On 28 February, Israel and the United States launched a massive airstrike campaign against Iran. Within hours, Iran retaliated with strikes against Israel and U.S. assets and allies across the Gulf, Jordan, and Iraq. Iran also announced a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20% of the world’s seaborne oil trade passes. On 2 March, Hezbollah joined the fight, launching missiles into Israel. Israel responded with airstrikes on Hezbollah strongholds in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and the Dahiyeh suburb of Beirut. Within the first two days of fighting, the Israeli military called on people to evacuate 80 villages and towns in southern Lebanon, displacing around 30,000 residents.
A month into the conflict, the number of displaced persons across Lebanon has reached 1 million people. Displacement orders are estimated to cover approximately 14 percent of Lebanon’s territory covering southern Lebanon, Beirut’s southern suburbs, and the Bekaa. The displaced population has placed enormous strain on Lebanon’s battered economy. On 28 March, Yemen’s Houthi rebels entered the conflict, attacking Israel with a barrage of ballistic missiles. The potential for the conflict to escalate and encompass war-torn Yemen raises serious, potentially catastrophic, humanitarian concerns.
As the war enters its second month, it is clear that neither party has an exit strategy. The U.S. and Israel had initially signaled hope that the strikes might precipitate regime change, but this remains highly unlikely. For its part, Iran, which has suffered several political and military setbacks over the past two years, may feel that it has little choice but to continue to disrupt and destabilize the region in an attempt to force a settlement. The specter of a prolonged conflict raises concerns about displacement, migration flows, and humanitarian responses for which countries in the region need to prepare.
This assessment examines the humanitarian consequences of the U.S.-Israel-Iran war, with a focus on displacement and humanitarian responses. The analysis is set within the broader context of financial pressures on the global aid architecture and reduced state capacities. It concludes with reflections on possible courses of action.
The U.S.-Israel-Iran war risks worsening an already severe regional displacement crisis. Over the past two decades, the Middle East has experienced considerable conflict and disruption, resulting in massive displacement of populations both internally and across borders. The Middle East has one of the highest share of refugees in the world. The largest source of displacement has been the 2011–2025 civil war in Syria, which resulted in the internal displacement of over 7.4 million people and the external displacement of 6.1 million refugees. These include 755,000 asylum-seekers in Lebanon and 611,000 in Jordan. The total number of externally displaced (including both asylum and non-asylum seekers) is likely to be much higher, at close to 1 million in each country.
The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and subsequent sectarian conflict resulted in the internal displacement of 2.2 million Iraqis and the migration of 2.5 million refugees to Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf. Repeated wars between Israel and Palestine have resulted in massive internal and external displacement. The most recent war on Gaza has led to the internal displacement of around 2 million people – close to 90% of the Gaza Strip’s population. Altogether, there are an estimated 6.5 million Palestinians living across Arab countries, mainly in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the Gulf.
Conflict is not the only source of internal and external displacement. The Middle East is the most water-stressed region in the world. Environmental degradation and climate change have pushed many people to abandon rural communities for urban centers or to migrate to other countries in search of better economic opportunities. Indeed, political instability and limited economic opportunities in resource-poor countries of the region have pushed many people to migrate to the Gulf in search of jobs and security. Lack of political inclusion and endemic corruption also contribute to outward migration.
These massive population displacements have placed tremendous burdens on host communities, particularly in urban centers and resource-poor countries such as Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Palestine. They have also aggravated tensions with local populations and exacerbated political and sectarian fault lines. As a result, these countries may be less likely to accept new refugees as the current conflict unfolds. The escalation between Israel and Hezbollah illustrates this point. On 3 March, thousands of Lebanese civilians fleeing the Israeli strikes arrived at the Syrian border, but many are being turned away. Having just emerged from a 15-year civil war that devastated the country and its economy, Syria has little capacity to host them.
The ability of other countries in the region to receive refugees is also severely limited. Jordan and Lebanon already have among the highest concentrations of refugees in the world, amounting to approximately 7% and 9% of their populations, respectively, as recently as 2022. This does not include Palestinians who arrived in 1948 and 1967. These countries are already struggling to provide basic social services to their populations and have limited capacity to host more people. While neighboring Iraq is an oil-rich country, it has a large population and has yet to recover from the political and social turmoil following the U.S. invasion in 2003.
One source of relative stability in the region during these difficult times has been the resource-rich countries of the Gulf. Supported by revenues from oil and natural gas, they have been willing and able to host migrants to support their economic development. In 2022, foreign nationals ranged from around 40% of the population in Oman to 88% in Qatar. The Gulf states have played a critical role in providing employment and economic opportunities to migrants from across the region, as well as serving as the key source of remittances, investments, and development assistance.
The war with Iran places much of this at risk. If the conflict persists beyond a few weeks, it could jeopardize business activity, jobs, investments, remittances, and development aid not just in the Gulf but also worldwide. Cutting the global supply of oil and natural gas by 20% has pushed oil prices above to $100 per barrel, which might be enough to precipitate a global economic downturn. A prolonged crisis might also affect the ability of Gulf countries to attract and retain talented expatriate workers. That said, migrants from the Middle East are more likely to remain. Many have experienced conflict in their home countries, and for many, opportunities there remain limited.
The renewed conflict between Israel and Iran places additional humanitarian pressures on the countries of the region. Gulf countries, Iraq, and Jordan will need to support affected individuals and communities by providing food, shelter, and other basic necessities. They also need to offer support to businesses affected by the slowdown in economic activity. Due to its direct involvement in the fighting and the ongoing economic crisis in the country, Lebanon is expected to be the most affected and will require food, shelter, health assistance, and support for social services.
Over the past decade, countries in the Middle East have counted on generous financial support from the international community to mitigate the impact of conflict and other crises. Overall, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Middle East has consistently received between 22% and 43% of total global humanitarian assistance (see figure 1 below). Over the past decade, Yemen has received the most funding (close to $30 billion in total), followed closely by Syria ($27 billion). Palestine has received $14 billion in funding, with over half of this amount received in 2024 and 2025. Lebanon has received close to $12 billion in funding.
Source: OCHA Financial Tracking Service, accessed March 4, 2026, https://fts.unocha.org/.
However, the humanitarian needs of the region remain massive. An estimated 3.6 million people are in need in Palestine, requiring approximately $4.1 billion in humanitarian assistance in 2026. In Syria, 16.5 million people are in need, requiring $3.2 billion in humanitarian aid. In Yemen, 23.1 million people are in need, requiring $2.5 billion in humanitarian assistance. These figures are in addition to the funds needed for post-conflict reconstruction, which have been estimated at $216 billion in the case of Syria.
This increase in needs comes at a time when global allocations to humanitarian aid have been falling, including both bilateral funding and support for international organizations. Global funding has fallen from $43 billion in 2022 to $27 billion in 2025. At the same time, global humanitarian needs are increasing, driven by conflict, climate change, and the erosion of international norms. This reality has already had a profound impact on UN agencies, such as OCHA, which are cutting back on staff and projects. This means that countries in the Middle East cannot count on receiving aid to the same extent as in recent years.
Countries in the Middle East continue to face humanitarian crises resulting from conflict, political instability, weak governance, and economic underperformance. However, they are facing a new global reality, one that is likely to see an increase in humanitarian needs at a time when the international community is reducing support. Furthermore, the current conflict and unprecedented attacks on their cities may adversely affect the position of the Gulf countries, potentially pushing them to recalibrate their role.
The war between Israel, the United States, and Iran underscores the fragility of the Middle East’s humanitarian landscape. While the conflict’s trajectory remains uncertain, the region’s governments cannot afford to wait for the crisis to unfold before preparing for its consequences. While it is difficult to envision a new path while hostilities continue, the broad parameters are clear: