Key Takeaways

East Asian players are the main producers of electric vehicles (EVs) and batteries: Western car manufacturers are catching up through industrial policies, and this is creating tensions with their East Asian competitors. However, unlike the US, European automakers will not end JVs with China easily and risk being denied market access to China. 

Due to US and EU Tariffs, Chinese vehicles are flooding GCC markets: The Gulf market is a vital outlet for Chinese automakers in the ongoing consolidation process, and Gulf states should establish regulatory standards of their own to avoid becoming a dumping ground for Chinese car exports. 

The Gulf can benefit from setting up a regulatory fence for battery identification: To ensure high safety standards for EV drivers in the Gulf, incentives can be placed to encourage the adoption of solid-state batteries as an alternative to lithium-ion batteries, as the latter hs been linked to EV battery fires. 

It is imperative to weigh the costs and benefits before joining the rush for EVs and mobility AI: When considering the adoption or development of EVs and mobility AI, the Gulf should weigh the costs and benefits, as well as their future role in grid connected cars and flying taxis—or eVTOLs, which would also entail autonomous driving. GCC policymakers must bear in mind that EV factories, like chip foundries, will not necessarily create jobs given the level of automation that has already been achieved. 

 

Introduction: EVs in the Heart of the Green Transition and Industrial Policy

As the Gulf states set their national strategies for digital and green transitions, electric vehicles are flooding into the traditionally fossil fuel-driven auto markets of the Gulf — especially in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. Sales are projected to reach 30.05K units in the GCC in 2025, which will potentially reach 36.62K units by 2029. ¹ Notably, in recent years, Chinese automobiles have been penetrating the major markets in the Gulf, not solely limited to the markets for EVs, but also diesel ICE (internal combustion engines) markets.² Multiple ‘Showroom + Discovery Centers’ for China’s BYD have opened and are expanding rapidly throughout the region—in Saudi Arabia, in Riyadh, Jeddah, and Dharan; in the UAE, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Ras al Khaimah, Sharjah; in Doha, Qatar; in Sitra, Bahrain; in Muscat, Oman; and in Al Rai, Kuwait, while China’s Xpeng and SAIC Motors showcase their products in shopping malls through exhibitions in major Gulf cities.³

Behind the scenes, what is motivating such market penetration by Chinese motor companies is the impact of industrial policy in various forms within China, compounded by industrial policies in the US and Europe, the other two prime markets for cars globally. China has, since the early 2000s, implemented several forms of subsidies and tax benefits for the EV industry and customer adaptation.⁴ In recent years, the U.S, came to a realization that it has fallen behind in the production of large capacity batteries and responded by attempting to onshore manufacturing related to the green transition (GX) through the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022.⁵ Underlying such concerns are national security implications and anticipations of fiercer competition with China in mobility AI. In the coming decade, China and the US will continue racing towards ‘EVs as connected cars,’ eVTOLs (electric vertical take-off and landing), and flying taxis. These technologies will only be achievable when physical AI is implemented on the grid in full self-driving (FSD) mode.

This issue brief examines the relationship between a) industrial policies (focusing on EVs) that entail subsidies and tax exemptions for growth in China, b) overcapacity issues concerning EVs, and c) the subsequent subsidies and tariffs on Chinese EVs by the US and Europe. Analyzing the intersection of these issues sheds light on the factors that have led Chinese automakers to proactively pursue market access in the Gulf.

The Gulf states, who are on the consumer end of the automotive supply chain, have not had the opportunity to either thoroughly examine their capacities or even ascertain valid reasons to embrace EVs in their fossil-fuel-dominant economies before responding with their own industrial policy. Such responsive industrial policy is often understood in the context of economic diversification in the Gulf, particularly with Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund (SWF), the Public Investment Fund (PIF), seeking several ways to bring in EV manufacturing into Saudi Arabia.⁶

The analysis finds that the three major car markets of China, the US, and the EU have yet to carve a clear path toward achieving efficiency in transportation through EV adoption, nor have they created appropriate global market conditions with competing industrial policies. Furthermore, the analysis warns that, contrary to the hopes of some Gulf economies, EV manufacturing will not necessarily create jobs due to increasing levels of automation. However, given that the Gulf states are looking to compete and achieve mobility AI, it is likely that EVs will eventually be adopted on a large scale in the region (although this may take time). Therefore, rather than pursuing EVs without caution and careful planning, the Gulf states must seriously consider addressing EV battery safety issues and advanced driver-assistance systems (ADAS).

 

The Battle for Market Access and EV Tariffs from the US and Europe

China’s ascendance into the EV and battery industry can be explained by the components of its industrial policy: subsidies and joint ventures — both for EV and battery production and for rebates on new EV purchases by consumers. China’s subsidies on EVs and batteries have played a crucial role. China invested approximately $231 billion since 2009 to foster the EV industry,⁷  and has grown to dominate battery production. In fact, most Chinese EV manufacturers began as battery producers, and Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Limited (CATL)⁸ currently leads the global market for lithium-ion-phosphate (LFP) batteries, with a 36.8% global market share in 2024.⁹ BYD (Biyadi, or ‘Build Your Dreams’) — the Chinese EV manufacturer that has now overtaken Tesla in terms of global EV production and sales — was originally a battery company that partnered with German automakers for design to transform itself into an EV company.¹⁰ As of 2024 (Figure 1), the global market shares for EV batteries are dominated by Chinese players (CATL, BYD, CALB, Gotion, Eve Energy, Sunwoda, etc.), followed by peers from South Korea (LG Energy Solution, SK On,  Samsung SDI, etc.), and Japan (Panasonic).

 

Figure 1: Market share of the world’s top EV battery makers, Jan-Nov 2024

Source: Lei Kang, “Global EV Battery Market Share.”¹¹

 

But subsidies alone could not have catapulted Chinese battery companies into full-fledged EV companies had it not been for joint ventures (JVs) with foreign automakers and the requirements embedded in them. Since 1994, the Chinese government had been encouraging foreign companies to form JVs with Chinese counterparts and build car factories to stimulate the domestic auto industry for competitiveness, but it restricted the percentage of foreign ownership to 50%. In 2018, the Chinese government gradually opened China’s auto market to foreign producers and then opened the commercial vehicle market in 2020. In December 2021, China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) lifted restrictions on foreign shares in the passenger car industry (which is about 80% of the total auto market in China), with the measures going into effect January 1, 2022.¹²

In addition to the enticement of joint ventures with foreign companies that sought access to the Chinese market, forced technological transfers via the joint venture (JV) requirement for foreign companies — particularly in the auto sector — were critical to China’s leap into future industries. China’s Cooperative Joint Ventures Requirement lapsed in 2022, and the Chinese EV and battery industry has since undergone a series of market consolidations. This trend is projected to continue in the coming years, which will likely lead to the demise or merging of several players. Furthermore, although the JV requirement was removed in 2022, the continued flow of labor and supplier overlaps make the JV requirement removal not so impactful in curbing knowledge spillover moving forward.¹³

 

Figure 2: Global Battery Production, EV Production and EV Registration, 2023

Source: IEA Analysis based on data from Benchmark Material Intelligence and EV Volumes.¹⁴

 

While the Gulf states considered DX/GX as part of their plans for economic diversification, elsewhere the debate on China’s EV overcapacity exacerbated throughout the years of 2023-2024 and continues into 2025. European ports faced a deluge of Chinese EVs, prompting the EU to investigate how the Chinese EV sector is unfairly boosted by huge amounts of state aid. After a series of talks with China, the EU proceeded with imposing pre-emptive tariffs against Chinese EVs.¹⁵ The Biden administration also imposed tariffs of 100% in anticipation of Chinese EVs entering the US market via Mexico.¹⁶ China’s MOC responded in protest, saying that the measures “severely affect the atmosphere for bilateral cooperation,” and China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted in response that Beijing “opposes unilateral tariff hikes in violation of WTO rules.”¹⁷ A day prior to the 50^th G7 Summit held in Italy on June 13, 2024, the EU  announced that its tariff on Chinese EVs will range from 17 to 38.1%.¹⁸ China has in turn initiated a WTO complaint against the EU’s definitive duties on Chinese EVs on November 6, 2024.¹⁹ This action was following China’s earlier request for consultation with the EU at the WTO on countervailing duties against Chinese EVs (DS626) on August 9, 2024.²⁰ The WTO, however, lacks an appellate body since the U.S. has ceased to appoint judges, and thus the dispute settlement function has not been fully operational since December 11, 2019.²¹

Upon his inauguration, US President Donald Trump issued a levy of 25% punitive tariffs on all imports from Canada and Mexico (which was then delayed for a month), then subsequently announced a 10% punitive tariff against imports from China and potentially the EU.²² China responded with counter tariffs on US goods.²³ Trump went on to impose 25% global tariffs on steel, to which the EU responded with countermeasures.²⁴

It is unclear whether the subsidies for EV production and purchases in the US under the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)²⁵ signed under Biden ²⁶ will remain under Trump in the long term. Yet, if significant subsidies are removed for South Korean EV and battery companies, this would force business planning shifts that may negatively impact the EV industry plans of Saudi Arabia, as Hyundai Motor Group is a major player in the Saudi-proposed EV brand CEER. The IRA subsidies have been controversial amongst European automakers and South Korean EV and battery producers,²⁷ who argue that they are discriminatory because they limit subsidy provisions only to purchases of EVs that underwent final assembly in North America (under the clean vehicle tax credit scheme).²⁸

As the global market competition for EVs and batteries intensifies, the battle for market access is on across continents and jurisdictions. The Gulf region is seen as a potential market as the US shuns Chinese EVs amid national security concerns, while the EU grapples with the dilemma of maintaining collaboration with Chinese companies while seeking restrictions on Chinese EVs. Given that China faces market barriers in the biggest car markets — the US and the EU — the only option is to expand into non-US, non-EU markets. In this context, the Gulf states present an attractive destination due to their purchasing power. However, as a fossil fuel producing region with a shortage of charging stations, there is relatively small demand and consumer incentive to opt for imported EVs in the Gulf.

 

EVs in the Gulf States: Aspiring for EV Production and Mobility AI amid Low Market Demand

The GCC economies have placed an emphasis on digital and green transitions as they seek a partial transition from fossil fuels. Transformations in other parts of the world, including in China, have led them to consider the adoption of EVs in line with their net-zero agenda. However, the pursuit of EVs within Gulf states and their ambitions for EV production and physical AI are constrained by considerably low market demand (as shown in Figure 3).

Figure 3: GCC EV Sales Figures, 2022 and 2023

Adapted from:  Statista Market Insights, “Electric Vehicles – United Arab Emirates”; Salma Saleh, “Volume of electric vehicle sales in the United Arab Emirates from 2017 to 2029 (in 1,000s)”; “UAE Electric Vehicle Market Size, Share and EV Demand”; “eMobility Outlook 2024,” PwC; Santiago Castillo, Arvind CJ and Smriti Priya, “EV Charging Index: Expert insight from the GCC region.”²⁹

The UAE is the fastest growing market for EVs in the GCC region, followed by Saudi Arabia (Figure 3). The UAE’s imports of EVs are driven by its pursuit of mobility AI, as it aims to obtain EVs and eVTOLs/UAMs (Urban Air Mobility) for air taxis, which are slated to begin commercial operations in 2025 in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Ultimately, the UAE aims to connect EV’s to the digital grid, enabling the realization of physical AI both on the ground and in the skies. American air taxi operators such as Archer, Joby Aviation (which acquired Uber’s short-lived eVTOL venture, Uber Elevate) and China’s Xpeng have already conducted pilot flights in the UAE, while South Korea’s Hanhwa Aerospace is seeking market entry.³⁰ In other GCC states, EV market penetration by Chinese EVs is significantly slower. For instance, in Qatar, electric public buses operated by the local transportation brand Karwa are sourced from China’s Yutong. BYD and Hyundai EV showrooms have opened in Doha, with Chinese ICE brands being showcased in malls. Qatar offers some free public electric charging stations, but the number of available charging stations is limited and insufficient to encourage the consumer.³¹

At the core, the main reason for the slow transition to EVs in the GCC lies in the difficulty of motivating consumer purchases, given the region’s affordable oil and gas prices. In this regard, the dilemma for GCC states is in that the policy emphasis on GX with a transition to EVs in the Gulf is not very effective if the countries without significant incentives in the form of consumer subsidies/rebates, or through increases in the price of gasoline.³² Such incentives, at a time of tariff wars elsewhere, may cause GCC markets to become dumping grounds for Chinese EVs.

Saudi Arabia has been most proactive to address industry policy dimensions for DX/GX among the Gulf states. The Kingdom’s sovereign wealth fund—the Public Investment Fund (PIF)—has been striving to construct an indigenous auto industry. PIF began by becoming a major shareholder of Lucid Group (which is struggling in performance).³³ Saudi Arabia had the Lucid Group establish the first-ever EV plant in the country.³⁴ In building the Saudi EV brand CEER, it formed a JV with Apple’s supplier Foxconn, ordering Level 3 ADAS systems powered by Nvidia in 2022.³⁵ PIF then sought to invest in China’s EV company Human Horizons in 2023,³⁶ but the company announced bankruptcy in 2024 as the market consolidation in the Chinese EV market accelerated. Consequently, PIF signed an agreement with Hyundai Motors Group (HMG) of South Korea to establish an EV plant in Saudi Arabia slated to open to produce its IONIQ models in the country, for which PIF will hold controlling interest (70%) and Hyundai the rest (30%).³⁷ This resulted in CEER striking a $2.18 billion agreement with Hyundai Transys (subsidiary of HMG) to supply EV driver systems (EDS: a motor for propulsion, an inverter, and a reduction gear).³⁸

While CEER (Arabic for “drive forward”) has plans to distribute EVs in MENA markets by 2025, strictly speaking, it is not a full-fledged EV company; rather, it is an assembly of Hyundai EV driving systems,³⁹ as well as Foxconn autonomous driving solutions.⁴⁰ Saudi Arabia has also invited Tesla to establish EV factories in the country,⁴¹ hoping to roll out a supercharging network throughout the jurisdiction.⁴² It remains to be seen whether Saudi Arabia’s attempt to develop a local EV brand without indigenous technological development of its own will be sustainable.

The Missing Pieces in the Gulf in EVs and Batteries

The DX/GX drive has sparked an interest in EVs, batteries, and eVTOLs in the Gulf, but a clear path toward EVs in their deployment for GX and for future transportation (e.g., with the operation of metro systems in Dubai, Doha, and Riyadh) remains unclear. Moreover, the discussions on global market conditions, which entail tariff wars between the US, EU, and China — in addition to the market consolidation of EV and battery companies within China — which further propel the pursuit of overseas markets by Chinese auto companies, are absent in the Gulf. In terms of contextualization in trade and energy policymaking, it is striking that the impact of trade wars and industrial policy outside the Gulf — in addition to overproduction and market consolidation within China — go unmentioned when they are the underlying reasons for the growth of demand and manufacturing of EVs and batteries in the Gulf.

While importing, manufacturing, or operating EVs aligns with the Gulf states’ own net-zero agendas, industrialization through EV factories faces challenges. Firstly, the factories may not create additional jobs, as automation rates for logistics and assembly continue to be increased. As a reference, the Hyundai Motors Group Innovation Center in Singapore (HMGICS), which produces Hyundai’s IONIC 5 and IONIC 5 Robotaxi (ADAS level 4) models, has already reached an automation rate of 46% in the entire process of manufacturing,⁴³ which is three times the conveyor belt-based automation rate. The logistics automation rate at HMGICS is even higher at 65%,⁴⁴ backed by 250 robots from Boston Dynamics, which it acquired in 2021,⁴⁵ and will be elevated to 80% in the coming years.⁴⁶ It is unlikely that the EV plants to be built in Saudi Arabia would have a lower automation rate, which means that EV manufacturing is unlikely to lead to significant job creation in the Gulf.

Also missing is a clear roadmap for implementing transportation policies that prioritize EV safety, and future mobility AI strategies that incorporate EVs and UAMs. Furthermore, Gulf states need to set clear goals for the implementation of self-driving and safety standards relating to such strategies. If the Gulf states do choose to adopt self-driving to achieve DX/GX goals and mobility AI, then regulations for battery safety must be prioritized, as cases have proven them to be a major fire hazard (it is worth noting that the UAE and Saudi Arabia have begun their initial steps).⁴⁷ Other potential hazards, including battery disposal and recycling plans, should also be considered.

Additionally, the geopolitical dimensions of connected cars for mobility AI must not be overlooked. Before leaving office, the Biden administration issued an executive order to regulate connected cars from foreign producers, citing concerns over influence and national security threats that foreign-made cars could pose once integrated into the US grid.⁴⁸ The Trump Administration has not repealed this directive. Considering the role that EVs and eVTOLs will play on connected roads and skies within a seamless AI environment (contingent upon realization of level 5 in ADAS), the expansion of EVs in the Gulf should be approached with caution ­— especially in light of the geopolitical dimensions of the global EV market and intensifying competition for mobility AI.

 

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Endnotes

¹ Statista Market Insights, “Electric Vehicles – GCC,” Statista, November 2024, https://www.statista.com/outlook/mmo/electric-vehicles/gcc.

² Agence France-Presse, “In fuel-guzzling Saudi Arabia, electric cars pique interest,” The Business Times, July 24, 2024, https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/companies-markets/transport-logistics/fuel-guzzling-saudi-arabia-electric-cars-pique-interest.

³ “BYD Chalks Up New Record as It Narrows EV Sales Gap With Tesla,” Bloomberg, January 1, 2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-01/byd-chalks-up-new-record-as-it-narrows-ev-sales-gap-with-tesla.

⁴ “Commission Investigation Provisionally Concludes that Electric Vehicle Value Chains in China Benefit from Unfair Subsidies,” The European Commission, June 12, 2024, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3231; The European Commission has found through investigation that the types of subsidies and tax breaks for the EV industry in China include: preferential financing (loans and other types of financing); direct cash grants, Fiscal Subsidy Policy for the Promotion and Application of New Energy Vehicles, government provision of goods and services for less than adequate remuneration (such as land use), provision of batteries for less than adequate remuneration, provision of lithium for the production of batteries for less than adequate remuneration, Enterprise Income Tax (‘EIT’) reduction for High and New Technology Enterprises, preferential pre-tax deduction of research and development expenses, dividend exemption between qualified resident enterprises, technology transfer revenue reduction, and battery consumption tax exemption.

⁵ Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022, H.R.5376 – 117th Congress (2021-2022) of the United States, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/5376/text.

⁶ Considering the Gulf states’ relationship with China, based on fossil fuel sales (China is the number one customer in all Gulf States), it may be assumed that Gulf states may have been prompted to allow Chinese EVs and ICEs market access or to allow for joint ventures for production within their jurisdictions—in the case of Saudi Arabia.

⁷ Evelyn Cheng, “China has Spent at Least $230 Billion to Build its EV Industry, New Study Finds,” CNBC, June 21, 2024, https://www.cnbc.com/2024/06/21/china-spent-230-billion-to-build-its-electric-car-industry-csis-says.html.

⁸ “Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Limited, Bloomberg, accessed March 9, 2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/profile/company/300750:CH#:~:text=Contemporary%20Amperex%20Technology%20Co.%2C%20Limited,also%20provides%20batteries%20recycling%20services

⁹ ; Lei Kang, “Global EV Battery Market Share in Jan-Nov 2024: CATL 36.8%, BYD 17.1%,” Cnevpost, January 5, 2025, https://cnevpost.com/2025/01/06/global-ev-battery-market-share-jan-nov-2024/.

¹⁰ “BYD Company Limited,” Bloomberg, accessed March 10, 2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/profile/company/002594:CH; Shizuka Tanabe, “BYD Challenges CATL’s EV Battery Crown in China,” Nikkei Asia, December 13, 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Electric-cars-in-China/BYD-challenges-CATL-s-EV-battery-crown-in-China.

¹¹ Lei Kang, “Global EV Battery Market Share.”

¹² In line with the NDRC and MOC announcement, restrictions on foreign auto company investment in China were removed, and a maximum limit of 2 JVs was also removed.

¹³ Jie Bai, Panle Jia Barwick, Shengmao Cao, and Shanjun Li, “Quid Pro Quo, Knowledge Spillover, and Industrial Quality Upgrades: Evidence from the Chinese Auto Industry,” Working Paper, National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2022, https://www.doi.org/ 10.3386/w27644.

¹⁴ “Trends in electric vehicle batteries,” International Energy Agency (IEA), 2024, https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2024/trends-in-electric-vehicle-batteries.

¹⁵ Ryan Featherston, “Slamming the Brakes: The EU Votes to Impose Tariffs on Chinese EVs,” Center for Strategic & International Studies (blog), December 16, 2024, https://www.csis.org/blogs/trustee-china-hand/slamming-brakes-eu-votes-impose-tariffs-chinese-evs.

¹⁶ Notice of Modification: China’s Acts, Policies and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property and Innovation, 2024-21217 (89 FR 76581), Trade Representative, Office of United States on 09/18/2024,  Federal Register, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/09/18/2024-21217/notice-of-modification-chinas-acts-policies-and-practices-related-to-technology-transfer.

¹⁷ “China Strongly Opposes U.S. Tariff Hikes, Pledging Measures to Defend Rights,” Reuters, May 14, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-strongly-opposes-us-tariff-hikes-pledging-measures-defend-rights-2024-05-14/.

¹⁸ Philip Blenkinsop, “EU hits Chinese EVs with tariffs, drawing rebuke from Beijing,” Reuters, June 12, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/eu-impose-multi-billion-euro-tariffs-chinese-evs-ft-reports-2024-06-12/.

¹⁹ “China initiates dispute complaint regarding EU definitive duties on electric vehicles,” World Trade Organization, November 6, 2024, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news24_e/ds630rfc_06nov24_e.htm

²⁰ ‘DS626: European Union — Provisional Countervailing Duties on New Battery Electric Vehicles from China,’ The World Trade Organization, August 9, 2024. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds626_e.htm

²¹ Peter Van den Bossche, ‘The Demise of the WTO Appellate Body: Lessons for Governance of International Adjudication?’ WTI Working Paper No. 02/2021, World Trade Institute. https://www.wti.org/media/filer_public/c2/ef/c2efc2de-ce85-45c7-9512-9286e14fca47/wti_working_paper_02_2021.pdf

²² David Lawder and Andrea Shalal, “Trump Delivers Fresh Tariff Threats Against EU and China,” Reuters, January 22, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-says-he-is-discussing-10-tariff-china-feb-1-2025-01-21/.

²³ Stephen Stapczynski, “China to Levy Tax on Some Commodities Imported from U.S.,” Bloomberg, February 3, 2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-02-04/china-to-levy-tax-on-some-commodities-imported-from-us.

²⁴ “Commission responds to unjustified US steel and aluminium tariffs with countermeasures,” Press Release, European Commission, March 12, 2025, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_740.

²⁵ Jarrett Renshaw, Chris Kirkham and Nora Eckert, “Exclusive: Trump’s Transition Team Aims to Kill Biden EV Tax Credit,” Reuters, November 15, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/trumps-transition-team-aims-kill-biden-ev-tax-credit-2024-11-14/

²⁶ Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022

²⁷ Chad P. Bown, “Industrial policy for electric vehicle supply chains and the US-EU fight over the Inflation Reduction Act,” Working Papers 23-1, Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE), May 2023. https://www.piie.com/publications/working-papers/2023/industrial-policy-electric-vehicle-supply-chains-and-us-eu-fight; Chad P. Bown, “How the United States solved South Korea’s problems with electric vehicle subsidies under the Inflation Reduction Act,” Working Papers 23-6, Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE), July 2023. https://www.piie.com/publications/working-papers/2023/how-united-states-solved-south-koreas-problems-electric-vehicle

²⁸ “Credits for new clean vehicles purchased in 2023 or after,” Internal Revenue Service (IRS), accessed March 12, 2025, https://www.irs.gov/credits-deductions/credits-for-new-clean-vehicles-purchased-in-2023-or-after; “Clean vehicle tax credits,” Internal Revenue Service (IRS), accessed March 12, 2025, https://www.irs.gov/clean-vehicle-tax-credits.

²⁹ Statista Market Insights, “Electric Vehicles – United Arab Emirates,” Statista, accessed March 11, 20205, https://www.statista.com/outlook/mmo/electric-vehicles/united-arab-emirates#unit-sales; Salma Saleh, “Volume of electric vehicle sales in the United Arab Emirates from 2017 to 2029 (in 1,000s),” Statista, November 13, 2024, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1423698/uae-number-of-ev-sold/; “UAE Electric Vehicle Market

Size, Share and EV Demand,” citaevcharger.com (blog), November 22, 2024, https://citaevcharger.com/blog/uae-electric-vehicle-market-size/; “eMobility Outlook 2024,” PwC, accessed March 11, 2025,

https://www.pwc.com/m1/en/publications/documents/2024/emobility-outlook-2024-uae-edition.pdf; Santiago Castillo, Arvind CJ and Smriti Priya, “EV Charging Index: Expert insight from the GCC region,” Roland Berger, July 10, 2024, https://www.rolandberger.com/en/Insights/Publications/EV-Charging-Index-Expert-insight-from-the-GCC-region.html.

³⁰ Sarwat Nasir, “Air Taxi Company Set for 2025 Abu Dhabi Launch Aims to be Uber of the Skies,” The National, November 25, 2024, https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/uae/2024/11/25/air-taxi-company-set-for-2025-abu-dhabi-launch-aims-to-be-uber-of-the-skies/.

³¹ Sanaullah Ataullah, “Kahramaa Sets up 200 EV Charging Stations,” The Peninsula, January 14, 2024, https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/14/01/2024/kahramaa-sets-up-200-ev-charging-stations.

³² Pesha Magid, “Riyadh’s Multi-Billion EV Dream Risks Crashing into Reality,” Reuters, January 24, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/riyadhs-multi-billion-ev-dream-risks-crashing-into-reality-2024-01-23/.

³³ “Lucid Motors Closes $1BN+ Investment from the Public Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia,” Lucid Motors, April 3, 2019, https://lucidmotors.com/media-room/lucid-motors-closes-1bn-investment-public-investment-fund-saudi-arabia; “Lucid CEO Says Struggling EV Maker Is Crucial to Saudi Arabia,” Bloomberg, February 27, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-27/lucid-ceo-says-struggling-ev-maker-is-crucial-to-saudi-arabia?utm_source=website&utm_medium=share&utm_campaign=copy.

³⁴ “Lucid Group makes history in Saudi Arabia as it opens country’s first-ever car manufacturing facility,” Public Investment Fund, September 27, 2023, https://www.pif.gov.sa/en/news-and-insights/newswire/2023/lucid-group-makes-history-in-saudi-arabia-as-it-opens-country-first-ever-car-manufacturing-facility/.

³⁵ “HRH Crown Prince Launches Ceer, the First Saudi Electric Vehicle Brand,” Foxconn (Hon Hai Technology Group), November 3, 2022,  https://www.foxconn.com/en-us/press-center/press-releases/latest-news/912.

³⁶ ‘Saudi PIF in Talks to Invest in Chinese EV Maker,’ Bloomberg, November 7, 2023. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-11-07/saudi-pif-said-in-talks-to-invest-in-chinese-hiphi-ev-maker

³⁷ Angel Sergeev, “Hyundai Building New Plant In Saudi Arabia For Combustion, Electric Vehicles,” Motor 1, October 24, 2023, https://www.motor1.com/news/692856/hyundai-new-plant-saudi-arabia/.

³⁸ “Saudi Arabia’s Ceer Signs $2bn Deal with Hyundai Transys to Supply EV Drive Systems,” Arab News, June 11, 2024, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2528476/business-economy; “PIF and Hyundai Motor Company Sign Joint Venture Agreement to Establish New Automotive Manufacturing Plant in Saudi Arabia,” Hyundai, October 23, 2023, https://www.hyundai.com/worldwide/en/newsroom/detail/pif-and-hyundai-motor-company-sign-joint-venture-agreement-to-establish-new-automotive-manufacturing-plant-in-saudi-arabia%2509%2509%2509%2509-0000000334.

³⁹ “Ceer Signs SAR 8.2 billion (USD 2.18 billion) Contract for the Supply of Hyundai Transys’ Advanced Electric Vehicle Drive Systems,” Ceer, June 11, 2024, https://ceermotors.com/ceer-signs-sar-8-2-billion-usd-2-18-billion-contract-for-the-supply-of-hyundai-transys-advanced-electric-vehicle-drive-systems/.

⁴⁰ Monica Chen, Hsinchu and Eifeh Strom, “Ceer Places Orders with Foxconn for Level 3 Autonomous Driving,” Digitimes, January 18, 2023,  https://www.digitimes.com/news/a20230117PD210/ceer-foxconn.html.

⁴¹ Stephen Kalin, Julie Steinberg and Summer Said, “Tesla, Saudi Arabia in Early Talks for EV Factory,” The Wall Street Journal, September 18, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/business/autos/tesla-saudi-arabia-in-early-talks-for-ev-factory-240cd075

⁴² Megha Merani, “Tesla to Enter Saudi Arabia within Months,” Arabian Gulf Business Insight, January 16, 2025, https://www.agbi.com/transport/2025/01/exclusive-tesla-to-enter-saudi-arabia-within-months/.

⁴³ Son Ji-hyoung, “Yoon visits Hyundai Motor’s AI-powered factory in Singapore,” The Korea Herald, October 8, 2024. https://www.koreaherald.com/article/3489834.

⁴⁴ Kan Hyeong-woo, “From the Scene: Hyundai Motor looks into future of auto production in Singapore,” The Korea Herald, November 21, 2023, https://www.koreaherald.com/article/3261937.

⁴⁵ “Hyundai Motor Group Completes Acquisition of Boston Dynamics from Softbank,” Press release, Boston Dynamics, June 21, 2021. https://bostondynamics.com/news/hyundai-motor-group-completes-acquisition-of-boston-dynamics-from-softbank/.

⁴⁶ Hyeong-woo, “From the Scene: Hyundai Motor looks into future of auto production in Singapore.”

⁴⁷ National Electric Vehicles Policy, Telecommunications and Digital Government Regulatory Authority of the United Arab Emirates, August 2, 2023, https://u.ae/en/about-the-uae/strategies-initiatives-and-awards/policies/transport-and-infrastructure/national-electric-vehicles-policy; Technical Regulation for Electric Batteries, Saudi Standards, Metrology and Quality Organization (SASO), approved in the meeting of SASO board of directors No.(166) held on September 13, 2018,

https://saso.gov.sa/en/Laws-And-Regulations/Technical_regulations/Documents/TR-Electric-Batteries.pdf.

⁴⁸ Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain: Connected Vehicles, 2025-00592 (90 FR 5360), Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), US Department of Commerce, Federal Register, January 16, 2025, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/16/2025-00592/securing-the-information-and-communications-technology-and-services-supply-chain-connected-vehicles.