notably, the Houthis have denied reports of plans to impose fees on passing ships, instead describing “safe passage permits” as voluntary and free of charge. It remains unclear what “voluntary” would mean in practice, including whether vessels without a permit would face restrictions or heightened risk. The distinction is legally significant. Under the international humanitarian law applicable to armed conflict at sea, a blockade is subject to specific requirements: it must be declared and notified, effectively enforced, and applied impartially. It is also subject to humanitarian restrictions. Vessels believed to be breaching a blockade may be captured, while those that resist capture after prior warning may, under certain circumstances, be attacked. By stopping short of formally declaring a blockade, the Houthis may therefore be seeking to retain leverage over maritime traffic while avoiding the legal obligations and consequences associated with one.

In this sense, Tehran does not need to fly its flag over Mayyun or deploy its navy off the coast of Djibouti. It suffices to have an ally armed with missiles, drones, and naval capabilities, able to threaten shipping lanes when necessary. This reflects a formula at the heart of Iranian strategy for decades: maximizing influence while minimizing direct costs. What has changed today, however, is the magnitude of the prize. Rather than individual missiles fired at cities or drones targeting specific facilities, the specter today is that of a maritime pincer movement stretching from the Strait of Hormuz to the Bab al-Mandab Strait, placing a large part of the Gulf’s energy trade under pressure simultaneously at its eastern and western gateways.

Domestic Weakness as an Explanatory Factor

Attributing responsibility solely to Iran and the Houthis fails to explain the rapid collapse on the ground. According to Yemeni military sources, the group’s campaign along the Tihamah coastal plain began with a barrage of missiles, directed by IRGC personnel. The prevailing belief, based on intercepted communications and prisoner testimonies, is that the operation was overseen by a senior commander from the Quds Force. Yet the other side of the story is that the opposing front held firm for over a week before its defensive lines suddenly crumbled. Yemen’s internationally recognized government, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), the forces of Tariq Saleh, the Islah Party, and various tribal and local factions do not operate within a unified political and military framework but often act based on conflicting priorities and agendas. This fragmentation gives the Houthis an advantage that Iranian military support alone cannot provide. The group’s advance reflects both its growing military capabilities and the weaknesses of a divided opposing front. Rather than either factor being sufficient on its own, the interaction between the two helps explain the speed and extent of the Houthi advance.

Compounding the dilemma is the apparent limit on the scope of the U.S. response. The head of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) traveled to Saudi Arabia for urgent coordination meetings as Riyadh-backed forces were unraveling; while around 200 U.S. military personnel were in the Kingdom performing non-combat intelligence and coordination roles. However, U.S. President Donald Trump rejected two Saudi requests for direct U.S. strikes, instead offering intelligence support and targeting data, while keeping the U.S. military focused on Iran and the Strait of Hormuz. Regionally, Riyadh’s options remained in limbo: Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif warned that Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia could trigger the Makkah Joint Defense Pact, though Islamabad later clarified that no military response had yet been discussed.

The humanitarian impact is, meanwhile, escalating in parallel with the strategic consequences. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) said that the escalation had displaced more than 100,000 people. Thousands of Yemenis also arrived in Djibouti over a 24-hour period, including women and children rescued at sea. On the opposite shore, the Houthis now hold positions just 32 kilometers from the U.S. Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, effectively transforming the Horn of Africa from a neighboring region into a direct extension of the crisis.

Who Controls Bab Al Mandab Other Shore

The Bab al-Mandab crisis cannot be assessed solely from its eastern shore. The strait has two shores, and developments on one reshape the strategic landscape for the other. The concentration of numerous foreign military bases in Djibouti increases the likelihood that multiple external powers could become involved in the event of an escalation. This implies that any confrontation around the strait could extend beyond a bilateral dynamic, as deterrence calculations intersect with the interests of nations that are not direct parties to the war in Yemen. Eritrea, meanwhile, faces renewed strategic considerations linked to the nearby islands and the port of Assab. At the same time, ports in the Horn of Africa, particularly Berbera, may gain importance as alternative logistics hubs as risks increase along the eastern shore. This shift could redistribute logistical advantages in the Red Sea in favor of the western shore, adding an economic competitive dimension to the crisis alongside its security dimension. Accordingly, any sustainable security framework for Bab al-Mandab needs to adopt an approach that takes both shores of the strait into account.

Likely Scenarios

Maritime consolidation coupled with territorial expansion (most likely)

Under this scenario, the Houthis would succeed in cementing their control over Mocha, Dhubab, Mayyun, and the strait’s other islands while maintaining a “voluntary safe passage” arrangement and shifting their ground forces to other fronts.

This is the scenario suggested by the current state of play, as battles have continued in Taiz, Lahj, and Marib even since the Houthis secured the coastline. The underlying premise here is that consolidating maritime gains does not imply the freezing of battlefronts on land; rather, it involves leveraging the former to improve conditions on the latter.

Limited escalation

In this scenario, the Houthis would use their newly captured territory to exert incremental economic pressure, such as targeting specific vessels, raising insurance premiums, and threatening a partial closure, akin to an earlier naval blockade on Saudi Arabia, which on July 22, forced four tankers to divert their routes. The response would likely involve limited airstrikes or naval operations to retake certain islands, without fundamentally altering the strategic equation.

All-out regional confrontation (least probable, highest cost)

This scenario would see an anti-Houthi attempt to retake the Strait through a large-scale military operation, prompting Iran and its allies to respond more aggressively, targeting commercial vessels and oil facilities, potentially extending to the Strait of Hormuz. Markets are clearly sensitive to such an outcome; oil benchmark Brent crude surpassed $100 per barrel for the first time in nearly four months following the fall of Mocha, hitting around $107.90 on September 11, up from a close of $101.21 just two days prior. Simultaneous pressure on both straits would trigger a supply shock beyond what the world’s spare capacity could absorb.

A comprehensive political settlement

The gravity of the situation could lead to a settlement involving the disarmament of the Houthis, the rebuilding of the Yemeni state, and an international mechanism to guarantee security for the Bab al-Mandab Strait. While this represents the optimal outcome, it would be the most difficult to achieve in the short term, as it would require rare regional and international consensus alongside massive funding for reconstruction.

Recommendations

Address the root cause rather than the symptom

The strategy for the coming phase cannot involve only protecting ships on the high seas. Securing navigation while leaving Yemen’s coast and islands under the control of an Iran-linked force amounts to treating the symptom while leaving the cause in place. What is needed is an integrated strategy that begins with rebuilding a more cohesive Yemeni front, supporting state institutions and the internationally recognized army, restoring a unified military command, and preventing the transformation of Mayyun, Hanish, and Zuqar into permanent bases for missiles, drones, and naval capabilities.

Sever Iranian supply networks

It is not sufficient to intercept weaponry after it is deployed; efforts must instead target supply chains for the components and technology behind them while enhancing maritime surveillance and intelligence gathering. The deployment of senior IRGC officers to Yemen indicates that the most critical element of these supplies is not hardware but human expertise.

Link any military progress to a political track

An airstrike alone is insufficient without a political project. Conversely, such a project will fall short if the Houthis retain the weaponry that allows them to alter the equation at will. Furthermore, American support limited to intelligence and targeting cannot compensate for the absence of a unified Yemeni command structure capable of translating information into the recovery of territory.

Secure logistical alternatives

As long as the Yanbu pipeline serves as the safety valve against a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, protecting its exit from the Red Sea becomes a matter of global energy security, rather than a purely domestic Yemeni affair. This entails supporting stable insurance mechanisms, as insurance costs have become the group’s most effective instrument of leverage.

Conclusion

What is unfolding at the Bab al-Mandab Strait is not merely a Yemeni chapter in a regional war. Rather, it signals the emergence of a new maritime order whereby international waterways are governed neither by sovereignty nor by law, but by consent. When passage becomes “voluntary and free” at the whim of an armed group, freedom of navigation shifts from an established right to a temporary, revocable privilege. Global trade thus begins to quietly pay rent—manifested in insurance premiums, waiting times, and the costs of rerouting by thousands of miles. This is the region’s present reality: corridors leased from actors who do not own them. The future, however, holds implications that are far graver than predictions of war or a settlement. The Houthi advance could establish a precedent whereby control over a relatively limited stretch of strategically located coastline provides disproportionate leverage over regional trade and energy flows. In this context, control of islands such as Mayyun carries strategic significance far beyond their size.

Thus, the key to the response lies neither in the number of destroyers deployed nor strikes executed, but rather in the ability to re-establish sovereignty over the coast itself; that is, in building a Yemeni state capable of guarding its own shores. Any alternative amounts to little more than paying rent, under one guise or another. The lesson for the coming years is both simple and harsh: whoever leaves the door open to those who do not own it will find themselves negotiating not over freedom of passage, but over its price.